

**CONFLICT FRAMING AND FOREIGN POLICY:
THE CASE OF IRAQ 2000-2004**

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List of Abbreviations

BOP – Balance of Power

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency

DIA – Defense Intelligence Agency

DoD – Department of Defense

FP – Foreign Policy

IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency

IR – International Relations

ME – Middle East

PM – Prime Minister

Res – Resolution/s

UK – United Kingdom

UN – United Nations

UN SC – United Nations Security Council

US – United States

WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation added to the literature of critical theory and conflict framing through relating conflict framing to foreign policy formulation in the case of Iraq from 2001-2004.

By focusing on policy discourse from the Bush administration and the Arab League, this dissertation analyzed and compared the groups' conflict frames toward the issue of Iraq. The research approach combined different textual analysis methods, including normative-framing charts and an ideational-mapping chart. By categorizing repeated themes in the discourse, the dissertation was able to evaluate and summarize the key components of the groups' conflict frames.

The results found that the Arab League conflict frame was overwhelmingly negative towards a possible military attack on Iraq, and key ideas centered on Iraqi suffering, state sovereignty and the need to renew the Arab-Israeli peace process. From the conflict frame of the Bush administration, Saddam's regime was identified as possessing weapons of mass destruction and a cooperative stance towards terrorist organizations. This combination represented a "gathering danger" to the US which required immediate action. These conflict frames were represented by the discourse of the policy-makers through public speeches or publications.

The dissertation discussed how conflict frames represent ideational and societal contexts within which foreign policy-making takes place. Similar to the layers of an "onion," conflict frames become the surrounding layers of the foreign policy-making process. Representing individual levels, an internal group level, societal level and state-ideational levels, these layers of the "onion" are used to interpret new information, give it meaning and incorporate it in the policy process. In doing so, the conflict frame pushes policy discourse in a biased direction that policy-makers themselves may not be fully aware of. Through this discussion, the dissertation strengthened the hypothesis that different conflict frames of the Bush administration and the Arab League influenced divergent policy options towards Iraq.

Introduction

Frames play an important role in intractable conflict. As lenses through which disputants interpret conflicts, divergent frames limit the clarity of communications... and encourage escalation (Shmueli, Elliot and Kaufman, 2006, p. 207).

While much of the scholarship in the field of international relations has focused on systemic models to understand conflict, the role of psychological processes and culture have slowly come to the forefront of academic debate since 2001. Perhaps this is due to the shortcomings of classical realist theory to explain ideologically-based threats, represented by groups such as Al Qaeda. Perhaps it is the elusive “peace dividend” which some predicted would follow the end of the Cold War. Whatever the cause of this shift in study and debate on conflict, the American government’s response to the events of September 11th is an example of the misunderstanding that lies at the center of the debate. While President G.W. Bush framed the American response as a “War on Terror,” many Arab nations were reluctant to follow his militant rhetoric.

Clearer still is the awareness that the US administration and Arab leadership have different approaches to battling threats in the region. Specifically, the way that policy-makers on both sides frame conflict impacts the direction of policy and debate. This in turn affects the application of national power, how and where it is used. Therefore, if a conflict is not framed in a manner which is shared by the involved parties, the policy decisions that are taken may be conflicting, disastrously inappropriate, or exacerbate the problem rather than moving the parties toward resolution. Dialogue and agreement about conflict and conflict sources is essential to peace-making and conflict resolution (Burton, nd; Wallenstein, 1988, 2002).

Statement of Purpose

This dissertation aims to explain the misunderstanding between American and Arab policy-makers through the concept of "conflict framing." The paper will study the impact of conflict framing on policy-making options from the perspective of the US administration as well as governmental leadership in the Arab world. The dissertation attempts to demonstrate the gap in understanding which resulted from the different conflict frames as evidenced in the case of Iraq.

Research Problem

In an era of high speed internet, technological advances, and increasingly sophisticated ways of communicating across cultures, American society prides itself with its ability to understand the world around it with cultural erudition. America has access to the most advanced and progressive form of media technology in the world and host some of the highest centers of learning in higher education. The United States (US) government has cultural attaches and regional affairs officers stationed at foreign embassies, teams of cultural experts in both the state department and at the pentagon, as well as military officers overseas whose careers are built around understanding a particular language and region. And yet US decision-makers seem to be failing profoundly in understanding and communicating with other cultures regarding their foreign policy, especially in the Arab world. The question that this dissertation will examine is why, with the kind of access to information, scholarship and resources that America possesses, did it follow a policy towards Iraq which now seems irrational. Additionally, why were the US and Arab approaches markedly different? This dissertation will examine the role of conflict framing as a contributing factor in producing these policy differences.

Hypothesis

This dissertation hypothesizes that the way the US administration framed the problem of Iraq versus the way that the Arab policy-makers framed the same case influenced divergent policy options from the involved parties.

Literature Review

Competing Explanations of Political Behavior

International relations, as an academic discipline, seeks to understand and explain political behavior of actors in the international system. Since this paper examines the role of ‘framing’ and its place in the literature, it is important to note the broader categories of approaches that scholars have used to understand political behavior. Historically, scholars have used a variety of models or approaches toward this end. This paper categorizes them into three main approaches and three levels-of-analysis, utilizing terminology given by scholars in the field. In this way, the paper will narrow in on the approach and level of analysis that it will use in the subsequent chapters. Broadly, these approaches are the structuralist, cultural and rationalist. As just mentioned, scholars also use levels-of-analysis to understand political behavior, here categorized as: systemic, nation-state, and individual levels-of-analysis. While each of the approaches listed above may be understood uniquely through each of the levels-of-analysis, they tend to be more relevant to one or two of the levels. The following review describes some of the most relevant and common pairings of these with a focus on understanding behavior toward Iraq.

Structuralist Approach and the Systemic Level of Analysis

Structuralist approaches and the systemic level of analysis, as a pairing, incorporate the most dominant number of theories and models for understanding international relations. This combination has traditionally led academic debate and guided the orientation of policy-makers. Within this pairing is balance of power theory, hegemonic-stability theory, as well as dimensions of game theory and liberal economic theory. This combination typically draws on the assumptions of realist theory, that nation-states are unitary actors which rationally pursue their interests in an anarchic international system. Distrust typifies political behavior. Realist scholars Morgenthau, Walt, Waltz and Carr describe the national security or survival of nations as the ultimate national interest

in an anarchic international system. It was precisely this lack of central authority in the international arena that allowed the US-led coalition to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein without UN approval and without any prohibition by an international government. No such government exists in anarchy. Due to this reality, the military instrument of power is a decisive instrument in meeting national interests and ensuring national survival. Struggles for power, as demonstrated in the case of Iraq, also give strength to realist projection of a “zero-sum game” where one group’s gain is another group’s loss in competition over limited resources. This competition between states in a chaotic international system is the basis for hegemonic stability theory.

Owing its roots in part to economic theory, hegemonic stability theory has been promoted by political scientists as well. Koehane and Kindleberger describe a system where a global hegemon or ultra-powerful state creates and enforces norms in the international system, bringing order and stability which promote the trade of goods across the system and perpetuate the dominance of the hegemon (Goldstein, 1996). The global hegemon can also rewrite the rules when it is in their interest to do so. This theory might view the US invasion of Iraq as an attempt by the US to assert itself with certainty as a global hegemon, demonstrating to other nations, such as Syria, Iran and North Korea, the strength of US resolve, the supremacy of US values, and that they should not choose the path of defiance as Iraq did. Some scholars have analyzed the subsequent use of “soft-balancing” against the US by Europe, Turkey and Russia as examples of the international community’s rejection of the US hegemonic bid for power (Pape, 2005). This “soft-balancing” has also been used to explain the international community’s reaction to America’s preponderance of power by through balance of power theory, where nations

work together to prevent any state from dominating the system. This paper highlighted the above combination in order to relate it to the debate on America's behavior toward Iraq. In general, this combination assumes that states are unitary actors which pursue their interests in an anarchic system.

Rationalist Approach and the Systemic Level of Analysis

Still within the systemic level of analysis, game theory falls largely a rationalist approach to understanding political behavior. It is used to study relationships between nations in areas such as arms-control and international cooperation (Kaufman, Collins & Schneider, 1995). Games such as the *Stag Hunt*, *Chicken Dilemma* or the *Prisoner's Dilemma* can be used to test hypotheses about political behavior (Doyle, 1997). However, conflict and cooperation depend on the rationality and strategy of the players in the competition or "game"—not on international order. This demonstrates how an anarchic environment can lead to conflict between states or can create cases of cooperation.

Structuralist Approach and Nation-State Level of Analysis

The nation-state level of analysis looks at the internal dynamics of states, such as bureaucratic decision-making models, domestic interests or national ideologies (Levy, 1996). Combined with the structuralist approach, explanations for the political behavior of states depend on these internal structures rather than the structure of the international system. Perhaps most famously, Marxist-Leninist theory views the expansionist and imperialist foreign policies of industrialized nations as the result of domestic economic failure and the need to seek foreign markets. It might argue that America's "oil lust" in the Middle East is an example and was a reason for invading Iraq. This theory argues that

internal economic pressure is driven by the unequal distribution of wealth within states from failing economic systems. Other similar versions of this explanation point to a coalition of elites or groups such as arms-sales companies that promote and lobby for certain foreign policies in order to advance their economic gains or status.

This combination is also relevant to the study of institutionalized processes such as bureaucratic decision-making. The bureaucratic model argues that where bureaucracies are at the center of decision-making, such as in democracies, domestic goals are the ultimate determinant of foreign policy decisions (Halperin and Kanter, 1973). While the president may remain the central decision-maker in foreign policy decisions, he relies on a national security bureaucracy consisting of political appointees, ministers and congressmen. As organizational heads, ministers are generally guided by their organization's interests, and to what extent a foreign policy issue will impact that organization's success or influence. A US congressman on the Armed Services Committee, however, may be guided by the interests of his voting constituents. If he is supported by a particular arms industry, he may support policies of foreign military intervention, aid or arms sales in order to boost his domestic base and help him get reelected. Career bureaucrats may have personal interests in their own job security or in future promotion and prestige, thus influencing their foreign policy role. Other institutions such as the military may have incentives to promote strategic myths to increase its relative significance and budget (Levy, 1996). All of the participants reflect domestically driven pushes and pulls on the foreign policy due structure of the decision-making process.

The institutional nature of democracy itself and its impact on political behavior has spawned a separate field known as democratic peace theory. Scholars have theorized that democracies do not make war on each other. This “democratic peace” is explained through one of two models. One approach points to the political culture of democracies that has developed norms for peaceful conflict resolution. The other approach sees the internal checks and balances, public debate of issues, dispersion of power in democracies, and expectation of reciprocity as factors which limit the chances of war between democracies (Owen, 1994). Conversely, autocratic regimes have less restraint on the use of force. Advocates of democratic peace theory might argue that Saddam Hussein’s behavior toward the US from 1992-2002 is the predictable behavior of a non-democratic regime taking advantage of the conciliatory nature of a democratic one (the US) through Iraq’s quazi-compliance with the UN weapons inspections. Essentially, approaches like democratic peace theory argue that the type of regime is the strongest predictor of political behavior.

Culturalist Approach and the Nation-State Level of Analysis

Ethno-nationalism has also been used to describe the political behavior of nations. Historically, leaders have appealed to national pride or ethnicity to mobilize support in the face of economic or security concerns (Levy, 1996). Ethnic groupings and geography may help determine state behavior. At times, states may support ethnic minorities in other countries for ideological or political reasons, potentially weakening the institutions and stability of a neighboring state. Through this lens, neighbors of Iraq may have filtered their own policy options through ethnic or demographic features. Turkey’s security, for example, was threatened by the same Kurdish minority that threatened stability in Iraq. Therefore, Turkey had an interest for Saddam to maintain tight control over Iraq’s

Kurdish population, therefore contributing to policies which opposed the US war.

Leaders also may appeal to symbols of nationalism or use nationalist myths to win support for certain policies. From the American perspective, feelings of nationalism that had been stirred by the events of September 11th arguable gave President Bush an effective platform to portray Saddam Hussein as a similar threat to American security. Despite the lack of real connections or tangible evidence between terrorist networks, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and Saddam Hussein, he was significantly “demonized” by the administration to garner enough support to launch the preventive war on Iraq. According to Levy, “once established, enemy images are highly resistant to change, which further undercuts the possibilities of compromise with external adversaries” (Levy, 1996, p. 13). The negative image of Saddam Hussein arguably still shapes the way many American’s view their country’s role in Iraq, a role of “helping Iraq come out from under a suppressive history of dictatorship.” Ironically, this enemy imaging stands in contrast to Saddam’s role as an American ally in the 1980’s against Iran. It was during this time Saddam committed his greatest “sins” of chemical gassing the Kurdish north, which he became so famous for by the Bush administration. Yet at the time of the worst attack in 1988, the issue was down-played by the American administration. Both the example of Turkey’s behavior toward the US-Iraq war as well as the American nationalism and enemy imaging of Saddam Hussein are examples of how political behavior can be explained through a culturalist approach and the nation-state level of analysis.

Rationalist Approach and the Individual Level of Analysis

The final two pairings that this review explores describe the role of individuals as the most important indicator to understand political behavior. Studies that have focused

on individuals within the decision-making process attempt to demonstrate the impact of their belief systems, culture, religion and psychological processes. These approaches argue that people tend to respond differently to similar crises depending on their own personal history and world view. People are unique in their capacities to analyze complex sets of information and reach coherent decisions.

Jervis argues that misperception is a key contributor to foreign policy options and is responsible for historic foreign policy fiascos like the Bay of Pigs and the Iran-Contra affair (Jervis, 1968; 1989). He and others point to deficiencies in perception and cognitive processes that limit the rationality of decision-makers. Perception-based approaches focus on the element of imperfect information and its role in conflict development. They argue that if adversary's had more accurately assessed their opponent's capabilities and intentions, conflict could have been avoided through an appropriate settlement. Alberts, Heisterkamp and McPhee demonstrated that effectiveness in mediation is also related to the role of perceptions (Alberts, Heisterkamp, and McPhee, 2005; Wallenstein, 1988).

Participants in any mediation effort adhere to a representation of reality which may be inaccurate or based on misunderstood cues from the opposing side, negatively impacting mediation efforts and policy-oriented decisions of the participants. This is arguably even more applicable to conflict development in the absence of a mediator, where lack of information permeates the decision-making environment. The Bush administration has now stated that it misperceived the threat of Saddam Hussein and the capability of his weapons programs prior to 2003, during the period of heated diplomatic confrontation and misinformation. While Bush's critics reject this statement, claiming instead that he willfully misled the American public, it is an example of the importance imperfect information and its relationship to perception in the international arena.

Culturalist Approach and the Individual Level of Analysis

Individual perceptive abilities, as described above, are only one aspect of decision-making by individuals. Cultural factors, such as prior beliefs, education, life-experiences and world view all shape the way in which individual cognitive processes make sense of the information that is heard, seen or read. An ideological backdrop may further serve to inhibit accurate perception by decision-makers. It is notable that several of the “insiders” of G.W. Bush’s first term had significant roles in the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq: Colin Powel, Paul Wolfowitz, and Dick Cheney. Several other political appointees were associated with neo-conservative think-tanks that had been advocating regime change in Iraq for years prior to the 2003 invasion. Their previous experience in war with Iraq and the ideological unity of many of the President’s close advisors almost certainly impacted the direction of US foreign policy toward Iraq prior to 2003.

While individual-level approaches and theories have struggled to produce a coherent framework that can be applied across cases, it has become an increasingly important category and area of study. “There has been more and more evidence from social psychology to demonstrate that people are limited in their cognitive abilities to process information, that their perceptions of their environment are shaped by their prior beliefs as much as by the objective evidence” (Levy, 1996, p. 16).

Thus far, this section has described with broad-strokes how political scientists have used different theories and models to understand international political behavior. The paper will now focus on the last two pairings, as described above, and demonstrate that they are the most relevant when it comes to understanding US political behavior toward Iraq. Thus, the paper will utilize a blend of culturalist and rationalist approaches, while primarily employing the individual level of analysis. In doing so, the paper attempts

to explain US policy toward Iraq in contrast to that of Iraq's neighbors through the concept of conflict framing.

Defining Conflict Framing

Though most of the scholarly research regarding individual-level approaches to conflict, including the role of perception, was completed in the 60's and 70's, some scholars continued to build upon the existing research. They argue that the individual level-of-analysis still has areas to be explored that could offer insights in understanding past, present and future conflict. One of these areas of study and exploration has led to the development of a psychological approach to conflict, mostly focused on the decision-makers and negotiators, known as "framing" or "conflict framing" (Rothman, 1997). As the word suggests, a frame in this sense is a psychological frame, or mental borders, put around a certain conflict that helps an individual understand and give meaning to the information inside of it and act on it. The way that individuals interpret and frame events is based on the factors discussed previously: past experiences, closely held values, worldview, and whether they see the event or new information as a threat of potential benefit (University of Colorado, nd). Scholars Putnam and Holmer described framing as being is tied to information processing, message patterns, linguistic cues and socially constructed meanings (1992). All of these factors come together to form a mental frame which serves as a basis for decision and leads to action. Minsky (1975), Tannen (1979) and Gray (1997) define framing as "cognitive structures held in memory and used to guide interpretation of new experience" where "parties rely on these mental structures to interpret or make sense of ongoing events" (Gray, 1997, p. 171). This definition includes the aspect of cognitive processes working together, but does not include what Shmueli, Elliott and Kaufman (2006) have described as an assertive, communicated frame used by the individuals to justify or support internal positions. For this purposes of this study, the

author will combine these two elements in a unified definition of conflict framing as the cumulative result of cognitive processes used to interpret and assimilate new events and communicate those meanings with others.

Distinguishing Framing from Perception

A question immediately arises from scholars familiar with individual levels-of-analysis asking, what is the difference between perception and framing, or is it just a different term for something that has been studied extensively? As already demonstrated, perception has been a variable repeatedly identified in existing literature, as a key function of decision-making in conflict (Levy, 1996). Levy described how people use heuristics, or cognitive shortcuts, instead of rational decision making rules which can produce some critical discrepancies between perceptions and objective reality (Levy, 1996). Wallensteen has discussed the concept of mirror-imaging, where conflicting sides “mirror” their own view of the conflict onto their opponent and make calculations based on their own view of the conflict and expect the opponent to react in a certain way (2002). Clearly, when “mirrored” inappropriately, this can lead to disastrous policy decisions and surprise outcomes for the decision-makers. Perhaps this is nowhere more clear than in the Iraqi case, where the outcome has been anything but what the U.S. administration had expected in its calculations, perhaps due in part to “mirror-imaging.”

However, in distinguishing perceptions from the concept of conflict framing, the researcher notes that conflict framing goes beyond cognition or the simple mental interpretation of events. It has an assertive dimension where policy-makers use a certain frame of conflict strategically, to justify self-interest, build coalitions or promote certain outcomes (Kaufman and Smith, 1999). Though deeply connected to perception of events and cognitive processes informed by worldview, life-events, and other shaping influences, conflict framing extends to the conscious and assertive promotion of that

understanding towards all parties involved in the conflict. This characteristic of conflict framing is noted as particularly important as related to intractable conflict, where parties seeking to understand the nature of the conflict must comprehend the frame that each one uses in approaching the conflict (Noel, Shoemaker, and Hale, 2006). There is little doubt that decision-makers actively use frames as they approach policy decisions and communicate with their constituents.

Decision-Makers and Framing

“Immediately following the traumatic attacks of 11 September 2001, US President George Bush made a decisive rhetorical choice, framing the assaults as acts of war and the US response as a protracted campaign in a global ‘war on terror’” (Burgess, 2003). The choice to frame the conflict in such terms perhaps still hasn’t been fully realized on a massive scale the extent to which this term has changed previous paradigms of war. This “War on Terror” has no sovereign national enemy or foreign forces to oppose and therefore raises challenging questions of legitimacy in fighting its battles within other countries borders. This is an example of how framing as an independent variable has been used to impact the direction of foreign policy. Yet President Bush wasn’t the first US President to frame a war of conflict in terms hoped to stir up national support, nor was he the first Bush to do so either. In 1990, George Bush the father, with other Western powers defined the first Gulf War as “just war with a new world order as its goal” as they built an Arab coalition against Saddam Hussein (Kuusisto, 1998, p. 1). More recently, the latest American public diplomacy initiatives have sought to frame the conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan as a war for global values and freedom against extremism (Zeller, 2006).

Decision-makers use conflict framing, not only as a way to make sense of world and process complex sets of information, but as a way to actively promote their particular approach to the conflict. It is likely that all leaders do it, and it isn’t necessarily done with

malevolent intent. However, it should be noted that their use of language is not without effect. “Definitions and language play a variety of roles within a culture...it must be recognized that definitions do not simply provide a way of discussing phenomena, but help produce phenomena” (Vasquez, 1996, p. 17). As definitions are developed historically and then socially institutionalized, such as the term “terrorism”, they give a degree of legitimacy to the definition and to the phenomenon itself as something unique. Since most of these institutionalized definitions result from a culture’s historical view of the phenomenon, they are not reached through a scientific pursuit of truth. As such, Vasquez argues that they not only may hamper objective analysis but “frame” the phenomenon in a particular way, pushing inquiry and dialog in a direction that researchers and the public are not fully aware of themselves (Vasquez, 1996). In as much as framing is used by decision-makers in communicating with the public, the decision-makers are directly promoting a particular understanding of events and “frame” the events accordingly.

Framing and Conflict Escalation

Finally, it is important to clarify the relevance of the discussion of conflict framing by briefly examining how it contributes to conflict escalation. “The deep culture or cosmology of a civilization obviously conditions not only the perception of the conflict life-cycles, but also the actual behavior in conflict” (Galtung, 1996, p. 81). Galtung’s reference to the deep culture of a civilization refers to the societal subconscious that helps shape cultural attitudes and behaviors toward conflict, and the author of this paper would add “conflict frames.” Research by Noel, Shoemaker and Hall also confirmed the influence of societal-level values on approaches to conflict in an Indonesian study (2006). It serves as a reminder to why certain ideas about the nature of conflict are so readily accepted in some cultures while so quickly rejected in others. It lends explanation to the

American public's quick acceptance of the Bush Administration's terms in the "war on terror" and the Middle East's rejection of the same terms. As these positions and frames are clarified, there is a polarization that takes place on the nature of the conflict itself.

This polarization and subsequent escalation may take different forms, depending on the conflict stage or framing type. Characterization frames are labels of simplification applied toward individuals or groups about their positive and negative traits (Shmueli, Elliott and Kaufman, 2006). These labels may inadvertently undermine the legitimacy of the other party and escalate the conflict by casting doubt on their ability or motivations toward reaching a resolution. These characterization-frames tend to strengthen and help justify one's own identity and position while diminishing the value of the other (Shmueli, Elliott and Kaufman). This use of framing is demonstrated in the Sunni-Shia conflict in Iraq as mutual doubts are cast on the opponent's desire and ability to work toward lasting peace. Sunnis have accused the Iraqi government of rejecting their participation in Iraq's future, and the Shia-dominated government has accused the Sunni block of opting for extremism and seeking to restore its rule through insurgency. Frames that focus on struggles for power, or imbalances in relative power, influence the way actors view their best options for success as well as what actions are legitimate (Shmuelim, Elliott and Kaufman). Framing in this sense can escalate conflict by justifying a group's actions by viewing the tactic employed as commensurate with the struggle for power. In the case of the American war in Iraq, the tactic of occupation and nation-building were framed as commensurate with the struggle for power with rogue regimes that threatened key American interests in the region. Likewise, suicide bombing attacks and targeting Iraqi civilians are seen as legitimate by the opposition because of the imbalance of power and

the use of these tactics against an occupying force. The result of these types of framing ultimately widens the gap in understanding between opposing sides and becomes an obstacle to peaceful conflict resolution.

Iraq as a Policy Case Study

It would be desirable to understand the role of conflict framing by the US administration toward several regional conflicts, notably Lebanon, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iraq, as well as the simmering relations with Iran and Syria. However, this dissertation will focus on one conflict in specific, thereby demonstrating with greater detail the role that framing played in relation to foreign policy options, and ultimately how it affects political behavior. While any of the aforementioned issues is worthy of study, Iraq is peculiar in the way that the US chose a unique policy path. A plausible explanation for this is that the role of individual misperceptions and irrationality played a greater part deciding the foreign policy direction, in spite of grave risks and unprecedented international opposition. The case of Iraq also enables this dissertation to study a significant and specific period of time which received a high degree of published attention from Iraq's regional neighbors. This will allow the researcher to more accurately study and analyze the discourse of the different leadership groups in the Arab world.

Significance of this Study

In conducting the literature review, it was clear that no other study currently exists which examines the case of Iraq from a similar comparative approach. Other studies have examined the role of neo-conservatives, their values-based outlook, and their effect on US policy, but not in comparison with Arab states' decision-making and discourse. Not only does this study examine both the background of Arab states' policies and that of the U.S., but it also develops the rather nascent and emerging concept of conflict framing through the instructive and ongoing case of Iraq.

Methodology

This paper uses a discourse analysis approach to describe and understand the power of the linguistics and discourse in "framing" a policy issue. By analyzing the language and political discourse of foreign policy-making groups within the US and the Arab world, the dissertation aims to demonstrate how the discourse leading up to the invasion of Iraq led to contrasting policy options from the American and Arab sides. This discourse is represented by articles, papers, conferences and speeches, all of which have a linguistic setting and background that helped give meaning to, and shape, the policy formulation environment.

The research will utilize publications, meetings and speeches of the US President and his immediate advisors from his first administration. It will draw on Arab League proceedings, as published in official news outlets, in reports to the UN and public websites, in order to analysis the discourse from the Arab side. The time-frame utilized will be from 2001-2004, in order to describe the discourse as published by a specific group of leaders from the US side. This time period was also selected because the paper is interested in the framing that led up to the invasion of Iraq and its immediate aftermath.

Structure of the Paper

Chapter 1: The first chapter of the paper will be the theoretical framework for the

remaining chapters, explaining the theories that guide the research analysis and point to the relevance of discourse analysis as the most appropriate methodology for this study. In accomplishing this, chapter one will also incorporate critical concepts from the literature review and discuss their relevance in the theoretical framework.

Chapter 2: The second chapter will build on chapter one by explaining in greater detail how the research project will use text analysis as a methodology in order to strengthen its central hypothesis.

Chapter 3: The third chapter will conduct a text analysis of several Arab decision-making groups, utilizing the League of Arab States Summits and meetings of ministers. As a part of the discourse analysis, the chapter will discuss the important historical context of Arab political thought and development.

Chapter 4: The fourth chapter will conduct a text analysis of the first G.W. Bush administration. This analysis will include the discourse of political appointees, discuss the neo-conservative movement in general and examine its relative importance in directing policy inside the administration.

Chapter 5: The fifth chapter will analyze the results of the previous two chapters, through the application of the theory and methodology as laid out in chapters 1 and 2 and summarize the conflict frames of the two sides.

Chapter 6: The sixth chapter will discuss the text analysis and proceed to build a theoretical bridge to its relationship with foreign policy formulation. It will also discuss the implications of the hypothesis.

Chapter 7: The seventh chapter will conclude the research project, summarizing what the paper sought to accomplish, how it carried that out and ultimately how it strengthened the hypothesis or not. It will also make suggestions to expand and strengthen the research in future study.

Variables

Independent: Conflict Frame (based on the discourse of the sides)

Dependent: Policy Options (of the respective sides)

Definition of Concepts

Conflict Framing: The cumulative result of cognitive processes used to interpret and assimilate new events and communicate those meanings with others.

Conflict: “A social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources” (Wallensteen, 2002, p. 16).

Foreign Policy Options: As the dependent variable, this concept refers to foreign policy options, and includes any possible political, economic or military behavior from any state toward another or toward another group of states in order to achieve a set of political ends.

Limitations

This paper is limited to a discussion of the discourse which has been published or released to the public by the decision-making groups in the US and the Arab world. Some documents may grant further insight into the decision-making body’s conflict frame, offering a behind-the-scenes look at their thought processes, but these cannot be considered if not made public.

CHAPTER 1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

While the previous section described in detail the concept of conflict framing and its relevance to understanding political behavior, this chapter will explain the theoretical backdrop for its employment in this research project. Thus far, the paper has dealt primarily with approaches and levels-of-analysis. Now it turns to political theory in a more in depth manner.

The Third Great Debate: The Critique of Social Theory

During the 1980s a new debate began to take place among IR theorists which was termed the "Third Great Debate" (Lapid, 1989, p. 235). This debate witnessed the rise of what became known as "post-positivist" thinking against the more classical theoretical approaches to IR such as realism, neo-realism, liberalism, and idealism which are regarded as "positivist" (Smith, Booth and Zalewski, 1996). Post-positivist theorizing criticized these classical theories' attempt to replicate the natural sciences in aggregate based knowledge, rejecting the idea that knowledge in social science could be separated from its complicated social context or tested like one would test in chemistry (Alker, 1966; Lapid, 1989). Where positivist theories typically focused on power, interests, military capabilities and economy as variables to be studied and tested like chemical compounds, post-positivist theorists focused on the social construction of ideas and relationships and how that construction impacts political behavior.

One significant theorist in this regard is Alexander Wendt who argued that all human association, to include political behavior, is based more on socially constructed ideas than on actual material forces (Wendt, 1999). Wendt articulated the epistemological and ontological basis of various classical theories in IR, which approach IR from a material perspective since they "see" things like state capabilities, institutions and structure as being the basis for explaining political behavior (1999). Social theory, on the

other hand, examines the very assumptions which positivist assumptions are based, asking "what is actually there" (Wendt, 1999). For example, do states actually exist materially or are they a socially constructed idea? This critique embodied what became known as critical theory, or the Frankfurt School, and was applied to the international level by scholars such as Habermas, Cox, and Linklater (Devetak, 1996). Where positive political theorists seek to understand why states behave in a certain way, social theorists ask "what is a state" and subsequently "what is the best way to study it?" Described by Ruggie as "almost Newtonian in character," the ascendancy of this epistemological and ontological critique from social theory profoundly impacted the direction of IR theoretical debate (Ruggie, 1998, p.855). The rise of critical social theory was especially pronounced after the end of the Cold War when the universalism of concepts like 'balance of power' seemed insufficient. While this type of theorizing was not IR theory, per say, it served as the basis for new post-positivist theorizing.

Social Constructivism

One of the most widely accepted post-positivist IR theories that developed was "constructivism" as described by Wendt and Nicholas Onuf (Wendt, 1992; Groom, 1991; Onuf, 1989). Constructivism essentially applies critical social theory to the level of international relations, by focusing on the cognitive process which lead to identity and interest formation and thus inform political interaction. Wendt went so far as to question the very nature of anarchy by demonstrating the 'social construction' of the international system as understood and acted upon by states, which promoted the concept of anarchy itself (Wendt, 1992). The degree to which the pursuit of a "science" of sociology was still possible separated the growing schools within the theory. Scholars such as Ernst, Haas, Onuf, Katzenstein, Searle, and Emanuel Adler generally followed a more pragmatic approach to constructivism by attempting to employ a set of analytical tools like speech

act theory, the theory of communicative action, or evolutionary epistemology, in order to make sense of relative meaning (Ruggie, 1998). Others like F. Nietzsche, Derian, Ashley and Campbell adopted a more postmodern approach, based on earlier thinkers like Michel Foucault, and essentially rejected the imposition of any scientific discipline or "regime of truth" that promoted a particular representation of reality; still others like Bhaskar, Wendt and Dessler forged a middle ground which attempted to observe an independent narrative, or reality, that actually exists independent of any particular side or perspectives of a conflict or issue (Ruggie, 1998, p. 881; Devetak, 1996).

Tracing constructivism's roots to Durkheim and Webber, Ruggie notes that all "constructivists contend that not only are identities and interests of actors socially constructed, but also that they must share the stage with a whole host of other ideational factors that emanate from the human capacity and will" (Ruggie, 1998, p. 856). One of these ideational factors is the role of linguistics in formulating behavior. "Language yields social performances through 'speech acts.' These are utterances which do something in themselves, as opposed to merely representing a state of affairs. They elicit a response from hearers" (Onuf and Klink, 1989, p. 158). One of the defining ideas of constructivism is that of "collective intentionality," as developed by Searle, where the shared meaning of words and concepts, like state sovereignty, becomes a socially constructed fact over time and gives states and even individuals certain "rights" (Ruggie, 1998, p. 870). To this extent, the language used to give meaning and promote a transnational shared meaning, can eventually direct or govern the way states relate to each other. This extraordinary effect of language on international relations led some political scientists into new academic terrain, taking up the research of other scholars in the field of linguistics and sociology.

Linguistics and the Development of Discourse Analysis

Erving Goffman, one of the most widely read and often cited sociologists in modern history, dedicated much of his life's work to the role of metaphors in language, developing the idea that meaning transmission is inherently complicated by word or phrase selection (Scheff, 2005). Goffman makes a particularly lucid statement on the subject in one of his last articles,

[In all social interaction] we find ourselves with one central obligation: to render our behavior understandably relevant to what the other can come to perceive is going on. Whatever else, our activity must be addressed to the other's mind, that is, to the other's capacity to read our words and actions for evidence of our feelings, thoughts, and intent (Goffman, 1983, p. 53).

Yet, Goffman's call for communicating to the perceptions of the other is the very thing that policy-makers find increasingly challenging in an international environment, especially as they strive to promote a particular meaning of a term such as "terrorism," "tyrants" or "disarmament." The linguistic effect on policy formation, and subsequently transmission, is significantly impacted by this struggle as well as its cultural context.

Grimshaw highlights "that differences in certain assumptions about optimal (or even appropriate) outcomes of negotiations across languages/cultures may be so great that unless those assumptions are somehow fore grounded, the outcomes are unlikely to be more than superficially successful" (Grimshaw, 1992, p. 98). In discussing political discourse, sociologist Thomas Kuhn argued that policy arguments are inherently theory-laden, or based on a set of facts according to a distinctive world view, inherent in cultures, about what is important and what causes what (Kuhn, 1962).

Like Kuhn, Alker was a post-positivist who also recognized the role of cultural context and world view on political dialogue, highlighting how ethnocentrism and societal values impact the peoples' understanding and motivations to contribute to the greater good of society (Alker, 1992). Alker embodied in his own scholarship the transition from positivism to post-positivism, describing his mission as "adapting the logically-informed analytical-empirical philosophies of research to humanistic, dialectic-hermeneutic purposes" (Alker, 1996, p. 7). Alker's research contributions as a constructivist are centered on humanistic studies and linguistics, clarifying and analyzing text and speech discourse as contextually dependent. It interesting to note that even before the ascendancy of constructivist theorizing, a research program known as "hermeneutics" asked many of the same questions about lingual-social relationships and also attempted to deconstruct the basis of traditional theorizing.

Developed by Dilthey, Husserl, Weber, Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Gadamer, the hermeneutics research program's central thrust was to demonstrate that analysis of the natural sciences was a fundamentally different undertaking than the analysis of the mind (Smith, Booth & Zalewski, 1996). The field sought to understand and explain speech texts and actor's behavior through asking ontological questions of being such as, "what does it mean for us to interpret and understand the world" (Smith, Booth & Zalewski, 1996, p. 26). Constructivist scholars Onuf and Klink developed some of Weber's ideas further by arguing that ideational "rules" are advanced by super-ordinate actors that monopolize the "shared meaning" of ideas while subordinated actors passively accept them (Onuf and Klink, 1989, p. 159).

For scholars today, attempting to understand foreign policy by navigating through a field of ontological, linguistic and related cultural factors is enormously complicated. What has helped them, however, is the field of research used by Alker and others known as discourse analysis. Arguably as much philosophical as it is a research methodology, discourse analysis is generally derived from post-positivist thinking that called for greater attention to dialectic and contextual factors (Alker and Biersteker, 1984).

Discourse Analysis and Policy

Alexander Wendt summed up the theoretical background of this paper and the value of discourse analysis when he stated, "the daily life of international politics is an on-going process of states taking identities in relation to others, casting them into corresponding counter-identities, and playing out the result...Managing this process is the basic practical problem of foreign policy" (Wendt, 1999, p. 21). This section will now build a bridge between the theory and the practice of discourse analysis, moving toward an understanding of conflict frames and foreign policy.

But first, it is important to note that there is not one methodological procedure for discourse analysis. Hayward Alker, through his writings on Thucydides, Aristotle, Bartolome de las Casas, Machiavelli and others, employed different types of linguistic schemes and tools for discourse analysis (Alker, 1988; Onuf, 1997). Discourse analysis, then, is a somewhat flexible term in that it is used by social scientists in different sub-fields and incorporates various methods of speech and text analysis. The next few paragraphs will discuss a few of these practices that are relevant to this research project.

Goldstein and Keohane, in a neo-liberal attempt to understand ideational factors on foreign policy, describe the "map"ing of world views in a way that is consistent and even clarifying for constructivism (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993, p. 13; Ruggie, 1998).

They develop a framework for understanding foreign policy formation were "focal points" or ideas help leaders chose from a set of viable outcomes (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). They further divide these ideas into three types:

- 1) World views, which are "entwined with peoples conceptions of their identities, evoking deep emotions and loyalties";
- 2) Principled beliefs, which "specify criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust"; And
- 3) Casual beliefs, derived from the shared consensus of recognized authorities, govern conceptualization of cause-effect relations (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993, p. 8-10).

This neo-liberal approach does not lessen the constructivist underpinning of much of discourse analysis, but rather, it offers a more traditional framework for a discursive analysis of policy talk and texts. This in turn helps to illuminate the possible relation of ideas and conflict frames to leaders' foreign policy formation.

One school of discourse analysis, constructivist empirical studies, is related to Goldstein and Keohane's approach and documents the impact of principled beliefs on patterns of international outcomes such as humanitarian interventions, human rights and weapons prohibitions (Ruggie, 1998). Other constructivist explorations focus on the role of causal beliefs, or how shared beliefs of a given community of experts impact an approach to a particular policy problem. Even further beyond Goldstein and Keohane's framework is the constructivist concept of second-order learning—or "evolutionary epistemology"—that takes place as leaders not only redefine how they understand a particular policy problem, but redefine their very approach to problem-solving

(Ruggie, 1998, p. 881). Ruggie's explanations here are very helpful in view of the policy scope of this research project.

Onuf and Searle's explanation of different types of speech-acts is also helpful to conducting a discourse analysis of the US and Arab policy makers. The three elementary types of speech-acts are assertive, directive and commissive (Onuf and Klink, 1989). Onuf argues that "all social rules stem from these three categories of speech acts" which make them critical for understanding policy discourse (Onuf and Klink, 1989, p. 158). Rules that "assert" a particular truth about a state of affairs are instruction-rules. Rules that "direct" others to take action in order to secure a state of affairs are called directive-rules. And rules that hold other people to their commitments, which become others' rights to a promised state of affairs, are called commitment-rules (Onuf and Klink, 1989). Understanding these speech-acts and their inherent rule-type will help to illuminate how senders and receivers in the various decision-making groups understood the dialectic context surrounding the policy problem of Iraq from 2000-2004.

A second descriptive list, as presented by Grimshaw, outlines several important elements that comprise conflict talk (to include written communication) as follows:

- (1) the ends (goals or purposes);
- (2) content (i.e. control over "things" or people or dispute over facts or ideologies);
- (3) likelihood and frequency of occurrence;
- (4) participant orientations (i.e. [a] acting for "self" or as representative of others; [b] perception of importance of "stakes"; [c] affectual/ emotional orientation, i.e. angry or "cool");

- (5) developmental course (e.g., cyclical, accelerating, truncated, episodic); and
- (6) constraints on this talk as it occurs in ordinary, everyday disputes (Grimshaw, 1992, p. 96).

When examining the discourse of the decision making groups, this study will examine the different components as described above.

Finally, Grimshaw outlines three instances where communicative nonsuccess (CNS) occurs:

- (1) those in which native speakers of the same dialect of the same language communicate but where, because of inadequacy of care or intention (of speaker, hearer, or both), communication fails;
- (2) those in which conversational participants are using the "same" language, but where actually there are different "rules" governing the "meaning" of such fine distinctions as intonation, stress, silence, or even eye contact; and
- (3) those in which the participants engaged in communicative attempts share neither language nor culture, and in which they must to some extent rely on translators or interpreters. "When the stakes are high, as they ordinarily are in international negotiations, such situations can become sensitive, complex, difficult, and dangerous" (Grimshaw, 1992, p. 94).

While all three are examples of communication non-success due to sociological barriers, this dissertation will focus on 2 and 3 when comparing the conflict frames between groups in a chapter 4.

Taking all of these descriptions together, one of the guiding principles of this discourse analysis is Alker's suggestion that this type of research analysis should be grounded in a cooperative, un-coerced, truth-seeking orientation and used skillfully to ask

the right questions (Alker, 1988). This will help bring to light the key determinants and consequences of "socio-political identities, actions, relations, and contexts," which ultimately are reflected by the foreign policies of the Arabs and the Americans (Alker, 2006; Alker, 1988, p. 818).

In conclusion, social theory and constructivism have significantly impacted the nature of IR study and strengthened existing linguistic approaches to social science that were by nature oriented around epistemology. One such approach is the methodology employed by this dissertation, that of discourse analysis. By examining policy speech acts through a normative and descriptive nature, this study will recreate conflict frames used by the various policy-making. The next chapter will explain this methodology in an in-depth manner.

CHAPTER 2 METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

In the previous chapter, the project described how critical theory, social theory, and the development of constructivism all led to a rethinking by IR theorists on the role of epistemology and ontology in the study of IR. Moreover, this led scholars into new fields of research, such as hermeneutics, linguistics and cultural studies. These theories fundamentally changed the way IR theory was applied methodologically because their most basic premise was that IR theory itself could not be separated from the societal context that derived it (Devetak, 1996). This means that traditional methodologies are based on an assumption that they can operate independent of the object of study and explain cause and effect relationships. However, critical theory questions this very assumption, arguing that traditional theories themselves are a product, or at least influenced by, their social, historical and political context.

Thus, critical and post-modern theories put forward alternative methodologies, methodologies that are more holistic and seek to understand political processes through the lens of social and ideational contexts. Discourse analysis is one of these preferred methods, which illuminates the social context by studying language and speech-acts. In particular, it is concerned with the role of linguistics in revealing and promoting beliefs about reality and how the use of that language promotes certain behavior. In this way, it seeks to understand, but not necessarily to predict political behavior.

Ideational Context Verses Cause and Effect

For the purpose of clarity, this section will restate the purpose of this paper and then connect it to the paper's methodology. What this research project attempts to do is to demonstrate how the divergence in understanding, or difference in conflict frames, regarding the issue of Iraq, represented the ideational context which influenced the formation of different foreign policy options by the involved parties. The theoretical

framework already described how discourse analysis is the most appropriate way to understand these divergent conflict frames, and it also discussed how language impacts behavior.

From a methodological perspective, discourse analysis is helpful in understanding the US and Arab conflict frames, but does not explain a cause-and-effect relationship between those frames and foreign policy. Instead, because it is based on post-positivist IR theory, discourse analysis is a descriptive study method. In other words, rather than explaining a cause and effect relationship in this project, discourse analysis is used to help reveal the conflict frames and illustrate how the difference between the US and Arab conflict frames correlated to a difference in foreign policy options towards Iraq. This is accomplished by demonstrating how "what they were thinking" correlated to "what they did" by discussing the policy choices of the US and Arab countries. This methodology does not exclude the impact of a host of other factors on foreign policy, but rather it intends to demonstrate that conflict frames served as part of the social and psychological framework from which the decision-makers acted. Therefore, conflict frames as such cannot be isolated as an independent variable and tested, because they served as a part of the very fabric of the decision-making environment. Therefore, the methodology of this research project is conducting a discourse analysis of the US and Arab positions, followed by a discussion of foreign policy processes, and finally will describe observable relationship between the conflict frames and policy options.

Specifically, this dissertation employs what is termed "text analysis." Since the selected speech-acts are all in the form of text or transcripts, the methodology will not

examine things like non-verbal cues, hand motions, pauses in speech, etc. Rather it will analyze the language within the texts exclusively. This study acknowledges the importance of additional communication signals, but restricts this methodology to the texts in order to focus on linguistic elements.

Selection Criteria and Obstacles

This paper readily acknowledges the challenge of selection bias when it comes to selecting texts for the discourse analysis. These biases are largely unavoidable due to time constraints on a thesis project of this nature. It cannot include all of the 22 Arab countries' decision-making discourse related to Iraq. Nor can it include all of the policy-oriented discourse of the Bush administration on the same issue. In order to control for this bias, the study examines 9 texts from 2001-2004, all reflecting the policy statements of the League of Arab States (Arab League). After a thorough review of various policy speech from different sources in the Arab world, the Arab League was chosen based on the following criteria.

- 1) The Arab League provides a controlled number of texts to be analyzed from a single forum. There are a few principle events each year sponsored by the Arab League: The twice-yearly summits and the minister's sessions.
- 2) The regularity of these events enables a systematic approach to the study of the Arab position. This is helpful when considering the vast array of information produced on the various Arab positions and the scattered sources which that information represents.

- 3) The participation of all 22 Arab states in the Arab League allows for the greatest possible density of Arab discourse, and unity of thought, in a single outlet.
- 4) Of all the possible sources, the Arab League arguably represents the most consistently engaged, official response of Arab leadership to the evolving Iraq crisis.
- 5) The Arab League is also representative of a leadership-level discourse, which represents policy-makers' conflict frames, by virtue of the fact that the participants were the heads-of-state, foreign ministers, and diplomatic delegations of the Arab states.

It should be understood that the Arab League communiqués and statements are not synonymous with, or directly correlated to, the foreign policy of Arab states. Rather, these reflect the regional social climate, as presented by the leadership of the Arab states. This is consistent with the project's theoretical underpinning, which argues that the social context itself is an integral part of the policy-making process. Thus, the project will use the Arab League speech-acts to draw out the conflict frame used by Arab leadership as seen through these publications. However, Arab states took unique policy paths to the Iraq crisis based on their own interests and internal factors. This will be discussed further in a later section. What is important for the purpose of this dissertation, is to demonstrate the difference between the Arab leadership's conflict frame and that of the US administration.

This analysis includes ministers' meetings and the annual Arab League summit communiqué from 2001-2004, as well as one additional minister's meeting proceedings

from 2002. This was an emergency meeting in light of eminent attack on Iraq (See Appendix 1-9 for full transcripts of the texts). The summits in Cairo and Beirut were notable because of their more publicized nature and their juxtapose position to the pre-war diplomatic and media efforts in the US.

From the US discourse, eight texts are selected from numerous policy-oriented speech-acts (See Appendix 10-17). Each text is a speech or testimony of an individual that was a part of the foreign-policy making process during the first Bush administration (2001-2004), whether individually or by nature of the agency they represented. Chapter 5 will explain in greater detail the specific role of each person and the extent to which their speech is reflective of the conflict frame of the administration. Similar to the Arab discourse, this also reflects a certain selection bias which is hard to avoid. To the extent possible, this was minimized by choosing significant policy speeches related to the case of Iraq, with reference to timing and venue of the speech (i.e. testimony before Congress, publication just prior to the invasion, etc.).

Classifying Speech-Acts to Build Conflict Frames

The text analysis will employ two charts to classify speech-acts, in order to reconstruct the conflict frame used by the actors. The first table will replicate a methodology used by Fiss and Hirsch (2005) which tracks the presence of keywords and reveals a type of normative frame. Fiss and Hirsch's work appeared in the *American Sociological Review* and creatively combined scholarship on framing and cognition. They described how frame creation, and differences in frames, impacts policy-formation as meanings take shape in the discourse, and that these frames are generated from their unique historical, political and social contexts (Fiss and Hirsch, 2005). They developed a tool to enable them to group together different words, or lexicons, which reveal a higher-order frame, based on the assumption that frames manifest themselves through key words

in sentences (Fan, 1988; Miller, 1997; Porac, Wade, and Pollock 1999).

This same approach is applied in this study to the case of the Arab League and the first G.W. Bush administration, by identifying repeated words and concepts in the selected texts. By categorizing these lexicons, the cognitive frame will take shape in a way that can be analyzed and compared between the US and Arab positions. For the purposes of the study, these lexicons will be grouped as part of a negative frame (i.e. seeing war in Iraq as unnecessary and/or having an overall negative effect/negative US regional role), a neutral frame (non-normative speech regarding US regional role and UN role towards Iraq), or a positive frame (i.e. war may be necessary/ Iraq a threat to neighbors/ Iraq responsible to comply with UN).

The second table will utilize Goldstein and Keohane's ideational mapping, which classifies speech acts according to content: world view, principled beliefs, or causal beliefs (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). Goldstein and Keohane suggest that these "ideational pathways" impact policy outcomes by promoting ideas which connect the actor's goals with policy strategies to meet these goals. While Ruggie argues that their work fails to demonstrate a casual relationship between ideational factors and policy, their work is helpful in illuminating types of ideas that correlate to policy choices (Ruggie, 1998). Ideational mapping, then, is particularly useful for the purpose of this study. Not only is the instrument intended to demonstrate links to policy-formation, but the ideas types are at the heart of the literature on conflict framing (University of Colorado, nd).

This study will combine the ideational mapping instrument with Onuf and Searle's "linguistic rules" (Onuf and Klink, 1989; Searle, 1979). Searle and Onuf's mutual language-typology is helpful in analyzing whether the ideas in the texts are being "asserted," "directed," or used in a "commitive" mode. This research therefore combines

these tools into one chart, demonstrating how the social context of ideas is communicated through speech-acts with an intended effect on action, or policy-formation. Cumulatively, this table will enable the paper to draw out the conflict frame through understanding the "ideational pathways" and the context of the language itself within the text. This will contribute to new understanding of the social and lingual context of the foreign policy-making in both the US and Arab countries.

Again, in as much as this project is concerned with the Arab foreign policy and US foreign policy towards Iraq, it will not attempt to prove a cause-and-effect relationship between the discourse and the actual foreign policy advocated by the US and throughout the Arab world. A traditional methodological approach to link conflict frames with foreign policy would be inconsistent with the theoretical background of this project and would be philosophically inconsistent with the work which this project builds on. Alker's 1992 to the American Political Science Association encapsulated this approach by quoting Havel, "We must try harder to understand than to explain" (Alker, 1992; Havel, 1992, p. 2). The most consistent and coherent methodology for what this paper attempts to do is the one described above, making a modest contribution to the literature and research on the ideational and linguistic context of policy-formation through analysis of conflict frames and the comparison of these frames across different groups. To begin this analysis, the next chapter will review the discourse of Arab decision-making groups.

CHAPTER 3

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF ARAB DECISION-MAKERS

Before this study delves into the analysis of recent discourse, it is necessary to briefly describe relevant social and cultural context of Arab thought, as described by Arab thinkers. Mohammed Al Jabari, professor of philosophy and Islamic thought at Mohammad IV University in Morocco, describes the epistemological struggle over the understanding of "culture" that the third world faces in light of its colonized history (Al Jabari, 2007). The struggle or fight against foreign control in all its forms, he continues, is an organic part of any local culture in the Arab world. The idea of a local culture is derived from its ideational position as something opposite to the colonizing culture. Thus, the very formation of the "Arab Mind" or "Arab thought," is a reflection of the reality around it—the cultural and social factors in the context of colonization (Al Jabari, 1984).

The Arab Mind

Al Jabari and Edward Said argue that Arab thought can only be accurately known by an Arab mind that has been through that culture's unique formulation. The understanding of the Arab reality cannot be separated from the perceiving mechanism—the Arab mind. Thus, deep cultural erudition can only be fully comprehended from inside a particular culture (Al Jabari, 1984; Said, 1978). Any attempt by an outsider to understand another culture will necessarily be flawed, for it will view it from a different cultural "mind" or "thought." In this respect, "oriental" scholars from the US or Europe have no choice but to view the Middle East from a Western mindset, representing a reality in an inherently biased manner. It is from this argument that Said launched his harsh criticism of the Bush administration's reliance on Bernard Lewis, an American scholar,

in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq (Said, 2004). It signals the gap in perception between Arab decision-makers and their American counterparts.

Beyond colonization as the general shaping environment for Arab identity and thinking, other Arab scholars have developed arguments or focused on specific aspects of Arab identity, such as religion or nationalism. Early writers like Jamal Ad Deen Al Afghani (1839-1898) promoted religious reformation and identity as a part of ushering in political change (Az Zobi, 2007). Still other Arab thinkers like Abdul Rahman Al Kawakabi (1840-1902) and Ibrahim Al Yazigi (1847-1906) promoted a more secular-oriented nationalism and political reform (Az Zobi, 2007; Hassassian, 2001). Yet despite the promising intellectual movements within the Arab world in the early 19th century, the region suffered through a fitful stage of ideological struggle, political turmoil, and new colonial legacies in the post-World War I and World War II eras (Milad, 2006). This included the Zionist project in Palestine, and also the formation of the modern Arab states.

Decades later, partly in response to the modern Arab state, new thinkers like Tunisian scholar Hesham Al Jeyat emerged. He called for a return of the historical importance of the Islamic identity in the Middle East, which had been distorted or limited by its nascent political regimes and institutions, and called for a new religious-social contract that was progressive and interactive in the public life (Al Jeyat, 1974, republished in 2008). Al Jayat's writings and republication is just one example of a reemergence of the Islamic identity that is part of a larger revival and debate on the role of Islam in modern Arab society. While a more thorough overview of Arab thought is offered elsewhere, these brief remarks sketch a backdrop that will help create a more complete analysis of the speech acts.

The Arab Social Context and Foreign Policy

Lucas and Hudson connected this cultural and psychological background to the foreign policy of these relatively new Arab states by demonstrating how even monarchs and elites were constrained in their foreign policy by the social context from which they rule. Even in a non-democratic region, the public voice has an influential role in policy formation (Lucas, 2004; Hudson, 1992). Hudson's analysis of Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Egypt suggests that these non-democratic regimes were sensitive to the external political context and its relation to their domestic constituency, especially at a time when Arab nationalism was on the rise. While focusing on the external environment, Korany and Dessouki's work also acknowledges the reality that a significant internal change in the domestic environment would invoke an appropriate foreign policy change (Korany and Dessouki, 1991).

Lucas highlights that in the unique case of Middle East monarchies, pluralism of the society is encouraged, enabling the King to rule from above tribal, family, ethnic or religious divisions and "act as the linchpin of the political system" (Lucas, 2004, p. 107). In this way, these monarchical systems play off of the societal cleavages by balancing and manipulating the different constituencies. These societal groups then look to the monarch's "benevolent patronage" as a national unifier (Lucas, 2004, p. 107). Therefore, in order to play a balancing role or as a "linchpin" in society, the monarch is to some degree responsive to his different constituencies' desires. From another aspect, Lucas refers to the institutional capacity and ability to respond to society's needs that led to the fall or survival of Middle East monarchies, citing Jordan and Egypt as opposing examples of how this played out—King Hussain's resiliency on the one hand and Egypt's revolution on the other (Lucas, 2004). Finally, some monarchical regimes rely on a broad coalition, based on heredity and tradition, to maintain power. This coalition, whether represented

through tribes or national institutions such as the military, is another shaping force on foreign policy. In sum, even the non-democratic regimes of the Arab world are responsive in one manner or another to their social context.

Therefore, it is important to make note of the general frame of the Arab constituency toward the question of Iraq, as measured by Arab public opinion. The aim here is not test a relationship between public opinion and Arab foreign policy, but rather to describe Arab public opinion as a tool to understand the social context of the decision-makers in the Arab world. Three helpful resources in this regard are the University of Maryland/Zogby polls on Arab public opinion, Jordan's Center for Strategic Studies, and a 2007 European Commission Study Commission paper (Telhami, 2003; Center for Strategic Studies, 2005; Aliboni and Qatarneh, 2007). Telhami's work produced a clear picture of the Arab public's opposition to the war in Iraq, taken shortly before the invasion. This is important because it is representative of public thought during the same period of that Arab summits were held by the region's decision-makers. Overwhelmingly, 9 out of 10 Arabs surveyed opposed an invasion of Iraq if carried out by the US unilaterally. A majority still opposed the war if sanctioned by the United Nations. And perhaps most remarkable, most people surveyed still opposed the war even if Iraq failed to comply with UN resolutions or if the UN inspectors found that Iraq hid weapons of mass destruction (Telhami, 2003). More than two-thirds of those surveyed believed that a war in Iraq would leave the region less democratic and less peaceful afterwards, and a full 80% believed that such a war would generate more terrorism than before (Telhami, 2003). Jordan's Center for Strategic Studies' (CSS) 2005 report serves as a bridge that connects Arab

public opinion on Iraq to their governments' interaction with the West (Center for Strategic Studies, 2005).

The CSS report confirmed Telhami's findings that Arabs ardently opposed the war in Iraq and did not believe that it would lead to democracy. Rather, they believed the US intention was to enhance Israel's security and to control Iraqi resources. When examining Arab attitudes about their governments' bilateral ties to the West, the results were varied. Of the five countries surveyed (Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Egypt) only Lebanon had a majority that favored stronger bilateral political relations with the US at 59%. The authors of the study make the case that it is the attitude of the respondent towards the US that dictates his or her readiness to enhance bilateral relations, rather than reflecting the strength of any current bilateral relations. For example, the majority of Arabs surveyed desired increased political ties with France, but not with the US. It is noted that France was the US' staunchest international critic of the war in Iraq. Remarkably, most Arab respondents were somewhat unenthusiastic about enhancing economic relations with the US despite its huge resources. While the percentages of those who favor strengthening economic ties are higher than those who favored strengthening political ties, only in Lebanon did a clear majority favor increasing economic relations with the US. Similar results were found on the question of strengthening cultural ties between the US and the Arab world. On the whole, youth were much less enthusiastic about improving relations with the West than were their national counterparts. This is significant because the Arab world's age structure is significantly younger than the global average, and the 15-24 age-group constitutes the largest percentage of the total Arab population (UNDP, 2005; UNDP, 2002).

According to Aliboni and Qatarneh, upon conducting survey research among a highly educated segment of society, "there is increasing hostility and suspicion towards the West amongst the Southern states [Middle East/North Africa] as a result of American foreign policy actions after the attacks of September 11, 2001" (2007). Respondents overwhelmingly noted that Arab approaches to conflict prevention are different than the West because the concepts of security, sources of threats and unique political culture are not shared between the Southern Mediterranean and the West. Protracted conflict related to the Arab-Israeli relations were the dominate feature of these remarks (Aliboni and Qatarneh, 2007). These responses were from academics in the field of conflict resolution, a segment that is likely more exposed to Western thought and liberal ideologies. Yet their perceptions of the West are very similar to the general population. In summary, all three of these studies demonstrated a general suspicion of the West and reluctance among Arab populations to enhance their ties with the US, and especially among youth. This is an important reality to be considered by Arab regimes with close strategic relations with the US, and it was likely a factor that impacted their policy decisions and rhetoric in regards to Iraq.

Analysis of the Arab Summits and Ministers Meetings 2001-2004

Table 1 below depicts this normative framing convention, with the associated year as annotated on the left hand column. In analyzing the selected texts, this project only records those phrases or lexicons specifically associated with US-Iraq, UN-Iraq relations or the role of the US in the region.

Table 1. Normative Framing*

	NEGATIVE FRAME	# of occurrences	NEUTRAL FRAME	# of occurrences	POSITIVE FRAME	# of occurrences
2001	"Illegitimacy" of attempts to move US Embassy to Jerusalem "Indignation" at US veto against UN observer force in Israel/ "reject" US justifications	1 1	"Urge" the US to put ME peace process as priority/shoulder "responsibility as peace sponsor"	4		
2002	"Rejected" threat of aggression against Iraq/ not authorized by UN Attack on Iraq a "threat" to all Arab countries "Demand" respect for Iraq's sovereignty "lift" the sanctions against a "suffering" Iraq	5 2 2 2	Seek US support for Arab peace initiative/ revive peace process Iraq accepts return of UN Inspectors "urges" UN to focus on eliminating WMD from Israel—not just Iraq	2 1 1		
2003	"destructive" repercussions of war/ regional stability Iraq "suffered" from previous wars/ "lift" sanctions Reject attack on Iraq/ and threat to any Arab state UN should ensure Iraq's "sovereignty"/eliminate WMD from Israel Denounce imposing change War of aggression/call for withdrawal	3 3 3 4 2 6	Urged Iraq to settle disputes with neighbors UN inspections supported and legitimate Renew US/Int'l efforts at ME peace process	1 2 1	Urge Iraqi leadership to work "seriously and genuinely" with the UN to avoid war; ensure Iraq implements resolutions	1 1

2004	Called for "non-interference" in Iraqi affairs	1	Called on Int'l body to implement UN SC resolutions in ME peace process/ "revive" Roadmap/ pledged continued activity in UN on behalf of Pal. issue	5		
	Rid the region of WMD, to include Israel	2				
	End the occupation of Iraq	2	Affirmed unity of Iraq	2		
	Negative effect of American sanction on region	1	Discussed Israel's continued possession of WMD	1		
	Called for respect of Iraqi sovereignty	1	Condemn terrorism but distinguish it from resistance to occupation/ condemn Israel's "terrorism"	1		

*The texts included the original Arabic documents, translated versions by the Arab League, or otherwise translated full copies or summaries available online or translated by the author.

The next table, as depicted below, will employ Goldstein and Koehane's concept of "ideational mapping," or classifying types of ideas that promote a particular kind of policy. Briefly, these are: 1) World views, which are "entwined with peoples' conceptions of their identities, evoking deep emotions and loyalties"; 2) Principled beliefs, which "specify criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust"; and 3) Casual beliefs, derived from the shared consensus of recognized authorities, govern conceptualization of cause-effect relations. This table will combine this "ideational mapping" concept with the linguistic typologies of Onuf and Searle. By combining these two tools of analysis, the research project will present a multi-dimensional analysis that can scrutinize the conflict framing employed by the Arab League through a theoretical lens.

Table 2. Ideational-Lingual Mapping *

	WORLD VIEW (entwined with conceptions of identity, invokes emotions)	# of occurrences	PRINCIPLED BELIEFS (used to distinguish just from unjust/right and wrong)	# of occurrences	CASUAL BELIEFS (consensus of cause-effect relations; recognized authority)	# of occurrences
Assertive	<p>Iraq "suffered" from previous wars/ sanctions should be lifted/ sanctions negative</p> <p>Attack on Iraq a "threat" to all Arab countries</p> <p>US initiated war of "aggression" against Iraq/ violation of international law</p> <p>War against Iraq "destructive," past impact on the region/ "undermine stability" in region</p> <p>"reject" any attack on Iraq or threaten any Arab state</p> <p>Condemns terrorism in all forms, including Israel. Resistance to occupation not terrorism</p>	5 3 5 4 6 1	<p>"Illegitimacy" of attempts to move US Embassy to Jerusalem</p> <p>"extreme indignation" at US veto against UN observer force in Israel/ "absolute rejection" US justifications for this</p> <p>Reaffirm commitment to "sovereignty and security of Iraq" and its "unity"</p> <p>Need to protect the Palestinian people</p>	1 1 7 2	<p>UN resolutions "do not constitute a pretext for unleashing war" thus...</p> <p>Security Council mission of investigating WMD in Iraq "legitimate"</p>	2 1
Directive	<p>"Call" for "immediate withdrawal" US forces from Iraq</p> <p>"End the occupation" of Iraq</p>	2 1	<p>"Demand" respect for Iraq's sovereignty</p> <p>"Denounce"/"deplore" imposing change from outside the region /interference in internal affairs</p>	1 4	<p>"Urge" the US to put ME peace process as priority</p> <p>"revive"/"resume" the peace process/ "materialize" the UN resolutions regarding the process</p> <p>"appeal" to UN SC for "elimination" of WMD from Israel in accordance with UN resolutions / discussion of Israel's possession of WMD</p> <p>Welcomed UN timetable to end occupation of Iraq</p>	1 5 6 1
"Commitive"	<p>"Welcomed" Iraq's resumption of dialogue with UN for "full implementation" of resolutions</p>	1	<p>"Welcomes" Iraq's "unconditional acceptance" of UN inspectors</p> <p>"urged" Iraq to solve outstanding disputes with its neighbors</p> <p>"Called" on Arab states to extend assistance to Iraq (post invasion)</p>	2 1	<p>US and co-sponsors should "shoulder the responsibility" /"obligations" of peace process</p> <p>Work to "ensure" the compliance of Iraq to UN resolutions</p> <p>Urge Iraqi leadership to work "seriously and genuinely" with the UN to avoid war</p> <p>"Urges continued cooperation" between UN and Iraq to resolve problems "in order to" end sanctions</p> <p>The Council "must preserve" Iraq's sovereignty as well as neighbors</p>	2 1 1 2 2

*The texts included the original Arabic documents, translated versions by the Arab League, or otherwise translated full copies or summaries available online or completed by the author.

CHAPTER 4

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST G.W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION

Why did the US invade Iraq? This dissertation presupposes that the answer is, in part, shaped by social context of the Bush administration's foreign policy decision-making process. Before this project can appropriately sketch the social context through the discourse analysis, it is necessary to understand the US foreign policy-making process. However, scholarship on foreign policy has hardly produced a straightforward or agreed upon methodology to understand it. Scholars are divided on how much domestic pressures, state interests, group dynamics, bureaucratic decision-making or presidential leadership style each affect foreign policy decisions (Allison, 1969). Case studies have repeatedly been used to demonstrate the importance of some of these factors over others.

What is clear, however, is that the White House is the primary crafter of national foreign policy in America and the US state department is responsible to carry it out under the leadership of the Secretary of State (Halperin and Kanter, 1973). Many individuals, agencies and groups play a role in the policy-making, such as the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Vice President, interest groups, political advisors and even think tanks or certain "experts" in relevant policy areas—like Iraq (Spanier and Uslaner, 1989). As such, institutional and bureaucratic politics also play a role as representatives of various departments or organizations seek to preserve their own influence and budgets, and therefore promote their institutional interest in the decision-making process, not necessarily the greater national interest (Allison, 1969). In referring to this process, Kissinger wrote, "Segmented into a series of individual, and at times isolated, initiatives geared to highly specific problems, American foreign policy is rarely approached from the point of view of an

overall concept. Ad hoc departmental approaches have more—and more passionate—spokesmen that does an overall strategy, which often has no spokesmen at all" (Kissinger, 1994, p. 718). Although Kissinger mentions specific policy goals of these organizations, not just their budgets, as a driving-force behind their policy advocacy, his remarks demonstrate the primacy of organizational struggles in the formulation of foreign policy. The degree to which internal players, organizations and institutional interests impact the decision-making process depends largely on the character of the Presidential administration (Kissinger, 1994; Halperin and Kanter, 1973). The case of the first G.W. Bush administration from 2001-2004 has been the focus of debate because of the perceived policy failures of the war in Iraq. Attempting to understand President Bush's policy-making process should help illuminate why his administration pursued war in Iraq.

Steve Yetiv's work on the first Gulf war focused on the role of "groupthink" and demonstrated the limits of the state-interest model, or the rational actor model, to explain America's first war in Iraq. Instead of a purely rational approach, he argues that the George Bush Sr.'s decision-making process suffered from Janis' "groupthink" model (Yetiv, 2004; Janis, 1982). Yetiv's analysis showed how group cohesion, insulation from outside ideas, lack of tradition of impartial leadership, lack of norms requiring methodological decision-making, and homogeneity of social background and ideology came together to minimize opposition to the group's decisions contributed to an irrational foreign policy result (Yetiv, 2004). His analysis gives support to a similar analysis of G.W. Bush's decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Many of the same factors were at work, the most prominent of which was the now well-documented neoconservative ideology and relative cohesion of the policy group's members. When combined with the theoretical approach of this research project, it is notably that this neoconservative ideology

contributed to a similar conflict frame towards Iraq, as the various participants inside the decision-making group were influenced by an official policy paper produced by the neoconservative American Enterprise Institute, called "The Delta of Terrorism" (Woodward, 2006). The policy paper was sponsored by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Among the handful of authors were Middle East academics Bernard Lewis and Fou'ad Ajami. It was intended not only to explain the background and sources of terrorism, but to offer policy implications for the US to protect its national interests. Among its fundamental conclusions was that "confrontation with Saddam was inevitable." He was a gathering threat and "would have to leave the scene" (Woodward, 2006). It is worth noting here that the American Enterprise Institute's assumptions about terrorism and its threat to America were not strange in the context of American society as a whole. According to a 2002 Pew Global Attitudes Project report, some 67% of Americans were "somewhat" to "very" worried about another terrorist attack on America, and 83% supported US efforts to topple the Taleban in Afghanistan (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2002). Understanding the societal context enables a broader understanding of the overall context of the foreign policy process.

In addition to ideology and social background, Janis also identifies objectivity as a factor impacting rationality, where previous involvement in case removes obscures the objectivity of the participant (Janis, 1982). In the case of Bush's administration, the following individuals were involved in the 1991 Gulf War.

	<u>2001 Position</u>	<u>1991 Position</u>
Dick Cheney	Vice President	Secretary of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz	Deputy Secretary of Defense	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Colin Powell	Secretary of State	Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff
Condoleezza Rice	National Security Advisor	National Security Council Staff
Richard Perle	Chairman, Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee	Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee

Though not involved at an official level, the list could also include President Bush himself. As the son of the George H.W. Bush, he was certainly involved at a personal level in the first Gulf War. Janis' model would argue that the role of these five participants in the '91 Gulf War, combined with the prominence of the policy-making group, meant that their objectivity was seriously threatened as they built the case for the invading Iraq prior to the 2003 invasion. Other factors also become clear through Bob Woodward's distinctive work on the Bush national security team, which pieced together a narrative through hours of personal interviews, memos, official notes, personal letters, briefing summaries and e-mails (Woodward, 2006).

One of these factors was the group's insulation to outside criticism, as reflected in the comment of Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to Condoleezza Rice, "Condi, in my view, anytime someone wasn't ready to do immediately exactly what the president wants, it was almost disloyal" (Woodward, 2006). Also reflected in Bob Woodward's account, is Janis' identification of a lack of a methodological decision-making process. According to Woodward's account, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld essentially dominated the policy process towards Iraq, whether related to intelligence on WMD or reconstruction. As a result, his team enjoyed enormous influence

over the Iraq policy-planning process, which included his deputy Paul Wolfowitz, Douglass Feith, the Pentagon's undersecretary for policy, as well as Feith's mentor Richard Perle, the Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee.

Also, Woodward records conversations where Bush indicates his decision to invade Iraq in the fall of 2002 to Secretary of State Colin Powell and Director of the CIA George Tenet. Instead of a participatory process, Bush stated his decision to Powell and then sought his support, "I think I have to do this. I want you with me... Time to put your war uniform on" (Woodward, 2006). Regarding the domineering effect of Rumsfeld in the policy meetings, Frank Miller, the National Security Council's senior director for defense, remembered how tightly Rumsfeld controlled information by: not returning Rice's phone calls about war planning, not allowing NSC members to take notes during briefings, passing out briefing sheets just before a meeting and then collected immediately after. "It was absolutely crazy," Miller thought, "the whole scene would have been comic...if the issues hadn't involved war, life and death" (Woodward, 2006).

Finally, Janis describes "observable consequences" in his theoretical analysis of groupthink. One of these consequences is the "inherent morality of the group" (Janis, 1982). Through Woodward's interviews, one recurring theme is Bush's belief in his administration's "exceptionalism," and that he believed "his role [was] to change the face of the world" after 9/11. Similarly, he revealed this perspective when told Karl Rove, "I'm here for a reason...and this is going to be how we're going to be judged" when he reflected on their post-9/11 role (Woodward, 2006). Janis describes how this type of thinking is a

consequence of the groupthink conditions and can contribute to irrational decision-making.

While not meant to be an exhaustive application of groupthink theory to the G.W. Bush administration, this section portrayed how some of the dynamics of the theory were at work during Bush's policy formation.

Selection: Identifying Policy-Making Participants

Before conducting the analysis of relevant policy texts, it is important to mention the selection criteria for the policy participants and their selected speech-acts. Historically speaking, there has been relatively little time for the accumulation of insider accounts of the decision-making process leading up to war in Iraq. Also, many of Bush's first term insiders served on his staff in his second term and are still in service. Thus, this research project relied heavily on Bob Woodward's extensive work as well as Richard Clark's insider account in order to identify Bush's core foreign policy team. They identified Bush's inner-circle, or war cabinet, prior to the invasion, as consisting of Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and CIA Director George Tenet. As was demonstrated in the analysis above, the Secretary of Defense and his associates in DoD held an unusually powerful policy role over all things having to do with Iraq. Therefore, this analysis included the following texts:

**23 Jan 2002 – Paul Wolfowitz, US Deputy Secretary of Defense, speech to the
Council on Foreign Relations**

**18 Sep 2002 – Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense, testimony before
Congressional House Armed Services Committee**

**17 Mar 2003 – Richard Perle, Chairman of the Defense Policy Review Board,
article immediately prior to US-led invasion**

Wolfowitz's speech is significant because of the publicized nature of the event in early 2002, a policy address which was simultaneously broadcast to a large group in Washington D.C. As a former George H.W. Bush administration official in DoD, he offered a compelling case for Iraq's defiance of UN resolutions and disarmament efforts over the course of 11 years. It has been argued that Wolfowitz was one of the strongest proponents for going to war in Iraq, even as an initial response to the events of 9/11 (Clarke, 2003).

While the choosing of a Rumsfeld speech is obvious, the timing of his testimony is just as critical. He attempted to offer the most compelling case possible to the US Congress in order to obtain congressional approval for the war prior to its recess. He also made the presentation in the shadow of the one-year anniversary of 9/11, something he made multiple references to in his testimony.

Richard Perle has been described as the intellectual architect behind the Iraq war, which he argued for in his 1996 report for Israel's Likud party "A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm" ("Empire Builders...", 2005). As a political appointee and chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee, he had access to classified documents and helped shape US policy towards Iraq. Together with Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld, Cheney and many others, Perle was a signatory on the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) letter to President Clinton in 1998 calling for the removal of Saddam Hussein from power ("PNAC Letters Sent to President Bill Clinton," 1998).

Two other signatories on the PNAC letter to President Clinton were William Kristol and Robert Kagan, the co-founders of the neoconservative think-tank that authored the letter. William Kristol is the editor of the influential *Weekly Standard*, where Kagan is also a contributing editor. While both served with various republican administrations in the past, neither had an official role in the Bush administration from 2001-2004. However, because of their roles in PNAC and the *Weekly Standard*, they are representative of the ideological movement that many Bush appointees were a part of. Not only the officials already mentioned, but also Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Under Secretary of State John Bolton, Under Secretary of State Paula Dobriansky, Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman, and National Security Council senior officials Elliott Abrams and Zalmay Khalilzad were all associated with the neoconservative movement and had a part in PNAC publications. Thus, Kagan and Kristol's article, which was published weeks after the attacks of 9/11, represents an ideological trajectory, and therefore is representative of a broad spectrum of policy-makers inside the Bush administration. This policy article is included in this analysis.

1 Oct 2001 – Robert Kagan and William Kristol, policy article

Vice President Dick Cheney is arguably one of the most powerful vice presidents in American history, and it was Cheney who personally suggested the selection of Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense. Cheney was chief of staff for President Ford during Rumsfeld's first term as Secretary of Defense, and Cheney was himself a Secretary of Defense for George H.W. Bush during the first Gulf War. Cheney has also been active in the Project for the New American Century, and there is perhaps no one that the President depended on more during his first term. His speech made to the Korean War veterans was an Iraq policy speech that received attention and scrutiny for making conclusive remarks

about Iraq's possession of WMD. This speech was included in the analysis.

29 Aug 2002 – Dick Cheney, US Vice President, speech to Korean War veterans

Finally, two other primary members of Bush's war cabinet were NSA Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell. Neither of them were a part of the neoconservative think-tanks, like PNAC or the American Enterprise Institute, but neither critically questioned the group's drive towards war with Iraq. To the contrary, Rice remarked that she found PNAC's "Delta of Terrorism" paper, which was generated through Wolfowitz, "very, very persuasive" (Woodward, 2006). Rice also took the CIA's terrorism assessments at face value without knowledge of the personal doubts of Director George Tenet (Woodward, 2006). It was Rice that first helped shape Bush's foreign policy before he began his presidential bid, and he relied upon her again to explain his national security strategy in 2002. This speech is included in the analysis.

While not nearly as influential in terms of policy-formation, Secretary of State Colin Powell is still significant because of his role representing the policies of the President abroad and to the UN in particular. His remarks before the UN Security Council in the weeks before the invasion, and even in light of improved inspection processes, are particularly helpful in understanding the administration's conflict frame. His willingness to advocate the policy that he did not have an emotional connection with makes the administration's conflict frame even more transparent. Based on the above argument, the following remarks are included in this analysis:

1 Oct 2002 – Dr. Condoleezza Rice, US National Security Advisor, speech on the Presidents National Security Strategy

14 Feb 2003 – Colin Powell, US Secretary of State, remarks to the UN Security

Council

Lastly, by considering the words of the President himself, the chief personality and center of foreign policy decision-making, this research project attempts to link his remarks in 2004 to the themes observed in the speeches leading up to the Iraq invasion. His speech given to the Army War College outlines his strategy in Iraq, one year after the invasion took place. This speech is included in the analysis.

24 May 2004 – George W. Bush, US President, speech to the US Army War

College on Iraq and the War on Terror

This text selection did not include CIA Director George Tenet for two primary reasons: 1) he made few public appearances and remarks advocating policy towards Iraq; the nature of his relationship with the President was essentially to confirm intelligence estimates; and 2) he acknowledged in Bob Woodward's account his own self-doubts about the intelligence estimates and therefore made few strong statements regarding Iraq, whether in approval or critique of the President's direction.

This chapter will now parallel the previous by analyzing the highlighted texts from the Bush administration's term, using the same methodology applied to the Arab League statements (See Appendixes 10-17).

In Table 3 below, the ideas are grouped under negative frame (i.e. seeing war in Iraq as unnecessary and/or having an overall negative effect/negative US regional role), a neutral frame (non-normative speech regarding US regional role and UN role towards Iraq), or a positive frame (i.e. war may be necessary/ Iraq a threat to neighbors/ Iraq responsible to comply with UN).

Table 3. Normative Framing

	NEGATIVE FRAME	# of occurrences	NEUTRAL FRAME	# of occurrences	POSITIVE FRAME	# of occurrences
* 2001					<p>Taking "decisive action against Saddam" does not require proof linking Saddam to 9/11</p> <p>War on terrorism must include removing Saddam Hussein from power</p> <p>Saddam represents "potent challenge" to US interests with WMD (Israel, Allies & Oil)</p> <p>Iraq supports terrorism</p>	<p>1</p> <p>3</p> <p>3</p> <p>3</p>

	<u>NEGATIVE FRAME</u>	#	<u>NEUTRAL FRAME</u>	#	<u>POSITIVE FRAME</u>	#
*** 2002	The President "wants to do everything humanly possible to eliminate this threat by peaceful means"/force a last resort	4	"Deadly/Serious" Game with Iraq and the UN	1	Combination of "Terrorists and tyrants"/ two "faces of the same evil"—need to confront both	15
	Change of attitude possible by the Iraqi regime/ hopeful of success of UN process	3	UN Resolution 1441 sought to give Saddam Hussein one more chance	3	Saddam "possesses WMD"/ dangerous arsenal/unaccounted for material / pursuing even more	39
			US "good faith" in inspection process	2	Saddam behavior like "Stalin" or "Hitler"/ used WMD in the past/ "murderous dictator"	22
			Limits to intelligence	3	Relevance of "9/11"/preventing another 9/11/War on Terror	25
			Fighting for/ working from common "values" and "principles"/ "freedom" and "democracy" / "just cause" / "rights" of citizens / "liberty"	20	Iraq "regime" and "terror"/ gives "sanctuary" to terrorists	26
			President will consult the US Congress and our allies before taking a course of action/ consider all available options	3	Iraq "threat" to neighbors and US/ "gathering danger"	37
			Preemption does not mean that the US doesn't exhaust other means first	1	"disarm" / "disarmament" of Iraq	20
					Iraq's violation of terms of '91 cease-fire justifies enforcement/ defiance of UN resolutions/ reference to time (11 years)	26
					Lie/lying/concealment/obstruction/cheat/intimidation related to UN and IAEA inspection activity	49
					UN inspectors unable to complete this task with Iraqi absence of cooperation Iraq not "willing" to disarm/ "not serious"/ pursuing nuclear program	24
					"Weapons of Mass Terror"/ WMD and terrorists	28
					"time" running out/ no "delay"	7
					"regime change"/remove from power/ "liberation"	9
					"risk" of inaction or waiting	10
					"benefits" of removing Saddam importance of "threatening" the Iraqi Regime	7
				cannot afford to "wait" until we know for sure/ stop them while "planning"/ deterrence or containment not an option	16	
				"burden of proof" on Saddam-- not the US	2	
				Iraq will "blackmail" the world/ "blackmail"/ use of oil reserves	7	
				UN "relevance" at stake/ "illegal" programs	8	

	<u>NEGATIVE FRAME</u>	#	<u>NEUTRAL FRAME</u>	#	<u>POSITIVE FRAME</u>	#
*** 2003	Force as a last resort	1	The US and the UN will stand for peace	1	The issue is disarmament—not inspections	5
			Recognize some improvements in the inspection process in Iraq	1	Iraq obstructing the inspection process/ playing tricks/ denying/ not serious or intending to comply	8
			The UN resolutions sought to disarm Iraq	1	Iraq in violation of UN resolutions	7
					Importance of the “pressure” and “threat of force” on Iraq	6
					Lack of a full and complete “declaration” and “cooperation” from Iraq	8
					Saddam “terrorized” his own citizens	3
					Iraq possesses WMD / unaccounted for materials/ trying to develop more	5
					Iraq a threat to its neighbors and to the US/ danger of WMD	2
					Reference to 9/11	1
					Iraq and “terror”/ “Al Qaeda”	4
					Terrorists and WMD	1
					Tyrants and Terrorists	3
					Cannot “wait” until a weapon is used/ must act now	1
					“Liberate” or “free” Iraq/ set up good government	3
					Irrelevance of UN to achieve international security, especially in new environment	9
					Moral authority	1

	<u>NEGATIVE FRAME</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>NEUTRAL FRAME</u>	<u>#</u>	<u>POSITIVE FRAME</u>	<u>#</u>
**** 2004					Fighting "terrorism" in Iraq who want a return to tyranny and "death of democracy"/ War on Terror in Iraq/ Al Qaeda / "illegal militias"/reference to 9/11	23
					Description of opposition as "vile," "brutal," contempt for "rules of warfare" un-civilized	3
					"fanaticism" not caused by any US act	1
					America fighting for the civilized world	1
					Goal of a self-governing Iraq with US values—democracy and freedom	15
					Forces of "hope" and "freedom" on US side/ "liberation"	11
					"no interest" in occupation	3
					Partnering with Iraq in security	2
					Iraq's crumbled infrastructure due to Saddam's management/ reference to Saddam's reign	4
					US working through the UN	1
				Terrorist and WMD	1	

* Robert Kagan and William Kristol editors of the *Weekly Standard* "The Right War."

** Includes remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice

*** Secretary of State Colin Powell's remarks before the UN Security Council; and Richard Perle, chairman of the Defense Policy Review Board, article

**** President George W. Bush speech to the National War College on US Strategy in Iraq

As in Table 2, the next table will employ Goldstein and Koehane's concept of ideational "mapping," or classifying types of ideas that promote a particular kind of policy. Briefly, these are: 1) World views, which are "entwined with peoples conceptions of their identities, evoking deep emotions and loyalties"; 2) Principled beliefs, which "specify criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust"; and 3) Casual

beliefs, derived from the shared consensus of recognized authorities, govern conceptualization of cause-effect relations. This table will combine this "ideational mapping" concept with the linguistic typologies as described by Onuf and Searle and will be applied to the first G.W. Bush administration as was similarly applied to the Arab League.

Table 4. Ideational-Lingual Mapping

	WORLD VIEW entwined with conceptions of identity, invokes emotions)	# of occurrences	PRINCIPLED BELIEFS (used to distinguish just from unjust/right and wrong)	# of occurrences	CASUAL BELIEFS (consensus of cause-effect relations; recognized authority)	# of occurrences
Assertive	Saddam represents "potent challenge" to US interests with WMD (Israel, Allies & Oil)	6	Iraq may have "aided" the "horrific attacks" of Sep 11 th	1	UN Resolution 1441 sought to give Saddam Hussein one more chance	3
	Fighting for/ working from common "values" and "principles"/ "freedom" and "democracy" / "just cause" / "rights" of citizens / "liberty"	31	Taking "decisive action against Saddam" does not require proof linking Saddam to 9/11	1	The President "wants to do everything humanly possible to eliminate this threat by peaceful means"/force a last resort	4
	Saddam behavior like "Stalin" or "Hitler"/ used WMD in the past/ "murderous dictator"	25	Change of attitude possible by the Iraqi regime/ hopeful of success of UN process	3	Iraq's violation of terms of '91 cease-fire justifies enforcement/ defiance of UN resolutions/ reference to time (11 years)	33
	Relevance of "9/11"/preventing another 9/11/War on Terror	49	Saddam "possesses WMD"/ dangerous arsenal/unaccounted for material / pursuing even more	44	UN inspectors unable to complete this task with Iraqi absence of cooperation Iraq not "willing" to disarm/ "not serious"/ lack of a "complete" declaration/ pursuing nuclear program	32
	Iraq "threat" to neighbors and US/ "gathering danger"	3	Iraq "regime" and "terror"/ gives "sanctuary" to terrorists	33	"benefits" of removing Saddam importance of "threatening" the Iraqi Regime	7
	cannot afford to "wait" until we know for sure/ stop them while "planning"/ deterrence or containment not an option	16	Lie/lying/concealment/obstruction/cheat/intimidation related to UN and IAEA inspection activity	57	Iraq will "blackmail" the world/ "blackmail"/ use of oil reserves	7
	The US and the UN will stand for peace	1	Recognize some improvements in the inspection process in Iraq	1	UN "relevance" at stake/ "illegal" programs	8
	Combination of "Terrorists and tyrants"/ two "faces of the same evil"—need to confront both	18	Limits to intelligence	3	"burden of proof" on Saddam--not the US	2
	"Weapons of Mass Terror"/ WMD and terrorists	30	UN now irrelevant to deal with int'l security environment	9	UN resolutions meant to "disarm" Iraq	26
	US to "liberate" or "free" Iraq With "moral authority"	1	"Deadly/Serious" Game with Iraq and the UN	1	Importance of UN "pressure" and "threat" on Iraq	6
America fighting for the civilized world	1					
Goal of a self-governing, free Iraq	15					
Directive	WORLD VIEW	#	PRINCIPLED BELIEFS	#	CASUAL BELIEFS	#
	"risk" of inaction or waiting	11	War on terrorism must include removing Saddam Hussein from power	3		
	"time" running out/ no "delay"	7	"regime change"/remove from power/ "liberation"	9		

"Commitive"	Preemption does not mean that the US doesn't exhaust other means first	1	US "good faith" in inspection process President will consult the US Congress and our allies before taking a course of action/ consider all available options	2 3		

CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

Discussion of the Arab League Text Analysis **Table 1**

The framing depiction in Table 1 clarifies several issues from the Arab decision-making conflict frame. Remarkably, the question of Iraq did not even surface in 2001, even though it was a part of the Bush administration policy discussions during that time. It demonstrates that from the Arab perspective, the most important issue was the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and that there was essentially no perceived threat from Iraq. While not illustrated in Table 1, the only mention of Iraq by the Arab League at these 2001 proceedings was its relationship to Kuwait and remaining issues involving POWs and the return of property from the 1990-91 war. However, 2002 saw a dramatic turn in Arab League rhetoric, which can be described as a regionally defensive discourse, and which looked to the UN to resolve the dilemma, preserve Iraq's sovereignty, and apply its resolutions uniformly across the region (to include Israel). This appeal to the UN became more desperate in the months before the invasion, when it appeared that an attack was eminent despite lack of UN approval. As observed in the entirety of the depiction above, the normative frame employed toward the issue of conflict with Iraq was overwhelmingly negative. The only glimpse of the Arab League's support of international efforts to disarm Iraq was seen in 2003. Even in these 2 instances, the context suggested that the motivation was to spare Iraq and the region from war—not because it felt threatened by a potential Iraqi weapons program.

As Wendt articulated, this defensive posture reveals the intellectual and linguistic commitment to a social construction of reality that embraces "states" as the unitary actors

in the international system, and the UN as a supportive organization which upholds that construction by guaranteeing state sovereignty (Wendt, 1992). This also incorporates Searle's notion of "collective intentionality," where a socially constructed idea like "sovereignty" invokes a response from the international community and where Iraq gains "rights" that should not be violated (Ruggie, 1998, p. 869; Onuf and Klink, 1989). Furthermore, the Arab League capitalizes on this social construction through their language by calling on the UN and the international community to uphold Iraq's sovereignty and subsequently its unity; in other words, to abide by the concept of state sovereignty and respect its historical acceptance.

The Arab League's overwhelmingly negative framing combines the promotion of state sovereignty with Wendt's idea where these states are "taking identities in relation to others" (Wendt, 1999, p. 21). The Arab League does this through its observation of the "threat" facing all Arab states, as well as calling attention to the destructive "regional" affects of war. Similarly, despite all the attention and diplomatic effort exerted toward avoiding war in Iraq, the Arab League never failed to lose sight of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and call the international community to renew efforts towards a just solution. This reflects an Arab identity and culture that views potential war in Iraq through the same lens that they viewed the negative effects of European colonialism (Kuhn, 1962). The Arab League discourse included discussion of different aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict on at least 12 occasions and in every year's meetings from 2001-2004, which also meant at the height of attention on Iraq.

Table 2

Table 2, the Ideational-Lingual Mapping table, presents a multi-dimensional depiction of the statements of the Arab League.

It is also an aggregate-type approach to understanding the conflict frame of the Arab leadership, combining the comments from 2001-2004. For example, in contrast to the first table, Table 2 groups similar comments from different years together in one subject area. This enables the research to make evaluations on the cumulative effect of certain ideas in comparison with others over the course of the four years studied.

In evaluating this table, some important elements of the Arab conflict frame come into clear focus. In general, the most common type of speech employed was *assertive*. The paper noted at least 37 *assertive* comments related to Iraq and US policy in the region, as compared with 20 *directive* comments and 14 *committive* comments. A possible explanation for this may be the following. As a political body, the Arab League has limited capacity to "direct" other countries, its own member countries or especially a global super-power, to do anything. Rather, they find a more effective role in "asserting" a certain truth or make normative critiques of the existing political realities. This is helpful from the standpoint of this project, because in effect it articulates the Arab League policy and orientation toward the conflict while at the same time revealing its world view and principled beliefs through its value-laden language.

Of the assertive statements observed in the texts, those associated with "World View" were the most prominent. This concept includes conceptions of identity or ideas that invoke an emotional response. Statements were grouped into five recurring themes, or "focal points" as termed by Goldstein and Keohane. These focal points reveal the following about the Arab conflict frame, some of which were already mentioned: a war was seen as a "threat" to all Arab states, that it would have a "destructive" regional impacts, that Iraq had already "suffered" enough through wars and sanctions, and that all Arab states "rejected" the threat war against Iraq. After the war began, the language

reflected the perspective that this was a war of "aggression" and "against international law." Another prominent theme among the assertive category, but under "Principled Beliefs" was the strong commitment to Iraq's "sovereignty" and "security"—and after the war—to its "unity." This theme occurred 5 times.

In evaluating the other types of speech rules, *directive* and *committive*, different elements of the Arab conflict frame come into focus. From the directive language, three dominant "focal points" were observed: warning the US against "imposing" external change on Iraq (4 times), "urging" the US to "revive" the Arab-Israeli peace process (6 times), and calling on the UN to "eliminate" WMD from Israel (6 times), in accordance with UN resolutions. From the *committive* statements, or those that call on others to act in accordance with recognized agreements or authorities, the most common theme (at least 8 statements) appealed to the Arab states, the UN and the Iraqi regime to cooperate toward the implementation of UN resolutions. However, in at least 2 occasions, the Arab League called on the UN to "preserve" Iraq's sovereignty, as well as that of her neighbors.

By describing the linguistic effect of these "focal points," the theoretical backdrop and methodology can now be applied more clearly. Alker's identification of societal values as formative in political discourse is relevant to world views, principled beliefs and causal beliefs, because they all reflect societal values to one degree or another. While the Arab League recognized and affirmed the international social construct in the case of state sovereignty, other more "local" factors affected their discourse in other cases. As Ruggie stated, "identities are generated in part by international interactions" at the state level, but also at the individual level "the full array of additional ideational factors shape actors outlooks and behavior" (Ruggie, 1998, p. 879). Among these factors, Ruggie lists culture, ideology, principled beliefs and causal beliefs about cause-and-effect. Based on

this theoretical understanding, the cultural issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict is immensely relevant because of its historical significance and manifestation in the Arab League discourse. This social context of Palestinian occupation significantly shapes the Arab response to a potential second occupation, in a rich and strategically important area. From the vantage point of world view, the theme of previous Iraqi "suffering" at the hands of foreigners since the '91 Gulf War also provides a strong negative psychological context for evaluating America's renewed "threats" towards Iraq. Finally, Table 4 demonstrates a connection between the *committive* idea that the US should assume its "responsibility" to renew the Middle East peace process, with the *causal belief* that the US and the international community are the only ones who can complete this task. In this way, the Arab League passively adopt what Onuf and Klink called the "ideational rules" of the "supra-ordinate" actors, that seeks to bring "peace" through an international and multi-lateral process that has international "legitimacy" (Onuf and Klink, 1989).

From this analysis, the Arab conflict frame included world views, principled beliefs and causal beliefs that were linguistically employed either *assertively*, *directively* or *committively* to their national constituencies as well as to the international community. This conflict frame, as represented at the Arab League, included following ideas: the UN role was legitimate, but should also be applied uniformly to Israel's WMD program; that change in Iraq should not come from an outside power, and that the US should focus on reviving the Arab-Israeli conflict as a priority.

Therefore, based on the analysis of Table 1 and Table 2, the Arab conflict frame can be summarized to include the following:

ARAB CONFLICT FRAME TOWARDS THE ISSUE OF IRAQ

- Concept of Iraqi suffering from previous war and sanctions a prominent feature of the discourse
- The perception of a threat was not from an Iraqi weapons program, but rather from an eminent US attack and negative regional impacts
- The most important regional issue was the Arab-Israeli conflict, calling on the US to resume the peace process
- The UN disarmament mission was legitimate, but should be applied to Israel's WMD program, which was also against UN resolutions
- Perceived the war as one of aggression and against international law
- Sovereignty of Iraq paramount; change should be from within

The next section will conduct a similar text analysis of the Bush administration from 2001-2004.

Discussion of the Bush Administration Text Analysis

Table 3

In comparison with Table 1, Table 3 includes a greater range of themes. Partly, this is due to the length of the selected speech-acts, which were on average longer than the Arab League texts. It could also be due to the nature of a political speech from a specific administration, which is more concerned with making a direct link to its domestic audience. It could also be due to the reality that the US administration had to make a strong case for taking an aggressive action, in front of its own citizens and to the international community, while the Arab League was simply reacting to the possibility of that action.

Each speech also had a different audience and the context of the speech was unique. In the case of Kagan and Kristol, their voice is heard by the neo-conservative movement, and it was specifically written in response to the events of 9/11, linking the newly declared "War on Terrorism" to the case of regime change in Iraq. Paul Wolfowitz and Condoleezza Rice's remarks were made to a policy-oriented group, the Council on Foreign Relations, and they made specific policy references to the Bush administration's approach to Iraq. Donald Rumsfeld and Colin Powell both made the case that now was the time for "consequences" for Iraq's defiance of UN resolutions before official political bodies as the war approached. One was before the US Congress and the other before the UN Security Council. Richard Perle's article, while published on the American Enterprise Institute website, was also published in a newspaper on the eve of the US invasion and intended to reach out to the wider public. Finally, Bush's address was much the same, even as he "I've come here tonight to report to all Americans, and to the Iraqi people, on the strategy our nation is pursuing in Iraq" (APPENDIX 17).

As these texts were categorized and repeated "lexicons" were identified, the analytical process highlighted the most prolific textual ideas. The paper here used the number of 30 occurrences in order to separate the most important themes from the many others present in the texts. When assessed cumulatively from 2001-2003, these were:

Theme	Occurrences in Texts
Lie/lying/concealment/obstruction/cheat/ intimidation related to UN and IAEA inspection activity	57
Saddam "possesses WMD"/ dangerous arsenal/ unaccounted for material / pursuing even more	44
Iraq "threat" to neighbors and US/ "gathering danger"	42
Connection between Iraq and Terrorism	33
Iraq's violation of terms of '91 cease-fire justifies enforcement/ defiance of UN resolutions/ reference to time (11 years)	33
Possible nexus between terrorists and WMD	30

Because President Bush's speech in 2004 was intended to describe his post-invasion strategy, it is a fundamentally different context and thus separated from the chart above.

However, it is still helpful in re-creating the administration's conflict frame towards Iraq.

Below, the three most significant themes are listed:

<u>Theme</u>	<u>Occurrences in Texts</u>
Fighting "terrorism" in Iraq who want a return to Tyranny and "death of democracy"/ War on Terror Al Qaeda / "illegal militias"/reference to 9/11	23
Goal of a self-governing Iraq with US values— democracy and freedom	15
Forces of "hope" and "freedom" on US side/ "liberation"	11

Unlike the Table 1, the Bush administrations framing of the conflict was overwhelmingly positive. Even the categorization of some "lexicons" under the negative frame is somewhat misleading. While the administration held out hope for resolution and disarmament by peaceful means, it never the less held out the option of the use of "force." Therefore, they were much more prone to endorse policies that led to war. Similar to the Arab League discourse, the US also supported and relied upon the social construction of international ideas, the most obvious being the international legitimacy of the UN and UN resolutions. As such, the administration argued that any Iraqi "obstruction" of UN resolutions was a violation of the "collective will" of the international community. In this way, they employed the use of identity and casting Iraq into an opposing identity (Wendt, 1999). Specifically, the US cast itself into a shared identity with, or on the same side, with the international community put Iraq into an opposing side, where they were singularly "in violation" of the will of the greater international community. In this opposing identity, Iraq was portrayed as being connected with "terrorism," as a "gathering danger" to the

US and its friends, and in "possession" of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, the US administration invoked the "right" of the UN member nations to enforce the UN resolutions effectively (Ruggie, 1998; Onuf and Klink, 1989). In essence, the Bush administration's rhetoric is based on a social construction of international authority and norms, and it pits Iraq outside those norms by highlighting Iraq's defiance of the UN, its development of WMD and its connection to terrorism (Kuhn, 1962). Ironically, when the Bush administration failed to convince the international community to endorse the war through a final UN resolution, they proceeded without UN "legitimacy" anyway. This can possibly be explained on the role of "values" in the discourse, which Kristol, Kagan and Perle describe as legitimizing US power, even outside the UN.

Bush's speech in 2004 embraces the same social construction of ideas, regarding Iraq as a in a state in "tyranny" under Saddam and the war's essential role in the greater "War on Terror." However, Bush focuses on values, primarily American values, as the source for a "positive" frame towards war with Iraq. The shift from WMD and the UN resolutions is a natural one, because the Iraq Study Group failed to find chemical or biological weapons, or an active nuclear program, that the administration had said were in Iraq (Tenet, 2004). Yet Bush's emphasis of values such as "freedom" and "democracy" is an important element of what Alker and Cambell identified as the social context of values in discourse (Alker, 1992). While present in 2003, especially in Condoleezza Rice's speech on the President's national security strategy, values were not as significant in the public justifications for invading Iraq. At the same time, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, values were an important aspect internal to the Bush administration. This is seen through the administration's belief in the inherent "morality" of their actions

in response to the events of 9/11 (Woodward, 2006).

These values, and particularly "freedom" and "liberty," were used to promote a uniquely positive conflict frame. This reflects what Alker refers to as a contradictory fulfillment of humanism in modern international studies (Alker, 1992). On the one hand, there is a humanistic recognition of inherent human dignity in all people, and from that recognition there is a humanistic drive to help all people experience that dignity. Yet the approach that the West has used before, and the approach the Bush administration used to achieve that in Iraq, was to destroy the social structure of another country, using ethnocentric language to describe the continued opposition to the American effort as "uncivilized" (APPENDIX 17).

Table 4

Table 4, the Ideational-Lingual Mapping table that mirrors Table 2, similarly presents a multi-dimensional depiction of the statements of the Bush administration. It is also an aggregate-type approach to understanding the conflict frame of the Bush administration, combining the comments from 2001-2004.

In evaluating this table, the most common type of speech employed was *assertive*. The paper noted at least 477 assertive comments related to Iraq and US policy in the region, as compared with 30 *directive* comments and 5 *committive* comments. This means that over 90% of the discourse was in the form of asserting a certain reality, not unlike the discourse of the Arab League. These assertive statements, as was mentioned in the previous section, are part of the social construction of a reality which ultimately correlates to US policies toward Iraq. By asserting 44 times that Iraq either had WMD, possessed unaccounted for prohibited material, or was continuing to seek nuclear weapons, the language "elicits a response" from its hearers—the US public, US lawmakers, the UN

Security Council and the international community at large—that something must be done about that reality (Onuf and Klink, 1989, p. 158; Kuhn, 1962). This is especially the case when the assertive statements are made in relation to "world view," which evokes an emotional, psychological and deeply rooted response (Goldstein and Koehane, 1993).

Therefore, the combined total of 49 references to 9/11, or preventing another 9/11, as categorized under "world view" are an important aspect of the linguistic context that shaped the policy environment toward Iraq. Not only did these references reflect a particular social context—that of the American experience with 9/11—but they also promoted a particular conflict frame that placed the Iraq debate inside that context. In doing so, the administration promoted the idea that stopping Saddam Hussein was directly connected to stopping another 9/11 experience, one that could be even more devastating than the first because of the effect of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons. Recalling Grimshaw's idea of the "stakes" or importance of the issue in conflict talk, the administration describes the highest possible "stakes"—a direct threat to US national security and ordinary Americans (Grimshaw, 1992). The effect of 9/11 is also related to what Ruggie described as the individual or societal factors which shape an outlook or behavior (Ruggie, 1998).

Alker's discussion of societal values also relevant here. As mentioned earlier, the identification of societal values as formative in political discourse is relevant to world views, principled beliefs and causal beliefs, because they all reflect societal values in different forms (Alker, 1992). While a significant societal value affecting the US discourse was related to September 11th, other factors were more general to American society. Recalling previous vanquished American foes, Stalin and Hitler, in connection with Saddam's "murderous" rule, the historical importance of American's role fighting

"tyranny" is emphasized (mentioned 25 times). It is language which others have identified as representing an ethnocentric interpretation of the world (Alker, 1992). America's own experience as a British colony and little experience as a colonizing power also show the nativity of the idea that America could invade Iraq as a "liberating" power. This is seen in the "world view" assertions that the US was fighting for "the cause of justice," empowered by right "values" and promoting "freedom" in the process (31 similar references).

These values-type assertions were bolstered by the assertions of a possible "nexus" between WMD and "terrorists" (mentioned 30 times), which promoted a defensive psychological posture towards Iraq and capitalized on American fears about terrorism (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2002). Onuf and Klink refer to these *assertive* types of comments as "instructive," or as instructing others on a construct of reality that yields a societal response. In this case the response was psychological defensiveness (Onuf and Klink, 1989).

The social construct that these assertive statements reflected and promoted was also connected to the "principled belief" that not only did Saddam Hussein possess WMD (mentioned 57 times) but that he was "obstructing," "lying," "cheating," "concealing" and "intimidating" in an all out effort to avoid disarming those weapons (mentioned 44 times). In effect, the defensive and righteous "world view" was reinforced by the "principled beliefs" which believed that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, would not disarm peacefully, and that he "gave sanctuary" to terrorists or was connected to terrorism (mentioned 33 times). The most numerous assertions categorized under "causal beliefs" were that if Saddam Hussein "did not offer full cooperation, then the UN

could not complete the mission" (mentioned 32 times); and that "over a period of 11 years Saddam Hussein refused enforcement of UN resolutions" (mentioned 33 times). These references, as an instructive-type rule, promote an understanding that something must be done about this problem because the UN resolution process failed to bring about disarmament. Onuf and Klink suggest that supra-ordinate actors attempt to dominate the discourse with instructive-rules that thereby give them legitimacy for their policies (Onuf and Klink, 1989).

In evaluating the other types of speech rules, *directive* and *committive*, the occurrences were minimal by comparison, accounting for less than 7% of the "focal points." The following two ideas were the most prominent and both were a type of *directive* statement. The idea that "time is running out" and the inherent "risk of inaction" were requests for a timely response to the issue of Iraq disarmament and reflected the administration's world view on critical nature of the matter (18 related occurrences). Also, the repeated suggestion that Saddam Hussein be "removed from power" reflected the principled belief that he was the source of trouble from Iraq (12 related occurrences). These comments, while not nearly as prolific as the *assertive* "focal points," are important examples of the language shift from instructive to directive, where the Bush administration suggests a course of action. Since this language was used by those involved in the policy-making process, in is an important observation because it can be related directly to the policies that the US eventually took—to invade Iraq and depose Saddam Hussein.

From this analysis of Tables 3 and 4, the Bush administration's conflict frame can be described by the following:

The Bush Administration Conflict Frame

- The US was on the side of the UN, the international community, and "freedom" and "liberty" while Iraq was on the side of terror and represented singular threat
- Iraq possessed WMD in defiance of the legitimate UN resolutions
- The last 11 years demonstrated that Saddam Hussein would not willfully disarm
- The possibly combination of terrorists and WMD made Saddam Hussein's regime an grave international threat
- Iraq was connected to terrorism and could bring about a more disastrous 9/11
- This threat requires immediate action and the likely removal of Saddam Hussein

The analysis above described the conflict framing and "ideational pathways" of the Arab and US foreign policy decision-makers. The next chapter will recall the foreign policy options of these groups and demonstrate the influence of the context of conflict frames.

CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION OF CONFLICT FRAMING AND FOREIGN POLICY

Conflict Framing's Contextual Relation to Foreign Policy: The US

On March 19th the US began its invasion of Iraq, with a small coalition, and toppled Saddam Hussein's regime in the spring of 2003. Chapter 4 discussed the nature of foreign policy formulation in the Bush administration. This section will attempt to build a cognitive bridge between the administration's conflict frame and their foreign policy options by describing the relationship between the two. This discussion is not meant to delve into policy intricacies but rather to investigate the possibility of relationship through further examination of the social and lingual constructs and context. This is a brief review of the main events related to US policy toward Iraq:

- 2001 – US policy of sanctions continues; US-UK air strike on 20 September of surface to air missile batteries
- 2002 – January 29 – President Bush shifts foreign policy from terrorists to governments by identifying "axis of evil" countries that seek WMD
 - September 12 - President Bush addresses UN special assembly; calls for multi-lateral action against Iraq
 - November 8 – UN resolution 1441 is passed, calling on Iraq to cooperate with the UN inspections and declare all WMD material by 8 December
 - December 7 – Iraq submits declaration which is discredited by US experts
- 2003 – March 7 – US and UK seek approval of additional UN resolution to authorize war; the resolution draft fails to win support and is withdrawn
 - March 17 – President Bush speech gives Saddam Hussein to evacuate the country within 48 hours

- March 19 – US-led war begins with air strikes against possible location of Saddam Hussein
- April 9 – Baghdad falls to US troops
- May 1 – US declares an end to the Iraq war
- Oct 16 – UN Security Council Resolution 1511 recognized authority of provisional Iraqi government, authorizes UN aid to Iraq, calls for submission of a time-table for Iraqi self-governance

2004 – June 7 - UN SC Resolution 1546 recognizes the legitimacy of the interim Iraqi government and calls on UN members to support it.

June 28 – US administrator Paul Bremmer hands over sovereign authority to sovereign Iraq to PM Iyad Allawi

In keeping with the theoretical basis of post-positivist theorizing and social constructivism, this discussion must be a discussion of the social construct of ideas that surrounded the foreign policy-making process. The principle ideas of the conflict frame which were summarized in the previous chapter will henceforth be referred to as the "principles." As stated previously, this conflict frame as represented in the "principles" does not cause a policy decision, but rather serves as part of the surrounding context. Therefore, this dissertation offers the following diagram to clarify this relationship according to the literature.




Figure 1. The Bush Foreign Policy (FP) "Onion"

In the figure above, the chart is divided into layers, the most core of which represents the actual foreign policy options. In the diagram, this is the core of the "onion." The surrounding layers are all the principle aspects of the administration's conflict frame: the individual ideational factors, the internal ideational factors (internal to the decision-making group), the societal level factors, and the state-to-state social construct, or how states relate to each other through the reinforcement of ideas (Alker, 1992; Ruggie, 1998; Wendt 1992).

The model has at its center "forcefully disarming Iraq" as the policy option. In order to get to the core of the onion, however, one has to peel back the layers. These layers are the ideational structure, as evidenced in the social, historical, cultural and political context surrounding the policy debate. Taken together, these layers form the conflict frame, which was previously defined as the cumulative result of cognitive processes used to interpret and assimilate new events and communicate those meanings with others (Noel, Shoemaker and Hall, 2006; Galtung, 1996). Thus, foreign policy options are the outcome of a process, a process that receives numerous information inputs which are filtered through the layers of the conflict frame. The diagram below depicts some of these inputs.




Figure 2. Inputs to the "Onion"

By mentioning a few of the prominent factors affecting the case of Iraq, this model demonstrates how external factors act as inputs in foreign policy formation. The UN proceedings, the Iraqi expatriate activity, the intelligence estimates from the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, outside counselors like Prince Bandar or the Israeli Lobby's Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and intrinsic national security interests all arguably played various roles in influencing US policy towards Iraq. However, each of these sources of information was interpreted through the

administration's conflict frame, which included the following elements:

- The US was on the side of the UN, the international community, and "freedom" and "liberty" while Iraq was on the side of terror and represented singular threat
- Iraq possessed WMD in defiance of the legitimate UN resolutions
- The last 11 years demonstrated that Saddam Hussein would not willfully disarm
- The possibly combination of terrorists and WMD made Saddam Hussein's regime an grave international threat
- Iraq was connected to terrorism and could bring about a more disastrous 9/11
- This threat requires immediate action and the likely removal of Saddam Hussein

The administrations conflict frame did influence foreign policy choices, though not as an independent variable but as a part of the decision-making structure. Next, the dissertation will describe this process, but first it deserves a more expanded theoretical explanation.

As this dissertation is based upon the theoretical arguments of critical theory and social constructivism, it argues that social behavior—to include international relations—is informed by the context of a social construction of ideas (Devetak, 1996, Wendt, 1999, Smith, Booth and Zalewski, 1996). These ideas are established and promoted as the state-to-state level, like the concept of "state sovereignty" or international "anarchy," but they are also critical at the individual and group levels of social activity (Ruggie, 1998; Alker, 1992). These social ideas are aided by language, which Vasquez says not only helps to describe phenomenon but actually helps to produce phenomenon (Vasquez, 1996). He also argues that such language "frames" the phenomenon in such a way that hampers objectivity by inadvertently directing discourse in particular direction (Vasquez, 1996). Thus, frames are closely connected to language choice, linguistic cues and message

patterns, and yet are based on individual and group psychological factors such as education, life experiences, and world view (Putnam and Holmer, 1992; University of Colorado, nd).

When connecting these frames with behavior, it is important to note that not only do frames help individual and groups interpret information, but they aid them to take action (Rothman, 1997). Policy-makers use certain frames of conflict strategically, to justify self-interest, build coalitions or promote certain outcomes (Kaufman and Smith, 1999). As mentioned in chapter 1, policy-makers use characterization frames to simplify their understanding of groups or individuals—like characterizing of Saddam Hussein as a "murderous dictator" (Shmueli, Elliott and Kaufman, 2006). These labels are not helpful in achieving peaceful resolution because they automatically undermine any sincere effort by Saddam Hussein to comply with UN disarmament by casting doubt on his motivations. These frames also tend to help justify one's own identity and position while diminishing the value of the other, as the Bush administration placed itself on the side of "freedom" and Saddam on the side of "terror." Frames also influence the way struggling participants evaluate their best options for success and what actions are legitimate, notably Bush's push for war against a "defiant" and "threatening" Saddam (Shmueli, Elliott and Kaufman, 2006). Now the dissertation will look at the previously mentioned policy inputs.

Table 5. Policy Process

Foreign Policy Input	Ideational Level/ Conflict Frame	Policy
UN Proceedings	State-to-State/ UN legitimate body to disarm Iraq	Support UNSC res 1441
	Internal to group/ Saddam defiant, will not disarm	Prepare for war
Iraqi Expatriates	Internal to group/ Saddam dangerous, hated	Give Saddam 48 hrs to
	Individual level/ "rightness" of the cause	Leave; "liberate" Iraq
National Interests	State-to-state/ Saddam Hussein poised to threaten Region with WMD	Continue sanctions, Invade to prevent "blackmail"
	Societal level/ US security at risk to terrorists	Promote preventive measures
Intelligence Estimates	Internal to group/ Saddam could cause another 9/11 but with WMD	Invade Iraq w/out UN approval
Outside Counselors	Internal to group/ Saddam Hussein is a threat; irrational must be dealt with immediately Iraq part of "war on terror"	Invade Iraq when UN authorization failed Seek coalition

This chart brings together the concepts that have been developed thus far in the dissertation by examining at a sampling of foreign policy inputs, considering how these inputs were filtered through the conflict frame of the US administration, and ultimately what foreign policy option it correlated to, if any. The chart only lists the most relevant level of the conflict frame, and it recalls the principle ideas from the Bush administration's conflict frame that is related to that input stream. In doing so, it demonstrates how an input like "intelligence estimates" is processed through the *group level* of the conflict frame, which believes that Saddam Hussein is "threatening" and could cause "another 9/11." By filtering the input in this way, the frame supports a discourse that promotes tough action toward Saddam's regime. Each example follows a similar pattern. The information input does not in itself incriminate or justify Saddam Hussein's regime, but

once the conflict frame gives it meaning, it pushes the policy discourse in a particular direction—almost inevitably towards war with Iraq.

This discussion has been theoretically grounded, theoretically guided, and ultimately theoretically applied. While this methodology has not demonstrated causality between conflict framing and foreign policy, it has strengthened the hypothesis that conflict framing does impact foreign policy through its ideational context. It has done this by applying critical theory, discourse analysis and an analysis of conflict framing to the case of the US administration and its policy toward Iraq from 2001-2004. The dissertation now turns to the Arab foreign policy.

Conflict Framing's Contextual Relation to Foreign Policy: The Arab World

Bearing in mind that the Arab League statements do not directly correlate to the policy choices of the Arab states, the dissertation assumes that these statements do represent the conflict frame of the Arab states' leadership toward the issue of the Iraq. Similar to the previous discussion, this section will attempt to demonstrate the relationship of the Arab conflict frame, as seen through the Arab League, and the Arab states policy choices through the ideational context. It will also discuss other relevant factors affecting Arab decision-making process. Thus, before beginning an analysis of the conflict frames and foreign policy, it is necessary to have a more in-depth look at foreign policy formulation in the Arab world. While this was accomplished previously regarding the Bush administration, it has not been described from the Arab perspective.

Foreign Policy Formation in the Arab World

When attempting to understand foreign policy formation in the Arab world, it is necessary to first consider who is governed and who is governing, and what the connection is between them. The Arab world is made up of 22 nation-states, consisting of some 300 million people, and sharing a national identity as "Arabs." This identity,

which represents the governed and the governors, has been profoundly influenced by the legacy of colonization and a resurgence of Islamic thought (Al Jabari, 2007; Al Jeyat, 1974). Within this greater national identity are unique social, religious and even ethnic groupings that represent small cleavages within the greater national identity. Whether in the social majority or minority, these groups all attempt to influence their governments to support their well-being and interests. In the Arab world this social structure, between the governed and the governors, has been historically reflected in variety of forms: monarchy, republic and dictatorship as in the case of Iraq, or the development of a bicameral parliamentary system in the case of Jordan. These two cases demonstrate the spectrum societal consensus and participation in the government in the Arab world. However, regardless of the degree of consensualism in Arab governments, most experts agree that foreign policy formation remains an elite-centric process (Korany and Dessouki, 1991; Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 2003; Halliday, 1991; Hudson, 1992). Some scholars have argued that authoritarian rule in the Arab world reduces its responsiveness to domestic pressure in the realm of foreign policy. However, others have argued that the type or degree of authoritarianism does not exclude societal factors on policy formation, and in some cases, makes it more responsive to domestic concerns (Hudson, 1992; Lucas, 2004). Generally, the decision-makers in the Arab world are responsive in degrees to their continuants as they attempt not only to build broad consensus for their policies, but more importantly, for their rule (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 2003; Lucas, 2004).

The complicated nature of consensus building among Arab regimes, and the unique models that each use, makes it difficult to study Arab policy formation. Additionally, each country in the Arab world has its own culture, strategic considerations, history of conflict with its neighbors, demographic make-up, religious and ethnic factions,

economy, elite groups and political processes—all of which affect the foreign policy formulation. For example, the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt, the pan-Arab nationalists from Morocco to Iraq, the tribes in Yemen, or the rising political influence of groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, all impact policy formulation in the Arab world depending on where a given decision-making group sits. Thus, this section only makes broad observations about policy formation in the Arab world.

One of Halliday's major contributions in this area has been his work on the conflict dynamics of the Middle East and foreign policies surrounding the 1991 Gulf War (Halliday, 1991). In his remarks on the post-war regional environment, Halliday remarked that the US coalition might be able to win the war but questioned whether they could "survive the peace" (Halliday, 1991, p. 225). What he meant was that war brings internal strain and pressures on the countries involved which produces political and ideological changes. He predicted a different political landscape in the Middle East following the '91 war, but not the result the US coalition anticipated. Instead of solving any strategic problems in the Middle East, Halliday predicted that a range of "policy issues will emerge...which will remain to bedevil governments" (Halliday, 1991, p. 225). To a large extent, Halliday's assessment proved correct. When the US attempted to rally another broad Arab coalition to go to war with Saddam Hussein in 2003, no one would join them except Kuwait. One of the many reasons was that the Arab conflict frame had changed as a result of the new political and ideological landscape.

Another observation that can be made through Halliday's work is the guiding principle of "regional security" to understanding foreign policy in the Middle East (Halliday, 1991, p. 230). He gives three sub-meanings to this concept: the maintenance of peace between regional states, the stability of the regimes themselves against internal

and external opposition, and the management of the region's relations with outside countries (Halliday, 1991). The first sub-meaning refers to inter-state relations, where the Arab world has become one of the most conflict ridden regions in modern history. Beyond interstate regional dynamics, "regional security" also relates to the survivability of the regimes themselves, a key element of US-Arab relations in recent history. This helps to explain some Arab regimes' reluctance to support the US war Iraq, not wanting a rapid Iraqi political development to undermine their rule (Al Badi, 2008). Finally, the third sub-meaning refers to the way in which outside countries compete over interests and influence in the Middle East region. As times of oil scarcity quickly approach, Arab regimes will likely respond to increased demand by playing off of the competing regional ambitions of the US, Iran, India and the industrializing Far East (Halliday, 2001). In this way, they will likely use the international context, and their position in a strategic environment, to maximize their regional and international standing. Therefore, understanding these three sub-meanings of "regional security," help explain how decision-makers determine appropriate foreign policy options in the Arab world.

These decision-makers, whether determined through monarchical, military, political, or tribal connections, are loyal to the executive branch in their representation as participants at the Arab League. Thus, by describing the conflict frame of the Arab League from 2001-2004, the conflict frame of the foreign policy decision-makers is represented. The next section will attempt to demonstrate a relationship between the mutual conflict frame of these elites and the policy options suggested by the Arab League.

The Ideational Context the Arab Conflict Frame and Foreign Policy

This discussion will closely resemble the analysis of the Bush administration except where notably differences between the groups require an adjustment of the analysis method. One immediate difference is that the Arab League is not a national policy-making group, as is the Bush administration. However, this dissertation assumes that the conflict frame of the Arab League represents the conflict frame of the policy-makers in the individual countries of the Arab world. Another key difference is that this analysis does not account for the individual level of ideational factors in the same way that Bush's conflict frame did. Since it represents such a broad group of elites, it doesn't account for personal ideologies or previous experiences with Iraq, etc. Therefore, the onion diagram below omits that level of the ideational conflict frame, and depicts the social construct of ideas that surrounded the Arab League's statements and foreign policy recommendations. The principle ideas of the conflict frame that were summarized previously are listed again here and illustrated in the layers of the onion:

- Concept of Iraqi suffering from previous war and sanctions a prominent feature of the discourse
- The perception of a threat was not from an Iraqi weapons program, but rather from an eminent US attack and negative regional impacts
- The most important regional issue was the Arab-Israeli conflict, calling on the US to resume the peace process
- The UN disarmament mission was legitimate, but should be applied to Israel's WMD program, which was also against UN resolutions
- Perceived the war as one of aggression and against international law
- Sovereignty of Iraq paramount; change should be from within




Figure 3. The Arab FP "Onion"

In the figure above, the core of the "onion" represents the foreign policy option of non-cooperation with the US-led effort to topple Saddam Hussein. The surrounding layers are all the principle aspects of the Arab League's conflict frame: the internal ideational factors (internal to the decision-making group), the societal level, and the state-to-state social construct, or how states relate to each other through the reinforcement of ideas (Alker, 1992; Ruggie, 1998; Wendt 1992). These layers of the ideational structure are the following: at the internal group level there was recognition of the long-suffering of the Iraqi people since the war with Iran in the 1980s up until the time of the Arab League

proceedings—part of which they shared responsibility for during the '91 Gulf War. While this dimension of the conflict frame does not necessarily reflect a deep concern for Iraqi people by the Arab elites, it does reflect the importance of the theme of this suffering to the larger Arab public. Thus it served as an important ideational filter, and part of the conflict frame, in evaluating potential policy toward Iraq. At the societal level, the history of colonization, occupation and exploitation of outside powers makes any foreign intervention highly suspect by the society, especially in light of America's support for the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands. At the state-to-state level, the Arab League also endorsed the role of the UN, if it meant to play an even-handed role in the region and could prevent unilateral action against Iraq. This recognition of the ideational structure of the international system, despite its injustices, was affirmed and crucial to the Arab League conflict frame. Processing through these levels were various inputs on the foreign policy formation process.




Figure 4. Inputs to the "Onion" (for the Arabs)

The above diagram illustrates some of the prominent factors affecting policy formation towards Iraq. Since the Arab League does not form national policy, this chart considers the "onion's" core as representing two arenas: the policy options of the Arab states individually as well as the policy options recommended by the Arab League. Therefore, the external circles depicted above are policy inputs that are considered by the Arab League and the Arab states themselves which are subsequently filtered through the

principles of the Arab conflict frame as identified in chapter 4. The chart below puts these concepts together to demonstrate how these policy inputs were understood by the Arab policy-makers.

Table 6. Policy Process

Foreign Policy Input Option	Ideational Level/ Conflict Frame	Arab League policy	Arab State Policy
UN Proceedings votes	State-to-State/ UN legitimate body to disarm Iraq and Israel	Support UNSC res 1441; called UN to disarm Israel	Syria UNSC participant, for res. 1441
proceedings	Internal to group/ Iraqi suffering do to sanctions	Call on Iraq to cooperate Call on UN to protect Iraqi sovereignty	Support UN
Relations with the US w/ war cooperation	Internal to group/ US should promote peace process US attack a threat to the region and to stability Societal level/ US "interference" negative	Called on US to renew peace process; "denounced" outside interference call for "non-interference"	Privately and publicly discouraged the war; * privately cooperated Publicly denied with US coalition
Public Opinion themselves to calm	Internal to group/ The war would destabilize while Arab-Israeli conflict more important; Iraq war not legitimate	Labeled the war an act of "aggression" and against international law	Publicly distanced from the war; appealed national unity and
Iraq's regional role in the war Balance of Power it came, w/ war *	State-to-state/ War a threat to all Arab states; Concern about Iraq power vacuum; Iraq not a regional treat	Demanded respect for Iraqi sovereignty and territorial integrity	Privately discouraged but when inevitably privately cooperated
National interests and regime publicly against	State-to-state/ threatens the regional status-quo	Called for non-interference; change should come internally	Privately and unilateral war
publicly against	Internal to group/ Unilateral war "illegal;" bad precedent for the region	Rejected participation in the US effort	Privately and the war but privately cooperated *
US on issue	Societal level/ Arab-Israeli conflict most important	Continued to call on UN to move on peace process	Privately counseled importance of Pal.

* The UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt all quietly cooperated with the US military to varying degrees. Kuwait cooperated openly, allowing major land forces to enter Iraq through its borders.

The conflict frame of the Arab elites, as depicted from the Arab League proceedings, helped to shape the policy response of the different regimes. This chart brings together the concepts that have been developed throughout the dissertation by examining a sampling of unique foreign policy factors in the Arab world. It demonstrates how these inputs were filtered through the conflict frame of the Arab elites. Then the chart depicts the related policy option of the Arab League and of the Arab states generally. The nature of the Arab regimes themselves, and the Arab League as a unit of study, makes this analysis different than understanding the Bush administration. This will be explained in the following discussion.

While Halliday, Hinnebusch and Ehteshami and Lucas all wrote about the self-preserving mechanism of Arab foreign policy, they implicitly suggest that Arab regimes' relations with their public are sensitive to public perception of the regime's interests in a particular policy decision. Because of this sensitivity and the need to manage public perceptions, the "survivability of the regime" will clearly never manifest itself in the public discourse. At the same time, the Arab League serves as a venue for Arab leadership to communicate to their constituency and to their regional partners and rivals. As Kaufman and Smith noted, decision-makers may use conflict frames strategically, to justify self-interest, build coalitions (at home) or to promote certain outcomes (Kaufman and Smith, 1999). In other words, ruling elites may use a conflict frame, and resulting discourse, to shore up domestic support at home—even if such discourse is totally insincere. Contextual evidence suggests that pressure at home made it very difficult for any Arab leader to stand with the US, to say nothing of their reluctance to support an effort that could lead to their demise. To the contrary, those leaders who publicly opposed

to the US effort stood to gain the most at home (Telhami, 2003).

Also, as previously mentioned, this conflict frame does not account for the differing ideologies and personal backgrounds of the various heads-of-state in the Arab world. Still, it is very useful to understand the conflict frame at the state-to-state level and at the internal level of the group. The chart lists some of the principle ideas of the Arab League conflict frame which are related to particular policy inputs. As such, it demonstrated the "UN proceedings" were viewed as appropriate but unevenly applied to the region. Furthermore, the UN was seen as a legitimate international body, with a prominent responsibility to help bring regional peace, reflecting acquiescence to the "collective intentionality" or norms promoted by the great powers (Ruggie, 1998, p.869). This resulted in statements which called on the UN to uphold the sovereignty and unity of Iraq, and to disarm Israel as well as Iraq. Individually, the Arab states stood behind the UN. Syria, the only voting Arab state at the UN Security Council proceedings, voted in favor of UN SC resolution 1441 which held Iraq in "material breach" of its disarmament obligations (UN Press Release 7564, 2002).

The remaining policy inputs shared a similar pattern. Public opinion, US relations, national interests, and consideration of Iraq's regional role all were filtered through the Arab decision-makers' similar conflict frame. The chart notes how the "threat" of a US invasion was a pervasive element of the ideational structure at more than one level. It threatened the status quo of the regimes, threatened new suffering in the eyes of the society, and it threatened stability of the region. This conflict frame related to the policy response of the Arab League which rejected the war, by pushing the policy discourse uniformly against the war (Vasquez, 1996; Rothman, 1997). However, when the threat of the invasion began to materialize and the private counsel of America's regional allies was

disregarded, many of the regimes cooperated privately. This demonstrates that the conflict frame is not an independent variable on foreign policy. The interests of the regimes and the strategic importance of maintaining strong ties with the US, the world's largest economy, were important factors which likely led to quiet cooperation with the US war effort. However, the manner that the policy formed and was carried out was in marked contrast to the 1991 coalition. The conflict framing analysis here suggests that the social and ideational environment in 2003, or Arab conflict frame, influenced the formation of an Arab policy that disagreed publicly and cooperated quietly.

Both the discussion above and the discussion of the Bush administration's conflict frame and foreign policy suggest that a contextual relationship does exist between frames and policy. It has done this by drawing on critical theory and text analysis to draw out conflict frames used towards the issue of Iraq. Yet the dissertation has yet to demonstrate that differences in conflict frames influenced differences in foreign policy options, as demonstrated in the case of the Arab League and the US administration in their discourse around Iraq. That is what the dissertation turns to next.

Comparison Across Study Groups

This section will compare the results and discussions of the two study groups: the Bush Administration and the Arab League from 2001-2004. It will do so by selecting key themes from the principles of the conflict frames of the two groups. The selected general themes are: the nature of "threat;" the role of justifications, and the idea of international order. This section will describe how the two groups understand the theme from within the conflict frame and discuss how that led to divergent policy options. First, the nature of the threat is explored in comparison.

Nature of the Threat

As highlighted in chapter 4, the Bush administration viewed Saddam Hussein's regime as a threat to its own interests and to its regional allies. The idea of threat was evidenced in the following conflict frame principles:

- 11 years of partial cooperation demonstrated that Saddam Hussein would not willfully disarm
- The possibly combination of terrorists and WMD made Saddam Hussein's regime an grave international threat
- Iraq was connected to terrorism and could bring about a more disastrous 9/11
- This threat requires immediate action and the likely removal of Saddam Hussein

Thus, through the conflict frame of the Bush administration, it was all but impossible for Saddam Hussein to reform himself or his regime. The menacing but incomplete intelligence assessments and accounts from Iraqi defectors only served to strengthen the simplified frame that Iraq was a "gathering" threat (Shmueli, Elliott and Kaufman, 2006). This in turn influenced a policy direction which supported war, demonstrated by Table 5.

The Arab League, on the other hand, reflected nearly an opposite understanding of the nature of the threat through its conflict frame. Accordingly, two of the principles of the Arab conflict frame were:

- The perception of a threat was not from an Iraqi weapons program, but rather from an eminent US attack and negative regional impacts
- Sovereignty of Iraq paramount; change should be from within

The nature of the threat, as referred to by Halliday, is understood through the concept of "regional security" (Halliday, 1991, p. 230). Through this concept, a possible invasion of Iraq undermines Arab regimes both externally (through democratization pressures), and internally (by galvanizing anti-Western and anti-regime public sentiment). Additionally,

the threat of a power vacuum in Iraq was a threatening possibility even for Saddam's enemies, like Saudi Arabia (Al Badi, 2008). This was part of the conflict frame that viewed war itself as a threat to the regimes and to the region. As noted in Table 6, this helped to direct the policy discourse of the Arab League to reject an attack on Iraq and even led to private consultations with Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, Saudi delegations, and King Abdullah II of Jordan to discourage the US plans for war. The justifications for war are considered next.

The Role of Justifications

The Bush administration made an extensive case for war with Iraq based on different levels of justifications. Among these were the themes of preventing another 9/11, the "rightness" of the cause in the face of such a threat, and the failure Saddam to disarm. According the conflict frame in chapter 4, the following principles are relevant:

- The US was on the side of the UN, the international community, and "freedom" and "liberty" while Iraq was on the side of terror and represented singular threat
- Iraq was connected to terrorism and could bring about a more disastrous 9/11

The Bush administration's use of the normative speech created a conflict frame that was positive in its outlook as well as connected to closely held values like "freedom." When combined with the societal context after the attacks of 9/11, nearly any policy choice became justifiable—even toppling a regime that was relatively weak. Though referring to international negotiations, Grimshaw makes a statement that is applicable in this context, stating that "differences in certain assumptions about optimal (or even appropriate) outcomes of negotiations across languages/cultures may be so great that unless those assumptions are somehow fore grounded, the outcomes are unlikely to be more than superficially successful" (Grimshaw, 1992, p. 98). While the Bush

administration's justifications for war were well-supported, its assumptions about the outcomes were not.

From the Arab perspective, the justifications for rejecting war and the denial of the US justifications were evidenced in the Arab conflict frame:

- Perceived the war as one of aggression and against international law
- Concept of Iraqi suffering from previous war and sanctions a prominent feature of the discourse

Because the Arab League frame did not recognize the US conflict frame or discourse as being legitimate, they did not support the US policy of unilateral action against Iraq and regarded it as "illegal." The Arab leadership also focused on the long-suffering of the Iraqi people as one justification for avoiding war. As demonstrated in Table 6, this led to policies which avoided war, in contrast to Bush's justifications. These differing perspectives are an example of what Grimshaw referred to as communicative non-success in different cultural environments, "When the stakes are high, as they ordinarily are in international negotiations, such situations can become sensitive, complex, difficult, and dangerous" (Grimshaw, 1992, p. 94).

The Idea of International Order

Finally, the US President's experience in responding to 9/11 impacted his understanding of the US role in the international system. In his subsequent 2002 National Security Strategy, President Bush outlined the doctrine of preemption in the new strategic environment. While still ideationally committed to the principles of "state sovereignty" under the UN, the following were a part his administration's conflict frame related the case of Iraq:

- This threat requires immediate action and the likely removal of Saddam Hussein
- The possibly combination of terrorists and WMD made Saddam Hussein's regime an grave international threat

This conflict frame, combined with the Bush administration's doctrine of preemption, led the US toward policies of unilateralism that later came to symbolize the administration's approach to Iraq through its disregard of the UN Security Council.

The Arab League's conflict frame was more committed ideationally to the role of the UN in promoting international peace and stability. It also saw the role of the US as critical to solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. The following pair was a part of the principle list of the Arab conflict frame:

- The most important regional issue was the Arab-Israeli conflict, calling on the US to resume the peace process
- The UN disarmament mission was legitimate, but should be applied to Israel's WMD program, which was also against UN resolutions

In summary, the Arab League conflict frame viewed positive international participation as necessary when dealing with regional conflict. Thus, the Arab League supported the UN, but insisted that the UN resolutions did not authorize the US to use force against Iraq. Also, by endorsing the international social construct, the Arab regimes benefit under the protection of such a system. Military action outside of that context is more threatening to weak states than to strong ones. The Arab states followed the pattern of the Arab League by supporting the legitimacy of the UN to respond to the Iraq crisis. This thinking reflects Kuhn's observation that policy arguments are inherently theory laden and based

on a set of facts according to a distinctive world view about what is important and what causes what (Kuhn, 1962).

These three areas, the nature of "threat;" the role of justifications, and the idea of international order, were all reflected in the conflict frames of the Bush administration and the Arab League. In each case, they interpreted the information inputs differently, regarding the case of Iraq. For the Bush administration, the conflict framing led to conclusions that Saddam was a "gathering" danger to the international system that must be disarmed, unilaterally if necessary. Meanwhile the Arab conflict frame viewed the US as menacing, disrupting the region, and that the Arab-Israeli conflict was neglected by the UN and the international community. Therefore, by comparing these groups, the dissertation has strengthened the hypothesis that divergent conflict frames influenced divergent policy options in the case of Iraq from 2001-2004.

CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION

This dissertation set out on an ambitious research program. It sought to explain the puzzling question of why the US would stumble badly in Iraq when it had the resources to make better policy decisions. Not only did it invade Iraq, but it did so in spite of the advice of its regional and international allies. Rather than attributing this to an oversimplified answer like, "oil" or "Israel," this paper incorporated those and many other ideas by voyaging into the world of critical theory, taking hold of its assumption that people use socially constructed ideas of reality, and cause-and-effect, to guide their decision-making (Wendt, 1999). These social and cognitive constructs lead to different pathways for rational thinking—or more appropriately at times—for irrational thinking (Onuf and Klink, 1989).

These ideational pathways become part of an individual's "framing" of a phenomenon or of a conflict, where frames give meaning to information related to that phenomenon. These frames are used to interpret complex sets of information, and are not only based on cognitive processes, but more broadly on education, world view, life experiences and ideology (University of Colorado, nd; Putnam and Holmer, 1992). Conflict frames not only simplify information cognitively, but they are also used to promote a particular understanding of a phenomenon in a way that benefits the communicator (Shmueli, Elliott and Kaufman, 2006).

This research project hypothesized that the way the US administration framed the problem of Iraq verses the way that the Arab policy-makers framed the same case influenced divergent policy options from the involved parties. No other research project, to the knowledge of the author, has attempted a study of the divergent US and Arab

positions around the case of Iraq using a conflict framing approach. In this way, the dissertation innovatively applied conflict framing to the case of foreign policy-making and Iraq. It incorporated post-positivist methods of analysis, discourse and text analysis, to help clarify, chart and analyze the conflict frames of the Arab League and the Bush administration from 2001-2004. The methodological philosophy of critical theory was summarized by Havel when he said "we should seek more to understand than to explain" (Havel, 1992, p. 2). This dissertation did just that. By applying a relatively new research area, conflict framing, to an old but complex phenomenon—decisions of war and peace—it attempted to offer new understanding into how these decisions are made.

The text analysis examined 9 documents from the Arab League proceedings and 8 texts from the Bush administration, all issued from 2001-2004. The dissertation then used concepts developed through the theoretical approach, particularly Hirsch and Fiss' framing categories, Onuf and Searle's language-rules typology, and Goldstein and Koehane's ideational mapping, to categorize key themes or "focal points" from the texts. In this way, normative references, ideational themes and cumulative lingual effects were recorded. These were analyzed and discussed in the results section and a principle list of concepts was created to summarize the conflict frame of the both the Arab League and the Bush administration.

The dissertation also discussed foreign policy-making processes in the Bush administration and in the Arab world before attempting to bring these two concepts together—conflict framing and foreign policy. The dissertation suggested a new model to understand the contextual relationship of conflict framing to foreign policy options. It proposed that a conflict frame could be likened to the layers of the onion, in as much as a conflict frame surrounds a policy decision-making process. In this way, conflict frames

have at least four different ideation levels: state-to-state, societal level, internal to the group, and individual levels. The layers of the frame are used to interpret and make sense of new information, therefore pushing the policy discourse in a direction and ultimately influencing foreign policy. The dissertation depicted this ideational context of foreign policy through subsequent "Onion" diagrams. It also charted foreign policy inputs, such as the UN proceedings, as factors that influence the policy formulation by first being filtered through the conflict frame's layers. In this way, the dissertation demonstrated that conflict frames are not an isolated independent variable on foreign policy, but rather are influential as part of the ideational fabric of the foreign policy-making environment.

The dissertation then compared the discussions of the Arab League and the Bush administration's conflict frames and foreign policy. The dissertation examined the nature of the "threat," the role of justifications, and the idea of international order, as shared themes between the two study groups' conflict frames. By comparing the effect of these themes on foreign policy formation, the dissertation demonstrated how social and ideational contexts, like the post-9/11 environment, influenced policy. This strengthened the hypothesis that the way the US administration framed the problem of Iraq verses the way that the Arab policy-makers framed the same case influenced divergent policy options from the involved parties.

New areas of research could expand the work done here. One of these would be to examine Arab states, and decision-makers themselves in those states, in greater depth. This could be done by greatly expanding the study group or by selecting a small group of Arab states using specific criteria. This would enable future research to incorporate the "individual level" of conflict framing, a level which this study of the Arab League was

unable to include. Another possible area of expansion would be to examine conflict framing revealed through private discourse, such as personal interviews. This dissertation was limited to the extent that it analyzed public statements, which may in fact promote certain strategic myths while omitting self-interested or taboo aspects of the decision-makers' conflict frames. For example, the mention of "oil" in the discourse from the Bush administration was minimal. Others have suggested that in actuality it was a decisive aspect of the administration's conflict frame.

Finally, possible alternative explanations for what influenced the US to invade Iraq are prolific and more prominent than the ideas proposed here. They were reviewed initially in the introduction, and include realist assumptions about the anarchic nature of the international system and the logic of power. Perhaps the US was attempting to rewrite the rules of the international system, demonstrating its hegemony in the uni-polar system. Perhaps it needed to ensure the survival of its economic systems and elites, as suggested by Marx, by dominating Iraq's oil reserves. These explanations would minimize any leadership discourse as simply meant for public justification. However, this dissertation has demonstrated that words and discourse are not without effect. Not only do they represent and reinforce a social construction of reality, but they promote that reality, and ultimately leaders form their decisions in the context of it.

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Appendices

APPENDIX 1

Arab foreign ministers meet in Cairo

13 March 2001

<http://www.saudiembassy.net/2001News/News/AraDetail.asp?cIndex=2841>

An official statement issued at the end of the session confirmed support of the decision of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, to declare the establishment of the State of Palestine this year. In order to achieve this, it stated, all the necessary steps, measures and international contacts should be carried out. It called on Arab, Islamic and other friendly countries to recognize the Palestinian State as soon as it is declared. The statement went on to urge the new U.S. administration to put the Middle East Peace Process among its priorities, taking into consideration the outcome of the Madrid conference, the principle of land for peace, and adherence to the United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. It also called on the Russian Federation and the European Union to take an active role in overcoming obstacles impeding the achievement of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the region. The Arab foreign ministers demanded that the UN Security Council provide international protection to the Palestinian people, and form a special committee to study the destructive effects of the depleted uranium being used by the Israeli forces. On the issue of occupied Al-Quds [Jerusalem], they stressed Palestinian sovereignty over eastern Jerusalem and its importance as capital of the independent State of Palestine, attesting to the city's Arab characteristics, antiquities, and holy sites. The statement reaffirmed the Arab stance on the illegitimacy of attempts to move the U.S. Embassy to Al-Quds [Jerusalem], and recalled the resolution of the 1980 Amman Arab Summit concerning severing relations with countries that move their embassies to Jerusalem or that recognize it as Israel's capital. It emphasized the need to take measures to ensure activation of the Al-Aqsa Fund in financing projects for maintaining the Arab and Islamic identity of occupied Jerusalem.

The council called on the co-sponsors of the peace process and the international community to shoulder their responsibility and force Israel to implement the UN resolutions that call for its full withdrawal from the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, and urged support for Syria in its inalienable stance for the achievements of a just and comprehensive peace in the region. The statement strongly condemned the continuing Israeli occupation of posts along the Lebanese border and resolved to extend urgent assistance of U.S. \$50 million for removal of mines planted by occupying Israeli forces.

The statement reaffirmed full support for the United Arab Emirates in its sovereignty over the three islands (Greater and Lesser Tunb and Abu Mousa), denounced their continuing occupation by Iran, and regretted Iran's refusal to deal with the tripartite committee formed by the Gulf Cooperation Council to deal with the matter. The statement also called on the UN Security Council to lift immediately its sanctions against Sudan and Libya.

APPENDIX 2

Text of final statement from the Arab summit in Amman

27-28 March, 2001

<http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/summit0103.htm>

Final statement issued by the Arab League Council at the summit level; ordinary session No. 13 in Amman, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, on 2 and 3 Muharram 1422 Hegira, corresponding to 27 and 28 March 2001:

1. In response to a kind invitation by His Majesty King Abdallah II Bin-al-Husayn, king of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and in implementation of a resolution adopted by the extraordinary Arab summit conference in Cairo on 21 and 22 October 2000 to convene the Arab League Council regularly at the summit level in an ordinary session in March every year, as of the year 2001, the Council met at the summit level in Amman, the capital of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, on 27 and 28 March 2001.

2. The leaders express their great appreciation to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for its care and attention and good preparation for the summit and the deep meanings contained in the opening speech by His Majesty King Abdallah II Bin-al-Husayn, president of the conference. The leaders decided to consider the speech an official summit document.

3. The leaders also express their profound thanks to His Excellency President Muhammad Husni Mubarak, president of the Arab Republic of Egypt, for the valuable efforts he exerted during his chairmanship of the extraordinary summit in October 2000.

4. The Arab leaders believe that their meeting today in Amman, in the first regular conference, constitutes a new beginning in joint Arab action, which makes it possible to adopt resolutions and initiatives required by the Arab situation and address the nation's vital issues. In line with this perspective, the leaders were unanimous in noting that restoring Arab solidarity is the basic pillar and a source of the nation's strength to safeguard its security, ward off dangers, and embody the hopes and aspirations of its sons through integration and solidarity. This conference is also a milestone and an occasion to renew the pledge to abide by the constants and foundations of joint Arab action, respect the rules that govern inter-Arab relations, and safeguard the vital interests of Arab countries within the context of achieving Arab accord and pan-Arab security.

5. Based on the Arab League Charter and its goals and in an atmosphere of understanding, brotherhood, and frankness, the leaders studied the state of the nation and the challenges facing it, as well as the situation in the region, and made a comprehensive assessment of the regional and international circumstances. In doing this, the leaders focused on strengthening Arab solidarity, activating the institutions of

joint Arab action, defending the nation's interests and rights, and safeguarding Arab national security.

6. In this context, the leaders examined the serious situation experienced by the Palestinian people as a result of the large-scale aggression, which the Israeli forces are waging against them, employing all means of repression and all types of weapons, including the internationally banned ones. This is in addition to tightening the economic siege and continuing the settlement activity and the policy of assassinations, demolition of homes, and destruction of the environment in a flagrant violation of agreements and obligations as well as international law, norms, and pacts.

7. The leaders hail with great pride the Palestinian people's steadfastness and brave intifadah in the face of the savage onslaught waged by Israel and the brutal oppression exercised by the occupation authorities. They salute the brave martyrs of the intifadah and praise the spirit of sacrifice and steadfastness shown by the Palestinian people. The Palestinian people have managed through their national leadership, relentless determination, and limitless sacrifice, to confront Israel's repressive measures and abort the de facto policy, through which the occupation authorities have tried to impose their unfair terms on the Palestinian people and negotiator by force. The leaders declare that they stand by the Palestinian people in their heroic struggle and support their brave intifadah and legitimate right to resist occupation until they achieve their just national demands, represented by their right to return, self-determination, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.

8. The Arab leaders also hail the steadfastness of the Syrian citizens in the occupied Syrian Arab Golan Heights and their adherence to their national identity.

9. The leaders condemn Israel's continuing aggression against the Palestinian people. They also condemn Israel's massive violation of human rights, especially its collective punishment, its dismembering of the Palestinian territories, and its continued attacks on vital Palestinian installations and national institutions, which constitute war crimes as well as crimes against humanity and racist practices.

All these represent a serious violation of the rules of international humanitarian law and should be confronted. As a result of all of this, these Zionist practices are still considered a form of racism. The leaders also call for a meeting of the parties to the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention as soon as possible to adopt measures to protect the Palestinian civilians.

10. The leaders express their extreme indignation at the US use of the veto against a draft resolution at the Security Council on protecting the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories and establishing a UN observer force in these territories. They express their absolute rejection of the US justifications. This position does not at all conform with the US responsibility as a sponsor of the peace process and a permanent member of the Security Council that bears special responsibility toward safeguarding world peace and security.

11. The leaders reiterate their demand that the Security Council should assume responsibility for providing the necessary international protection for the Palestinian people under the Israeli occupation, and for forming an international force for this purpose. They ask the Security Council member states, especially the permanent ones, to take the necessary measures to implement this.

12. The leaders call on the Security Council to try the Israeli war criminals who committed massacres and crimes against Arab citizens inside and outside all the occupied territories, especially in light of what was contained in the report submitted by Mrs. Mary Robinson, the UN high commissioner on human rights.

13. The leaders welcome the decision of the higher board of Al-Aqsa Fund and the Jerusalem Intifadah Fund to urgently support the budget of the Palestinian National Authority by disbursing \$15 million of the approved \$60-million soft loan, based on a proposal by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Considering the difficult financial and economic conditions experienced by the Palestinian people, the leaders commission the higher board of the two funds to respond favorably to the PNA request to disburse the additional required sum of \$180 million to support the Authority's budget over the next six months.

The leaders also welcome Iraq's decision to allocate 1 billion euros of its oil export sales in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding to meet the Palestinian people's food, medicine, and other basic needs, and support the families of the intifadah martyrs. This responds to a pan-Arab demand to support the Palestinian people's steadfastness and their blessed intifadah. They request the Arab permanent UN representatives to follow up on this subject and facilitate the Iraqi request at the UN Security Council.

14. The leaders reaffirm their adherence to Security Council resolutions concerning the City of Jerusalem, especially Resolutions 252 (1968), 267 (1969), 465 (1980), and 478 (1980), which consider null and void all Israeli measures to change the features of this city, and call on world countries not to transfer their embassies to Jerusalem. In this respect, the leaders renew their emphasis on the resolutions adopted by the 1980 Arab summit in Amman, the 1990 summit in Baghdad, and the 2000 summit in Cairo, which call for severing all ties with states that transfer their embassies to Jerusalem or recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

15. The leaders reaffirm their adherence to a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on international legitimacy resolutions and the land-for-peace principle in a manner that ensures the legitimate Arab rights and realizes security and stability in the region.

16. The Arab leaders warn of the consequences of the Israeli Government's disavowal of the bases and principles on which the peace process was launched in Madrid in 1991. They also warn of the consequences of circumventing these principles or suggesting alternatives that do not respond to the rules of international legitimacy. They stress the inseparability of the Syrian and Lebanese tracks and their connection

with the Palestinian track in order to realize the Arab aims of activating all tracks. They warn against the Israeli practices aimed at dealing with individual tracks separate from the others. They call for Arab coordination and reiterate that the establishment of a just and comprehensive peace in the region requires first and foremost full Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Palestinian territories, including Jerusalem, and from the occupied Syrian Golan Heights up to the 4 June 1967 line, and the remaining parts of southern Lebanon that are still under occupation, including the Shab'a farms, up to the internationally recognized borders. This should be done in implementation of the relevant UN resolutions -- 242, 338, 425 -- and the land-for-peace principle. The Palestinian people should be enabled to regain their national inalienable rights, including their right to return to their homes, get compensation for the losses they had sustained as a result of the Israeli occupation in accordance with UN Resolution 194, and establish their independent state on their national soil with Jerusalem as its capital. All Arab prisoners in Israeli jails should also be released.

17. The leaders note that Israel bears full legal responsibility for the problem of the Palestinian refugees and for their displacement. They reiterate their rejection of all plans and attempts to resettle these refugees outside their homeland. They also demand that Israel compensate the host Arab countries for the financial losses they sustained as a result of hosting these refugees on behalf of the international community.

18. The leaders decide to continue the Arab states' boycott of the multilateral talks and to suspend all steps and activities on regional economic cooperation with Israel, holding it responsible for the steps and measures that have been taken by the Arab states against it. These steps are necessitated by the suspension of the peace process and the Israeli occupation authorities' escalation of their repressive measures and siege against the Palestinian people. The leaders reaffirm their decision at the extraordinary Cairo summit in 2000 to firmly confront Israel's attempts to infiltrate the Arab world under any slogan and to stop establishing any relations with it. They hold Israel responsible for any steps or decisions by the Arab states regarding relations with it, including the cancellation of these relations. They also demand the activation of the Arab boycott of Israel by holding periodic boycott meetings as called for by the Central Office of the Boycott [in Damascus] with the aim of preventing any dealings with Israel in implementation of the boycott regulations.

19. The leaders also emphasize their full solidarity with Syria and Lebanon and reject recent Israeli threats against the two sisterly states, as well as the Israeli officials' serious threats to other Arab states and the Palestinian people and their leadership. They condemn the threat to use force and stress the need to discuss the dangers posed by these threats, as well as Israel's return to its racist policy. They also call for a clear Arab strategy to expose the Israeli schemes, which do not serve peace and which threaten security and stability in the region. They also reject Israel's attempts to brand as terrorist the Arab states that carry out the duty of legitimate national resistance against the Israeli occupation of their territories.

20. The leaders emphasize their support for Lebanon to complete the liberation of its territory from the Israeli occupation up to the internationally recognized borders, including Shab'a farms. They praise the role of the valiant Lebanese resistance and the

splendid Lebanese steadfastness that forced the Israeli forces to withdraw from Southern Lebanon and western Al-Biqa. They also demand the release of Lebanese prisoners and detainees held in Israeli jails. They support the right of Lebanon and its resistance to free these prisoners with all legitimate means. They also support Lebanon's demand to clear the mines left behind by the Israeli occupation. Israel planted them and, therefore, should clear them. In this respect, they praise the UAE's adoption of a plan to remove the mines in South Lebanon. The leaders also support Lebanon's firm rights to its water, as stipulated by international law, against the Israeli designs.

They reaffirm the resolutions of the 10th, 11th, and 12th Arab summits on the need to support the Lebanese Government and assist it to rebuild Lebanon. They praise the assistance the Arab countries have offered to Lebanon, and the countries that expressed readiness to offer such assistance, particularly to the liberated areas. They call for reactivating the fund for supporting Lebanon to help it rebuild and develop its infrastructure, particularly in the areas that were liberated from the Israeli occupation.

21. The leaders stress that the achievement of a lasting peace and security in the region requires Israel to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and open all Israeli nuclear facilities to the international inspection and monitoring regime. They also stressed the extreme importance of keeping the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, given that this is a basic condition for any future regional security arrangements.

22. The leaders reaffirm that commitment to the peace process demands that Israel implement the agreements and fulfill the obligations that have been reached, build on what has been achieved, and resume the negotiations on all tracks from where they stopped in accordance with the terms of reference and the principles on which the peace process was launched. [The two sponsors of the peace process, especially the United States, must assume] their responsibilities and obligations toward the peace process on the basis of justice and neutrality.

[above words in brackets are dropped from press version; they are provided from the final statement as distributed to reporters at conclusion of summit]

23. The leaders also urge all the states that are concerned with the peace process, headed by the EU states, to play an active role in order to overcome the obstacles facing the peace process in the Middle East.

24. The Arab leaders believe that the United Nations, which has been entrusted with the task of preserving international security and peace in its capacity as the source of international legitimacy, is called upon to play a more effective role in implementing its resolutions on the Middle East question.

25. The leaders have decided to entrust His Majesty King Abdallah II Bin-al-Husayn, president of the summit, with the task of holding consultations with his brother Arab leaders and the Arab League secretary general, and making the necessary contacts to pursue discussion of the situation between Iraq and Kuwait in order to achieve Arab solidarity.

26. The Arab leaders congratulate the brotherly peoples of Bahrain and Qatar and their wise leaders on the resolution of the border dispute between the two countries and praise the good brotherly spirit with which they received the ruling of the International Court of Justice on this subject. They consider this important accomplishment will contribute to strengthening their brotherly relations and common interests and enhancing Arab solidarity and security and stability in the region.

27. The leaders also congratulate the brotherly people of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Qatar and their wise leaders on the demarcation of the borders between the two countries in a manner that would contribute to strengthening the fraternal ties between them and enhancing Arab solidarity.

28. The Arab leaders reaffirm the UAE's sovereignty over the three islands of Tunb al-Kubra, Tunb al-Sughra, and Abu-Musa and their support for all the steps and means it is pursuing to regain its sovereignty over its three Arab islands. They call on Iran to end its occupation of the three Arab islands and stop the policy of imposing a status quo by force on these islands, including the establishment of facilities to settle Iranians on these islands. They call on Iran to pursue peaceful means to resolve the existing dispute over the islands in accordance with the principles and rules of international law, including an agreement to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The leaders regret Iran's refusal to respond to the efforts of the three-way committee that was entrusted by the Gulf Cooperation Council to formulate a mechanism for the initiation of direct negotiations between the UAE and the Islamic Republic of Iran to end the Iranian occupation of the three Arab islands. The leaders task the Arab League secretary general to follow up the issue of the Iranian occupation of the UAE islands and submit a report on this issue to the next Arab summit.

29. The leaders also renew their support for and solidarity with the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in requesting the Security Council to lift the sanctions imposed on it immediately and completely, as they are no longer justified under any pretext. The Arabs will consider themselves free from any commitment to these sanctions should they continue to be imposed, especially since the Jamahiriya has fulfilled all its obligations as stipulated in the relevant Council resolutions.

The leaders express their support for the Jamahiriya in obtaining compensation for the human and material losses it has sustained as a result of the sanctions imposed on it. The leaders call for the immediate release of Libyan citizen Abd-al-Basit al-Miqrahi, who was convicted for political reasons that have nothing to do with the law. In accordance with all relevant laws and norms, he will be considered hostage if he remains in custody.³⁰ The leaders welcome the efforts by the interim government in

Somalia to continue the general reconciliation and achieve national unity and restore security and stability to the country. They decide to offer it support to entrench security and stability and reactivate state institutions.

31. The leaders express concern for Sudan's unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. They back the good offices that are being exerted by Egypt and Libya to help achieve national accord in Sudan. They praise the Sudanese Government's efforts to achieve peace and allow relief stuff to reach those harmed. They reiterate their support for the Sudanese Government's call on the UN Security Council to lift the sanctions imposed on it.

32. The leaders express their full concern for the national unity of the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros and the safety of its territorial integrity and national sovereignty. They welcome the national reconciliation efforts that are being exerted by the government of the Republic of the Comoros in cooperation with the Arab League, regional organizations, and the United Nations in order to preserve national unity and achieve general national reconciliation. They decide to extend the necessary support for the Comoros to help the reconstruction effort there. In this context, they praise the Qatari initiative to set up a fund sponsored by the General Secretariat to support the Comoros and the donation of \$2 million to this fund by His Highness Shaykh Hamad Bin-Khalifah Al Thani, amir of the State of Qatar.

33. The leaders attach special importance to Arab economic integration. They endorse any steps taken to ensure the activation of this aspect of joint Arab action in a manner that achieves the Arab states' common interests and mutual benefits, strengthens their economic capabilities through the adoption of an Arab plan for a comprehensive and sustainable development, and promotes joint economic action through positive interaction with international economic developments and globalization.

34. The leaders express their appreciation for the efforts being made to set up the Greater Arab Free Trade Area and praise the steps taken thus far toward this end. They decide to immediately eliminate all non-customs administrative, technical, financial, monetary, and volume restrictions and subject all duties and taxes of similar effect to the gradual reduction agreed upon. They also decide to treat the Arab commodities the same as national commodities.

35. The leaders underline the importance of expediting a study on merging the services industry in the Greater Arab Free Trade Area. They also underline the importance of preparation for moving to an advanced stage of Arab economic integration through setting up an Arab customs union. They entrust the Economic and Social Council to follow up on this issue.

36. The leaders bless what has been achieved by the Arab countries in the field of improving the investment climate. They emphasize the importance of giving more incentives to attract investments and encourage the private sector to play a greater role in this field. They call on the Arab financial establishments to co-finance infrastructure and private sector projects.

They assign the Economic and Social Council the task of reviewing the unified agreement on investing Arab capital in the Arab countries to activate this agreement in light of the international and Arab developments.

37. Due to the effective role of the transportation sector in all aspects of Arab economic integration and cooperation, the Arab leaders entrust the Economic and Social Council with the task of working in cooperation with all relevant sides to discuss all aspects and dimensions of the problem of transportation and ways to link the Arab countries via land, sea, and air routes and submit their recommendations in this regard to the next regular Arab summit through the foreign ministers of the Arab League Council.

38. Aware of the fact that the communication and information revolution has begun to cross geographical boundaries, the Arab leaders assert the need to accord priority to developing the Arab capabilities in the area of information technology and communications, and to consider this a vital domain for cooperation and coordination on the Arab level. In this regard, the Arab leaders welcome the UAE's offer to host the first session of the Arab Forum of Information Technology.

39. The Arab leaders value the distinguished role of joint Arab action in investments and integration in the field of electric power. They assert that the vital contribution of this sector requires that the agencies in charge of electricity chart a specific plan to boost electric power and expedite the completion of Arab electric power linkage.

40. In view of the relatively growing importance of the tourism sector on the Arab level and the competition this sector is facing on the international level, the leaders underscore the need for all the agencies and bodies concerned with inter-Arab tourist activities and development of tourism to spur inter-Arab tourism and attract more foreign tourists to the Arab region by supporting investments in this sector and promoting transportation services in the Arab states and facilitating entry into the Arab states.

41. The Arab leaders value the results of joint Arab action in the field of environment and sustainable development and coordination in the international arenas. They express their support for the Abu Dhabi Declaration on the future of Arab environmental action in this field and consider it as a working mechanism in the 21st century. They stress the importance of Arab consultation and coordination for the Earth Summit in 2002. The leaders also welcome the convocation of the seventh session of the conference of the parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Marrakech from 29 October to 9 November 2001.

42. The leaders welcome the initiative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to convene the first economic conference in Cairo in November 2001 with the participation of Arab governments, the Arab and foreign private sectors, and regional and international economic establishments. The Arab League secretary general will be entrusted with taking the necessary steps in cooperation with the host countries to ensure the success of the conference.

43. In light of the increasing tasks of the technical team at the General Secretariat, they entrust the secretary general with supporting and developing this team, in cooperation with the Economic and Social Council, in order to activate the mechanisms and Arab establishments in charge of following up joint Arab action. The Economic and Social Council, in collaboration with the organizations and establishments of Arab action, will be in charge of preparing and presenting economic topics to the Arab League's Foreign Ministers' Council prior to referring them to the summit.

44. Having reviewed relations with the neighboring countries, the leaders stress the importance of strengthening the ties of cooperation with these countries, especially Iran and Turkey, which are bound with the Arab homeland by historical and cultural relations and common interests. The leaders consider the water issue in its legal, economic, and security dimensions as extremely vital to the Arab nation. Therefore, they call on Turkey to enter into tripartite talks with Iraq and Syria in accordance with the rules of international law and the treaties concluded between them in order to reach a fair and equitable agreement on the distribution of water that guarantees the rights of the three countries.

45. Proceeding from the historical and cultural links and the common interests that unite our Arab nation with the countries of the African continent, the leaders paid attention to the subject of Afro-Arab cooperation. They examined its different aspects and stressed the need to continue efforts to promote this cooperation and remove any obstacles that hamper meetings or obstruct the implementation of joint programs. They entrusted the secretary general of the Arab League with the task of resuming his contacts in this connection with his counterpart, the OAU secretary general. In this respect, they welcome Algeria's offer to host a meeting of the Standing Committee on Arab-African Cooperation.

46. The leaders believe in the importance of developing Arab-European relations, including the revival of the Arab-European dialogue and promoting these ties in a manner that achieves balanced and equitable interests.

47. The leaders discussed the affairs of Arab expatriates, particularly in the two Americas and Europe. They welcomed the growing role of Arab communities and the remarkable interaction with the nation's causes being demonstrated by Arab and Muslim associations. They expressed their eagerness to accord full attention to the conditions of Arab expatriates, care for their interests and concerns, and promote their affiliation with the motherland.

48. The leaders extend their thanks and appreciation to His Excellency Dr. Ahmad Ismat Abd-al-Majid for his management of issues pertaining to joint Arab action during his term as Arab League secretary general with great efficiency and competence. Thanks to his great expertise and political shrewdness, he contributed to maintaining harmony and accord between Arab League members. He also contributed to the effort to foster new values and foundations for restoring Arab solidarity and promoting the performance of joint Arab action under circumstances marked by Arab and international upheavals.

49. The leaders were unanimous in their choice of Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Musa as new Arab League secretary general. They noted his diplomatic acumen and high competence, which qualify him to manage joint Arab action at the helm of the Arab League General Secretariat at this stage. They wished him success in his new job.

50. To enable the Arab League to shoulder its responsibilities, perform its tasks, and implement its programs and activities, the leaders have assigned the Arab League secretary general the task of taking the necessary steps and proposing the appropriate formulas to reform the Arab League General Secretariat financially, administratively, and organizationally with a view to restructuring it, upgrading its procedures and performance, and enabling it to shoulder its pan-Arab tasks and catch up with the latest developments on the regional and international levels.

In this regard, they welcome all the proposals submitted by member states, including the paper submitted by the State of Qatar and the proposal submitted by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

51. The leaders express their thanks to the chairman and members of the Follow-up and Action Committee formed by the recent Cairo summit for the efforts they exerted in implementing the summit resolutions. They stress the importance of this committee as an essential work mechanism for following up on the implementation of summit resolutions and taking action on the regional and international levels. They approve the continuation of its work. The summit presidency shall consult with the Arab leaders on its formation. The committee shall meet once every two months on the ministerial level and once every month on the level of permanent representatives or personal representatives of the ministers at the Arab League Headquarters or in any member state that requests hosting its work.

52. Based on the mechanism of the regular convocation of the Arab League Council on the summit level, and in accordance with an agreement reached between the United Arab Emirates and Lebanon on exchanging their presidency of the summit, the leaders decided to hold the 14th ordinary session of the Arab League Council on the summit level in Beirut, capital of the Lebanese Republic, in March 2002. The State of Bahrain will assume the presidency of the Arab League Council on the summit level at the 15th session in accordance with the alphabetical order of the names of the member states.

The leaders also express their profound gratitude and best wishes to the brotherly Jordanian people for the good hospitality and warm reception, which they accorded to the delegations participating in the Arab summit. They also express their great appreciation to His Majesty King Abdallah II Bin-al-Husayn for the big efforts he exerted to ensure the success of the summit conference and also for the good

preparation and organization. They praise the wisdom, perseverance, and competence with which his majesty ran the working sessions, which have had a great effect on the success of the summit and the important results that crowned the summit meetings -- results which would help strengthen the course of joint action, achieve the higher interests of the Arab nation, and help safeguard Arab national security.

FBIS translation of Arabic text published in al-Ra'y newspaper, Jordan, 29 March 2001, p 33

http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/arabic/details_ar.jsp?art_id=348&level_id=202

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مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة الدورة العادية (13) 2 و3 محرم 1422هـ - الموافق 27 و28 مارس /

آذار 2001 م

عمان - المملكة الاردنية الهاشمية (2 و3 محرم 1422هـ - الموافق 27 و28 مارس / آذار 2001 م)

*القرارات

*البيان الختامي

*إعلان عمان

*بيان بشأن إعادة انتخاب كوفي أنان

*خطاب جلالة الملك عبد الله الثاني ابن الحسين

*قائمة أسماء السادة رؤساء الوفود

القرارات

دعم انتفاضة الشعب الفلسطيني وصموده

إن مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة

- إذ يؤكد تضامنه التام مع الشعب الفلسطيني في نضاله من أجل استعادة حقوقه المشروعة ودعمه المطلق لصمود

الشعب الفلسطيني في كفاحه من أجل إستعادة هذه الحقوق،

- ونظرا للاوضاع الخطيرة التي يعيشها الشعب الفلسطيني جراء العدوان الاسرائيلي وتقطيع الضفة الغربية وقطاع

غزة وذلك من خلال نشر قواته العسكرية ودباباته حول المدن والقرى الفلسطينية والحصار الخانق الذي تسبب في

خسائر فادحة للاقتصاد الفلسطيني وعرقلة السلطة الفلسطينية من أداء مهامها.

- واستجابة لتوصيات لجنة المتابعة والتحرك المنبثقة عن مؤتمر القمة العربي غير العادي بالقاهرة في اكتوبر 2000،

يقرر

1- التأكيد على مواصلة توظيف الطاقات العربية في خدمة قضايا الامة العربية ووضع كافة امكانياتها لتحرير الارض

العربية المحتلة، ودعم نضال الشعب الفلسطيني بقيادة منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية، من أجل استرداد ارضه وإقامة

دولته المستقلة على ترابه الوطني وعاصمتها القدس والحفاظ على المقدسات الاسلامية والمسيحية فيها.

2- التأكيد على ضرورة الاستمرار في توفير وسائل الدعم المالي والسياسي لنضال الشعب الفلسطيني وانتفاضته

الباسلة.

3- مواصلة التحرك العربي في مجلس الامن والجمعية العامة لتوفير الحماية الدولية للشعب الفلسطيني والعمل على

استصدار قرار من الجمعية العامة في دورة استثنائية طارئة لإرسال قوات حماية دولية الى المناطق الفلسطينية إذا ما

تعذر إصدار القرار من مجلس الامن بهذا الشأن. وحث لجنة تقصي الحقائق الدولية على الاضطلاع بمسئوليتها

والاسراع

في إنجاز لتقديم تقريرها انسجاماً مع قرار مجلس الامن رقم 1322.4- تكليف لجنة من الخبراء القانونيين العرب للبدء في توثيق جرائم الحرب الاسرائيلية ضد الشعب الفلسطيني، وجمع الادلة والتحري حولها، تمهيداً للتحرك نحو إنشاء محكمة دولية خاصة لمحاكمة مجرمي الحرب الاسرائيليين، وتحريك الرأي العام الدولي عن طريق منظمات المجتمع المدني العالمية. 5- التحرك مع الحكومة السويسرية والدول الاوروبية لضمان استئناف عقد مؤتمر اتفاقية جنيف الرابعة لعام 1949 لحمل اسرائيل على الالتزام باحترام بنود هذه الاتفاقية ووضع حد للانتهاكات الاسرائيلية لها ولللقانون الدولي الانساني. 6- الموافقة على توسيع أهداف الدعم الذي يقدمه صندوق الانتفاضة والأقصى وإيجاد آليات جديدة ومرنة وبمبسطة تؤمن وصول الأموال التي خصصتها القمة العربية الطارئة بما يتناسب مع حالة الحصار المفروض على الشعب الفلسطيني الأمر الذي يساعد على مواجهة الاحتياجات العاجلة لدعم الميزانية الجارية للسلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية لتمكينها من سداد رواتب أجور العاملين بها واستمرار تقديم المساعدات الطبية والاجتماعية العاجلة وتقديم الدعم المالي للعمال الذين فقدوا أعمالهم وتمويل مشروعات خلق فرص عمل. 7- الترحيب بقرار المجلس الأعلى لصندوق الأقصى وانتفاضة القدس للاستجابة العاجلة لدعم ميزانية السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية بصرف مبلغ 15 مليون دولار من القرض الحسن الذي اعتمده بقيمة 60 مليون دولار تدفع على أربعة أشهر بناء على اقتراح تقدمت به المملكة العربية السعودية. وبالنظر للظروف المالية والاقتصادية الصعبة التي يعيشها الشعب الفلسطيني بعد مرور قرابة ستة أشهر على الإعتداءات الاسرائيلية والحصار الخانق للمدن الفلسطينية، يكلفون المجلس الاعلى الاستجابة لطلب السلطة الوطنية صرف مبلغ إضافي مقداره (180 مليون دولار) لدعم ميزانية السلطة للاشهر الستة القادمة. 8- الترحيب بتخصيص جمهورية العراق مبلغ مليار يورو من مبيعاتها النفطية المصدرة بموجب مذكرة التفاهم لتأمين احتياجات الشعب الفلسطيني من الغذاء والدواء والمستلزمات الاساسية الاخرى ، ولمساعدة عوائل شهداء الانتفاضة ، باعتبار ذلك مطلباً قومياً عربياً يدعم صمود الشعب الفلسطيني وإنتفاضته المباركة ، ويكلفون المندوبين الدائمين للدول العربية في نيويورك متابعة وتسهيل طلب جمهورية العراق لدى مجلس الامن في هذا الشأن . 9- الطلب من الدول العربية التي لم تعلن بعد عن مساهمتها المالية الى المساهمة الفورية في صندوق الانتفاضة والاقصى ومناشدة الدول التي اعلنت عن مساهمتها تحويل تلك المساهمات في اسرع وقت ممكن . 10- التأكيد على قراره الخاص بدعم الاقتصاد الفلسطيني وتمكينه من الصمود وإعفاء المنتجات ذات المنشأ الفلسطيني من الرسوم والجمارك عند دخولها الدول العربية ، وتكليف الاجهزة المعنية بالاسراع في تنفيذ هذا القرار. 11- حث المنظمات والهيئات الشعبية العربية على مواصلة دعم جهود الشعب الفلسطيني ، وضرورة تنسيق التعاون بين هذه الهيئات والمنظمات والجهات المعنية في السلطة الوطنية لضمان وصول المساعدات إلى مستحقيها ، وتنظيم

صرفها تحاشياً للازدواجية ولضمان عدالة توزيعها . 12- تكليف لجنة المتابعة والتحرك ووزراء العمل العرب والجهات المعنية في الدول الاعضاء ، بحث أوضاع العمال الفلسطينيين وتأمين حلول عاجلة لمشاكلهم وتكليف الامانة العامة ودولة فلسطين متابعة ذلك .

(ق . ق 201 د . ع - 28 / 3 / 2001)

إحياء المقاطعة العربية الإسرائيلية

إن مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة ،

-بعد اطلاعه :

* على تقرير الامين العام بشأن إحياء المقاطعة العربية ضد اسرائيل ،

* وعلى قرار مجلس الجامعة العربية رقم 6052 تاريخ 2001/3/12

يقرر

1- العمل على تفعيل المقاطعة العربية ضد اسرائيل ومقاومة التغلغل الاسرائيلي في الوطن العربي من خلال :

أ - البدء بإعادة تفعيل نشاط مكاتب الاتصال المختصة في الدول العربية للغرض اعلاه .

ب- انتظام عقد مؤتمرات المقاطعة الدورية التي يدعو اليها المكتب الرئيسي لمقاطعة اسرائيل .

ج- البدء بإعادة تفعيل دور اللجان الاقتصادية المشتركة المتواجدة في الخارج ، وتنشيط دورها في كشف عمليات

إعادة تصدير البضائع الاسرائيلية الى الدول العربية من خلال التأكد من صحة البيانات الواردة في شهادات المنشأ.

2- تكليف الامين العام بمتابعة تنفيذ هذا القرار ، وتكليف المكتب الرئيسي لمقاطعة اسرائيل بالدعوة لعقد اجتماع

عاجل لضباط الاتصال لتفعيل المقاطعة العربية ضد اسرائيل .

(ق . ق : 202 د.ع - 28 / 3 / 2001)

تقرير لجنة المتابعة والتحرك.

إن مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة ، بعد إطلاعه :

* على تقرير لجنة المتابعة والتحرك ، والعرض الذي قدمه الامين العام حول أنشطة واعمال اللجنة وتوصياتها ،

- وبعد تدارس التوصيات الصادرة عن اللجنة.

يقرر

1- الموافقة على توصيات لجنة المتابعة والتحرك بشأن دعم الشعب الفلسطيني ، وتفعيل التحرك السياسي والاعلامى

على الساحتين الاقليمية والدولية وتوجيه الشكر لرئيس واعضاء اللجنة والامين العام على ما بذلوه من جهود مقدرة

لمتابعة تنفيذ نتائج قمة القاهرة (2000) ومقرراتها.

2- التأكيد على أهمية لجنة المتابعة والتحرك كآلية عمل ضرورية ، تتولى متابعة تنفيذ قرارات القمة وما يستجد

بشأنها من تطورات على الساحة الدولية ، ويعهد لرئاسة القمة الحالية إجراء المشاورات مع القادة العرب ، والامين

العام لتشكيلها . وتعتقد اللجنة إجتماعاتها كل شهرين على المستوى الوزاري وشهرياً على مستوى المندوبين الدائمين أو الممثلين الشخصيين للوزراء في مقر الامانة العامة أو في إحدى الدول الاعضاء التي تطلب استضافتها.
3-ترفع اللجنة تقريراً حول انشطتها وتوصياتها الى رئاسة القمة تمهيداً لعرضه على القمة العربية القادمة .
(ق . ق : 203 د . ع - 2001/3/28)

تشكيل لجنة لدراسة الأفكار التي طرحها الأخ العقيد معمر القذافي قائد ثورة الفاتح العظيم.
إن مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة
-بعد أن استمع الى الافكار التي طرحها الاخ العقيد معمر القذافي قائد ثورة الفاتح العظيم بشأن الوضع العربي العام في الجلسة المغلقة لمجلس الجامعة
يقرر

تشكيل لجنة مؤلفة من المملكة الاردنية الهاشمية والجمهورية التونسية والجمهورية الجزائرية الديمقراطية الشعبية والجمهورية العربية السورية ودولة فلسطين والجماهيرية العربية الليبية الشعبية الاشتراكية العظمى وجمهورية مصر العربية والامين العام للجامعة لدراسة الافكار التي طرحها الأخ العقيد معمر القذافي قائد ثورة الفاتح العظيم في الجلسة المغلقة بشأن الوضع العربي العام توطئة لعرضها على مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة في دورته القادمة أو في قمة غير عادية .
(ق . ق : 204 د . ع - 2001/3/28)

خامسا : دعم فلسطين :

نظرا للأوضاع الصعبة التي تمر بها دولة فلسطين وخطورة الوضع الاقتصادي الناجم عن الحصار الاسرائيلي المحكم ، يؤكد المجلس على ضرورة الاستمرار في دعم الاقتصاد الفلسطيني وإعفاء السلع والمنتجات الفلسطينية من الرسوم والجمارك وفقا لقرارات القمة العربية غير العادية أكتوبر 2000.
(ق . ق : 212 د . ع - 2001/3/28)

الإعداد لقمة الأرض الثانية (ريو + 10) وإعلان أبو ظبي حول مستقبل العمل البيئي العربي
إن مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة - بعد إطلاعه:

*على إعلان أبو ظبي عن مستقبل العمل البيئي العربي المعد من قبل مجلس الوزراء العرب المسئولين عن شئون البيئة.

*وعلى نص المادة الثامنة من معاهدة الدفاع المشترك والتعاون الاقتصادي بين دول الجامعة العربية ،

* وعلى توصيات الدورة الاستثنائية للمجلس الاقتصادي والاجتماعي (عمان 23 مارس 2001) ،

-وإذ يؤكد على أهمية الاعداد العربي الجيد لمؤتمر قمة الأرض الثانية(مؤتمر ريو + 10) خاصة الاتفاق على المسائل التي تمس مصالح الدول العربية ، وعلى أسلوب طرح المواقف العربية فيما سواها ،

يقرر

1-مباركة إعلان أبو ظبي عن مستقبل العمل البيئي العربي كمنهاج عمل يحدد الملامح الاساسية لاستراتيجية العمل البيئي العربي في القرن الحادي والعشرين ، وتكليف مجلس الوزراء العرب المسئولين عن شؤون البيئة الى مواصلة عمله البناء وبلورة الاعلان الى أنشطة وبرامج عمل قابلة للتنفيذ .

2-تكليف مجلس الوزراء العرب المسئولين عن شؤون البيئة باستكمال الاعداد الجيد لمؤتمر قمة الارض الثانية (ريو +10) والتشاور مع القطاعات الاخرى ذات العلاقة في الدول العربية والتنسيق المسبق بشأن أسلوب طرح الموضوعات التي لا يكون هناك اجماع عربي حيالها.

3- الترحيب بعقد الدورة السابعة لمؤتمر الاطراف في اتفاقية الامم المتحدة للتغير المناخي بمدينة مراكش المغربية خلال الفترة 10/29 - 11/9 / 2001 .

(ق . ق : 215 د . ع - 2001/3/28)

الإطار العربي لحقوق الطفل

إن مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة.

- بعد إطلاعه :

* على وثيقة الإطار العربي لحقوق الطفل ،

يقرر

1-الموافقة على وثيقة الإطار العربي لحقوق الطفل والعمل بها كإطار استرشادي للقضايا المتعلقة بالطفولة على الصعيد العربي .

2-دعوة الدول الاعضاء للمشاركة الفعالة في اعمال الدورة الخاصة بالطفولة للجمعية العامة للامم المتحدة التي ستعقد اعمالها في سبتمبر / أيلول 2001 ، وايداع وثيقة الإطار العربي لحقوق الطفل لدى الامم كوثيقة رسمية.

3-الدعوة الى عقد مؤتمر عربي رفيع المستوى ، لوضع الآليات والخطط المناسبة بهدف تفعيل العمل العربي المشترك في هذا الإطار.

4- مناقشة الدول العربية تقديم كل الرعاية والدعم للطفل الفلسطيني الذي يتعرض للاعتداءات اليومية الاسرائيلية السافرة ، واحترام حقوقه في الدراسة والعيش الآمن ، والتعريف دوليا بنضاله.

(ق . ق : 216 د . ع - 2001/3/28)

تعيين الأمين العام لجامعة الدول العربية

إن مجلس الجامعة على مستوى القمة.

- بعد إطلاعه :

*على المادة (12) من ميثاق الجامعة ، والمادة (2) من الملحق الخاص بألية انعقاد القمة.

-ونظراً لأن ولاية معالي السيد الدكتور / أحمد عصمت عبد المجيد تنتهي في 2001/5/15.

- وبناء على ترشيح جمهورية مصر العربية لمعالي السيد عمرو موسى لمنصب الامين العام لجامعة الدول العربية.
يقرر

1-الموافقة بالإجماع على تعيين معالي السيد / عمرو موسى ، أميناً عاماً لجامعة الدول العربية لمدة خمس سنوات تبدأ بعد انتهاء ولاية الامين العام الحالي .

2- تكليف الامين العام إتخاذ الخطوات اللازمة لاعادة هيكلة الامانة العامة بما يمكنها من الاضطلاع بمهامها ، وكذلك إتخاذ الخطوات اللازمة وفقاً للميثاق والآليات القائمة لتنفيذ قرارات القمة.

3- الطلب إلى الأمين العام تقديم تقارير انجاز في هذا الشأن إلى مجلس الجامعة في دوراته القادمة وإلى الدورة (14) لمجلس الجامعة على مستوى القمة.

(ق . ق : 217 د . ع - 2001/3/28)

تطوير جامعة الدول العربية وتفعيل دورها

إن مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة.

- بعد إطلاعه :

* على الورقة المقدمة من دولة قطر في الموضوع ،

* وعلى مشروع القرار المقدم من المملكة الاردنية الهاشمية.

يقرر

أولاً : فيما يتعلق بتطوير جامعة الدول العربية :

تكليف الامين العام للجامعة بما يلي :

1-اتخاذ الاجراءات اللازمة لتحديث وتطوير أنظمة العمل العربي المشترك بما في ذلك منع الازدواجية في المهام وبحيث

تتلاءم هذه الانظمة مع أهداف العمل العربي في المرحلة المقبلة وتمكين الجامعة وكافة مؤسسات واجهزة العمل العربي المشترك من الاضطلاع بالمتطلبات القومية ، ومواكبة المستجدات على الساحتين الاقليمية والدولية .

2-اتخاذ الخطوات اللازمة والصيغ المناسبة لاصلاح أوضاع الامانة العامة من جميع النواحي المالية والادارية

والتنظيمية ، من أجل تطوير هيكلها ، وترقية أساليب عملها والارتفاع بأدائها .

3-الاستعانة بما يراه من خبرات عربية سواء في مجال صياغة أنظمة جديدة للعمل العربي المشترك أو وضع أنظمة داخلية حديثة للامانة العامة للجامعة .

4-الاتصال بالدول العربية الراغبة في المساهمة في عملية التطوير للاستئناس بأرائها والاستفادة من امكاناتها في هذا الشأن.

5-عرض تقارير إنجاز عن الموضوع على مجلس الجامعة على مستوى القمة ، وذلك بعد بحثها في مجلس الجامعة على المستوى الوزاري.

ثانياً : فيما يتعلق بالوضع المالي للأمانة العامة للجامعة :

1-إعادة دراسة نسب مساهمة الدول الاعضاء في موازنة الامانة العامة.

2-تكليف الامين العام باعداد دراسة عاجلة حول سبل ترشيد الانفاق، والعمل على تطوير وتحديث أساليب العمل والادارة في الامانة العامة.

3-قيام الدول الاعضاء بتسديد متأخراتها غير المعترض عليها وفق الجدولة التي اقرها مجلس الجامعة.

(ق . ق : 218 د . ع - 2001/3/28)

موعد ومكان انعقاد الدورة العادية (14) لمجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة.

إن مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة.

-إستناداً إلى ما جاء في ملحق الميثاق الخاص بألية الإنعقاد الدوري المنتظم لرئاسة مجلس الجامعة على مستوى القمة.

-وفي ضوء الاتفاق الذي تم بين دولة الامارات العربية المتحدة والجمهورية اللبنانية بشأن تبادل رئاسة القمة بينهما. يقرر

عقد الدورة العادية (14) لمجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة في بيروت عاصمة الجمهورية اللبنانية خلال شهر مارس / آذار 2002 ، على أن تعود دولة البحرين لتولى رئاسة مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة في دورته (15) ، وذلك طبقاً لقاعدة الترتيب الهجائي لاسماء الدول الاعضاء في تولى رئاسة القمة .

(ق . ق : 220 د . ع - 2001/3/28)

البيان الختامي

انعقاد مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة في مدينة عمان عاصمة المملكة الاردنية الهاشمية يومي 27 و 28 مارس / آذار 2001

1-بدعوة كريمة من صاحب الجلالة الملك عبد الله الثاني ابن الحسين المعظم، ملك المملكة الأردنية الهاشمية ، وتنفيذاً لقرار مؤتمر القمة العربي غير العادي المنعقد في القاهرة بتاريخ 21 و 22 من شهر اكتوبر / تشرين الأول لعام 2000 بعقد مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة بصفة منتظمة في دورة عادية مرة كل عام في شهر مارس / آذار اعتباراً من عام 2001 ، انعقد المجلس على مستوى القمة في مدينة عمان ، عاصمة المملكة الأردنية الهاشمية ، يومي 27 و 28 من شهر مارس / آذار لعام 2001 .

اعتبار خطاب جلالة الملك عبد الله الثاني ابن الحسين وثائق رسمية من وسائق المؤتمر .

2-يعرب القادة عن تقديرهم البالغ للمملكة الأردنية الهاشمية لما وفرته من رعاية وعناية وإعداد رصين لهذه القمة ، وللمعاني العميقة التي تضمنها الخطاب الافتتاحي الذي ألقاه جلالة الملك عبد الله الثاني ابن الحسين المعظم ،

رئيس القمة ، وقرروا اعتباره وثيقة رسمية من وثائق المؤتمر.

اعتبار رسالة صاحب السمو الشيخ زايد بن سلطان ال نهيان وخطاب فخامة الرئيس صدام حسين وثيقتين رسميتين من وثائق المؤتمر.

كما قرروا إعتبار رسالة صاحب السمو الشيخ زايد بن سلطان آل نهيان رئيس دولة الامارات العربية المتحدة إلى جلالة الملك عبد الله الثاني ابن الحسين رئيس المؤتمر ، ورسالة فخامة الرئيس صدام حسين رئيس جمهورية العراق التي القاها نيابة عن فخامته معالي السيد / عزه إبراهيم نائب رئيس مجلس قيادة الثورة وثيقتين رسميتين من وثائق المؤتمر.

الاعراب عن الشكر لفخامة الرئيس محمد حسنى مبارك على جهوده خلال ترؤسه القمة العربية غير العادية أكتوبر / تشرين أول 2000 .

3- كما يعرب القادة عن شكرهم البالغ لفخامة الرئيس محمد حسنى مبارك ، رئيس جمهورية مصر العربية ، على جهوده القيمة التي بذلها خلال فترة ترؤسه للقمة العربية غير العادية أكتوبر / تشرين أول 2000 .

الاجماع على أن إستعادة التضامن العربي يشكل الدعامة الاساسية لقوة الامة وصيانة أمنها.

4- ويعتبر القادة أن اجتماعهم اليوم في عمان في أول مؤتمر دورى منتظم ، يشكل انطلاقة جديدة في مسيرة العمل العربي المشترك تمكن من اتخاذ القرارات والمبادرات التي يتطلبها الوضع العربي ، ومعالجة القضايا الحيوية للأمة . ووفق هذا المنظور أجمع القادة على أن استعادة التضامن العربي يشكل الدعامة الأساسية ، والعروة الوثقى ، ومصدر قوة الأمة لصيانة أمنها ، ودرء الأخطار عنها وتجسيد آمال وطموحات أبنائها بالتكامل والتضامن . كما يشكل هذا المؤتمر حدثاً بارزاً ومناسبة لتجديد العهد بالالتزام بالثوابت والمركيزات التي يقوم عليها العمل العربي المشترك ، واحترام الضوابط التي تحكم العلاقات العربية - العربية ، وتصون المصالح الحيوية للدول العربية في إطار تحقيق الوفاق العربي والأمن القومى .

تعزيز التضامن العربي وتفعيل مؤسسات العمل العربي المشترك .

5- واستناداً إلى ميثاق جامعة الدول العربية وأهدافه ، وفي جو من التفاهم والإخاء والصراحة ، تدارس القادة حال الأمة ، والتحديات التي تواجهها ، والأوضاع في المنطقة ، وأجروا تقويماً شاملاً للظروف الإقليمية والدولية ، واضعين نصب أعينهم تعزيز التضامن العربي ، وتفعيل مؤسسات العمل العربي المشترك ، والدفاع عن مصالح الأمة وحقوقها ، وصيانة الأمن القومى العربي .

إستعراض الوضع الخطير الذى يعيشه الشعب الفلسطينى جراء العدوان الواسع النطاق الذى تشنه قوات الاحتلال الاسرائيلية ضد الفلسطينيين.

6- وفي هذا السياق استعرض القادة الوضع الخطير الذى يعيشه الشعب الفلسطينى جراء العدوان الواسع النطاق الذى تشنه قوات الاحتلال الإسرائيلية ضد الفلسطينيين مستخدمة مختلف أساليب القمع وأنواع الأسلحة ، بما فيها

المحرمة دولياً ، إلى جانب إحكام الحصار الاقتصادي ، ومواصلة السياسة الاستيطانية ، والاعتداءات وهدم المنازل وتدمير البيئة ، وذلك في انتهاك صارخ للاتفاقات والاستحقاقات وخرق واضح لقواعد القانون الدولي وللإعتراف والمواثيق الدولية .

توجيه التحية لضمود الشعب الفلسطيني وانتفاضته الباسلة .

7- ويحيى القادة باعزاز كبير صمود الشعب الفلسطيني ، وانتفاضته الباسلة في وجه الهجمة الشرسة التي تشنها إسرائيل ، ومجاهته للقمع الوحشي الذي تمارسه سلطات الاحتلال ، ويوجهون تحية إكبار وإجلال لشهداء الانتفاضة البواسل ، ويشيدون بروح الفداء والصمود للشعب الفلسطيني الذي استطاع بقيادته الوطنية وبزعامة لاتين ، وتضحية بلا حدود ، التصدى لإجراءات القمع الإسرائيلية، وإجهاض سياسة الأمر الواقع التي حاولت سلطات الاحتلال بواسطتها فرض شروطها المجحفة على الشعب والمفاوض الفلسطيني بالقوة . ويعلن القادة وقوفهم إلى جانب الشعب الفلسطيني في نضاله البطولي ودعم انتفاضته وحقه المشروع في مقاومة الاحتلال حتى تتحقق مطالبه الوطنية العادلة المتمثلة في حق العودة ، وفي تقرير المصير ، وفي قيام الدولة الفلسطينية المستقلة وعاصمتها القدس . توجيه التحية إلى المواطنين السوريين في الجولان السوري المحتل.

8- كما يحيى القادة العرب صمود المواطنين السوريين في الجولان العربي السوري المحتل وتمسكهم بهوياتهم الوطنية . إدانة الانتهاكات الاسرائيلية لحقوق الانسان .

9- يدين القادة العدوان الاسرائيلي المتواصل على الشعب الفلسطيني ، كما يدينون انتهاكات اسرائيل الجسيمة لحقوق الانسان ، خاصة العقوبات الجماعية وتقطيع اوصال الاراضي الفلسطينية ، والاعتداءات المستمرة على المرافق الحيوية والمؤسسات الوطنية الفلسطينية والتي تمثل جرائم حرب وجرائم ضد الانسانية وممارسات عنصرية ، وكلها تشكل خرقاً جسيماً لقواعد القانون الانساني الدولي ، الامر الذي يتعين مواجهته ، ونتيجة لكل ذلك فإن هذه الممارسات الصهيونية مازالت تعتبر شكلاً من أشكال العنصرية . كما يدعو القادة الى استئناف عقد مؤتمر الدول اطراف اتفاقية جنيف الرابعة لعام 1949 في وقت أسرع ممكن لاتخاذ الاجراءات الكفيلة بحماية المدنيين الفلسطينيين .

الاعراب عن الاستياء البالغ لاستخدام الولايات المتحدة حق النقض (الفيتو) في مجلس الامن ضد مشروع القرار حول حماية الشعب الفلسطيني.

10- ويعبر القادة عن استيائهم البالغ لاستخدام الولايات المتحدة حق النقض (الفيتو) في مجلس الامن ضد مشروع القرار حول حماية الشعب الفلسطيني في الاراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة وإنشاء قوة الامم المتحدة للمراقبة في تلك الاراضي ، ويعبرون عن رفضهم التام للتبريرات الامريكية ، حيث ان هذا الموقف لا ينسجم إطلاقاً مع مسئولية الولايات المتحدة الامريكية بوصفها راعياً لعملية السلام وعضواً دائماً في مجلس الامن وتتحمل مسئولية خاصة تجاه صيانة الامن والسلم الدوليين.

مطالبة مجلس الامن بضرورة تحمل مسئولية توفير الحماية الدولية اللازمة للشعب الفلسطيني.

11- ويؤكد القادة مجدداً مطالبتهم لمجلس الأمن بضرورة تحمل مسئولية توفير الحماية الدولية اللازمة للشعب الفلسطيني الرازح تحت الاحتلال الإسرائيلي ، وتشكيل قوة دولية لهذا الغرض ويطالبون الدول الاعضاء في مجلس الامن ، وخاصة الدول دائمة العضوية ، إتخاذ الاجراءات اللازمة لتنفيذ ذلك .

مطالبة مجلس الامن محاكمة مجرمي الحرب الاسرائيليين .

12 - ويطالب القادة مجلس الامن محاكمة مجرمي الحرب الإسرائيليين الذين ارتكبوا مجازر وجرائم في حق المواطنين العرب في جميع الأراضي العربية المحتلة وخارجها ، وخاصة في ضوء ما ورد في تقرير المفوض السامية للجنة الامم المتحدة لحقوق الانسان السيدة / ماري روبنسون .

تكليف المجلس الاعلى لصندوقى الاقصى وإنتفاضة القدس بصرف المبلغ الاضافى المطلوب لدعم ميزانية السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية .

13-ويرحب القادة بقرار المجلس الاعلى لصندوقى الاقصى وإنتفاضة القدس الاستجابة العاجلة لدعم ميزانية السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية بصرف مبلغ 15 مليون دولار من القرض الحسن الذى اعتمده بقيمة 60 مليون دولار ، بناء على إقتراح تقدمت به المملكة العربية السعودية . وبالنظر للظروف المالية والاقتصادية الصعبة التى يعيشها الشعب الفلسطينى ، يكلفون المجلس الاعلى للصندوقين الاستجابة لطلب السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية بصرف المبلغ الاضافى المطلوب والبالغ (180 مليون دولار) لدعم ميزانية السلطة للاشهر الستة القادمة .

الترحيب بتخصيص جمهورية العراق مبلغ مليار يورو لتأمين احتياجات الشعب الفلسطينى.

كما يرحب القادة بتخصيص جمهورية العراق مبلغ مليار يورو من مبيعاته النفطية المصدرة بموجب مذكرة التفاهم لتأمين احتياجات الشعب الفلسطينى من الغذاء والدواء والمستلزمات الاساسية الاخرى ، ولمساعدة عوائل شهداء الانتفاضة ، باعتبار ذلك مطلباً قومياً عربياً يدعم صمود الشعب الفلسطينى وانتفاضته المباركة ، ويكلفون المندوبين الدائمين للدول العربية لدى الامم المتحدة فى نيويورك متابعة وتسهيل طلب جمهورية العراق لدى مجلس الامن فى هذا الشأن .

قطع جميع العلاقات مع الدول التى تنقل سفارتها الى القدس أو تعترف بها عاصمة لاسرائيل .

14 - يؤكد القادة على تمسكهم بقرارات مجلس الأمن المتعلقة بمدينة القدس وخاصة قراراته 252 (1968) و 267 (1969) و 465 (1980) و 478 (1980) التى اكدت بطلان كافة الإجراءات التى اتخذتها وتتخذها إسرائيل لتغيير معالم هذه المدينة ، وطالبت دول العالم بعدم نقل سفارتها إلى القدس . وفى هذا الإطار يجدد القادة التأكيد على ما جاء فى قرارات القمة العربية فى عمان عام 1980 ، وبغداد عام 1990 ، والقاهرة عام 2000 ، بشأن قطع جميع العلاقات مع الدول التى تنقل سفارتها إلى القدس ، أو تعترف بها عاصمة لإسرائيل .

التمسك بالسلام الشامل والعدل في الشرق الاوسط ومبدأ الارض مقابل السلام.

15 - يؤكد القادة استمرار تمسكهم الشامل والعدل والدائم في الشرق الاوسط على اساس قرارات الشرعية الدولية ومبدأ الارض مقابل السلام ، وبما يكفل الحقوق العربية المشروعة، وتحقيق الامن والاستقرار في المنطقة.

التأكيد على تلازم المسارين السوري واللبناني وتربطهما مع المسار الفلسطيني .

16 - ويحذر القادة العرب من عواقب تنصل الحكومة الاسرائيلية من الاسس والمرجعيات والمبادئ التي قامت عليها عملية السلام في مدريد سنة 1991 ، ومن مغبة الالتفاف عليها ، أو طرح بدائل لها لاتستجيب لقواعد الشرعية الدولية . ويؤكدون تلازم المسارين السوري واللبناني ، وتربطهما مع المسار الفلسطيني تحقيقاً للاهداف العربية في تفعيل كافة المسارات ، ويحذرون من الممارسات الاسرائيلية الرامية الى الانفراد بمسار دون آخر ، ويدعون إلى التنسيق العربي.

ويؤكدون مجدداً أن إقامة السلام العادل والشامل في المنطقة يتطلب بادئ ذي بدء ، الانسحاب الاسرائيلي الكامل من جميع الاراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة بما فيها القدس ، والجولان السوري المحتل حتى خط الرابع من يونيو / حزيران 1967 ، ومن الاراضي اللبنانية التي ماتزال محتلة الى الحدود المعترف بها دولياً ، بما فيها مزارع شبعاء ، تنفيذاً لقرارات مجلس الامن 242 و 338 و 425 ومبدأ الارض مقابل السلام ، وتمكين الشعب الفلسطيني من استرداد حقوقه الوطنية الثابتة بما فيها حقه في العودة الى دياره ، والتعويض عما لحقه من اضرار نتيجة للاحتلال الاسرائيلي وفق قرار الامم المتحدة رقم 194 ، واقامة دولته المستقلة على ترابه الوطني وعاصمتها القدس ، والافراج عن جميع الاسرى العرب في السجون الاسرائيلية.

رفض الخطط والمحاولات الرامية الى للتوطين للاجئين الفلسطينيين خارج ديارهم .

17 - يحمل القادة إسرائيل المسؤولية القانونية الكاملة عن وجود مشكلة اللاجئين الفلسطينيين وتهجيرهم ، ويؤكدون رفضهم للخطط والمحاولات الرامية إلى توطين هؤلاء اللاجئين خارج ديارهم ، كما يؤكدون على تحميل اسرائيل مسؤولية تعويض الدول العربية المضيفة عما تحملته هذه الدول من أعباء مالية نيابة عن المجتمع الدولي ، جراء استضافتها لهؤلاء اللاجئين.

مواصلة تعليق مشاركة الدول العربية في المفاوضات المتعددة الاطراف واستمرار وقف كافة خطوات وأنشطة التعاون الاقتصادي مع اسرائيل .

18 - ويقرر القادة مواصلة تعليق مشاركة الدول العربية في المفاوضات المتعددة الأطراف ، واستمرار وقف كافة خطوات وأنشطة التعاون الاقتصادي الإقليمي مع إسرائيل وتحميلها مسؤولية الخطوات والإجراءات التي تتخذها الدول العربية تجاهها والتي تستوجبها مواجهة توقف عملية السلام ، وتصعيد سلطات الاحتلال الإسرائيلية لإجراءات القمع والحصار على الشعب الفلسطيني . ويؤكد القادة على قرارهم في قمة القاهرة غير العادية لعام 2000 ، القاضي بالتصدي الحازم لمحاولات اسرائيل التغلغل في العالم العربي تحت أي مسمى ، والتوقف عن اقامة اية علاقات

مع اسرائيل ، ويحملونها مسؤولية الخطوات والقرارات التي تتخذ في صدد العلاقات معها من قبل الدول العربية ، بما في ذلك الغاؤها . كما يطالبون بتفعيل المقاطعة العربية ضد اسرائيل من خلال انتظام عقد مؤتمرات المقاطعة الدورية التي يدعو اليها المكتب الرئيسي للمقاطعة بهدف منع التعامل مع اسرائيل تطبيقاً لاحكام المقاطعة . التضامن مع سورية ولبنان ورفض التهديدات الاسرائيلية .

19- كما يؤكد القادة تضامنهم التام مع سورية ولبنان ، ويرفضون التهديدات الاسرائيلية التي تصاعدت مؤخراً ضد البلدين الشقيقين ، وكذلك التهديدات الخطيرة الموجهة من قبل المسئولين الاسرائيليين تجاه الدول العربية وتجاه الشعب الفلسطيني وقياداته ، كما يدينون منطق التهديد باستخدام القوة ، ويؤكدون ضرورة تدارس الموقف الخطير الناجم عن ذلك وعن عودة اسرائيل الى سياستها العنصرية . ويدعون الى رسم استراتيجية عربية واضحة المعالم لكشف المخططات الاسرائيلية التي لاتخدم السلام وتهدد الامن والاستقرار في المنطقة . كما يرفضون محاولات اسرائيل الصاق تهمة الارهاب بالدول العربية التي تقوم بواجب المقاومة الوطنية المشروعة ضد الاحتلال الاسرائيلي لاراضيها . .

دعم لبنان والمطالبة بإفراج عن الاسرى والمعتقلين اللبنانيين في السجون الاسرائيلية .

20 - يؤكد القادة على دعم لبنان لاستكمال تحرير اراضيه من الاحتلال الاسرائيلي حتى الحدود المعترف بها دولياً بما في ذلك مزارع شبعا ، ويشيدون بدور المقاومة اللبنانية الباسلة وبالصمود اللبناني الرائع الذي أدى الى تحقيق اندحار القوات الاسرائيلية من جنوب لبنان وبقاعه الغربي ، ويطالبون بالافراج عن الاسرى والمعتقلين اللبنانيين في السجون الاسرائيلية ، ويؤيدون حق لبنان ومقاومته في تحريرهم بشتى الوسائل المشروعة ، ويدعمون مطالب لبنان في إزالة الالغام التي خلفها الاحتلال الاسرائيلي الذي يتحمل مسؤولية زرعها وإزالتها وفي هذا الصدد يشيدون بتبنى دولة الامارات العربية المتحدة لمشروع إزالة الالغام في لبنان ، كما يدعم القادة حقوق لبنان الثابتة في مياهه بوجه المطامع الاسرائيلية وفقاً للقانون الدولي .

التأكيد على قرارات القمة العربية (10) و (11) لدعم الحكومة اللبنانية ومساعدتها على إعمار لبنان.

ويؤكدون مجدداً على قرارات مؤتمرات القمة العربية العاشرة والحادية عشرة بضرورة دعم الحكومة اللبنانية ومساعدتها لاعمار لبنان ، ويشيدون بالمساعدات التي قدمتها الدول العربية إلى لبنان ، وتلك التي اعربت عن استعدادها لتقديم الدعم ، ولاسيما الى المناطق المحررة ، ويدعون الى تفعيل صندوق دعم لبنان من أجل المساعدة على إعادة إعمار بنيته التحتية ، وتنميته ، ولاسيما في المناطق المحررة من الاحتلال الإسرائيلي.

التأكيد على أن السلام والأمن في المنطقة يستلزم إنضمام إسرائيل لمعاهدة منع انتشارالاسلحة النووية وإخضاع كافة منشآتها النووية لنظام التفتيش والمراقبة الدولية .

21 - ويؤكد القادة أن تحقيق السلام والامن الدائم في المنطقة يستلزم إنضمام إسرائيل لمعاهدة منع انتشار الاسلحة النووية ، وإخضاع كافة منشآتها النووية لنظام التفتيش والمراقبة الدولية ، ويؤكدون في هذا الصدد الأهمية البالغة

لإخلاء منطقة الشرق الاوسط من السلاح النووى وكافة أسلحة الدمار الشامل باعتبار هذا الهدف شرطاً ضرورياً ولازماً لإرساء أية ترتيبات للامن الاقليمي في المنطقة مستقبلاً .

التأكيد على إستئناف المفاوضات على جميع المسارات من حيث توقفت وفقاً للمرجعيات والشروط التى انطلقت بموجبها .

22 - ويجدد القادة التأكيد على أن الالتزام بعملية السلام يتطلب قيام إسرائيل بتنفيذ الاتفاقات والاستحقاقات التى تم التوصل إليها والبناء على ما تم إنجازه ، واستئناف المفاوضات على جميع المسارات من حيث توقفت ، وفقاً للمرجعيات والشروط التى انطلقت بموجبها . وعلى راعيي عملية السلام ، وخاصة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية ، تحمل مسئولياتهما والتزاماتهما تجاه عملية السلام على أسس من العدل والحياد.

حث الجهات المهتمة بعملية السلام على القيام بدور فاعل للتغلب على العقبات التى تعترض عملية السلام فى الشرق الاوسط .

23 - كما يحث القادة جميع الدول المهتمة بعملية السلام وفى مقدمتها دول الاتحاد الاوروبى ، القيام بدور فاعل للتغلب على العقوبات التى تعترض العملية السلمية فى الشرق الاوسط .

مطالبة الامم المتحدة بتنفيذ قراراتها الخاصة بتسوية وضع الشرق الاوسط .

24 - ويرى القادة العرب أن الأمم المتحدة المنوط بها صيانة الأمن والسلم الدوليين ، باعتبارها مصدر الشرعية الدولية ، مطالبة بالقيام بدور أكثر فاعلية لتنفيذ قراراتها الخاصة بتسوية قضية الشرق الاوسط.

الحالة بين العراق والكويت

25 - ويقرر القادة أن يعهد إلى جلالة الملك عبد الله الثانى ابن الحسين، رئيس القمة ، باجراء المشاورات مع اخوانه القادة العرب والامين العام لجامعة الدول العربية ، والقيام بالاتصالات اللازمة لمواصلة بحث موضوع الحالة بين العراق والكويت من أجل تحقيق التضامن العربى.

تهنئة الشعبين الشقيقين البحرينى والقطرى وقيادتيهما على تسوية الخلاف الحدودى بين البلدين .

26 - ويهنئ القادة العرب الشعبين الشقيقين البحرينى والقطرى وقيادتيهما الحكيمتين على تسوية الخلاف الحدودى بين البلدين ، ويثمنون الروح الأخوية الطيبة التى استقبلا بها قرار محكمة العدل الدولية بهذا الشأن ، ويعتبرون أن هذا الإنجاز الهام سيسهم فى تمتين الروابط الأخوية بينهما وفى تعزيز المصالح المشتركة لكليهما ، لدعم التضامن العربى ، وكذلك الأمن والاستقرار فى المنطقة .

تهنئة الشعبين الشقيقين فى المملكة العربية السعودية ودولة قطر وقيادتيهما على ترسيم الحدود بين البلدين .

27 - كما يهنئ القادة الشعبين الشقيقين فى المملكة العربية السعودية ودولة قطر وقيادتيهما الحكيمتين على ما تم انجازه بترسيم الحدود بين البلدين ، مما يسهم فى تقوية الروابط الاخوية بينهما ويدعم التضامن العربى.

العمل على وضع خطة محددة للاسراع في استكمال الربط الكهربائي العربي وتقويته.

- 39 - ويثمن القادة الدور المتميز للعمل العربي المشترك في الاستثمارات والتكامل في مجال الكهرباء ، ويؤكدون ان المساهمة الحيوية لهذا القطاع تتطلب العمل من قبل الاجهزة المعنية بشئون الكهرباء على وضع خطة محددة للاسراع في استكمال الربط الكهربائي العربي وتقويته.
- اعلان ابو ظبي حول مستقبل العمل البيئي العربي .

أهمية التنسيق العربي حول قمة الارض 2002 .

مؤتمر الاطراف في اتفاقية الامم المتحدة للتغير المناخي(مراكش 200)

- 41 - ويثمن القادة نتائج العمل العربي المشترك في مجال البيئة والتنمية المستدامة والتنسيق في المحافل الدولية ، ويعربون عن تأييدهم لاعلان ابو ظبي حول مستقبل العمل البيئي العربي كمنهاج عمل في القرن الحادي والعشرين ، ويؤكدون على أهمية التشاور والتنسيق العربي لقمة الارض عام 2002 كما يرحب القادة بعقد الدورة السابعة لمؤتمر الاطراف في اتفاقية الامم المتحدة للتغير المناخي بمدينة مراكش المغربية خلال الفترة 29 أكتوبر / تشرين اول الى 9 نوفمبر / تشرين الثاني 2001.

الترحيب بمبادرة جمهورية مصر العربية بعقد المؤتمر الاقتصادي العربي الاول في القاهرة في نوفمبر 2001 .

- 42 - ويرحب القادة بمبادرة جمهورية مصر العربية بعقد المؤتمر الاقتصادي العربي الاول في القاهرة في نوفمبر / تشرين الثاني 2001 بمشاركة حكومات الدول العربية والقطاع الخاص العربي والاجنبي والمؤسسات الاقتصادية الاقليمية والدولية ، وتكليف الامين العام لجامعة الدول العربية ، اتخاذ الخطوات اللازمة بالتعاون مع الدول المضيفة لنجاح المؤتمر.

تعزيز علاقات التعاون مع دول الجوار الجغرافي ودعوة تركيا الى الدخول في مفاوضات ثلاثية مع كل من العراق وسوريا للتوصل إلى إتفاق عادل لتقاسم المياه .

- 44 - وبعد أن استعرض القادة العلاقات مع دول الجوار الجغرافي ، فإنهم يؤكدون على أهمية تعزيز علاقات التعاون مع هذه الدول خاصة إيران وتركيا التي ترتبط بعلاقات تاريخية وحضارية ومصالح مشتركة مع الوطن العربي . ويعتبر القادة قضية المياه في ابعادها القانونية والاقتصادية والأمنية مسألة في غاية الحيوية للأمم العربية . ومن هذا المنطلق يدعون تركيا إلى الدخول في مفاوضات ثلاثية مع كل من العراق وسوريا ، وفقاً لاحكام القانون الدولي والاتفاقات المعقودة بينها ، للتوصل الى إتفاق عادل ومنصف لتقاسم المياه ، يضمن حقوق البلدان الثلاثة .
- إحياء الحوار العربي الاوروي بما يحقق المصالح المتوازنة والمتكافئة .

- 46 - ويرى القادة أهمية تنمية العلاقات العربية - الأوروبية وتطويرها ، بما في ذلك إحياء الحوار العربي الاوروي ، وتطوير تلك العلاقات بما يحقق المصالح المتوازنة والمتكافئة.

إصلاح أوضاع الامانة العامة لجامعة الدول العربية من جميع النواحي المالية والادارية والتنظيمية.

50 - وحرصا على تمكين جامعة الدول العربية من الاضطلاع برسالتها وأداء مهامها ، وتنفيذ برامجها وأنشطتها ، كلف القادة الأمين العام للجامعة اتخاذ الخطوات اللازمة واقتراح الصيغ المناسبة لإصلاح أوضاع الامانة العامة للجامعة من جميع النواحي المالية والإدارية والتنظيمية ، من أجل إعادة هيكلتها ، والارتقاء بأساليب عملها وادائها ، وتمكينها من الاضطلاع بالمتطلبات القومية ، ومواكبة المستجدات على الساحتين الإقليمية والدولية . ويرحبون في هذا الصدد بكافة المقترحات المقدمة من الدول الاعضاء ، بما فيها الورقة المقدمة من دولة قطر والمقترح المقدم من المملكة الاردنية الهاشمية.

توجيه الشكر الى رئيس لجنة المتابعة والتحرك وأعضائها المنبثقة عن قمة القاهرة والتأكيد على استمرارها في عملها. 51- ويوجه القادة الشكر إلى رئيس لجنة المتابعة والتحرك وأعضائها المنبثقة عن قمة القاهرة الأخيرة على ما قاموا به من جهود لتنفيذ قرارات القمة ، مؤكدين على أهمية هذه اللجنة كآلية عمل ضرورية تتولى متابعة تنفيذ قرارات القمة ، والتحرك على الساحتين الإقليمية والدولية ، ويقررون استمرارها في عملها ، على أن تتولى رئاسة القمة ، بالتشاور مع القادة العرب ، أمر تشكيلها ، وإن تعقد اجتماعاتها كل شهرين على المستوى الوزاري ، وشهريا على مستوى المندوبين الدائمين أو الممثلين الشخصيين للوزراء في مقر الامانة العامة للجامعة ، أو في إحدى الدول الأعضاء التي تطلب استضافة أعمالها.

عقد الدورة العادية الرابعة عشرة لمجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة في بيروت مارس 2002.

52 - وعملاً بما جاء في آلية الإنعقاد الدوري لمجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة ، وفي ضوء الاتفاق الذي تم بين دولة الامارات العربية المتحدة والجمهورية اللبنانية بشأن تبادل رئاسة القمة بينهما ، يقرر القادة عقد الدورة العادية الرابعة عشرة لمجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة في بيروت عاصمة الجمهورية اللبنانية خلال شهر مارس / آذار عام 2002 ، على أن تعود دولة البحرين لتولى رئاسة الدورة الخامسة عشرة وفقاً لقاعدة الترتيب الهجائي لاسماء الدول الاعضاء في تولى رئاسة القمة.

إعلان مؤتمر قمة عمان

نحن ملوك ورؤساء وأمراء الدول العربية المجتمعون كمجلس لجامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة (الدورة العادية الثالثة عشرة) في عمان ، عاصمة المملكة الاردنية الهاشمية ، يومى 2 و3 من شهر محرم لسنة 1422 هـ الموافق 27 إلى 28 من شهر مارس / آذار لسنة 2001 م

وبعد أن اجرينا تقويماً شاملاً للوضع العربى والعلاقات العربية ، وللظروف التي تعيشها الامة ، وفي ضوء التحديات التي تواجهها ، والتهديدات التي تمس الامن القومى العربى ، وما آلت إليه عملية السلام في الشرق الاوسط من شلل. أخذين بعين الاعتبار المتغيرات في النظام الدولى ، لاسيما ثورة المعلوماتية والعولمة ، وبروز التكتلات الاقليمية الضخمة ، وتفاعل الحضارات والثقافات.

وإنطلاقاً من المسؤولية القومية ، ورغبة في تعزيز العلاقات العربية وتنميتها بما يحقق الأهداف العليا للامة ، ويصون أمنها القومي ، ويحفظ كرامتها نعلن مايلي :

التمسك بالهوية القومية ومبادئ ميثاق جامعة الدول العربية وأهدافها.

-التمسك بالروابط القومية وأواصر الاخوة التي تجمع أبناء الامة ووحدة الهدف بين شعوبها ، وبمبادئ ميثاق جامعة الدول العربية واهدافها ، والمحافظة على الامن القومي العربي على أساس احترام سلامة كل دولة وسيادتها على اراضيها ومواردها وحقوقها وعدم السماح بالتدخل في شئونها الداخلية أو استخدام القوة أو التهديد بها ، والالتزام بتسوية المنازعات بالطرق السلمية ، وعن طريق الحوار والتفاوض ، والالتزام بآليات فض النزاعات بالطرق السلمية .
الالتزام بقرار عقد القمة العربية بشكل دوري.

- التأكيد على الالتزام بقرار عقد القمة العربية بشكل دوري ، وفي موعدها لما لذلك من أهمية في استمرار تطوير العمل العربي المشترك.

تعزيز التضامن العربي وتفعيل العمل العربي المشترك .

-السعي لتعزيز التضامن العربي ، وتفعيل العمل العربي المشترك ، لتحقيق التكامل الاقتصادي بين الدول العربية وفق منهجية جديدة تقوم على أسس ومنطلقات عملية موضوعية ، وبموجب عمل تراكمي تدريجي يحفظ لكل دولة خصوصيتها ومصالحها الوطنية ، ويحقق ، في الوقت ذاته ، التقارب المتواصل والتعاون القطاعي بين مختلف المؤسسات والهيئات العربية المتشابهة وذات التوجه المشترك في الإقطار العربية.

دعم التواصل بين المواطنين في الاقطار العربية.

-دعم التواصل بين المواطنين في الاقطار العربية بما يعزز الترابط بين مصالحهم ، ودورهم في إحداث التنمية وفي تحصين الامة وحماية هويتها وتفعيل دورها ، وتعزيز مكانتها.

تشجيع التفاعل مع الثقافات والحضارات الاخرى .

-تشجيع التفاعل مع الثقافات والحضارات الاخرى انطلاقاً مما نصت عليه رسالتنا السمحة التي تنبذ جميع اشكال التفرقة والعنصرية ، وتدعو الى التسامح والتعايش على أساس الاحترام المتبادل ، وصيانة الحقوق المشروعة .

دعم الاشقاء الفلسطينيين والسوريين واللبنانيين في نضالهم لاسترداد حقوقهم المشروعة

-تقديم الدعم الكامل للاشقاء الفلسطينيين والسوريين واللبنانيين في نضالهم لاسترداد حقوقهم المشروعة ، مؤكداً أن الإنسحاب الإسرائيلي من جميع الاراضي العربية المحتلة عام 1967 ، وفي مقدمتها القدس الشريف ، ومن الجولان السوري حتى حدود الرابع من يونيو / حزيران ، وما تبقى من الاراضي اللبنانية المحتلة ، هو المدخل الوحيد لتحقيق السلام العادل والشامل في الشرق الاوسط ، وان تحقيق السلام الدائم في المنطقة مرتبط باخلاؤها من كافة أسلحة الدمار الشامل ، وفي مقدمتها السلاح النووي الاسرائيلي . ونناشد كافة القوى الفاعلة والاطراف المعنية بصيانة الامن والسلم الدوليين تحمل مسؤوليتها بهذا الخصوص ضمن منهجية شاملة ومتوازنة ومعايير واحدة .

الدعوة الى رفع العقوبات عن العراق .

-الدعوة الى رفع العقوبات عن العراق ، والتعاون مع المسائل الانسانية المتعلقة بالاسرى والمفقودين الكويتيين والمفقودين العراقيين وغيرهم إنطلاقاً من مبادئ تراثنا القومي والديني والانساني.
الدعوة لتحقيق المصالحة العربية.

-دعوة الجميع الى السمو فوق الخلافات والسعى لتحقيق المصالحة العربية ، والامتناع عما من شأنه النيل من التضامن العربي أو تهديد الامن القومي ، وما يمس الامن الوطني لأى من دولنا ، بما فى ذلك ما تقوم به بعض وسائل الاعلام ، دون المساس بحرية التعبير ودور الاعلام والصحافة ورجال الفكر فى خلق الرأى العام القومي المساند والداعم للعمل العربي المشترك ، وفى الدفاع عن قضايا الامة وحقوق المواطنين ، والتى على رأسها حقوق الانسان العربي .

سرعة إنجاز منطقة التجارة الحرة العربية الكبرى .

-إتخاذ الخطوات اللازمة ، وحسب ظروف كل دولة ، لتسريع انجاز منطقة التجارة الحرة العربية الكبرى ، وتوفير الدعم الكامل للجنة الوزارية العربية المشكلة كآلية لمتابعة تطبيق قرارات القمة .

الاعراب عن التقدير البالغ للمملكة الاردنية الهاشمية بقيادة جلالة الملك عبد الله الثانى ابن الحسين.

-أخيراً ، نعرب عن تقديرنا البالغ للمملكة الاردنية الهاشمية بقيادة جلالة الملك عبد الله الثانى ابن الحسين المعظم لما وفرته من رعاية ، وعنايه ، واعداد مميز لانعقاد هذه القمة ، مؤكداً ثقتنا الكاملة فى قيادة جلالته لدفة العمل العربي المشترك بكل الحنكة والحكمة والمسئولية والحرص على تعزيز التضامن العربي.

عمان 28 مارس / آذار 2001

بيان بشأن تأييد إعادة إنتخاب السيد كوفى أنان أميناً عاماً للامم المتحدة لولاية ثانية

إن مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة المنعقدة بعمان - المملكة الاردنية الهاشمية يومى 27 و 28 مارس / آذار 2001 ، يعبر عن تقديره للجهود التى يبذلها السيد كوفى أنان من أجل فض المنازعات بالطرق السلمية وإرساء دعائم السلم والامن الدوليين .

وينوه بمساهمته لتحقيق السلام العادل فى الشرق الاوسط على أسس الشرعية الدولية وتنفيذ قرارات مجلس الامن ذات الصلة . ويعلن عن تأييده لإعادة انتخاب السيد كوفى أنان لولاية ثانية أميناً عاماً للامم المتحدة .

أصحاب الفخامة والسيادة والسمو

لقد كانت القمم العربية السابقة فى معظمها ، تعقد للإتفاق على مواقف موحدة، تجاه القضايا التى استدعت انعقادها ، وبالتالي فقد كانت تلك القمم محكومة بظروف خاصة ، تجعلها أقرب إلى رد الفعل منها الى الفعل ، المستند إلى الرؤية الشمولية ، والريادة وأخذ زمام المبادرة .

أما قمتنا هذه ، وهى التطبيق الفعلى لقرار قمة القاهرة الأخيرة ، التى كان لجهود فخامة الرئيس محمد حسنى

مبارك الدور الكبير في إنجاحها ، والذي نص على ضرورة إنعقاد القمة العربية بشكل دوري في كل عام ، فهي تؤسس لمنهج جديد في مسيرة العمل العربي المشترك ، يستند إلى استمرار التواصل والتشاور والتنسيق ، بغض النظر عن الخلافات الآنية العابرة ، والظروف التي قد تمر بها هذه المنطقة ، وقد يشكل هذا المنهج الحد الأدنى ، من طموحات الأمة ، وتوقعات المواطن العربي ، الذي يتطلع الى تفعيل النظام العربي بكامله ، وتفعيل مبدأ العمل العربي المشترك ، وعلى أساس من التضامن والتكامل ، وتعظيم القواسم المشتركة ، ونقاط الإتفاق ، ومعالجة القضايا الخلافية من منطلق وضع المصلحة العربية العليا ، فوق كل المصالح والإعتبارات .

إن مواجهة التطورات العالمية المتسارعة من حولنا ، والتي تشمل على العديد من التحديات والتجمعات الإقتصادية ، التي تسعى لتوجيه وتوظيف العولمة لمصالحها ، تستدعي أن نعمل معا ، وأن نكون مجموعة متكاملة ، قادرة على مواكبة تلك التطورات ، والتفاعل معها بثقة ووعي ، وقدرة أكبر على مواجهة الآثار السلبية لهذه التطورات على شعوبنا ودولنا.

قائمة أسماء رؤساء وفود الدول العربية مرتبة حسب الحروف الهجائية للدول الأعضاء

* جلالة الملك عبد الله الثاني ابن الحسين ملك المملكة الاردنية الهاشمية

* صاحب السمو الشيخ مكتوم بن راشد آل مكتوم ... نائب رئيس دولة الامارات العربية المتحدة رئيس مجلس الوزراء حاكم دبي

* حضرة صاحب السمو الشيخ حمد بن عيسى آل خليفة أمير دولة البحرين

* فخامة الرئيس زين العابدين بن علي رئيس الجمهورية التونسية.

* فخامة الرئيس عبد العزيز بوتفليقة ... رئيس الجمهورية الجزائرية الديمقراطية الشعبية

* فخامة الرئيس إسماعيل عمر جيلة رئيس جمهورية جيبوتي

* صاحب السمو الملكي الأمير سلطان بن عبد العزيز آل سعود النائب الثاني لرئيس مجلس الوزراء وزير الدفاع والطيران والمفتش العام

* فخامة الرئيس الفريق عمر حسن أحمد البشير رئيس جمهورية السودان

* فخامة الرئيس بشار الأسد رئيس الجمهورية العربية السورية

* فخامة الرئيس عبد القاسم صلاح حسن رئيس جمهورية الصومال

* معالي السيد عزة ابراهيم نائب رئيس مجلس قيادة الثورة في جمهورية العراق

* صاحب السمو السيد فهد بن محمود بن محمد آل سعيد نائب رئيس الوزراء لشؤون مجلس الوزراء في سلطنة عمان

* فخامة الرئيس ياسر عرفات رئيس دولة فلسطين

* حضرة صاحب السمو الشيخ حمد بن خليفة آل ثاني أمير دولة قطر

- * فخامة الرئيس العقيد عثمان غزالي رئيس جمهورية القمر الاتحادية الإسلامية
- * معالي الشيخ صباح الأحمد الجابر الصباح النائب الاول لرئيس مجلس الوزراء ووزير خارجية دولة الكويت
- * فخامة الرئيس العماد إميل لحود رئيس الجمهورية اللبنانية
- * الأخ العقيد معمر القذافي قائد ثورة الفاتح العظيم الجماهيرية العربية الليبية الشعبية الاشتراكية العظمى
- * فخامة الرئيس محمد حسنى مبارك رئيس جمهورية مصر العربية
- * معالي السيد محمد بنعيسى وزير الشؤون الخارجية والتعاون - المملكة المغربية
- * معالي الشيخ العافية ولد محمد خونا الوزير الاول (رئيس الوزراء فى الجمهورية الاسلامية الموريتانية)
- * فخامة الرئيس الفريق على عبد الله صالح رئيس الجمهورية اليمنية

APPENDIX 3

The Final Communiqué of the Arab Summit in Beirut

28 March 2002

<http://www.ain-al-yaqeen.com/issues/20020405/feat6en.htm>

At the conclusion of the 14th Summit of the League of Arab States held in Beirut the Arab leaders issued a statement endorsing the peace initiative presented by Crown Prince Abdullah Ibn Abdul Aziz Deputy Prime Minister and Commander of the National Guard, which became an Arab initiative. The Arab leaders called on the international community with all its countries and organizations to support this initiative.

They asked the Presidency of the Arab League Summit Council to form a special committee of a number of concerned member countries and the Secretary General to make necessary contacts on this initiative and work to mobilize its support at all levels led by the United Nations, the Security Council, the United States, Russia, the Islamic countries and the European Union.

The Arab leaders expressed their sincere appreciation for Lebanon and its President, Emile Lahoud for the support, care and special preparations carried out to hold the Summit.

They also expressed their happiness over the safe return of the Emir of the State of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber Al Ahmed Al Jaber Al Sabah to Kuwait after concluding his medical treatment abroad.

The Arab leaders wished Sheikh Jaber Al Ahmed Al Jaber Al Sabah full recovery and continued health which will enable him to continue his march in providing prosperity and security for the country and people of Kuwait as well as for the Arab nation as a whole.

During their two-day deliberations, the Arab leaders reviewed the serious regional and international developments which have led to perilous repercussions and dire challenges for the Arab community, notably that pertaining to the occupied Palestinian territories and the destructive war launched by Israel under the pretext of fighting terrorism, exploiting the tragic incidents of September 11 in the United States.

The communique backed the plans to finance Palestinian uprising, including a campaign to collect one-day salary of Arab employees for the purpose.

The Arab leaders decided to support the Palestinian Authority's budget with a total sum of 330 million dollars.

The final communique of the summit said the 330 million dollars will be paid in six monthly instalments of 55 million dollars each starting from 1/4/2002.

It added the sum is automatically renewable for another six months as long the Israeli aggression is continuing and the Palestinian Authority is in need of this support.

It noted that these sums of money are grants and all Arab countries' contributions are compulsory and are in proportion to their shares in the General Secretariat's budget.

The Arab leaders also decided the Arab countries will provide an additional aid of 150 million dollars to be added to the Al Aqsa and Intifada Funds.

The communique issued at the end of the Summit stated: "The Arab leaders praised the steadfastness of the Palestinian people in face of Israeli occupation and paid respect for the Palestinian martyrs and supported the legitimate struggle of the Palestinian people until fulfilling the demands of the right of return, the right of self-determination and the establishment of the Palestinian state with Holy Jerusalem as its capital."

The Arab leaders stressed that, "in the event that the peace process is further set back, the Arab leaders stress their commitment to halt any relations with Israel and to re-activate the Arab Bureau for the Boycott of Israel, in order to oblige Israel to implement the relevant UN resolutions, with reference to Madrid and full withdrawal from all Arab occupied territories to the border lines of June 1967."

The communique emphasized that peace in the Middle East will not be successful if it is not just and comprehensive in line with UN Security Council resolutions 242, 338 and 425, and the principle of land for peace. It also stressed the unity of the Syrian and Lebanese tracks and their integral linkage with the Palestinian track for the realization of the Arab goals of a comprehensive solution.

The Arab leaders called on the government of Israel and all Israelis to accept the Arab Peace Initiative in order to preserve the chance for peace and to spare bloodshed, enable Arab countries and Israel to live in peace side by side and provide future generations with a secure future filled with prosperity and stability; and urged all the countries and organizations of the international community to support this initiative.

They reviewed the heroic Palestinian Intifadah as well as the Arab initiatives that aim at realizing a just and comprehensive peace in the region in the light of United Nations resolutions on the Arab-Israeli dispute and the Palestinian problem, and declared: "Shouldering our national responsibility, and in line with the conventions of the Arab League and the United Nations, we would like to attest to our determination to proceed on the path of Arab solidarity in all spheres, and to work to abort foreign plots hatched to undermine our regional Arab safety."

"We would like to salute the heroic Intifadah of the Palestinians and their resistance to Israel's occupation and its destructive military machinery and repressive measures against them. We hail the courageous martyrs of the Intifadah, and stress strong support on all levels for the Palestinian people and for their legitimate heroic struggle against occupation, to achieve their just demands for their right of return, self-determination, and

the establishment of their state with Al-Quds [East Jerusalem] as its capital," the communiqué said.

"The Arab leaders reviewed the peace process and the Israeli practices that aim at undermining the stability of the Middle East, and followed up the heroic Palestinian Intifada as well as the Arab initiatives that aim at realizing just and comprehensive peace in the region in the light of the resolutions of the international legitimacy pertaining to the Arab-Israeli dispute and the Palestinian problem," it added.

The communiqué urged just solution to the problem of Palestinian refugee, held Israel responsible for the Palestinian refugee problem, condemned Israel's "full-scale, programmed and destructive war" against the Palestinians and held Israel fully responsible for its brutal aggression on the Palestinians and the Palestinian Authority.

It expressed solidarity with Lebanon for full liberation of its territories and for its development and reconstruction.

The Arab leaders praised the Lebanese resistance which was able to drive out Israeli forces from most parts of Southern Lebanon. They also called for the immediate release of Lebanese detainees in Israeli prisons.

"The continuous Israeli aggression against Lebanon's sovereignty in all its forms, either by Israeli planes violating Lebanese air space or Israeli ships entering Lebanese waters" was denounced by the Arab leaders who said that these obstructions could lead to an explosive situation on the Southern Lebanese border which Israel would be totally responsible for.

The Arab leaders stressed their solidarity with Syria as well as Lebanon against Israel's aggressive threats that undermine the security and stability in the region, considering any attack on the two countries as an act of aggression against all Arab countries. They condemned Israel's continued occupation of the Golan Heights.

The leaders confirmed their commitment to cease the establishing of relations with Israel and to activate the Arab Office of Israeli Boycott until Israel implements all UN resolutions.

The Arab leaders affirmed a previous decision to cut ties with countries which shift their embassies to Jerusalem or recognizes Jerusalem as Israel's capital and advised member states to cut ties with Israel and revive boycott of the Jewish state if the peace process suffers any set back.

The Arab leaders blasted Israeli policy of killings and destruction on the pretext of combating terrorism and rejected moves to exploit the war on terrorism to attack Arab countries. They urged Israel to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

They called to differentiate between terrorism and the right of people to resist foreign occupation.

The communique welcomed the European Union initiatives to achieve a comprehensive and just peace settlement in the Middle East and urged the United States to revive the Middle East peace process.

The Arab leaders welcomed statements by Iraq to respect the independence, sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Kuwait in a way that leads to avoidance of all that can cause the reoccurrence of the events of 1990.

They called for the adoption of policies leading to the achievement of this within a framework of good will and good neighbourly relations.

In this context, the Arab leaders drew attention to the importance of ending negative media statements in preparation for creating a positive atmosphere to reassure the two countries of the adherence to the principles of good neighbourliness and non-interference in internal affairs.

The 14th Arab summit achieved a breakthrough in the 11-year-old conflict between Kuwait and Iraq. The breakthrough came after Iraq gave a written commitment not to invade Kuwait again followed by a declaration to the summit that "Iraq guarantees the security of all the Arab countries, including Kuwait".

The Arab leaders urged respect for the independence, sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Iraq; called on Iraq to co-operate in finding a quick and final solution to the issue of Kuwaiti prisoners and hostages and to return property in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions; and urged that Kuwait and Iraq co-operate regarding missing persons through the International Committee of the Red Cross.

"We welcome the representative of Iraq's guarantees/assurances that it respects the independence, sovereignty and security of the state of Kuwait," said the Arab leaders in their communiqué.

"Iraq ought to find a speedy solution to end Kuwaiti POWs' and detainees and to return all stolen properties according to related international laws," the communiqué said.

It continued, "Kuwait should co-operate with Iraq on its detainees through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)."

The Arab leaders welcomed the resumption of dialogue between Iraq and the United Nations, which has started in a positive and constructive atmosphere towards full implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions.

The communique urged that the sanctions imposed on Iraq be lifted and the sufferings of its people ended, in order to ensure stability and security in the region.

It rejected the threat of aggression against certain Arab countries, Iraq in particular, stressing absolute rejection of a strike against Iraq or a threat to the security and peace of any Arab country, considering that as a threat to the national security of all Arab countries.

"We reject the threat of attacking Arab countries, especially Iraq. We reaffirm our complete rejection of any attack on Iraq," the communiqué said. "And we affirm our rejection of any security threat on any Arab country, and we consider it a security threat to the Arab states as a whole."

The communiqué went on to say, "we demand the respect of Iraq's independence, sovereignty, security and unity." In addition, it calls for "the lifting of the sanctions on Iraq, ending the punishment of the Iraqi people."

The communiqué affirmed the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over its three islands occupied by Iran- Abu Moussa, the Lesser and Greater Tunbs- and supported all peaceful measures and means according to the principles and rules of international law as well as the acceptance of referring the dispute to the International Court of Justice.

The Arab leaders condemned international terrorism and the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001; and condemned its exploitation by the Israeli government to continue its practices of state terrorism and the launch of comprehensive, destructive and aggressive war against the Palestinian people.

They stressed the distinction between international terrorism and the legitimate right of peoples to resist the foreign occupation; and underlined the need to reach an international agreement within the framework of the United Nations to set a precise definition of international terrorism and to set its causes and ways of dealing with them.

The communiqué called for "importance of interaction among cultures and civilisations springing from what the divine religions and human values call for namely discarding all forms of racial discrimination, in addition to magnanimity and co-existence based on mutual respect, maintenance of legal rights and appreciation of Arab, Islamic and other efforts aiming at clearing out rights of on Arab and Islamic culture and civilisation, and rebutting falsifications thereon".

The communiqué called on the swift completion of the Arab Free Trade Zone in light of the formation of international economic global coalitions and the close deadline of the implementation of the World Trade Agreement, and affirmed the importance of encouraging inter-Arab investments.

The Arab leaders decided to unify fees and wages of paper work in the state states with regard of the flow of commodities and tasked the social-economic council to take practical steps in this respect.

They expressed satisfaction with measures that have been taken by the Council to confine exemptions within the framework of the free trade zone and blessed the approach to establish the Common Arab Authority for registration of medicines.

The Arab leaders called on the Council and the Arab Transports Council to speedily complete studies on tackling transport problems among the Arab countries and completing the land and sea link-ups of these countries.

They decided to "launch the free air navigation among the Arab states according to resolutions of the Arab Council of Transports and the Arab Authority for Civil Aviation."

They urged Arab finance institutions and the private financing sector to contribute to funding economic ventures that boost development in Arab states, particularly in the infrastructure.

The Arab leaders reiterated their support and solidarity with Libya in its call on the Security Council to lift the sanctions imposed on it at once and for good.

They said that the Arab countries would call off all these sanctions after Libya has shown it had fulfilled all its commitments stipulated by the Security Council.

Regarding Somalia, the Arab leaders stressed the importance of preserving sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia and not to interfere into its internal affairs. They welcomed efforts of the transitional Somalian government to continue the full reconciliation, achieve unity and restoring peace and security to the country.

They decided to grant some 56 million dollars to the Somalian government to enable it execute its urgent program concerning restoring peace and stability and achieve the national reconciliation.

Regarding Sudan, the Arab leaders expressed their appreciation to the government of Sudan for achieving comprehensive peace and national reconciliation among the Sudanese people and dispatch the relief aides to needy people.

The leaders looked into the main system of the Arab Fund for Aiding Sudan for the sake of enhancing its South. The Arab League Secretary General was deputized to make contacts to rally financial support.

Regarding the Comoros islands, the Arab leaders expressed their keenness of the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity and blessed efforts of the national reconciliation exerted by the government.

The Arab leaders called for strengthening co-operation between Arab and African states.

Regarding the issue of water between Syria, Iraq and Turkey, the Arab leaders stressed their support to the rights of Iraq and Syria to the Euphrates River water.

They urged Turkey to indulge into tripartite talks with Syria and Iraq according to the international law provisions and the signed agreements to reach a just solution.

They also backed the Arab Organization for Communication and Information Technology in Tunis and Arab Forum for Information Technology in Cairo.

The communique proposed an international fund to fight poverty.

The Arab leaders decided to hold the next summit in Manama, Bahrain in March 2003.

http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/arabic/details_ar.jsp?art_id=996&level_id=202#

مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة الدورة العادية (14) بيروت - الجمهورية اللبنانية (إعلان بيروت)

13 و 14 محرم 1423 هـ الموافق 27 و 28 مارس/آذار 2002 م نحن ملوك ورؤساء وأمراء الدول العربية المجتمعين كمجلس لجامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة (الدورة العادية الرابعة عشرة) في بيروت عاصمة الجمهورية اللبنانية يومي 13 و 14 محرم 1423 هـ الموافق 27 و 28 مارس/آذار 2002، تدارسنا المتغيرات الإقليمية والدولية الخطيرة التي أدت إلى تداعيات مقلقة والتحديات المفروضة على الأمة العربية والتهديدات التي تواجه الأمن القومي العربي، وأجرينا تقييماً شاملاً لهذه المتغيرات والتحديات وبخاصة تلك المتعلقة بالمنطقة العربية ولا سيما الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة، وقيام إسرائيل بشن حرب تدميرية شاملة بذريعة محاربة الإرهاب، مستغلة أحداث أيلول المأساوية والإدانة العالمية لهذه الأحداث.

وتباحثنا بما آلت إليه عملية السلام وممارسات إسرائيل الرامية إلى تدميرها وإغراق الشرق الأوسط بالفوضى وعدم الاستقرار، وتابعا باعتزاز كبير انتفاضة الشعب الفلسطيني ومقاومته الباسلة، وناقشنا المبادرات العربية الهادفة إلى تحقيق السلام العادل والشامل في المنطقة، وتنفيذ قرارات الشرعية الدولية المتعلقة بالصراع العربي-الإسرائيلي، والقضية الفلسطينية. وانطلاقاً من المسؤولية القومية، وإيماناً بمبادئ وأهداف ميثاق جامعة الدول العربية وميثاق الأمم المتحدة، نعلن ما يلي:

- متابعة العمل على تعزيز التضامن العربي في جميع المجالات صوتاً للأمن القومي العربي ودفعاً للمخططات الأجنبية الرامية إلى النيل من السلامة الإقليمية العربية.
- توجيه تحية الاعتزاز والإكبار إلى صمود الشعب الفلسطيني وانتفاضته الباسلة في وجه الاحتلال الإسرائيلي وألته العسكرية التدميرية، وقمعه المنهجي والمجازر التي يرتكبها باستهداف الأطفال والنساء والشيوخ دون تمييز أو رادع إنساني.
- الوقوف بإجلال وإكبار أمام شهداء الانتفاضة البواسل، وتأكيد الدعم الثابت للشعب الفلسطيني بمختلف الأشكال تأييداً لنضاله البطولي المشروع في وجه الاحتلال، حتى تتحقق مطالبه العادلة المتمثلة بحق العودة وتقرير المصير وقيام دولته المستقلة وعاصمتها القدس.
- التضامن مع لبنان لاستكمال تحرير أراضيه وتقديم الدعم له لإنمائه وإعادة إعمارها.
- الاعتزاز بالمقاومة اللبنانية وبالصمود اللبناني الرائع الذي أدى إلى اندحار القوات الإسرائيلية من معظم جنوب لبنان وبقاعه الغربي، والمطالبة بالإفراج الفوري عن المعتقلين اللبنانيين في السجون الإسرائيلية خلافاً للقوانين والمواثيق الدولية، وإدانة العدوان الإسرائيلي المتكرر على سيادة لبنان المتمثل بخرق الطائرات

والبوارج الإسرائيلية للأجواء والمياه الإقليمية اللبنانية، مما يندر بعواقب وخيمة لما يشكّله من تحرّش واستفزاز وعدوان قد يؤدي إلى تفجير الوضع على الحدود الجنوبية اللبنانية تتحمّل إسرائيل مسؤوليته الكاملة.

- توجيه التحية إلى صمود المواطنين العرب السوريين في الجولان السوري المحتلّ، مشيدين بتمسّكهم بهويتهم الوطنية ومقاومتهم للاحتلال الإسرائيلي ومؤكدين التضامن مع سورية ولبنان في وجه التهديدات العدوانية الإسرائيلية التي تقوّض الأمن والاستقرار في المنطقة واعتبار أيّ اعتداء عليهما اعتداءً على الدول العربية جمعاء.

- يؤكّد القادة، في ضوء انتكاسة عملية السلام، التزامهم بالتوقف عن إقامة أية علاقات مع إسرائيل، وتفعيل نشاط مكتب المقاطعة العربية لإسرائيل، حتى تستجيب لتنفيذ قرارات الشرعية الدولية، ومرجعية مؤتمر مدريد للسلام، والانسحاب من كافة الأراضي العربية المحتلة حتى خطوط الرابع من حزيران / يونيو 1967

- التأكيد على أنّ السلام في الشرق الأوسط لن يُكتب له النجاح إن لم يكن عادلاً وشاملاً تنفيذاً لقرارات مجلس الأمن رقم 242 و338 و425 ولبدء الأرض مقابل السلام، والتأكيد على تلازم المسارين السوري واللبناني وارتباطهما عضويّاً مع المسار الفلسطيني تحقيقاً للأهداف العربية في شمولية الحلّ. - وفي إطار تبني المجلس للمبادرة السعودية كمبادرة سلام عربية يطلب المجلس من إسرائيل إعادة النظر في سياساتها، وان تجنح للسلام معلنة أن السلام العادل هو خيارها الاستراتيجي أيضاً. كما يطالبها القيام بما يلي :-

أ - الانسحاب الكامل من الأراضي العربية المحتلة بما في ذلك الجولان السوري وحتى خط الرابع من يونيو (حزيران) 1967، والأراضي التي مازالت محتلة في جنوب لبنان.

ب- التوصل إلى حل عادل لمشكلة اللاجئين الفلسطينيين يتفق عليه وفقاً لقرار الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة رقم 194.

ج- قبول قيام دولة فلسطينية مستقلة ذات سيادة على الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة منذ الرابع من يونيو 1967 في الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة وتكون عاصمتها القدس الشرقية .

- عندئذ تقوم الدول العربية بما يلي :

أ - اعتبار النزاع العربي الإسرائيلي منتهياً، والدخول في اتفاقية سلام بينها وبين إسرائيل مع تحقيق الأمن لجميع دول المنطقة .

ب- إنشاء علاقات طبيعية مع إسرائيل في إطار هذا السلام الشامل .

- ضمان رفض كل أشكال التوطين الفلسطيني الذي يتنافى والوضع الخاص في البلدان العربية المضيفة .

- يدعو المجلس حكومة إسرائيل والإسرائيليين جميعاً إلى قبول هذه المبادرة المبينة أعلاه حماية لفرص السلام وحققاً للدماء، بما يمكن الدول العربية وإسرائيل من العيش في سلام جنباً إلى جنب، ويوفر للأجيال القادمة مستقبلاً آمناً يسوده الرخاء والاستقرار .

- يدعو المجلس المجتمع الدولي بكل دوله ومنظماته إلى دعم هذه المبادرة. - يطلب المجلس من رئاسته تشكيل لجنة خاصة من عدد من الدول الأعضاء المعنية والأمين العام لإجراء الاتصالات اللازمة بهذه المبادرة والعمل على تأكيد دعمها على كافة المستويات وفي مقدمتها الأمم المتحدة ومجلس الأمن والولايات المتحدة والاتحاد الروسي والدول الإسلامية والاتحاد الأوروبي. - الترحيب بتأكيدات جمهورية العراق على احترام استقلال وسيادة وأمن دولة الكويت وضمان سلامة ووحدة أراضيها بما يؤدي إلى تجنب كل ما من شأنه تكرار ما حدث في عام 1990 ويدعون إلى تبني سياسات تؤدي إلى ضمان ذلك في إطار من النوايا الحسنة وعلاقات حسن الجوار . وفي هذا الإطار يدعو القادة إلى أهمية وقف الحملات الإعلامية والتصريحات السلبية تمهيدا لخلق أجواء إيجابية تطمئن البلدين بالتمسك بمبادئ حسن الجوار وعدم التدخل في الشؤون الداخلية .

- المطالبة باحترام استقلال وسيادة العراق وامنه ووحدة أراضيه وسلامته الإقليمية.
- مطالبة العراق بالتعاون لإيجاد حل سريع ونهائي لقضية الأسرى والمرتهنين الكويتيين وإعادة الممتلكات وفقا لقرارات الشرعية الدولية ذات الصلة .وتعاون الكويت فيما يقدمه العراق عن مفقوده من خلال اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر.

- الترحيب باستئناف الحوار بين العراق والأمم المتحدة الذي بدأ في جو إيجابي وبناء استكمالا لتنفيذ قرارات مجلس الأمن ذات الصلة .

- المطالبة برفع العقوبات عن العراق وإنهاء معاناة شعبه الشقيق بما يؤمن الاستقرار والأمن في المنطقة .
- رفض التهديد بالعدوان على بعض الدول العربية وبصورة خاصة العراق وتأكيد الرفض المطلق ضرب العراق أو تهديد أمن وسلامة أية دولة عربية باعتباره تهديداً للأمن القومي لجميع الدول العربية .
- التأكيد على سيادة دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة على جزرها الثلاث وتأييد كافة الإجراءات والوسائل السلمية الكفيلة باستعادة سيادتها عليها وفقاً لمبادئ وقواعد القانون الدولي والقبول بإحالة النزاع إلى محكمة العدل الدولية .

- إدانة الإرهاب الدولي، بما في ذلك الهجوم الإرهابي الذي تعرّضت له الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية في الحادي عشر من سبتمبر/ أيلول 2001 واستغلال الحكومة الإسرائيلية لهذا الهجوم من أجل استمرارها في ممارسة إرهاب الدولة وشنّ حرب عدوانية تدميرية شاملة على الشعب الفلسطيني.
- التشديد على التمييز ما بين الإرهاب الدولي وبين الحقّ المشروع للشعوب في مقاومة الاحتلال الأجنبي وعلى ضرورة التوصل إلى اتفاق دولي في إطار الأمم المتحدة يضع تعريفاً دقيقاً للإرهاب الدولي ويحدّد أسبابه وسبل معالجتها.

- التأكيد على أهمية التفاعل ما بين الثقافات والحضارات، انطلاقاً ممّا تدعو إليه الأديان السماوية والقيم الإنسانية من نبذ جميع أشكال التفرقة العنصرية، والحضّ على التسامح والتعايش على أساس الاحترام المتبادل وصيانة الحقوق المشروعة، وتثمين الجهود العربية والإسلامية وغيرها الرامية إلى توضيح الحقائق عن الثقافة والحضارة العربية والإسلامية، وتفنيد المزاعم الباطلة حولها.

- الإسراع بإنجاز منطقة التجارة الحرة العربية الكبرى في ضوء تنامي ظاهرة التكتلات الاقتصادية العالمية وقرب انتهاء الفترة المحددة لتطبيق اتفاقية منظمة التجارة العالمية.
- الإعراب عن التقدير البالغ للجمهورية اللبنانية وفخامة الرئيس إميل لحود رئيس الجمهورية، على الرعاية والعناية والإعداد المميّز لانعقاد هذه القمة والشكر العميق لفخامة الرئيس إميل لحود على قيادته الناجحة لإدارة أعمال القمة العربية بأعلى درجات الحنكة السياسية والحكمة الناضجة والمسؤولية الواعية.

APPENDIX 4

Arab League Ministers gather in Cairo – Extraordinary session regarding Iraq

11 November 2002

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/687/11/PDF/N0268711.pdf?OpenElement>

Letter from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

In accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, I have the honour to enclose herewith resolution No. 6257 dated 10 November 2002 concerning Iraq, adopted by the Council of Arab Foreign Ministers of the League of Arab States at its extraordinary session, held in Cairo (see annex). I would appreciate if you would draw the attention of the members of the Security Council to this letter and its annex and have both circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yahya **Mahmassani**
Ambassador

S/2002/1238

Annex to the letter dated 11 November 2002 from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

Evolution of the question of Iraq

The Council of the League of Arab States, meeting at the ministerial level in an extraordinary session on Sunday, 10 November 2002, at the headquarters of the Secretary-General to consider the evolution of the situation and the serious prospects with which the Arab region is confronted, Having studied the evolution of the question of Iraq in the light of resolution 1441 (2002) adopted by the Security Council on 8 November 2002, Considering its adherence to the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of international law, On the basis of the attachment of the Arab States to the Charter of the League of Arab States and to all its agreements,

1. *Reaffirms* the resolutions of the Council of the League, in particular resolution 227 adopted at the summit meeting in Beirut on 28 March 2002 and resolution 6216 of the Council of Ministers of the League of 5 September 2002;
2. After having considered Security Council resolution 1441 (2002), *welcomes* the provisions whereby the Security Council is the competent authority to evaluate the reports of the inspectors, and takes into consideration the statements made before the Security Council according to which that resolution does not constitute a basis for recourse to the use of military force against Iraq, and *urges* the States permanent members of the Security Council which have given reassurances to the Syrian Arab Republic, the Arab member of the Security Council, to give an undertaking that the resolution does not constitute a pretext for unleashing war against Iraq and does not provide for automatic recourse to a military operation;
3. *Welcomes* the unconditional acceptance by Iraq of the return of the international inspectors and *urges* continued cooperation between the United Nations and Iraq with a view to resolving all the outstanding problems by peaceful means in order to lift the

sanctions against Iraq, put an end to the embargo imposed against it and end the suffering of the Iraqi people;

4. *Urges* the teams of inspectors to carry out their mission with professionalism and complete neutrality and objectivity, and not to engage in any acts of provocation, in order to ensure the credibility of their actions, and also urges the participation of Arab experts in the inspection teams;

5. *Reaffirms* that the Arab States remain attached to the preservation of the security and safety of Iraq, to its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and also to the preservation of the security, safety and sovereignty of all the Arab States, and *affirms* that the Arab States continue to reject totally a strike against Iraq, considering that such a strike would constitute a threat to the national security of all the Arab States;

S/2002/1238

6. *Appeals* to the Security Council, in its further action aimed at the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, to constrain Israel to implement the legitimate international resolutions and to urge it to implement without delay paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) concerning the

establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, and, in particular, the elimination of Israeli weapons of mass destruction which constitute a serious threat to the security of the Arab nations and to international peace and security;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his efforts and to maintain contact with the Iraqi Government and the United Nations and the other parties concerned in this matter;

8. *Extends* the session of the Council with a view to following the evolution of the situation and any new developments concerning this question.

Resolution 6257

10 November 2002

http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/arabic/details_ar.jsp?art_id=1583&level_id=237#

قرارات مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على المستوى الوزاري الدورة غير العادية بشأن النظر في

التطورات والاحتمالات الخطيرة التي تواجه المنطقة العربية القاهرة: 2002/11/10

تطورات المسألة العراقية

إن مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على المستوى الوزاري المنعقد في مقر الأمانة العامة بدورته غير العادية بتاريخ 2002/11/10،

- بعد أن تدارس تطورات المسألة العراقية في ضوء القرار رقم 1441 الصادر عن مجلس الأمن بتاريخ 2002/11/8،

- وانطلاقاً من التزامه بمبادئ وأهداف ميثاق الأمم المتحدة وأحكام القانون الدولي،

- وتأسيساً على التزام الدول العربية بميثاق جامعة الدول العربية وكافة معاهداتها،

يقرر

1 - التأكيد على قرارات مجلس الجامعة وعلى رأسها القرار رقم 227 الصادر عن قمة بيروت بتاريخ 2002/3/28 وكذلك قرار مجلس الجامعة الوزاري رقم 6216 بتاريخ 2002/9/5.

2 - بعد أن أطلع المجلس على قرار مجلس الأمن رقم 1441 (2002) يرحب بما ورد فيه من أن مجلس الأمن هو المرجعية المناط بها تقييم تقارير المفتشين، ويأخذ بعين الاعتبار ما صدر من بيانات أمام مجلس الأمن من أن هذا القرار لا يشكل أساساً للجوء إلى استخدام القوة العسكرية ضد العراق، ويطالب الدول الدائمة العضوية في مجلس الأمن التي قدمت تطمينات للجمهورية العربية السورية، العضو العربي في مجلس الأمن، بالالتزام بما تقدمت به من أن القرار لا يشكل ذريعة لشن الحرب على العراق ولا يتضمن التلقائية للجوء إلى العمل العسكري.

3 - الترحيب بقبول العراق عودة المفتشين الدوليين بدون شروط، والمطالبة بمواصلة التعاون بين الأمم المتحدة والعراق لحل كافة المشاكل العالقة بصورة سلمية تمهيدا لرفع العقوبات عن العراق وإنهاء الحصار المفروض عليه ووضع حد لمعاناة شعبه.

4 - مطالبة فرق المفتشين بممارسة مهامها مهنية وبكل حياد وموضوعية وعدم الإقدام على أي أعمال استفزازية وذلك لضمان مصداقية عملها، والمطالبة بمشاركة خبراء عرب في فرق المفتشين.

5 - استمرار التزام الدول العربية بالحفاظ على أمن وسلامة العراق وسيادته ووحدة أراضيه، بنفس قدر الالتزام بالحفاظ على أمن وسلامة وسيادة الدول العربية كافة، وتأكيد استمرار رفض الدول العربية المطلق ضرب العراق باعتبار ذلك تهديداً للأمن القومي لجميع الدول العربية.

6 - دعوة مجلس الأمن، امتداداً لما قام به لإزالة أسلحة الدمار الشامل في العراق، إلى إلزام إسرائيل بتنفيذ قرارات الشرعية الدولية والمطالبة بالإسراع في تنفيذ الفقرة الرابعة عشرة من قرار مجلس الأمن رقم 687 (1991) الخاصة بإخلاء منطقة الشرق الأوسط من أسلحة الدمار الشامل وبوجه خاص إزالة أسلحة الدمار الشامل الإسرائيلية لما تشكله من تهديد خطير للأمن القومي العربي وللأمن والسلم الدوليين.

7 - الطلب إلى الأمين العام مواصلة جهوده ومتابعة الاتصالات مع الحكومة العراقية والأمم المتحدة وغيرها من الأطراف المعنية في هذا الشأن.

8 - إبقاء دورة المجلس في حالة انعقاد لمتابعة التطورات والمستجدات الخاصة بهذا الموضوع .

(ق: رقم 6257-د.غ.ع.-ج2-10/11/2002)

الجهود العربية والدولية من أجل السلام

إن مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على المستوى الوزاري المنعقد في مقر الأمانة العامة بدورته غير العادية بتاريخ 2002/11/10،

- بعد أن تدارس التطورات الخطيرة في الأراضي المحتلة وخاصةً احتلال إسرائيل للأراضي الفلسطينية وحصار المدن والقرى الفلسطينية واستمرار العدوان الإسرائيلي ضد الشعب الفلسطيني وسلطته الوطنية، والسياسات العدوانية المتطرفة للحكومة الإسرائيلية الحالية، وإعلان قادتها عن إلغائهم لاتفاقيات السلام الموقعة مع منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية التي تمت تحت إشراف دولي، والتهديدات المستمرة ضد سورية ولبنان ،

يقرر

1 - القيام بتحريك عربي مكثف لتفعيل الجهود الدولية لتنفيذ قرارات الأمم المتحدة وآخرها قراري مجلس الأمن رقمي 1397 ، 1435 التي تطالب إسرائيل بالانسحاب الفوري من الأراضي العربية والفلسطينية المحتلة والعودة لطريق السلام وإقامة الدولة الفلسطينية .

2- التمسك بمبادرة السلام العربية بكامل مقوماتها وبدون اجتزاء، بوصفها الطريق الأفضل للتوصل إلى حل عادل وشامل لقضية الشرق الأوسط .

3 - أن يستند التحرك العربي على الساحة الدولية إلى المبادرة العربية للسلام ومرجعية مدريد والأرض مقابل السلام وقرارات مجلس الأمن ذات الصلة .

4 - تكليف لجنة مبادرة السلام العربية بحث أية خطط أو مبادرات أو اقتراحات متعلقة بالصراع العربي الإسرائيلي وتقديم تقرير عنها إلى المجلس .

(ق: رقم 6258-د.غ.ع.-ج2-10/11/2002)

قرار الكونجرس الأمريكي بشأن القدس

إن مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على المستوى الوزاري المنعقد في مقر الأمانة العامة بدورته غير العادية بتاريخ 2002/11/10،

- بعد أن أستمع إلى العرض الذي قدمه رئيس وفد دولة فلسطين بشأن قرار الكونجرس الأمريكي حول

مدينة القدس،

يقرر

- 1- التأكيد على أن القدس جزء لا يتجزأ من الأراضي العربية التي احتلتها إسرائيل عام 1967 والتي يجب الانسحاب منها وفقاً لقرارات الشرعية الدولية ولا سيما 242 (1967)، 338 (1973)، 252 (1968)، 267 (1969)، 271 (1969)، 298 (1971)، 465 (1980)، 476 (1980)، 478 (1980)، وكذلك القرارات الخاصة بالقدس والتي تدعو إلى إلغاء جميع الإجراءات الإسرائيلية واعتبارها باطلة ولاغية.
 - 2- الرفض المطلق لقرار الكونجرس الأمريكي الذي يعتبر خروجاً عن أحكام القانون الدولي والشرعية الدولية وانتهاكاً لقرارات مجلس الأمن ذات الصلة .
 - 3- تأييد قرار الرئيس ياسر عرفات باعتبار القدس عاصمة لدولة فلسطين المستقلة، والتأكيد على الموقف العربي الداعم لضمود الشعب الفلسطيني وقيادته الوطنية في مواجهة المخططات الإسرائيلية لتهويد القدس .
 - 4- الطلب إلى الإدارة الأمريكية اتخاذ الخطوات اللازمة التي تكفل عدم الالتزام بالفقرة الخاصة بوضع القدس كما وردت في الفقرة 214 من مشروع قانون ميزانية وزارة الخارجية الأمريكية، واستمرار الجهود للتوصل إلى حل عادل لقضية القدس يكفل الحقوق العربية المشروعة فيها .
 - 5- تفعيل قرارات مؤتمرات القمة العربية، والتي أكدت بطلان كافة الإجراءات التي اتخذتها وتتخذها إسرائيل لتغيير معالم القدس، والتي طالبت فيها دول العالم بعدم نقل سفارتها إلى القدس وقطع جميع العلاقات مع الدول التي تقوم بذلك .
 - 6- دعوة الاتحاد البرلماني العربي والبرلمانات العربية إلى القيام باتخاذ ما يلزم من إجراءات حيال هذا القرار الخطير .
 - 7- تأييد الدعوة إلى عقد اجتماع عاجل للجنة القدس لمواجهة تبعات هذا القرار .
 - 8- دعوة مجلس الأمن إلى تحمل مسؤولياته لوضع قراراته بشأن قضية فلسطين موضع التنفيذ وفي مقدمتها تلك القرارات المتعلقة بالقدس ، ومطالبة الأمين العام للأمم المتحدة أن يوجه رسالة واضحة إلى الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية يبين فيها أن قرار الكونجرس الأمريكي الخاص بموضوع القدس مخالفة صريحة لقرارات الشرعية الدولية والتي كانت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية قد صادقت عليها .
 - 9- مناشدة الفاتيكان رفض الإجراءات الإسرائيلية لتهويد القدس، والعمل على حماية المدينة المقدسة من مخاطر الإجراءات الإسرائيلية .
- (ق: رقم 6259-د.ع.ع-ج-2-10/11/2002)
- دعم صمود الشعب الفلسطيني
- إن مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على المستوى الوزاري المنعقد في مقر الأمانة العامة بدورته غير العادية بتاريخ 2002/11/10،
- بعد اطلاعه على الأوضاع المتزدية والخطيرة التي تعرض لها الشعب الفلسطيني من خسائر في الأرواح والممتلكات والمنشآت الاقتصادية ،

يقرر

- 1- الإسراع في تنفيذ قرارات مجلس الجامعة على مستوى القمة العربية في بيروت 2002 لدعم موازنة السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية، ويقرر تشكيل لجنة من رئاسة القمة والأمانة العامة ودولة فلسطين لزيارة الدول العربية من أجل تنفيذ قرار القمة سالف الذكر .
- 2- تكليف اللجنة بدراسة كيفية سداد العجز المالي الناتج عن الخلاف حول النسب وعن عدم مقدرة بعض الدول على سداد مبلغ وقدره 105 مليون دولار عن الستة أشهر الأولى، وتطبيق نفس الأسلوب على الستة أشهر التالية .
- 3- أهمية تعزيز التبرعات الشعبية من المؤسسات والأفراد، والطلب من الأمانة العامة للجامعة الاستمرار في فتح حسابات لدعم صمود الشعب الفلسطيني في بنوك الدول العربية المختلفة .
(ق: رقم 6260-د.غ.ع.-ج2-10/11/2002)
- أهمية دور الجماهيرية في دعم العمل العربي المشترك
إن مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على المستوى الوزاري المنعقد في مقر الأمانة العامة بدورته غير العادية بتاريخ 2002/11/10،
- بعد أن تدارس طلب الجماهيرية العربية الليبية الشعبية الاشتراكية العظمى الانسحاب من عضوية جامعة الدول العربية ،
يقرر
- 1- تأكيد أهمية دور الجماهيرية في دعم العمل العربي المشترك وإثرائه وتطويره، وفي سعيها للحفاظ على تماسك الصف العربي .
- 2- الحرص على استمرار عضوية الجماهيرية لمواصلة دورها في تعزيز التضامن العربي خاصة في هذه المرحلة الدقيقة التي تعيشها الأمة العربية ويدعوها إلى سحب طلب انسحابها .
- 3- التأكيد على أن الموقف الليبي هو دعوة قوية لمراجعة العمل العربي المشترك وأسلوبه أمام جسامه التحديات التي تهدد المصالح الحيوية للوطن العربي وأمنه واستقراره .
- 4- مشاركة الدول العربية كافة، الجماهيرية الشقيقة انشغالها الكبير بالواقع العربي وحرصها على تطوير أسلوب التعاطي العربي مع القضايا الخطيرة التي يواجهها .
- 5- الدعوة إلى تناول موضوع الواقع العربي وأسلوب العمل العربي المشترك في قمة عربية والطلب من الأمانة العامة استجلاء آراء الدول العربية لاعداد خطة التطوير، والتأكيد على أهمية مساهمة كل الدول العربية بما فيها الجماهيرية في وضع وإثراء خطة تطوير العمل العربي المشترك على أن تصل الاقتراحات في الوقت المناسب.
- 6- التنويه بسرعة تحرك الأمين العام ورئاسة المجلس في احتواء هذا الموقف وفي الدعوة لعقد الاجتماع الوزاري غير العادي لمجلس جامعة الدول العربية .
(ق: رقم 6261-د.غ.ع.-ج2-10/11/2002)

اقترح دولة قطر عقد قمة استثنائية

إن مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على المستوى الوزاري المنعقد في مقر الأمانة العامة بدورته غير العادية بتاريخ 2002/11/10،

- بعد أن تدارس اقتراح دولة قطر بشأن عقد قمة استثنائية،
يقرر

1- الطلب إلى كافة الدول الأعضاء موافاة الأمانة العامة بمقترحاتها وآرائها بأسرع وقت ممكن حول تفعيل العمل العربي المشترك، والطلب إلى الأمين العام استمرار التشاور والنشط ومتابعة الموضوع في ضوء ردود الدول في هذا الشأن .

2- التأكيد على الأهمية البالغة لانعقاد مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة، لمناقشة المقترحات والبدائل حول التحديات التي تواجه الأمة العربية، وتقدير ما يراه في دورة استثنائية أو أثناء القمة العادية القادمة .

(ق: رقم 6262-د.ع.غ.ع.ج-2-2002/11/10)

التضامن مع السودان

إن مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على المستوى الوزاري المنعقد في مقر الأمانة العامة بدورته غير العادية بتاريخ 2002/11/10،

- بعد أن اطلع على البيان الصادر عن اجتماع اللجنة الوزارية الخاصة بالسودان،

- وبعد أن تدارس تطورات الوضع في السودان،

يقرر

1- دعم جهود الحكومة السودانية لتحقيق السلام في كافة ربوع السودان بما يصون أمنه واستقراره ووحدته وسلامة أراضيه.

2- تأكيد التضامن مع السودان في مواجهة كل ما يهدد أمنه وسلامته ووحدته ودعم جهود حكومة السودان لتحقيق السلام الشامل والوفاق الوطني بين جميع أبنائه.

3- الترحيب بوقف إطلاق النار والعدائيات بين الحكومة السودانية والحركة الشعبية لتحرير السودان، ودعم جهود حكومة السودان الرامية إلى تحقيق وقف شامل لإطلاق النار لحقن دماء المواطنين وفتح الطريق أمام تنمية السودان وتقديمه.

4- إبداء القلق إزاء تصاعد العمليات العسكرية في شرق السودان ومطالبة إريتريا باحترام سيادة وسلامة أراضي السودان وسلامته الإقليمية، وعدم التدخل في شؤونه الداخلية.

5- إبداء القلق لإصدار الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية القانون المسمى بقانون سلام السودان لأنه يشكل عقبة أمام تقدم جهود السلام. ودعوة الولايات المتحدة إلى اتخاذ موقف متوازن وإعادة النظر في هذا القانون ورفع العقوبات الأمريكية الأحادية المفروضة على السودان.

6- التأكيد على أهمية الدور العربي في تنمية جنوب السودان، وعلى دور الصندوق العربي لدعم السودان لتنمية جنوبه ودعوة الدول الأعضاء وصناديق التمويل والاستثمار العربية والقطرية والقومية إلى الإسراع لحشد الموارد اللازمة والشروع في إقامة المشروعات التنموية في جنوب السودان الذي يزخر بالإمكانيات الجاذبة للاستثمارات بكافة أنواعها.

- 7- دعوة المنظمات العربية غير الحكومية إلى تقديم عونها الفني والمساعدات الإنسانية والتنموية إلى جنوب السودان والمساهمة في رعاية النازحين والمتضررين من جراء الحرب. ودعوة الدول الأعضاء والمؤسسات المالية العربية إلى تمكين هذه المنظمات من أداء هذا الدور.
- 8- أخذ العلم أن يكون الاجتماع القادم للجنة السودان على المستوى الوزاري في يناير/ كانون ثاني 2003 في الخرطوم.
- (ق: رقم 6263-د.غ.ع.-ج2-10/11/2002)

APPENDIX 5

Region's foreign ministers issue statement on Iraq

24 January 2003

<http://www.saudiembassy.net/2003News/News/RelDetail.asp?cIndex=833>

Warning against the adverse effects and destructive repercussions of a war on Iraq, the foreign ministers of Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia issued a statement at the end of their meeting in Istanbul yesterday that war should never be the only option for solving a problem. The joint statement affirmed that the people of Iraq had suffered a great deal from the repercussions of the two previous consecutive wars; moreover, the entire region had suffered from their adverse impact. The statement declared: "We would like to urge the Iraqi leadership to work seriously and genuinely for restoration of peace and stability to the region." It stressed the importance of Iraq cooperating with the UN inspection team and the International Agency for Atomic Energy in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1441, and urged Iraq to settle outstanding problems with its neighbors and take decisive measures towards national reconciliation in a way that preserves Iraq's sovereignty and unity

APPENDIX 6

15th Arab Summit at Sharm Al-Shaikh focuses on Iraqi crisis

3 March 2003

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/269/66/PDF/N0326966.pdf?OpenElement>

Letter from the Permanent Observer for the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council Pursuant to Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the resolutions of the fifteenth session of the Council of the League of Arab States, meeting at the summit level in Sharm el-Sheikh on 1 March 2003, on the following items:

1. The serious threats to Iraq and the dangers to the Arab States, the possibility that the situation might lead to a military conflict and the grave repercussions that this would have for the region and for the peace of the Arab nation (Summit resolution 243 (15) of 1 March 2003) (see annex 1);
2. The situation between Iraq and Kuwait (Summit resolution 244 (15) of 1 March 2003) (see annex 2);
3. The Arab-Israeli conflict, the evolution of the Palestinian question, intensified Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people and its impact on peace and security in the Middle East region (Summit resolution 245 (15) of 1 March 2003) (see annex 3).

I should be grateful if you would draw the attention of the members of the Security Council to these resolutions and have them circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yahya Mahassani

Ambassador

Permanent Observer

S/2003/254

Annex 1 to the letter dated 3 March 2003 from the Permanent Observer for the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Resolution

The serious threats to Iraq and the dangers to the Arab States, the possibility that the situation might lead to a military conflict and the grave repercussions that this would have for the region and for the peace of the Arab nation

The Council of the League of Arab States, meeting at the summit level,

1. Having discussed the grave developments in the Iraq crisis,
2. Reaffirming resolution 227 adopted at its Beirut Summit in 2002, in which it categorically rejected an attack on Iraq or a threat against the security and integrity of any Arab State,
3. Reiterating its satisfaction at the assurances given by the Syrian Arab Republic, the Arab member of the Security Council, concerning resolution 1441 (2002), the fact that the aforesaid resolution does not constitute a pretext for waging war on Iraq and the fact that the resolution does not provide for automatic recourse to military action, thereby expressing the Arab position of support for the international legitimacy represented by the Security Council and its mission of investigating weapons of mass destruction in Iraq,
4. Welcoming again with satisfaction the fact that the Iraqi Government agreed to the return of inspectors, is guaranteeing their complete freedom of movement and is giving

them the means to perform the mission entrusted to them by the Security Council as effectively and objectively as possible,

5. Praising international positions opposed to the use of force against Iraq, believing that war would seriously undermine stability in the region and throughout the world,

6. Taking into consideration the many diplomatic contacts pursued by the Arab States with States members of the Security Council, internationally and with the Republic of Iraq in an effort to avoid a war in the region and ensure maximum cooperation with the inspection process, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1441 (2002),

7. Taking note of the reports presented to the Security Council by the chiefs of the two inspection teams on weapons of mass destruction, particularly the reports presented on 14 February 2003, which described the progress achieved with regard to Iraq's cooperation with the inspectors,

8. Taking into account the Security Council's responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, believing that the Council must play its role in dealing with the Iraq crisis in all its aspects by implementing its relevant resolutions, preserving the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Iraq and lifting the sanctions against Iraq,

9. Taking into account the great dangers and adverse consequences that would accompany any military action against Iraq and its people, as well as attempts by Israel to occupy the country in order to carry out its plans to empty the occupied

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Palestinian territories of their inhabitants and replace them with Israeli settlements, thereby compounding the suffering of the Palestinian people,

Decides:

1. To emphasize its categorical rejection of a strike against Iraq or a threat to the security and integrity of any Arab country, believing that this poses a threat to the security of the Arab nation, and to underscore the need to resolve the Iraq crisis peacefully, within the framework of international legitimacy;

2. To call upon all countries to support Arab efforts to avoid a war by ensuring that Iraq implements Security Council resolution 1441 (2002) fully;

3. To request that the inspection teams be given sufficient time to complete their mission in Iraq and to ask them to continue to perform their mission objectively;

4. To emphasize the Security Council's responsibility for ensuring that Iraq and its people are not attacked and for preserving Iraq's independence and territorial integrity, and to underscore the need to guarantee the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq's neighbours;

5. To affirm that its member States will refrain from participating in any military action against the security and territorial integrity and unity of Iraq or any other Arab country;

6. To express again its solidarity with the long-suffering Iraqi people and to state that the time has come to lift the embargo against Iraq, within the framework of the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, particularly resolution 687 (1991);

7. That the Kingdom of Bahrain will set up a presidential committee in cooperation with the member States, to also include the outgoing President, the incoming President and the Secretary-General of the Arab League, as well as any other States that wish to join. This committee will be responsible for making contact with the international parties concerned

and explaining the Arab position, particularly to the permanent members of the Security Council, and for consulting with the Iraqi Government, in the context of the Arab League Summit resolutions on Iraq, on ways to tackle the serious challenges confronting Iraq and the dangers and risks threatening the Arab countries;

8. To emphasize that the affairs of the Arab nation and the development of its regimes are decided by the peoples of the region, based on their national and State interests and free from any outside interference; in this context, the Arab leaders denounce attempts to impose change on the region or interfere in its internal affairs, without regard for its own interests and problems;

9. To view the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq as part of the process of eliminating weapons of mass destruction in the region, including Israel, in accordance with paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991);

10. To continue to follow closely the evolution of the question of Iraq. Resolution 243 of the fifteenth session of the League of Arab States, meeting at the summit level, adopted on 1 March 2003.

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Annex 2 to the letter dated 3 March 2003 from the Permanent Observer for the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Resolution

The situation between Iraq and Kuwait

The Council of the League of Arab States, meeting at the summit level,
Having considered resolution 227 adopted at its Beirut Summit in 2002,

Decides:

1. To recall the assurances given by the Republic of Iraq at the Beirut Summit that it would respect the independence, sovereignty and security of the State of Kuwait and guarantee its territorial integrity and unity within internationally recognized borders, to emphasize the need for this commitment to be respected in order to avoid any possibility of a repetition of the events of 1990 and to urge the adoption of policies that will make it possible to achieve this goal in a climate of goodwill and good-neighbourly relations. In this regard, the Summit draws Arab leaders' attention to the importance of halting hostile press campaigns and statements, so as to create a positive atmosphere that will assure the two countries that the principles of good-neighbourliness and non-interference in internal affairs are being respected;

2. To urge resumption of the work of the Technical Subcommittee of the Tripartite Commission responsible for questions relating to Kuwaiti nationals held prisoner or hostage since 1990 and 1991, which was reactivated on 8 January 2003, and to commend Kuwait's positive response to all the information provided by Iraq through the International Committee of the Red Cross concerning missing Kuwaiti nationals. The Council hopes that decisive, significant progress will be made in this area. The Council also welcomes the return by Iraq of part of the Kuwaiti archives and calls on Iraq to return the remaining archives and other property of the Kuwaiti State.

Resolution 244 of the fifteenth session of the Council of the League of Arab States, meeting at the summit level, adopted on 1 March 2003.

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Annex 3 to the letter dated 3 March 2003 from the Permanent Observer for the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council Resolution

The Arab-Israeli conflict, the evolution of the Palestinian question, intensified Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people and its impact on peace and security in the Middle East region

The Council of the League of Arab States, meeting at the summit level, 1. Deeply concerned at the grave situation facing the Palestinian people and their national authorities as a result of the continuing and escalating Israeli aggression, which has claimed a large number of victims and caused heavy losses to the Palestinian national economy,

2. Reaffirming its complete solidarity with the Palestinian people in their struggle to regain their legitimate rights and its unequivocal support for their committed struggle for these rights,

3. Also reaffirming its earlier resolutions on support for the Palestinian economy,

Decides:

1. To pay a resounding tribute to the Palestinian people and their legitimate national leadership, headed by President Yasser Arafat, for their tenacious resistance against the continuing and escalating Israeli aggression that violates the rights of this people and seeks to destroy their capacities, sacred places and national leadership, and to reaffirm its determination to continue to provide all forms of political, moral and material support for the Palestinian people, their heroic intifada and their legitimate struggle against occupation;

2. To consider that the all-out and premeditated aggression by Israel against the Palestinian people, their authorities and their national institutions is aimed at bringing the peace process in the Middle East to a definitive halt and to hold Israel solely responsible for this policy;

3. To reaffirm the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to resist the occupation of their land by Israel and to take action within the framework of respect for international legality and of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations to defend themselves against the aggressive practices of the occupation forces, manifested in their policies of colonization and the blockading and reoccupation of cities, villages and refugee camps, without mentioning assassinations, arrests, the destruction of infrastructure, homes, religious institutions and medical centres and attacks on international organizations working in the humanitarian field;

4. To take steps to put an end to the aggression of which the Palestinian people are victims, to ensure international protection for Palestinian civilians through the dispatch of an international protection force to oblige Israel to respect the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention and to request the Secretary

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General of the United Nations to make arrangements for the early dispatch to the area of a team to investigate Israeli crimes and identify their authors with a view to bringing them to international justice;

5. To reaffirm the Arab identity of Jerusalem and the rejection of all attempts by Israel to Judaize the city, to consider all the acts and practices engaged in by Israel, as the occupying Power, null and void and in violation of the resolutions that express international legality, to also consider the establishment of settlements in Jerusalem and other parts of the Palestinian territory as a danger that threatens the peace and security of the region, and to reaffirm the support of Arabs for this heroic city;
6. To condemn the rejection by Israel of all initiatives and proposals for a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East currently being put forward by various international parties and groups;
7. To reaffirm the commitment of Arab States to the Arab peace initiative put forward at the 2002 Beirut Summit that sets out the bases for a just and comprehensive peace settlement in the region and to hold Israel responsible for the failure of peace efforts;
8. To urge the international Quartet to resume its efforts to bring peace to the Middle East and to find a just and comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on the Arab peace initiative;
9. To reiterate its earlier resolutions, in which it expressed its commitment to a just and comprehensive peace as an objective and a strategic choice to be achieved through the implementation at all levels of decisions expressing international legality, in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council and, in particular, resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 425 (1978), and with resolution 194 (III) of the General Assembly, and to stress the need to take as the point of departure the Madrid Peace Conference and the principle of "land for peace". The Council also stresses that the achievement of this objective requires the complete withdrawal of Israel from all of the Arab territories that it occupies, including the Syrian Arab Golan, back to the lines of 4 June 1967, and from the Lebanese territory still under occupation, including the Shab`a farms area, an end to the occupation of Palestinian lands, and the exercise by the Palestinian people of all of their inalienable rights, including their right to self-determination and to the establishment of an independent State on all of their national territory with Jerusalem as its capital, the guarantee of the right of return for Palestinian refugees and the release of Palestinians who have been abducted or arrested and are now in Israeli prisons;
10. To charge the Committee on the Arab Peace Initiative with pursuing and intensifying Arab efforts at the international level and to make the necessary preparations for bringing the question before the Security Council so that this organ can assume its full responsibility in the face of the grave situation existing in the Palestinian territories and its consequences for peace and stability in the region and the world;
11. To reiterate the firm commitment of Arabs to provide financial support for the budget of the Palestinian National Authority for the next six months beginning 1 April 2003 and to automatically renew this assistance under the arrangements established at the Beirut Summit for as long as the Israeli aggression

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continues, to invite the member States of the Arab League that have not yet done so to make the remainder of their contributions to the budget of the Palestinian National Authority and to the Al-Aqsa Fund and the Al-Quds Intifadah Fund, in accordance with the decisions of the Beirut Summit;

12. To charge the General Secretariat with continuing its efforts to collect donations from Arab populations in support of the resistance of the Palestinian people and to continue to cooperate with the competent international organizations providing support for the process of development and reconstruction in the Palestinian territories.

Resolution 245 of the fifteenth session of the Council of the League of Arab States, meeting at the summit level, adopted on 1 March 2003.

http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/arabic/details_ar.jsp?art_id=1857&level_id=236#

قرارات مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة - الدورة العادية (15) - شرم الشيخ : 28 ذو

الحجة 1423هـ الموافق 1 مارس / آذار 2003

قرار

التحديات الخطيرة التي يتعرض لها العراق،

وما يتهدد الدول العربية من مخاطر،

واحتمال تطورات الموقف إلى مواجهة عسكرية

وتداعياتها الخطيرة على المنطقة وعلى الأمن القومي العربي

إن مجلس الجامعة على مستوى القمة،

1- بعد أن ناقش الوضع الخطير المتعلق بتطورات الأزمة العراقية،

2- وإذ يؤكد قراره الصادر في قمة بيروت رقم 227 الذي أكد الرفض المطلق لضرب العراق أو تهديد أمن

وسلامة أية دولة عربية،

3- وإذ يعبر مجدداً عن ترحيبه بالتأكيدات التي قُدمت للجمهورية العربية السورية، العضو العربي في

مجلس الأمن، إزاء القرار 1441 (2002)، وبأن هذا القرار لا يشكل ذريعة لشن حرب على العراق ولا

يتضمن التلقائية للجوء للعمل العسكري، وذلك تعبيرا عن الموقف العربي المؤيد للشرعية الدولية المتمثلة

في مجلس الأمن وبمهمة التفتيش عن أسلحة الدمار الشامل في العراق،

4- وإذ يجدد الترحيب بموافقة حكومة العراق على عودة المفتشين وضمان حرية حركتهم بالكامل،

وتمكينهم من أداء مهمتهم المكلفين بها من قبل مجلس الأمن بأقصى درجة من الفعالية والموضوعية،

5- وإذ يشيد بالمواقف العالمية المعارضة لاستخدام القوة ضد العراق، باعتبار أن الحرب ستؤدي بتداعياتها

الخطيرة إلى عدم الاستقرار في المنطقة وفي العالم،

6- وفي ضوء ما تقوم به الدبلوماسية العربية من اتصالات مكثفة مع الدول الأعضاء في مجلس الأمن وعلى

الساحة الدولية ومع جمهورية العراق لضمان تجنب اندلاع حرب في المنطقة، وتحقيق أقصى تعاون

بالنسبة لعملية التفتيش تنفيذاً لقرار مجلس الأمن رقم 1441 (2002)،

7- وإذ يأخذ علماً بالتقارير التي قدمها رئيسا فريقَي التفتيش عن أسلحة الدمار الشامل في العراق إلى

مجلس الأمن، وخصوصاً التقارير المقدمة في 14 فبراير/شباط 2003 والتي أشارت إلى التقدم الذي تم

إحرازه من خلال تعاون العراق مع المفتشين،

8- وانطلاقاً من مسئولية مجلس الأمن في الحفاظ على السلم والأمن الدوليين، وإيمانه بوجود اضطلاع المجلس بدوره في معالجة الأزمة العراقية بكل جوانبها، تنفيذاً لقرارات مجلس الأمن ذات الصلة والمحافظة على سيادة العراق واستقلاله ووحدة وسلامة أراضيه ورفع العقوبات عنه،
9- وفي ضوء المخاطر الجمة والتداعيات السلبية التي تحيط بأي عمل عسكري ضد العراق وشعبه والمحاولات الإسرائيلية لاستغلالها في تنفيذ مخططاتها الرامية إلى تفرغ الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة من سكانها، وإقامة المستوطنات الإسرائيلية فيها، وزيادة معاناة الشعب الفلسطيني،
يقرر

- 1- تأكيد الرفض المطلق لضرب العراق، أو تهديد أمن وسلامة أي دولة عربية، باعتباره تهديداً للأمن القومي العربي وضرورة حل الأزمة العراقية بالطرق السلمية في إطار الشرعية الدولية.
- 2- دعوة كافة الدول لمساندة الجهود العربية الهادفة إلى تجنب الحرب، وأن ذلك يتحقق من خلال استكمال تنفيذ العراق لقرار مجلس الأمن رقم 1441 (2002).
- 3- المطالبة بإعطاء فرق التفتيش المهلة الكافية لإتمام مهمتها في العراق ودعوتها إلى مواصلة توخي الموضوعية في استكمال هذه المهمة.
- 4- التأكيد على مسؤولية مجلس الأمن في عدم المساس بالعراق وشعبه، وفي الحفاظ على استقلاله وسلامة ووحدة أراضيه، والتأكيد على ضمان أمن دول الجوار العراقي وسيادتها وسلامة أراضيها.
- 5- التأكيد على امتناع دولهم عن المشاركة في أي عمل عسكري يستهدف أمن وسلامة ووحدة أراضي العراق وأي دولة عربية.
- 6- الإعراب مجدداً عن التضامن مع الشعب العراقي الذي عانى لسنوات طويلة، وبأن الوقت حان لرفع العقوبات عن العراق في إطار تنفيذ قرارات مجلس الأمن ذات الصلة ولاسيما القرار 687 (1991).
- 7- قيام مملكة البحرين بتشكيل لجنة رئاسية بالتشاور مع الدول الأعضاء تضم الرئاسة السابقة والحالية والقادمة والأمين العام للجامعة بالإضافة إلى الدول الراغبة في الانضمام إليها، وذلك للقيام بالاتصال مع الأطراف الدولية المعنية ولعرض الموقف العربي عليها وخاصة الدول دائمة العضوية في مجلس الأمن، وكذلك التشاور مع الحكومة العراقية في إطار قرارات القمم العربية حول العراق الشقيق، وذلك لبحث سبل مواجهة التحديات الخطيرة التي يواجهها العراق وما يتهدد الدول العربية من مخاطر واحتمالات .
- 8- إن شؤون الوطن العربي وتطوير نظمه أمر تفرره شعوب المنطقة، بما يتفق مع مصالحها الوطنية والقومية، بعيداً عن أي تدخل خارجي، وفي هذا الإطار يستنكر القادة ما يتردد من محاولات رامية إلى فرض تغييرات على المنطقة، أو التدخل في شؤونها الداخلية وتجاهل مصالحها وقضاياها العادلة.
- 9- اعتبار نزع أسلحة الدمار الشامل في العراق جزء من نزع أسلحة الدمار الشامل في المنطقة بما في ذلك إسرائيل، طبقاً للفقرة 14 من قرار مجلس الأمن رقم 687 (1991).
- 10- الاستمرار في المتابعة الدقيقة لتطورات المسألة العراقية.

(ق.ق : 243 د.ع (15) - 2003/3/1)

قرار

الحالة بين العراق والكويت

- إن مجلس الجامعة على مستوى القمة،
- وبعد أن تدارس قرار قمة بيروت رقم 227 (2002) في هذا الشأن،

يقرر

1- التذكير بتأكيدات جمهورية العراق في قمة بيروت (2002) باحترام استقلال وسيادة وأمن دولة الكويت وضمان وسلامة وحدة أراضيها ضمن الحدود المعترف بها دولياً، والتأكيد على ضرورة الالتزام بذلك، وبما يؤدي إلى تجنب كل ما من شأنه تكرار ما حدث في عام 1990 ، ويدعو إلى تبني سياسات تؤدي إلى ضمان ذلك في إطار من النوايا الحسنة وعلاقات حسن الجوار ، وفي هذا الإطار يدعو القادة إلى أهمية وقف الحملات الإعلامية والتصريحات السلبية، تمهيداً لخلق أجواء إيجابية تطمئن البلدين بالتمسك بمبادئ حسن الجوار وعدم التدخل في الشؤون الداخلية.

2- تشجيع استئناف اللجنة الفنية المتفرعة عن اللجنة الثلاثية بشأن قضية الأسرى والمرتهنين الكويتيين منذ 1990 و 1991 ، والتي استأنفت عملها في 2003/1/8، وينوه بتجاوب دولة الكويت فيما يقدمه العراق من معلومات عن مفقوديه من خلال اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر، وفي هذا النطاق يعبر المجلس عن الأمل الكبير في أن يتم تحقيق تقدم جوهري وملموس بشأن هذه القضية. كما يرحب المجلس باعادة العراق لجزء من الأرشيف الكويتي ، ويدعو العراق الى استكمال اعادة ما تبقى من هذا الأرشيف والممتلكات الاخرى لدولة الكويت .

(ق.ق : 244 د.ع (15) - 2003/3/1)

قرار

الصراع العربي الإسرائيلي وتطورات القضية الفلسطينية وتصاعد العدوان الإسرائيلي على الشعب الفلسطيني، وتأثيراته على الأمن والسلام في منطقة الشرق الأوسط
إن مجلس الجامعة على مستوى القمة،

- إذ يتابع بقلق بالغ الاوضاع الخطيرة التي يعيشها الشعب الفلسطيني وسلطته الوطنية جراء العدوان الإسرائيلي المستمر المتصاعد وما نتج عنه من ضحايا جسيمة في الأرواح وخسائر فادحة للاقتصاد الوطني الفلسطيني ،

- وإذ يؤكد تضامنه التام مع الشعب الفلسطيني في نضاله من أجل استعادة حقوقه المشروعة، والدعم المطلق لصدوده وكفاحه من أجل استعادة هذه الحقوق،

- وإذ يؤكد على قراراته السابقة بشأن دعم الاقتصاد الفلسطيني ،

يقرر

1- توجيه تحية إجلال واكبار لصدود الشعب الفلسطيني وقيادته الشرعية والوطنية، وعلى رأسها الرئيس ياسر عرفات، في وجه العدوان الإسرائيلي المستمر والمتصاعد والهادف إلى النيل من حقوقه ومقدراته ومقدساته وقيادته الوطنية، والتأكيد مجدداً على مواصلة كل أشكال الدعم السياسي والمعنوي والمادي للشعب الفلسطيني وانتفاضته الباسلة ومقاومته المشروعة ضد الاحتلال .

- 2- اعتبار ما تقوم به إسرائيل من عدوان شامل ومخطط على الشعب الفلسطيني وسلطته ومؤسساته الوطنية يرمى إلى إنهاء عملية السلام في الشرق الأوسط برمتها، تتحمل إسرائيل وحدها كامل المسؤولية عن ذلك .
- 3- تأكيد حق الشعب الفلسطيني المشروع في مقاومة الاحتلال الإسرائيلي لاراضيه، والعمل وفقاً للشرعية الدولية وقرارات الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة ومجلس الأمن ذات الصلة للدفاع عن النفس إزاء الممارسات العدوانية التي ترتكبها قوات الاحتلال ضد الشعب الفلسطيني، والمتمثلة في سياسة الاستيطان والحصار وإعادة احتلال المدن والقرى والمخيمات، إضافة إلى جرائم القتل والاعتقال والتدمير البنية التحتية والمنازل والمؤسسات الدينية والطبية واستهداف الهيئات الدولية العاملة في الحقل الإنساني .
- 4- التحرك لوقف العدوان على الشعب الفلسطيني وتوفير الحماية الدولية للمدنيين الفلسطينيين من خلال إرسال قوات حماية دولية، والزام إسرائيل بالامتثال لاحكام اتفاقية جنيف الرابعة، ومطالبة الأمين العام للأمم المتحدة، العمل على سرعة إرسال فريق للتحقيق في الجرائم الإسرائيلية وتحديد مرتكبيها تمهيداً لتقديمهم لمحاكمة دولية .
- 5- التأكيد على عروبة القدس ورفض كافة الإجراءات الإسرائيلية لتحويلها واعتبار ما تقوم به إسرائيل، السلطة القائمة بالاحتلال، من إجراءات وممارسات باطلة ولاغية ومخالفة لقرارات الشرعية الدولية، واعتبار الاستيطان في القدس وفي باقي الأراضي الفلسطينية خطراً يهدد الأمن والسلام في المنطقة . وتجديد الدعم العربي لأهل هذه المدينة الصامدة .
- 6- إدانة المواقف الإسرائيلية الراضة لكافة المبادرات والمقترحات الرامية لتحقيق حل سلمي عادل وشامل في الشرق الأوسط والمطروحة حالياً من قبل العديد من الأطراف والمجموعات الدولية .
- 7- تأكيد تمسك الدول العربية بمبادرة السلام العربية التي أقرتها القمة العربية في بيروت 2002 التي تتضمن أسس الحل السلمي العادل والشامل في المنطقة ، وتحميل إسرائيل مسؤولية فشل جهود السلام.
- 8- دعوة اللجنة الرباعية الدولية إلى استئناف العمل لتحقيق السلام في الشرق الأوسط، وإيجاد حل عادل وشامل للصراع العربي الإسرائيلي على أساس المبادرة العربية للسلام .
- 9- التأكيد مجدداً على قراراته السابقة المتعلقة بتمسكهم بالسلام العادل والشامل كهدف وخيار استراتيجي، يتحقق في ظل تنفيذ قرارات الشرعية الدولية على جميع المسارات استناداً لقرارات مجلس الأمن خاصة القرارات 242، 338، 425 وقرار الجمعية العامة 194 ومرجعية مؤتمر مدريد ومبدأ الأرض مقابل السلام .
- ويؤكدون ان ذلك يتحقق بانسحاب إسرائيل الكامل من جميع الأراضي العربية التي تحتلها بما في ذلك الجولان العربي السوري المحتل حتى خط الرابع من يونيو / حزيران 1967، ومن الأراضي اللبنانية التي مازالت تحت الاحتلال بما في ذلك مزارع شبعاء، وإنهاء احتلال الأراضي الفلسطينية، وتمكين الشعب الفلسطيني من التمتع بجميع حقوقه غير القابلة للتصرف بما فيها حقه في تقرير المصير، واقامة دولته

المستقلة على كامل ترابه الوطني وعاصمتها القدس، وتأمين حق العودة للاجئين الفلسطينيين، والإفراج عن المعتقلين والمخطوفين العرب من السجون الإسرائيلية كافة .

10- تكليف لجنة مبادرة السلام العربية بتكثيف ومواصلة التحرك العربي على الساحة الدولية، والاعداد لعرض الأمر على مجلس الأمن حتى يتحمل كامل مسؤولياته تجاه الوضع الخطير في الأراضي الفلسطينية وتداعياته على الأمن والاستقرار في المنطقة والعالم .

11- تجديد الالتزام العربي بالدعم المالي لموازنة السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية لستة اشهر قادمة تبدأ من أول إبريل / نيسان 2003، وتجديدها تلقائياً على نفس الأسس التي أقرتها قمة بيروت طالما استمر العدوان الإسرائيلي، ودعوة الدول الأعضاء التي لم تستكمل مساهماتها بشأن دعم ميزانية السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية وصندوقى الأقصى وانتفاضه القدس وفقاً لقرارات قمة بيروت تحويل تلك المساهمات .

12- تكليف الأمانة العامة لمواصلة جهودها في جمع التبرعات الشعبية العربية دعماً لصمود الشعب الفلسطيني، والاستمرار في تعاونها مع المنظمات الدولية المعنية بتوفير الدعم لعملية التنمية وإعادة الإعمار في الأراضي الفلسطينية .

(ق.ق : 245 د.ع (15) - 2003/3/1)

قرار

تقرير لجنة المتابعة والتحرك المنبثقة عن القمة

إن مجلس الجامعة على مستوى القمة،

- بعد إطلاعه :

* على تقرير لجنة المتابعة والتحرك المرفوع إلى القمة، وما تضمنه من توصيات،

يقرر

1 - الإشادة بأعمال لجنة المتابعة والتحرك، وتوجيه الشكر لرئيس وأعضاء اللجنة والأمين العام على ما بذلوه من جهود مُمَدرة لمتابعة تنفيذ قرارات قمة بيروت (2002) .

2 - أن يعهد لرئاسة القمة (مملكة البحرين) إجراء المشاورات مع القادة العرب ومع الأمين العام للاتفاق على تشكيلها .

3 - تكليف مجلس الوزراء في دورته القادمة (119) بدراسة مشروع " آلية وأسلوب عمل لجنة المتابعة والتحرك " في صيغته النهائية المرفقة وإصداره .

4 - ترفع اللجنة تقارير دورية حول أنشطتها وتوصياتها إلى رئاسة القمة تمهيداً لعرضها على القمة العربية المقبلة .

(ق.ق : 246 د.ع (15) - 2003/3/1)

قرار

تقرير الأمين العام عن العمل العربي المشترك
 إن مجلس الجامعة على مستوى القمة،
 - بعد إطلاعه :

- * على تقرير الأمين العام الذي تناول مختلف مجالات العمل العربي المشترك بما في ذلك عملية تطوير وتحديث منظومة العمل العربي المشترك،
 يقرر
- 1 - الاشادة بتقرير الأمين العام عن العمل العربي المشترك بما في ذلك عملية تحديث وتطوير منظومة الجامعة العربية وتمكين مؤسساتها كافة من الاضطلاع بالمتطلبات القومية ومواكبة المستجدات على الساحتين الإقليمية والدولية .
- 2 - الإعراب عن التقدير للخطوات التي اتخذها الأمين العام تنفيذاً لقرارات القمة، وتدعوه إلى الاستمرار في جهوده في هذا الشأن .
 (ق.ق : 247 د.ع (15) - 2003/3/1)
 قرار

تطوير منظومة العمل العربي المشترك :

- أ - المبادرة المقدمة من جمهورية السودان
 ب- المبادرة المقدمة من دولة قطر
 ج- المقترحات المقدمة من الجماهيرية العربية الليبية الشعبية الاشتراكية العظمى بشأن تعديل ميثاق جامعة الدول العربية،
 وعدد من الوثائق الأساسية
 إن مجلس الجامعة على مستوى القمة،
 - بعد اطلاعه:
- على المبادرات والمقترحات المقدمة من جمهورية السودان، ودولة قطر، والجماهيرية العربية الليبية الشعبية الاشتراكية العظمى لإصلاح الوضع العربي وتطوير منظومة العمل العربي المشترك،
 - وعلى تقرير الأمين العام في هذا الشأن ،
 - وإذ يؤكد على أهمية تطوير منظومة العمل العربي المشترك،
 - واستنادا الى قراره رقم 218 بتاريخ 2001/3/28 بعمان - المملكة الأردنية الهاشمية بشأن الموضوع،
 يقرر

- 1- الطلب من الأمين العام تشكيل لجنة من الخبراء القانونيين والسياسيين والمتخصصين في مسائل التنظيم الدولي، لدراسة التعديلات والمقترحات المقدمة من الدول الأعضاء، واقتراح الصياغات القانونية اللازمة.
- 2- دعوة الدول التي لم تتقدم بمقترحاتها في هذا الشأن إلى سرعة موافاة الأمانة العامة بها في فترة لا تتجاوز شهرين من تاريخ صدور القرار.

- 3- تحديد مهلة زمنية قدرها ستة أشهر لعمل اللجنة التي يمكن لها أن تُشكل لجاناً فرعية ومجموعات عمل طبقاً لما يتطلبه عملها.
- 4- أن تُقدم اللجنة تقريرها إلى الأمين العام تمهيداً لعرضه على مجلس الوزراء في دورة خاصة تُعقد للنظر فيه تمهيداً لرفعه إلى قمة استثنائية تُعقد لهذا الغرض أو إلى القمة التالية في عام 2004 مشفوعاً بتوصيات وآراء مجلس الوزراء.
- 5- الطلب من الأمين العام اتخاذ الإجراءات الفورية اللازمة لتنفيذ هذا القرار.
- (ق.ق : 248 د.ع (15) - 2003/3/1)
- الشكر والتقدير لجمهورية مصر العربية لاستضافتها القمة العربية العادية (15) في مدينة شرم الشيخ
إن مجلس الجامعة على مستوى القمة ،
* تقديراً لجمهورية مصر العربية لاستضافتها الكريمة لأعمال الدورة العادية (15) لمجلس الجامعة على مستوى القمة ولجهودها المقدرّة في إعداد وتنظيم أعمال هذه الدورة،
يقرر
- 1 - توجيه خالص التحية ووافر الامتنان إلى جمهورية مصر العربية رئيساً وحكومة وشعباً على حفاوة الاستقبال وكرم الضيافة التي أحاط بها الوفود المشاركة في القمة العربية .
- 2 - الإعراب عن التقدير لفخامة الرئيس محمد حسني مبارك رئيس جمهورية مصر العربية للجهد الكبير الذي بذله لتوفير فرص انعقاد القمة وإنجاح أعمالها .
- (ق.ق : 251 د.ع (15) - 2003/3/1)
- قرار
- موعد ومكان انعقاد مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة الدورة العادية (16)
إن مجلس الجامعة على مستوى القمة ،
* استناداً إلى ما جاء في ملحق الميثاق الخاص بألية الانعقاد الدوري المنتظم بشأن رئاسة مجلس الجامعة على مستوى القمة،
يقرر
- عقد مجلس الجامعة على مستوى القمة الدورة العادية (16) برئاسة الجمهورية التونسية خلال شهر مارس/ آذار 2004 .
- (ق.ق : 252 د.ع (15) - 2003/3/1)

APPENDIX 7

119TH Regular Session of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs to the Arab League

26 March 2003

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/298/13/PDF/N0329813.pdf?OpenElement>

In my capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group for March 2003, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States at its meeting, held at the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs during its 119th regular session at the seat of its secretariat between 22 and 25 March 2003. The resolution is entitled "The American/British aggression against fraternal Iraq and its implications for the security and safety of neighbouring Arab States and Arab national security" (resolution No. 6266/119/2 of 24 March 2003). I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the fifty-seventh session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 36 entitled "The situation in the Middle East".

(Signed) Mohammed A. Aldouri

Ambassador

Permanent Representative

Chairman of the Arab Group

Annex to the letter dated 26 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
Resolution

The American/British aggression against fraternal Iraq and its implications for the security and safety of neighbouring Arab States and Arab national security The Council of the League of Arab States, meeting at the ministerial level at the seat of its secretariat in its 119th regular session on 24 March 2003, Having reviewed the grave situation in the region arising from the American/British aggression against Iraq, Pursuant to the provisions of article 6 of the Pact of the League of Arab States, In accordance with the decisions adopted at the Beirut Summit (March 2002) and at the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit in the course of its fifteenth regular meeting on 1 March 2003, Commending the position of those members of the Security Council who rejected the logic and policy of war, as well as the position of the African Union, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the European Union and His Holiness the Pope, as well as the stands taken at the regional, international and popular levels, and the position of Christian and Islamic bodies which oppose the aggression and call for an end to that aggression and the immediate withdrawal of invading forces from Iraqi territory, Affirming the Arab States' solidarity with Iraq and support for it in confronting the aggression, Recalling the decision adopted at the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit on 1 March 2003, whereby the affairs of the Arab world and the evolution of order therein are a matter for the peoples of the region in accordance with their national and Arab interests, free of any foreign aggression and, in this context, the leaders deplore recurring attempts to impose changes in the region or to interfere in their internal

affairs and ignore their interests and just causes, Affirming commitment to the decision of the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit whereby Arab States must refrain from joining in any military action against the sovereignty, security, safety and territorial integrity of Iraq or any other Arab State, In conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular, under Chapter I, with Article 1, paragraph 1, and Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, and, under Chapter VII, with Article 51,

In accordance with the general rules of international law, particularly with respect to aggression, *Decides*

1. To condemn the American/British aggression against Iraq, a State Member of the United Nations and a member of the League of Arab States; 3A/57/766
2. To deem this aggression a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, a departure from international legitimacy, a threat to international peace and security and an act of defiance against the international community and world public opinion, which call for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and compliance with the decisions of international legitimacy;
3. To call for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the invading American/British forces from Iraqi territory and to make them bear the material, moral and legal responsibility for this aggression;
4. To affirm commitment to the decision whereby Arab States must refrain from joining in any military action against the security and territorial integrity of Iraq or of any other Arab State, and to affirm a guarantee for the security, safety and territorial integrity of all Arab States;
5. To mandate the Arab Group at the United Nations to call for an urgent meeting of the Security Council, with a view to the adoption of a decision to halt the aggression and to secure an immediate withdrawal of the invading forces beyond the international borders of the Republic of Iraq, affirmation of respect for Iraq's sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity, and a commitment by all States not to interfere in its internal affairs;
6. To mandate the Arab Group, in the event that the Security Council does not meet or fails to adopt the decision required to halt the aggression and secure withdrawal, pursuant to the contents of the paragraph above, to call for an extraordinary meeting of the General Assembly to discuss the attack on Iraq, with a view to calling for an immediate halt to the attack, the withdrawal of hostile forces from all Iraq's territory and respect for its territorial integrity;
7. To consider the Council as being in permanent session and to mandate the Secretary-General to monitor the situation and provide the Council with immediate reports on further developments therein.

The State of Kuwait enters a reservation to this resolution.

http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/arabic/details_ar.jsp?art_id=1925&level_id=237

قرارات مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على المستوى الوزاري المنعقد في مقر الأمانة العامة بدورته العادية
(119) بتاريخ 2003/3/24

العدوان الأمريكي البريطاني على العراق الشقيق وتداعياته على أمن وسلامة دول الجوار العربي والأمن القومي العربي

إن مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على المستوى الوزاري المنعقد في مقر الأمانة العامة بدورته العادية
(119) بتاريخ 2003/3/24،

- وبعد مناقشته لوضع الخطير في المنطقة الناشئ عن العدوان الأمريكي - البريطاني على العراق ،
- وبناءً على أحكام المادة السادسة من ميثاق جامعة الدول العربية ،
- واستناداً إلى ما أقرته قمة بيروت (آذار - مارس 2002)، وقمة شرم الشيخ في اجتماعها العادي الخامس عشر بتاريخ أول مارس / آذار 2003 ،
- وإذ يشيد بموقف أعضاء مجلس الأمن الذين رفضوا منطلق الحرب وسياستها، وبموقف الاتحاد الأفريقي، ومنظمة المؤتمر الإسلامي، وحركة عدم الانحياز، والاتحاد الأوروبي، وقدااسة بابا الفاتيكان، وبالمواقف الإقليمية والدولية والشعبية، والهيئات المسيحية والإسلامية التي تقف ضد العدوان، وتدعو إلى إنهائه، وسحب القوات الغازية فوراً من الأراضي العراقية،
- وإذ يؤكد تضامن الدول العربية مع العراق، ودعمها له في مواجهة العدوان ،
- وإذ يستذكر قرار قمة شرم الشيخ في أول مارس / آذار 2003، الذي ينص على " أن شؤون الوطن العربي وتطوير نظمته أمر تقررته شعوب المنطقة، بما يتفق مع مصالحها الوطنية والقومية، بعيداً عن أي تدخل خارجي، وفي هذا الإطار يستنكر القادة ما يتردد من محاولات رامية إلى فرض تغييرات على المنطقة، أو التدخل في شؤونها الداخلية وتجاهل مصالحها وقضاياها العادلة "،
- وإذ يؤكد الالتزام بقرار القمة العربية في شرم الشيخ بضرورة امتناع الدول العربية عن المشاركة في أي عمل عسكري يستهدف سيادة وأمن وسلامة ووحدة أراضي العراق وأية دولة عربية أخرى،
- واستناداً إلى ميثاق الأمم المتحدة ولا سيما المادة الأولى الفقرة (1) ، والمادة الثانية الفقرتان (3 و 4) من الفصل الأول والمادة (51) من الفصل السابع ،
- وبناءً على القواعد العامة للقانون الدولي خاصة تلك المتعلقة بالعدوان،

يقرر

- 1- إدانة العدوان الأمريكي - البريطاني على العراق الدولة العضو في الأمم المتحدة وجامعة الدول العربية .
- 2- اعتبار هذا العدوان انتهاكاً لميثاق الأمم المتحدة ولمبادئ القانون الدولي وخروجاً عن الشرعية الدولية وتهديداً للأمن والسلم الدوليين، وتحديداً للمجتمع الدولي والرأي العام العالمي المطالب بحل المنازعات الدولية بالطرق السلمية والاحتكام إلى قرارات الشرعية الدولية.
- 3- المطالبة بالانسحاب الفوري وغير المشروط للقوات الأمريكية - البريطانية الغازية من الأراضي العراقية، وتحميلها المسؤولية المادية والأخلاقية والقانونية عن هذا العدوان .

4- تأكيد الالتزام بضرورة امتناع الدول العربية عن المشاركة في أي عمل عسكري يمس سيادة وأمن ووحدة أراضي العراق أو أية دولة عربية أخرى، والتأكيد على ضمان أمن وسلامة ووحدة أراضي الدول العربية كافة .

5- تكليف المجموعة العربية في الأمم المتحدة بطلب عقد جلسة عاجلة لمجلس الأمن لاتخاذ قرار بوقف العدوان وسحب القوات الغازية فوراً خارج الحدود الدولية لجمهورية العراق، والتأكيد على احترام سيادة العراق واستقلاله السياسي وحرمة أراضيه، وامتناع جميع الدول عن التدخل في شؤونه الداخلية .

6- تكليف المجموعة العربية في حالة عدم انعقاد مجلس الأمن أو عدم اتخاذ القرار اللازم لوقف العدوان والانسحاب، وفقاً لما ورد في الفقرة السابقة، بدعوة الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة، لعقد جلسة طارئة لبحث العدوان على العراق والمطالبة بوقفه الفوري، وسحب القوات المعتدية من جميع الأراضي العراقية واحترام وحدة وحرمة أراضيه .

7- اعتبار المجلس في حالة انعقاد دائم، وتكليف الأمين العام متابعة الموقف وتقديم تقارير فورية إلى المجلس عن تطورات الموقف .

(ق : رقم 6266 - د.ع (119) - ج 2 - 2003/3/24)

اعتبار أعمال التدخل العسكري الخارجي انتهاكاً صريحاً لحقوق الإنسان
إن مجلس الجامعة على المستوى الوزاري،

- بعد إطلاعه :

* على مذكرة الأمانة العامة،

* وعلى التقرير الصادر عن اللجنة العربية الدائمة لحقوق الإنسان في دورتها السابعة عشرة المنعقدة في

الفترة من 19 إلى 23 يناير/ كانون الثاني 2003،

* وعلى توصية لجنة الشؤون القانونية،

يقرر

1- اعتبار أعمال التدخل العسكري الخارجي خرقاً لمبادئ واحكام ميثاقى الأمم المتحدة وجامعة الدول العربية، وانتهاكاً صريحاً لحقوق الإنسان، ورفض كل أشكال العدوان واستخدام القوة المسلحة تحت أي ذريعة باعتباره مساساً بحق الشعوب في العيش بأمان وسلام، وتهديداً خطيراً للأمن الإنساني، والدعوة إلى الوقف الفوري لهذا السلوك غير المشروع .

2- اعتبار العدوان على أي دولة عربية، وبصورة خاصة العدوان الأمريكي البريطاني على العراق انتهاكاً صريحاً لحقوق الإنسان وموائيقها .

3- الطلب من الأمين العام لجامعة الدول العربية مواصلة جهوده على الصعيدين الإقليمي والدولي لوقف العدوان على العراق ودرء العدوان عن أي دولة عربية .

(ق : رقم 6309 - د.ع (119) - ج 2 - 2003/3/24)

APPENDIX 8

Arab foreign ministers issue communiqué, covering reform, Iraq, and Mideast

March 4, 2004

<http://www.saudiembassy.net/2004News/News/AraDetail.asp?cIndex=1750>

The foreign ministers of the League of Arab States issued a communiqué yesterday at the end of their 121st regular session, confirming their agreement to submit to the Arab Summit scheduled for later this month in Tunis, proposals on democratic reforms in the Arab world. Draft resolutions proposed by Egypt and Jordan will be presented to the Summit, stressing the desire of Arab countries for such reform by expanding the base of public participation and freedom of expression, with the participation and efforts of enlightened popular organizations, and the cooperation of other friendly countries who are willing to interact on a basis of equality without imposing their own models.

On Iraq, the communiqué condemned the recent terrorist bombings, welcomed the ratification of the transitional state administration law, and called on Arab countries to extend assistance to Iraq and to confront attempts to spread ethnic sedition, affirming the unity of Iraq and its people, as well as respect for its sovereignty and independence and non-interference in its internal affairs.

The communiqué condemned the human rights violations that took place during the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and the suppression of truth concerning Kuwaitis taken prisoner or missing in action; and urged that members of the deposed Iraqi regime be brought to trial before Iraqi courts for crimes against humanity.

The communiqué also emphasized the need to resolve the Palestinian issue and end Israeli occupation, in accordance with the Arab peace initiative that was endorsed at the 2002 Arab Summit in Beirut; and called on the international community to implement UN Security Council resolutions regarding the Syrian and Lebanese as well as the Palestinian peace tracks, voicing support for Syria's right to the Golan heights and denouncing Israel's aggression against Syrian territories last October. The ministers urged the United States to activate the 'Roadmap', warning of the grave consequences of Israel continuing construction of the wall of segregation aimed at aborting a peaceful solution of the Palestinian issue; stressed that Al-Quds [East Jerusalem] was part of the Arab territories occupied in 1967; endorsed the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland; and affirmed commitment to financial support for the Palestinian Authority of U.S. \$ 55 million per month.

Turning to other issues, the communiqué expressed full support for the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over the three islands occupied by Iran; solidarity with the Sudan in its efforts to maintain its territorial integrity, establish peace, and realize national conciliation; and endorsement of Somalia's territorial unity and sovereignty, affirming commitment to UN Security Council resolutions banning export of arms to that country. The ministers also discussed Israel's possession of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear arms, and stressed the importance of Arab participation in meetings of signatory states of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty scheduled for New York next April.

http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/arabic/details_ar.jsp?art_id=2535&level_id=237

*This was a long "report" and not a "declaration" or a communique. Thus, it was shortened from its original length to only include areas related to regional and international relations.

قرارات مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على المستوى الوزاري

(الدورة العادية) ١٢١

٢٠٠٤/٣ إلى ٢٠٠٤/٤ /٢ القاهرة : ٢٨

قضية فلسطين والصراع العربي الإسرائيلي:

متابعة تطورات

الانتفاضة، القدس، اللاجئون، الأونروا، الاستيطان، التنمية

إن مجلس الجامعة على المستوى الوزاري،

-بعد إطلاعه:

□ على مذكرة الأمانة العامة،

□ وعلى تقرير نشاط الأمانة العامة فيما بين دورتي المجلس،

□ وعلى توصية لجنة الشؤون السياسية،

-وإذ يستذكر قرارات القمم العربية، وخاصة بيان وقرارات قمة بيروت (٢٠٠٢) بما

فيها مبادرة السلام العربية، وقرار قمة شرم الشيخ (٢٠٠٣) (بهذا الخصوص،

-وإذ يشير إلى قرارات الشرعية الدولية الخاصة بقضية فلسطين والصراع العربي

الإسرائيلي، وخاصة قرارات مجلس الأمن ذات الصلة والمتعلقة بإقامة الدولة

الفلسطينية وعملية السلام الدائم والشامل،

٢٠٠٣/٩/٩ - وإذ يؤكد على قراره رقم ٦٣١٨ - د.ع ١٢٠ - ج ٧

-وبعد اطلاعه على مذكرة المندوبية الدائمة للجمهورية اللبنانية رقم ٢٧٢١ / ج / ٢٠٠٣

٢٠٠٣ بخصوص اللاجئين، / ١٢ / بتاريخ ٢٧

-وإذ يدين بشدة التصعيد العدواني الدموي الإسرائيلي تجاه المدنيين الفلسطينيين،

-وإذ يعبر عن تقديره واعتزازه بالشعب الفلسطيني وقيادته الوطنية المنتخبة وصموده

البطولي في وجه العدوان الإسرائيلي المستمر، وإصراره على نيل حقوقه المشروعة

وفي مقدمتها حقه في تقرير المصير، وإقامة دولته المستقلة وعاصمتها القدس،

-وإذ يشدد على أهمية وحدة الصف الفلسطيني وتدعيم القرار الوطني الفلسطيني في

هذه المرحلة الهامة،

-وإذ ينبه إلى خطورة استمرار إسرائيل في عرقلة المساعي السلمية الدولية والعربية

واتخاذ الإجراءات أحادية الجانب وفي مقدمتها إقامة حائط الفصل العنصري الذي

-٧-

يهدد فرص إقامة الدولة الفلسطينية المستقلة، كما أقرتها قرارات القمم العربية،

(٢٠٠٣) (وقرارات الشرعية الدولية، وخاصة قرار مجلس الأمن رقم ١٥١٥

يقرر

١- العمل على تفعيل مبادرة السلام العربية (قمة بيروت ٢٠٠٢) ، و إحياء عملية السلام الشامل في المنطقة ، وفقا لقرارات مجلس الأمن ذات الصلة ، ومطالبة المجتمع الدولي بوضع آلية لتنفيذ هذه القرارات على جميع المسارات الفلسطينية والسورية واللبنانية ، وإلزام إسرائيل بتنفيذها دون شروط، والانسحاب الكامل من الأراضي العربية المحتلة ، بما في ذلك الجولان السوري وحتى الخط الرابع من يونيو /حزيران ١٩٦٧ والأراضي التي مازالت محتلة في جنوب لبنان، وبما يضمن إقامة دولة فلسطينية ذات سيادة على الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة منذ الرابع من يونيو / حزيران ١٩٦٧ في الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة وتك ون عاصمتها القدس الشرقية، والتوصل إلى حل عادل لمشكلة اللاجئين الفلسطينيين يتفق عليه وفقاً لقرار الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة رقم ١٩٤٨ (١٩٤٨).

٢-مطالبة الإدارة الأمريكية العمل على تفعيل خارطة الطريق، وتجسيد بيان الرئيس بوش بشأن إقامة دولة فلسطينية مستقلة، إلى جانب إسرائيل لدعم الأمن والاستقرار في منطقة الشرق الأوسط، ودعوة أطراف اللجنة الرباعية لاتخاذ الإجراءات اللازمة في هذا الشأن.

٣-التحذير من الآثار الخطيرة المترتبة على إقامة إسرائيل لحائط الفصل العنصري واعتباره إجراء غير شرعي يستهدف إفشال الحل السلمي للقضية الفلسطينية ويؤدي إلى قضم وابتلاع الأرض الفلسطينية ، وقطع التواصل بين المدن والقرى، ونهب مصادر المياه، وعرقلة حركة البضائع والأفراد ، مما يهدد فرص قيام الدولة الفلسطينية المستقلة ذات السيادة والقابلة للحياة، ودعوة الأمم المتحدة إلى تنفيذ قرار ٢٠٠٣ (في هذا) (١٠ /الدورة الاستثنائية الطارئة العاشرة للجمعية العامة رقم ١٣ الشأن).

٤-الإشادة بالمشاركة المكثفة للدول العربية والأمانة العامة للجامعة العربية، في المرافعات أمام محكمة العدل الدولية حول حائط الفصل العنصري، والتتويه على وجه الخصوص بالجهود التي قام بها السيد الأمين العام في هذا الشأن.

-٨-

٥-إدانة أية إجراءات أحادية الجانب تتخذها إسرائيل لفرض الأمر الواقع ورسم الحدود خلافاً لقرارات الشرعية الدولية ودون تفاوض مع الطرف الفلسطيني، الذي له كامل الحق في رده المشروع على هذه الإجراءات والممارسات وتنبية المجتمع الدولي إلى خطورة اتخاذ خطوات تضيي شرعية على هذه الإجراءات.

٦-استمرار التحرك العربي في الأمم المتحدة لمواجهة المحاولات الإسرائيلية الرامية إلى إلغاء قرارات الأمم المتحدة الخاصة بقضية فلسطين والصراع العربي الإسرائيلي والتمسك بهذه القرارات حتى يتم التوصل إلى السلام العادل والشامل طبقاً لقرارات القمم العربية، وقرارات الشرعية الدولية، ودعوة الأمانة العامة إلى مواصلة التنسيق مع المجموعة العربية لتكثيف الاتصالات مع جميع الدول التي صوتت بالامتناع أو ضد القرار المشار إليه.

كما يقرر:

أولاً : الانتفاضة:

- ١ - توجيه تحية إعزاز وتقدير إلى الشعب الفلسطيني وانتفاضته الباسلة وقيادته الشرعية المنتخبة وعلى رأسها الرئيس ياسر عرفات لصمودهم في وجه الممارسات الوحشية التي تقوم بها إسرائيل، ومطالبة المجتمع الدولي بإرغام إسرائيل على وقف عدوانها ورفع الحصار عن الشعب الفلسطيني وعن مقر الرئيس ياسر عرفات وتحركاته، وضرورة احترام مكانته التاريخية والسياسية كرئيس منتخب.
 - ٢ - العمل لدى المجتمع الدولي من أجل توفير الحماية الدولية للشعب الفلسطيني، وإطلاق سراح جميع الأسرى والمعتقلين في السجون والمعتقلات الإسرائيلية، والتأكيد على أهمية دور المراقبين المشار إليهم في خارطة الطريق، وإلزام إسرائيل باحترام اتفاقية جنيف الرابعة لعام ١٩٤٩ (وكافة القرارات الدولية بشأن القضية الفلسطينية).
 - ٣ - دعم الحوار الوطني الفلسطيني بما يكفل الحفاظ على الوحدة الوطنية للشعب الفلسطيني، وتمتين نسيجه الوطني لتحقيق أهدافه التي كفلتها قرارات الشرعية الدولية.
- ٩-

ثانياً : القدس:

- ١ - التأكيد على عروبة القدس كجزء من الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة عام ١٩٦٧، وعدم شرعية الإجراءات الإسرائيلية لضمها وتهويدها وتغيير طبيعتها وتركيبتها السكانية والجغرافية، وعدم شرعية إعلان إسرائيل القدس عاصمتها الموحدة.
- ٢ - إدانة السياسات والإجراءات الإسرائيلية لتهويد القدس والمساس بمقدساتها، وتوسيع الاستيطان فيها وعزلها وتهجير أهلها، وإقامة الحائط العنصري المسمى بغلاف القدس بطول ٧٦ كم بهدف تقطيع أوصال القدس وعزل سكانها الفلسطينيين عن امتدادهم الطبيعي في الضفة الغربية، ومناشدة المجتمع الدولي والمؤسسات الدولية المعنية بالتدخل لوقف العدوان الإسرائيلي على المدينة المقدسة.
- ٣ - تقديم الدعم اللازم للمواطنين الفلسطينيين في مدينة القدس وللمؤسسات الفلسطينية لمساعدتهم على مواصلة صمودهم ضد المحاولات المستمرة الهادفة إلى اقتلاعهم من مدينتهم، والعمل على تمكينهم من مواجهة الخطر الذي يهدد المسجد الأقصى باعتبارهم خط الدفاع الأول عن مقدسات الأمة الإسلامية.
- ٤ - التأكيد على تفعيل الخطة الإعلامية التي اعتمدها مجلس وزراء الإعلام العرب في اجتماعه الذي عقد بالقاهرة في يونيو / حزيران ٢٠٠٣ والخاصة بدعم صمود القدس وحماية عروبتها.

٥ -التنسيق مع منظمة المؤتمر الإسلامي للاستفادة من تقرير اللجنة الدولية المقدم إلى عصابة الأمم عن حائط البراق) المبكى (ديسمبر/كانون أول ١٩٣٠ في التحرك الدبلوماسي والإعلامي، والعمل على مواجهة الانتهاكات الإسرائيلية للأماكن المقدسة و خاصة السماح للمتطرفين والمستوطنين الإسرائيليين بدخولها مما يشكل استفزازاً لمشاعر المسلمين والمسيحيين في كل مكان ويؤدي إلى استمرار المواجهات والصدام.

٦ -إدانة الممارسات والأعمال الإسرائيلية التي تسببت في انهيار مقطع بعرض عشرة أمتار من الجسر الذي يدعم حائط البراق ويؤدي إلى باب المغاربة.

٧ -تكثيف الجهود والاتصالات مع الدول أعضاء لجنة التراث العالمي و مع المنظمات الدولية المعنية وبخاصة اليونسكو من أجل الحفاظ على الأماكن الدينية والأثرية في القدس والعمل على صيانتها وترميمها وتوثيقها والتعريف بقيمتها الحضارية وما تتعرض له من أخطار مما يهدد التراث الثقافي الإنساني العالمي

- ١٠ -

اللسطيني للضياع، وتكليف الأمانة العامة بالتنسيق مع المنظمة العربية للتربية والثقافة والعلوم) الألكسو (والمنظمة الإسلامية للتربية والعلوم والثقافة) ايسيسكو) لمتابعة هذا الموضوع.

٨ -دعوة الدول العربية لتوفير الدعم المطلوب وتقديم المساعدات الممكنة لدائرة الأوقاف الإسلامية في القدس والأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة لاستكمال عملها في ترميم أسوار المسجد الأقصى.

٩ -دعوة الأمانة العامة لإجراء الاتصالات اللازمة لتأمين المشاركة العربية بصفة عامة والفلسطينية بصفة خاصة في الندوة التي ستقام عن مدينة القدس في جنيف في العام الجاري (٢٠٠٤) ، من قبل لجنة الشؤون الخارجية للمجلس الفيدرالي الروسي واللجنة الفرعية في الجمعية البرلمانية في مجلس أوروبا.

ثالثاً : اللاجئون:

١ -التمسك بحق اللاجئين الفلسطينيين في العودة، ورفض محاولات التوطين بكافة أشكاله الذي يتنافى والوضع الخاص في البلدان العربية المضيفة ، ودعوة الأمانة العامة والدول الأعضاء إلى مواصلة وتكثيف جهودها على الساحة الدولية ، وفي الأمم المتحدة، لتأكيد هذا الحق وفقاً لقرارات الشرعية الدولية وخاصة قرار ١٩٤٨) ، وتأكيد مسؤولية إسرائيل القانونية والسياسية (الجمعية العامة رقم ١٩٤ والأخلاقية عن نشوء واستمرار مشكلة اللاجئين الفلسطينيين.

٢ -التعبير عن القلق العميق من مخططات التدمير الوحشي التي تنفذها قوات الاحتلال الإسرائيلي لمخيمات اللاجئين في الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة، ودعوة كافة الدول والمجموعات والمنظمات العالمية للتدخل فوراً، وبذل أقصى الجهود لمنع وقوع كارثة إنسانية واسعة النطاق ، الأمر الذي سيؤدي إلى انعكاسات خطيرة على مستقبل السلام في المنطقة

٣- إدانة إقامة حائط الفصل العنصري الذي يفاقم الضغوط المعيشية القاسية التي يعانيها الشعب الفلسطيني، مما يهدد بإحداث عملية تهجير فلسطيني نية جديدة تطل اللاجئين وغير اللاجئين ، ودعوة الأونروا والمنظمات الدولية والمنظمات غير الحكومية لمواجهة إقامة هذا الحائط وانعكاساته على المجتمع المدني.

٤- التأكيد على مسؤولية المفوضية العليا لشئون اللاجئين ، والأونروا في إيجاد حل عادل لأوضاع اللاجئين الفلسطينيين في مخيم الرويشد (على الحدود العراقية

- ١١ -

الأردنية) ، يضمن إعادتهم إلى الأراضي الفلسطينية ، ومطالبة المجتمع الدولي بالضغط على إسرائيل لدفعها للموافقة على عودة هؤلاء اللاجئين إلى الأراضي الفلسطينية في أقرب وقت ممكن.

٥- دعوة الأمانة العامة والدول العربية المضيفة إلى تكثيف جهودها في عملية التوثيق الخاصة باللاجئين الفلسطينيين وحقوقهم ، والاستمرار في متابعة النشاطات الخاصة بقضيتهم.

٦- توجيه الشكر للدول العربية المضيفة للاجئين الفلسطينيين لما تقدمه من مساعدات إنسانية ومادية للاجئين الفلسطينيين ويهيب المجلس بها أن تقدم المزيد من هذه المساعدات لتخفيف معاناتهم.

رابعاً : الأونروا:

١- التأكيد على أهمية الدور الذي تقوم به الأونروا في مساعدة اللاجئين الفلسطينيين وعلى استمرار توفير الدعم المالي اللازم لبرامجها وأنشطتها العادية والطارئة ، ودعوة الأمانة العامة والدول العربية إلى مواصلة تفعيل قنوات الاتصال المختلفة مع كافة الدول والمنظمات العربية والإسلامية والدولية لحشد التأييد اللازم لاستمرار الوكالة في مهامها ، ودعم تمويلها إلى حين إيجاد حل عادل لقضية ١٩٤٨) ، وتنفيذ ذلك الحل تنفيذاً كاملاً (. للاجئين على أساس القرار ١٩٤٨

٢- توجيه الشكر للأونروا على مباشرتها تنفيذ مشروع ملفات عائلات اللاجئين والى الدول المتبرعة لهذا المشروع ، ودعوة الأونروا إلى ضمان سلامة ملفات عائلات اللاجئين الفلسطينيين الأصلية ، ومطالبتها بإدخال تكاليف ذلك ضمن موازنة تنفيذ المشروع.

٣-حث الأمانة العامة والدول الأعضاء والمنظمات الإقليمية المدعوة على المشاركة بفاعلية في أعمال مؤتمر الأونروا الاستثنائي الذي سيعقد في ج نيف أوائل يون يو /حزيران ٢٠٠٤ والرامي إلى دعم تمويلها وتوسيع قاعدة المتبرعين لها، والتأكيد على الموقف العربي الهادف إلى ضمان تحقيق أهداف المؤتمر المعلنة دون المساس بولايتها أو بحقوق اللاجئين الفلسطينيين ولا سيما حقهم في العودة (١٩٤٨) (والتعويض طبقاً لقرارات الشرعية وفي مقدمتها القرار ١٩٤٨

٤-دعوة الأونروا إلى تكثيف التنسيق مع الدول العربية المضيفة في كافة الأمور المتعلقة باللاجئين الفلسطينيين المسجلين لديها.

- ١٢ -

خامساً : الاستيطان والهجرة اليهودية:

- ١ -التأكيد على مطالبة المجتمع الدولي بذل جهوده لوقف النشاط الاستيطاني في الأراضي الفلسطينية، وتنفيذ القرارات الدولية ذات الصلة، لا سيما قرار مجلس الأمن رقم ١٩٨٠) ، الذي يؤكد عدم شرعية الاستيطان وضرورة تفكيك (الأمن رقم ٤٦٥ المستوطنات القائمة.
- ٢ -دعوة الدول الأعضاء لتكثيف جهودها لوقف إقامة حائط الفصل العنصري، وإزالة الأجزاء التي تمت إقامتها وذلك طبقا لقرار الدورة الاستثنائية الطارئة ٢٠٠٣) ، ومطالبة الولايات (١٠) /للجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة رقم ١٣ المتحدة توضيح موقفها إزاء حائط الفصل العنصري، باعتباره خرقة خطيرة للقانون الدولي ويعرقل عملية السلام ويتعارض مع ما أعلنه الرئيس جورج بوش في شأن قيام الدولة الفلسطينية.
- ٣ -تنبيه المجتمع الدولي إلى ما تقوم به الحكومة الإسرائيلية من تضليل للرأي العام الدولي بإعلانها إزالة بعض البؤر الاستيطانية والتي تصفها بأنها غير قانونية رغم أن كل المستعمرات الاستيطانية القائمة والنشاطات الاستعمارية الاستيطانية الأخرى مخالفة للقانون الدولي والشرعية الدولية.
- ٤ -دعوة الاتحاد الأوروبي ودول العالم لاتخاذ الإجراءات اللازمة لمنع منتجات المستعمرات الاستيطانية الإسرائيلية من الاستفادة من أي تسهيلات وإعفاءات جمركية في الأسواق الأوروبية والعالمية.
- ٥ -الإشادة بتحريك الأمين العام للجامعة العربية لدى منظمة اليونسكو لمواجهة قيام إسرائيل بتدمير التراث الإنساني الفلسطيني في مدينة نابلس، وطلبه منها إرسال لجنة تقصي حقائق ، مع وضع برنامج لترميم الآثار المدمرة في نابلس وغيرها من المدن الفلسطينية، ودعوة الدول الأعضاء لدعم هذا التحرك.
- ٦ -رفض وإدانة السياسات الإسرائيلية الرامية لجلب المهاجرين اليهود وغير اليهود إلى فلسطين، وتنبيه دول المصدر إلى خطورة هذه الهجرة اليهودية على السلام والاستقرار في المنطقة لارتباطها بسياسة الاستعمار الاستيطاني ومصادرة الأراضي الفلسطينية.

-١٣-

سادساً : التنمية:

- ١ -تقديم الشكر للدول التي قامت بتسديد نسب حصصها المالية تنفيذاً لقرارات مؤتمر قمة بيروت (٢٠٠٢) وقمة شرم الشيخ (٢٠٠٣) ، لدعم موازنة السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية، والتجديد التلقائي لهذا الدعم العربي لفترة ستة شهور ٢٠٠٣ ، وذلك وفقاً للآليات المقررة ونظراً لاستمرار العدوان / ١٠ /تبدأ من ١ والحصار الإسرائيلي، وحث باقي الدول الأعضاء على الإسراع في تسديد نسب حصصها، وتكليف الأمانة العامة لجامعة الدول العربية مخاطبة الدول الأعضاء شهرياً لتسديد الحصص المتأخرة

٢. توجيه الشكر للدول التي بادرت بتقديم الدعم الإضافي المقرر في قمة بيروت ٢٠٠٢ (والمقدر بمبلغ ١٥٠ مليون دولار والموجه إلى صندوق الأقصى) وانتفاضة القدس، لدعم مجالات التنمية في فلسطين، وحث باقي الدول على الإسراع في دفع مساهماتها.
٣. العمل على استمرار التبرعات الشعبية من المؤسسات والأفراد، لدعم صمود الشعب الفلسطيني، والطلب إلى الأمانة العامة الاستمرار في فتح حسابات لدى بنوك الدول العربية المختلفة لهذا الغرض.
٤. تقدير الجهود التحضيرية التي تبذلها الأمانة العامة بالتعاون مع اللجنة الاقتصادية والاجتماعية لغربي آسيا (الاسكوا) والسلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية، من أجل تقديم الدعم لكافة الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة بما فيها مدينتي القدس، وعقد "المن تدي العربي - الدولي لإعادة التأهيل والتنمية في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة" في العام الجاري ٢٠٠٤، ودعوة الصناديق والمؤسسات المالية والاقتصادية العربية للاجتماع والتنسيق من أجل المساهمة في التحضير للمنتدى وإنجاح أعماله.
٥. دعوة الدول الأعضاء والمؤسسات المالية العربية لمساعدة الطلبة الفلسطينيين من الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة الدارسين في الأكاديمية العربية للعلوم والتكنولوجيا والنقل البحري، بتسديد الرسوم الدراسية المستحقة عليهم للأكاديمية، وتوجيه الشكر للأكاديمية على السماح لهم بأداء امتحاناتهم.
- (٤/٣/٢٠٠٤) - ق: رقم ٦٣٧٢ - د.ع (١٢١ - ج) ٤ - ١٤-
- قضية فلسطين والصراع العربي الإسرائيلي:
تقرير وتوصيات مؤتمر المشرفين على شؤون الفلسطينيين
(في الدول العربية المضيفة) الدورة ٧١
إن مجلس الجامعة على المستوى الوزاري،
بعد اطلاعه:
على مذكرة الأمانة العامة،
وعلى تقرير نشاط الأمانة العامة فيما بين دورتي المجلس،
وعلى تقرير وتوصيات مؤتمر المشرفين على شؤون الفلسطينيين في دورته الحادية والسبعين،
وعلى توصية لجنة الشؤون السياسية،
يقرر
الموافقة على توصيات مؤتمر المشرفين على شؤون الفلسطينيين في الدول العربية
٢٨/١/٢٠٠٤ - المضيفة في دورته الحادية والسبعين المنعقدة بالقاهرة من ٢٥
(٤/٣/٢٠٠٤) - ق: رقم ٦٣٧٣ - د.ع (١٢١ - ج) ٤-١٥-

قضية فلسطين والصراع العربي الإسرائيلي:

تقرير عن أعمال المكتب الرئيسي والمكاتب

الإقليمية لمقاطعة إسرائيل

١٢١ ، بين دورتي مجلس الجامعة ١٢٠

إن مجلس الجامعة على المستوى الوزاري،

-بعد اطلاعه:

على مذكرة الأمانة العامة،

وعلى تقرير المكتب الرئيسي لمقاطعة إسرائيل عن أعماله وأعمال المكاتب

(، ١٢١ – الإقليمية لمقاطعة إسرائيل بين دورتي مجلس الجامعة) ١٢٠

وعلى تقرير نشاط الأمانة العامة فيما بين دورتي المجلس،

وعلى توصية لجنة الشؤون السياسية،

يقرر

أخذ العلم بما ورد في التقرير المقدم من المكتب الرئيسي للمقاطعة، والمكاتب الإقليمية

لمقاطعة إسرائيل في الدول العربية.

(٤/٣/٢٠٠٤) – ق: رقم ٦٣٧٤ – د.ع) ١٢١ - (ج ٤

-١٦-

قضية فلسطين والصراع العربي الإسرائيلي:

الجولان العربي السوري المحتل

إن مجلس الجامعة على المستوى الوزاري،

-بعد اطلاعه:

على مذكرة الأمانة العامة،

وعلى تقرير نشاط الأمانة العامة فيما بين دورتي المجلس،

وعلى القرار رقم ٦٣٢١ الصادر عن مجلس الجامعة على المستوى الوزاري

٩/٢٠٠٣/بتاريخ ٩

وعلى توصية لجنة الشؤون السياسية،

-وإذ يؤكد على قراراته السابقة في هذا الشأن،

يقرر

١ – تأكيد الدول العربية دعمها ومساندتها الحازمة لمطلب سورية العادل وحققها في

استعادة كامل الجولان العربي السوري المحتل إلى خط الرابع من يونيو / حزيران

١٩٦٧ ، استناداً إلى، أسس عملية السلام، وقرارات الشرعية الدولية، والبناء على

ما أنجز في إطار مؤتمر السلام الذي انطلق في مدريد عام ١٩٩١

١٩٨٢ ، وقراراته اللاحقة وآخرها/ ٢/ ٢ – التأكيد مجدداً على قراره رقم ٤١٢٦ بتاريخ ١٣

٢٠٠٣ الذي ينص على رفض كل ما اتخذته سلطات/ ٩ /قراره رقم ٦٣٢١ بتاريخ ٩

الاحتلال الإسرائيلي، من إجراءات تهدف إلى تغيير الوضع القانوني والطبيعي

والديمغرافي للجولان العربي السوري المحتل، واعتبار الإجراءات الإسرائيلية

لتكريس سيطرتها عليه غير قانونية ولاغية وباطلة، وتشكل خرقاً للاتفاقيات الدولية (١٩٨١) (ولميثاق الأمم المتحدة وقراراتها، ولاسيما قرار مجلس الأمن رقم ٤٩٧ ٥٧ بتاريخ / وقرار الجمعية العامة في دورتها السابعة والخمسين رقم ١٢٨ ١٩٨١ بضم الجولان/ ١٢ / ٢٠٠٢ ، الذي أكد على أن قرار إسرائيل في ١٤ / ١٢ / ١١ -١٧-

العربي السوري المحتل غير قانوني ولاغ وباطل وغير ذي أثر قانوني ويشكل انتهاكاً (١٩٨١) (خطيراً لقرار مجلس الأمن رقم ٤٩٧ ٣ -التأكيد من جديد أن استمرار احتلال الجولان العربي السوري المحتل منذ عام ١٩٦٧ يشكل تهديداً مستمراً للسلام والأمن في المنطقة والعالم. ٤ -إدانة إسرائيل لممارساتها في الجولان العربي السوري المحتل المتمثلة خاصة في الاستيلاء على الأراضي والموارد المائية وبناء المستوطنات وتوسيعها ونقل المستوطنين إليها واستغلال مواردها الطبيعية وبناء المشاريع عليها وفرض المقاطعة الاقتصادية على المنتجات الزراعية للسكان العرب ومنع تصديرها. ٥ -تأكيد الموقف العربي بالتضامن الكامل مع سورية ولبنان، والوقوف معهما في مواجهة الاعتداءات والتهديدات الإسرائيلية المستمرة ضدّهما، واعتبار أي اعتداء عليهما اعتداء على الأمة العربية.

٦ -دعم صمود المواطنين العرب في الجولان العربي السوري المحتل، والوقوف إلى جانبهم في تصديهم للاحتلال الإسرائيلي وممارساته القمعية، وإصرارهم على التمسك بأرضهم وهويتهم العربية السورية، والتأكيد على ضرورة تطبيق اتفاقية جنيف الرابعة لعام ١٩٤٩ على مواطني الجولان العربي السوري المحتل. ٧ -التمسك بقرارات الشرعية الدولية التي تقضي بعدم الاعتراف بأي أوضاع تنجم عن النشاط الاستيطاني الإسرائيلي في الأراضي العربية المحتلة، باعتباره إجراء غير مشروع لا يرتب حقاً ولا ينشئ التزاماً، واعتبار أن إقامة مستوطنات، واستقدام مستوطنين إليه، يشكل خرقاً خطيراً لاتفاقيات جنيف، وجريمة حرب وفقاً للملحق الأول لهذه الاتفاقيات، وانتهاكاً لأسس عملية السلام، مما يحتم وقف كافة الأنشطة الاستيطانية الإسرائيلية في الجولان العربي السوري المحتل، والأراضي العربية المحتلة.

٨ -إدانة سياسة الحكومة الإسرائيلية التي دمرت عملية السلام، وأدت إلى التصعيد المستمر للتوتر في المنطقة، ودعوة المجتمع الدولي وخاصة راعيي مؤتمر مدريد للسلام، والاتحاد الأوروبي، إلى حمل إسرائيل على تطبيق قرارات الأمم المتحدة المتعلقة بالانسحاب الإسرائيلي التام من الجولان العربي السوري المحتل و من جميع الأراضي العربية المحتلة، إلى خط الرابع من يونيو/حزيران ١٩٦٧.

(٤/٣/٢٠٠٤) - ق: رقم ٦٣٧٥ - د.ع) (١٢١ - ج) ٤

-١٨-

قضية فلسطين والصراع العربي الإسرائيلي:
التضامن مع الجمهورية اللبنانية
إن مجلس الجامعة على المستوى الوزاري ،
بعد اطلاعه:

على مذكرة الأمانة العامة،
وعلى تقرير نشاط الأمانة العامة فيما بين دورتي المجلس،
وعلى الفقرة التاسعة من قرار مجلس الجامعة على مستوى القمة رقم
٢٤٥/٣/٢٠٠٣ بتاريخ ١
وعلى توصية لجنة الشؤون السياسية،
-وإذ يؤكد على قراراته السابقة في هذا الشأن،

يقرر

١ - إدانة إسرائيل بشدة لاستمرارها في احتلال أراضٍ لبنانية ومواقع على الحدود اللبنانية، ولاستمرارها في اعتقال لبنانيين في سجونها، ولعدم تسليمها الأمم المتحدة كامل الخرائط العائدة لمواقع الألغام التي زرعتها قواتها المحتلة، ولانتهاكاتها المستمرة للسيادة اللبنانية برًا وبحرًا وجوًا، وكذلك إدانة الاعتداءات والتهديدات الإسرائيلية الموجهة إلى لبنان وسورية واعتبار أي اعتداء عليهما عدوًا على الدول العربية جمعاء.

٢ - التأكيد على دعم لبنان:

أ- في استكمال تحرير أراضيها من الاحتلال الإسرائيلي حتى الحدود المعترف بها دوليًا، بما في ذلك مزارع شبعا، وفقًا لقرار مجلس الأمن رقم (٤٢٥) لعام ١٩٧٨ ، مع احتفاظ لبنان بحقه في مقاومة هذا الاحتلال بشتى الوسائل المشروعة.

-١٩-

ب- في مطالبته بالإفراج عن الأسرى والمعتقلين اللبنانيين في السجون الإسرائيلية كرهائن خلافًا لأحكام القانون الدولي والإعلان العالمي لحقوق الإنسان واتفاقيات جنيف لعام ١٩٤٩ واتفاقية لاهاي لعام ١٩٠٧ ، وتأييد حق لبنان في تحريرهم بشتى الوسائل المشروعة.

ج- في دعوة مجلس الأمن إلى تحمل مسؤولياته والتحرك الفوري لمطالبة إسرائيل بالكف عن تهديداتها وانتهاكاتها لسيادة لبنان وخرقها لحرمة الأراضي والأجواء والمياه الإقليمية اللبنانية، وتحملها مسؤولية موقفها هذا وما يترتب عليه من عواقب وخيمة على أمن واستقرار المنطقة.

د - في مطالبته بإزالة مئات آلاف الألغام التي خلفها الاحتلال الإسرائيلي والتي تتحمل إسرائيل مسؤولية زرعها وما تتسبب به من قتل وإيذاء للمدنيين.

هـ - في حقه في مياهه وفقًا للقانون الدولي وذلك بوجه الأطماع الإسرائيلية.

و - في إدانة الاعتداءات والانتهاكات الإسرائيلية المستمرة على الخط الأزرق

ولا سيما ما يطال المدنيين اللبنانيين مثل قيام قوات الاحتلال بإطلاق النار على ٢٠٠٣ إلى منطقة/ ١٢ /مواطنين لبنانيين كانا يقومان بنزهة صيد بتاريخ ٩ الوزاني وبالتسلسل إلى مكان الحادث وسحب جثتيهما إلى داخل الأراضي المحتلة مما يشكل خرقاً للقانون الدولي.

٣ - مطالبة المجتمع الدولي والهيئات الدولية القضائية والسياسية من أجل: أ- الضغط على إسرائيل لتقديم التعويضات إلى لبنان عن الأضرار والخسائر الناجمة عن اعتداءاتها المتكررة على أراضيها قبل فترة الاحتلال وخلالها وبعدها.

ب- تمكين مندوبي اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر والمنظمات الإنسانية الأخرى من زيارة جميع المعتقلين اللبنانيين بصورة مستمرة والإطلاع على أوضاعهم وتوفير الرعاية الصحية لهم.

ج- العمل على إصدار قرار من قبل لجنة الأمم المتحدة لحقوق الإنسان يمكن من إجراء التحقيقات حول المعتقلين الذين توفوا في المعتقلات الإسرائيلية، ودفع التعويضات المترتبة عن ذلك لمتضررين وفقاً للقوانين والاتفاقات الدولية.

٤- التأكيد على حق عودة اللاجئين الفلسطيني نيين إلى ديارهم والتحذير من أن عدم حل قضية المقيمين منهم في لبنان على قاعدة عودتهم إلى ديارهم وفقاً لقرارات الشرعية -٢٠-

الدولية ومبادئ القانون الدولي أو محاولة توطينهم، يزعزع الأمن والاستقرار في المنطقة ويعيق تحقيق السلام العادل فيها.

٥ - توجيه الشكر إلى الدول الأعضاء والصناديق العربية التي قدمت العون والمساهمة المالية إلى الحكومة اللبنانية، والطلب إلى باقي الدول الوفاء بالتزاماتها المقررة في مؤتمرات القمة العربية، والمتعلقة بدعم لبنان وصمود شعبه وإعادة اعمارهم.

٦ - التأكيد على إدانة الإرهاب الدولي والذي تساهم الدول العربية في مكافحته بفاعلية ورفض إدراج المقاومة على لوائح الإرهاب، من منطلق ضرورة التفريق بين الإرهاب والمقاومة المشروعة ضد الاحتلال الإسرائيلي.

(٤/٣/٢٠٠٤) - ق: رقم ٦٣٧٦ - د.ع) ١٢١ - (ج ٤

-٢١-

تطورات الوضع في العراق

ان مجلس الجامعة على المستوى الوزاري،

-بعد اطلاعه:

٣٠/١٢/٢٠٠٣، -على تقرير وفد الأمانة العامة الذي زار العراق للفترة ١٨

وعلى تقرير نشاط الأمانة العامة فيما بين دورتي المجلس،

-وبعد استماعه إلى العرض الذي قدمه رئيس وفد جمهورية العراق،

-وبعد المداولات التي أجراها السادة رؤساء الوفود بشأن تطورات الوضع في العراق،

يقرر

- ١ - إعادة التأكيد على وحدة الأراضي العراقية واحترام سيادة العراق واستقلاله ووحدته والالتزام بمبدأ عدم التدخل في شؤونه الداخلية، ودعوة الأطراف الأخرى لاتباع النهج ذاته والتأكيد على حق الشعب العراقي في تقرير مستقبله بحرية.
 - ٢ - دعوة الدول العربية إلى مساعدة العراق للوقوف بوجه كل المحاولات الرامية إلى غرس بذور الفتنة الطائفية والفرقة والخلافات الداخلية، والترحيب بدور الدول المجاورة للعراق لمساعدته على تحقيق ذلك.
 - ٣ - الترحيب باستجابة الأمين العام لجامعة الدول العربية للدعوة التي وجهتها السلطات العراقية وإرساله وفد الأمانة العامة لجامعة الدول العربية إلى بغداد برئاسة السفير احمد بن حلي - الأمين العام المساعد لجامعة الدول العربية ، وأخذ العلم بالتقرير المقدم من وفد الأمانة العامة حول الزيارة، والتأكيد على الدور المهم للجامعة العربية في مساعدة العراق في المرحلة الحالية.
 - ٤ - الترحيب بإعلان مجلس الحكم في العراق، إقرار قانون إدارة الدولة للمرحلة الانتقالية.
 - ٥ - إدانة التفجيرات الإرهابية الأخيرة التي حدثت في العراق وأودت بحياة المئات من الأبرياء من الشعب العراقي دون مراعاة لقدسية ذكرى يوم عاشوراء، وتأكيد إدانة جميع الأعمال الإرهابية التي تستهدف المدنيين ورجال الأمن والشرطة العراقية -٢٢-
- والمؤسسات الإنسانية والدينية والمنظمات الدولية والبعثات الدبلوماسية العاملة في العراق وضرورة الكشف عن مرتكبيها وتحميلهم مسؤولية جرائمهم.
- ٦ - دعوة الشعب العراقي إلى الوقوف ضد محاولات زرع الفتنة والفرقة، والتمسك بالوحدة والمصالحة الوطنية لبناء مستقبل العراق الجديد وإنهاء الاحتلال.
 - ٧ - الترحيب بالدور المركزي للأمم المتحدة في تهيئة الظروف الكفيلة بإنهاء الاحتلال وتنظيم الانتخابات، وبكافة قرارات مجلس الأمن ذات العلاقة بما في ذلك قرار مجلس الأمن رقم ١٥١١ وخاصة الفقرة السابعة منه والتي تدعو لوضع جدول زمني لنقل السلطة للشعب العراقي، ودعوة الأمم المتحدة إلى تيسير نقل السلطة إلى الشعب العراقي وإنهاء الاحتلال، بتاريخ ٣٠ حزيران / يونيو ٢٠٠٤ وفقاً للاتفاق المبرم بين مجلس الحكم وسلطة الائتلاف المؤقتة.
 - ٨ - دعوة الدول العربية والصناديق والمؤسسات المالية العربية إلى الإسراع في تقديم مساعداتها في إعادة إعمار العراق.
 - ٩ - إدانة الانتهاكات الخطيرة لحقوق الإنسان التي تمت أثناء احتلال دولة الكويت، وطمس الحقائق المتعلقة بالأسرى والمفقودين الكويتيين ورعايا دول ثالثة الذين تم العثور على عدد من رفاتهم قتلى في المقابر الجماعية، والإعراب عن عميق التعازي لأسر الضحايا الذين جرى التعرف على رفاتهم والقلق لمحنة أولئك الذين لا يزال مكان وجودهم مجهولاً، والمطالبة ببذل كافة الجهود من أجل كشف مصير جميع الرعايا الكويتيين والرعايا التابعين لدول ثالثة.

١٠ - تأييد إحالة مرتكبي الجرائم بحق الشعب العراقي و ضد الإنسانية من أعضاء النظام السابق إلى محكمة عراقية وفقاً للقانون العراقي وعدم توفير ملاذ آمن لهم مع إبقاء الباب مفتوحاً لاعطاء المحكمة بعداً دولياً.

(٤/٣/٢٠٠٤) - ق: رقم ٦٣٧٧ - د.ع) ١٢١ - (ج ٤

مخاطر التسليح الإسرائيلي على الأمن القومي العربي والسلام الدولي:
مخاطر السلاح النووي الإسرائيلي وأسلحة الدمار الشامل الإسرائيلية
الأخرى على السلم الدولي والأمن القومي العربي
إن مجلس الجامعة على المستوى الوزاري،
بعد إطلاعه:

على مذكرة الأمانة العامة،

وعلى تقرير نشاط الأمانة العامة فيما بين دورتي المجلس،

وعلى توصيات الاجتماع الخامس عشر للجنة متابعة النشاط النووي الإسرائيلي
المخالف لمعاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية، الذي عقد بمقر الأمانة العامة يومي
٢٥-٢٦/١/٢٠٠٤،

وعلى توصية لجنة الشؤون السياسية،

يقرر

١ - أخذ العلم بتقرير وتوصيات الاجتماع الخامس عشر للجنة "متابعة النشاط النووي
الإسرائيلي المخالف لمعاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية" ، الذي عقد بمقر الأمانة
٢٥-٢٦/١/٢٠٠٤ - العامة خلال يومي ٢٥

٢ -الطلب إلى الدول العربية المشاركة في أعمال الدورة الثالثة للجنة التحضيرية لمؤتمر
الأطراف في معاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية لعام ٢٠٠٥ ، والتي ستعقد في
٢٠٠٤ والعمل على /-: ٧/٥ - ٤ /نيويورك خلال الفترة ٢٦

أ -تكثيف التنسيق العربي قبل وخلال أعمال " الدورة الثالثة للجنة التحضيرية
لمؤتمر الأطراف في معاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية لعام ٢٠٠٥ " ، ووضع
ورقة عربية موحدة للآليات تتضمن تصوراً لتطبيق قرار الشرق الأوس ط
(الصادر عن مؤتمر الأطراف في معاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية لعام
-٣٦-

١٩٩٥) ، والتأكيد أن قرار الشرق الأوسط جزء لا يتجزأ من عملية مراجعة
معاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية.

ب -حث الدول العربية المشاركة في اللجنة التحضيرية الثالثة، والدول الصديقة على
دعوة الدول الثلاث المتبينة لقرار الشرق الأوسط) الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية،
وروسيا الاتحادية، وبريطانيا (للتحرك ا لفعال لوضع هذا القرار موضع التنفيذ
خاصة وأنه كان أحد الأسباب الرئيسية وراء الموافقة على التمديد اللانهائي
للمعاهدة.

ج -إعداد ورقة عربية تتضمن موقفاً موحداً من مختلف القضايا المطروحة على
المؤتمر وليس القضايا العربية فقط.

٣-الطلب إلى الدول الأعضاء المشاركة في الدورة العادية (٤٨) للمؤتمر العام للوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية بالتنسيق المبكر وبذل الجهود من أجل:-
أ-العمل على إبقاء بند" القدرات النووية الإسرائيلية والتهديد النووي الإسرائيلي" مدرجاً على جدول أعمال المؤتمر العام للوكالة الدولية في دوراته العادية القادمة.

ب-التحرك العربي المبكر على مستوى وزراء الخارجية من أجل تأييد ودعم هذا البند لدى دول الاتحاد الأوروبي ومجموعة دول حركة عدم الانحياز ومجموعة ال ٧٧ والدول الإسلامية والمجموعات الجغرافية الأخرى.
٤-تكاليف المجموعة العربية في فيينا بإعداد:

أ - ورقة ت تضمن تحلياً لا لمواقف جميع الدول والمجموعات الفاعلة من مشروع القرار المتعلق بهذا البند خلال الدورة (٤٧) للمؤتمر العام للوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية، وذلك لتعميمهما على مجالس السفراء العرب في الدول ذات العلاقة، للاستفادة منها في إجراء المباحثات المطلوبة لدعم وتأييد هذا القرار.
ب-مسودة مشروع قرار يتعلق ببند" القدرات النووية الإسرائيلية والتهديد النووي الإسرائيلي" المدرج على جدول أعمال الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية تمهيداً لإجراء المفاوضات بشأنه، والعمل على إقراره أو تعديله أو اس تصدار أية نصوص أخرى تفي بالغرض المطلوب من أجل إنجاح الهدف من إدراج هذا البند.

-٣٧-

٥-تكاليف مجالس السفراء العرب في الدول المعنية إجراء المباحثات المطلوبة بغية دعم وتأييد هذا القرار، وذلك قبل انعقاد الدورة العادية للمؤتمر العام للوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية في ٢٤/٩/٢٠٠٤ - الذرية في مقر الوكالة الدولية في فيينا في الفترة ما بين ٢٠
٦-تكثيف التحرك الإعلامي العربي من أجل العمل على إبراز مخاطر التسليح النووي الإسرائيلي ومطالبة المجتمع الدولي الضغط على إسرائيل للانضمام إلى معاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية وإخضاع جميع منشآتها النووية إلى التفتيش الدولي للوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية.

(٤/٣/٢٠٠٤) - ق: رقم ٦٣٨٦ - د.ع) (١٢١ - ج ٤)

-٣٨-

مخاطر التسليح الإسرائيلي على الأمن القومي العربي والسلام الدولي:
جعل الشرق الأوسط منطقة خالية من أسلحة الدمار الشامل
وفي مقدمتها السلاح النووي
إن مجلس الجامعة على المستوى الوزاري،
بعد إطلاعه:

على مذكرة الأمانة العامة،
وعلى تقرير نشاط الأمانة العامة فيما بين دورتي المجلس،

وعلى تقرير الاجتماع التاسع عشر للجنة الفنية المعنية بإعداد مشروع معاهدة لجعل الشرق الأوسط منطقة خالية من أسلحة الدمار الشامل وفي مقدمتها السلاح النووي، ٢٧/٢٠٠٤/١-٢٩- والذي عقد في مقر الأمانة العامة خلال الفترة من ٢٧ وعلى توصية لجنة الشؤون السياسية،

يقرر

١- أخذ العلم بما توصل إليه الاجتماع التاسع عشر للجنة الفنية المعنية بإعداد مشروع معاهدة لجعل الشرق الأوسط منطقة خالية من أسلحة الدمار الشامل وفي مقدمتها السلاح النووي والذي عقد في مقر الأمانة العامة خلال الفترة من ٢٧-٢٩/١/٢٠٠٤.

٢- تكليف اللجنة الفنية مواصلة جهودها، وتقديم تقرير عن أعمالها إلى المجلس في دورته القادمة.

(٤/٣/٢٠٠٤) - ق: رقم ٦٣٨٧ - د.ع) (١٢١ - ج ٤ - ٣٩-

مخاطر التسليح الإسرائيلي على الأمن القومي العربي والسلام الدولي:
حجم ومخاطر النشاط الفضائي والصاروخي الإسرائيلي
على الأمن القومي العربي
إن مجلس الجامعة على المستوى الوزاري،
-بعد اطلاعه:

على مذكرة الأمانة العامة،

وعلى تقرير نشاط الأمانة العامة فيما بين دورتي المجلس،
وعلى تقرير وتوصيات الاجتماع الخامس عشر للجنة متابعة النشاط النووي الإسرائيلي المخالف لمعاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية الذي عقد في مقر ٢٥/٢٠٠٤/١-٢٦- الأمانة العامة يومي ٢٥
وعلى توصية لجنة الشؤون السياسية،

يقرر

أخذ العلم بتقرير وتوصيات اللجنة حول النشاط الفضائي والصاروخي الإسرائيلي،
وتكليفها متابعة هذا النشاط وتقييم مخاطره على الأمن القومي العربي.

(٤/٣/٢٠٠٤) - ق: رقم ٦٣٨٨ - د.ع) (١٢١ - ج ٤ - ٤٠-

التنسيق العربي في مجالات الأمن
ونزع السلاح على الساحة الدولية
إن مجلس الجامعة على المستوى الوزاري،
-بعد إطلاعه:

على مذكرة الأمانة العامة،

وعلى تقرير نشاط الأمانة العامة فيما بين دورتي المجلس،

وعلى توصية لجنة الشؤون السياسية،

يقرر

- ١ - تكليف الأمانة العامة عقد اجتماعات تنسيقية للدول العربية على هامش المؤتمرات والمحافل الدولية لاتخاذ مواقف موحدة من القضايا التي تمس المصالح العربية المشتركة في مجالات الأمن ونزع السلاح، وذلك بناء على قرارات مجلس الجامعة المتخذة بهذا الشأن.
 - ٢ -حث الدول العربية على التنسيق المسبق للمواقف العربية في إطار الأمانة العامة ، وذلك قبل الدخول في أية مفاوضات تنع لق باتفاقيات أو معاهدات أو أدوات قانونية أو سياسية تتعلق بقضايا الأمن وضبط التسلح لما لهذا التنسيق من أهمية كبرى في زيادة القدرة التفاوضية للدول العربية.
 - ٣ -تفعيل التنسيق العربي في مختلف المحافل إزاء المخاطر والقدرات النووية الإسرائيلية على منطقة الشرق الأوسط، بما يعزز المهام الموكلة إلى اللجنة المعنية بمتابعة النشاط النووي الإسرائيلي.
 - ٤ -الطلب إلى الأمين العام تقديم تقرير دوري إلى المجلس حول هذه القضايا على الساحة الدولية، وتقييم مستوى التنسيق العربي ووسائل تفعيله.
- (٤/٣/٢٠٠٤) - ق: رقم ٦٣٨٩ - د.ع) ١٢١ - (ج ٤ -٤١-

مكافحة الإرهاب الدولي

إن مجلس الجامعة على المستوى الوزاري،

-بعد اطلاعه:

على مذكرة الأمانة العامة،

وعلى تقرير نشاط الأمانة العامة فيما بين دورتي المجلس،

وعلى توصية لجنة الشؤون السياسية،

يقرر

- ١ -أخذ العلم بقراري مجلسي وزراء العدل والداخلية العرب بشأن اعتماد تعديل الفقرة ٣ (من المادة الأولى من الاتفاقية العربية لمكافحة الإرهاب، ودعوة الدول الأعضاء) إلى التصديق على التعديل وفق إجراءاتها الدستورية.
- ٢ -دعوة الدول الأعضاء التي لم تصدق بعد على الاتفاقية العربية لمكافحة الإرهاب إلى التصديق عليها.
- ٣ -التأكيد مجددًا على الموقف العربي بإدانة الإرهاب بكافة أشكاله وصوره، وأيا كانت دوافعه ومبرراته، مع التمييز بين الإرهاب والحق المشروع للشعوب في مقاومة الاحتلال والعدوان الأجنبي.
- ٤ -التأكيد على قراره السابق برفض وإدانة الأعمال والتفجيرات الإرهابية التي تتعرض لها المملكة العربية السعودية وذهب ضحيتها أبرياء . وتأكيد وقوف الدول الأعضاء وتأييدها لكل الإجراءات التي اتخذتها أو ستتخذها المملكة العربية السعودية لمكافحة

الإرهاب، والحفاظ على الأمن والاستقرار فيها والعمل من أجل تفعيل أحكام الاتفاقية العربية لمكافحة الإرهاب في مجال التعاون القضائي والأمني.

٥ - إدانة واستنكار الأعمال الإجرامية المتمثلة بالتفجيرات الإرهابية التي يتعرض لها العراق من القوى المعادية له.

٢٠٠٤ ، وراح ضحيته/ ٢ / ٦ - إدانة حادث الانفجار الذي وقع في مدينة الدوحة بتاريخ ١٣ السيد / سليم خان يندربا ييف باعتباره عملاً لا إجرامياً منافياً للقيم الدينية والأخلاقية -٤٢-

والإنسانية، وتأكيد الدول الأعضاء دعمها وتأييدها لدولة قطر لكافة الإجراءات التي اتخذتها وسوف تتخذها للكشف عن ملبسات هذا العمل الإجرامي والحفاظ على الأمن والاستقرار فيها.

٧ - تأكيد تضامن الدول العربية مع المملكة المغربية ودعمها في كافة الإجراءات التي اتخذتها على أثر الأحداث الإرهابية التي تعرضت لها مدينة الدار البيضاء خلال شهر مايو/أيار ٢٠٠٣.

٨ - إدانة إرهاب الدولة الذي تمارسه إسرائيل ضد الشعب الفلسطيني.

٩ - رفض إصاق تهمة الإرهاب بالعرب والمسلمين، والتأكيد على المبادئ السليمة التي يدعو إليها الإسلام، ونبذها لكافة أشكال الإرهاب.

١٠ - مواصلة التنسيق العربي في الأمم المتحدة مع الدول والمجموعات الإقليمية من أجل الدعوة إلى عقد مؤتمر دولي في إطار الأمم المتحدة، لبحث ظاهرة الإرهاب ووضع اتفاقية دولية شاملة لمكافحته تتضمن تعريفاً محدداً له يميز بينه وبين حق الشعوب المشروع في مقاومة الاحتلال الأجنبي.

١١ - دعوة الدول الأعضاء إلى موافاة نقطة الاتصال في الأمانة العامة مع لجنة مكافحة الإرهاب (٢٠٠١) ببيانات عن (المشكلة بموجب قرار مجلس الأمن ١٣٧٣ (CTC) الإرهاب الإجراءات التي اتخذتها في مجال مكافحة الإرهاب لتضمينها في التقرير العربي الدوري الذي تقدمه الأمانة العامة إلى لجنة مكافحة الإرهاب بناء على طلبها.

١٢ - دعوة الأمانة العامة والمجالس الوزارية المعنية إلى مواصلة تعاونها مع أجهزة الأمم المتحدة المختصة في مجال مكافحة الإرهاب والجريمة المنظمة، والتأكيد على أهمية التصديق والانضمام إلى الاتفاقيات الدولية المتعلقة بمكافحة الإرهاب والجريمة المنظمة عبر الوطنية.

(٤/٣/٢٠٠٤) - ق: رقم ٦٣٩٠ - د.ع) (١٢١ - ج) ٤

-٤٣-

العلاقات العربية الدولية:

تبادل الرأي حول الأفكار المتداولة والخطط

المنشورة بشأن مستقبل الشرق الأوسط

إن مجلس الجامعة على المستوى الوزاري،

بعد إطلاعه:

على مذكرة الأمانة العامة،

-وفي ضوء المناقشات والمداخلات التي أبدتها رؤساء الوفود،

يقرر

١ -الطلب إلى الأمين العام إعداد تقرير عن موضوع " تبادل الرأي حول الأفكار

المتداولة والخطط المنشورة بشأن مستقبل الشرق الأوسط.".

٢ -رفع التقرير المشار إليه، إلى اجتماع وزراء الخارجية التحضيري لمجلس الجامعة

على مستوى القمة) د.ع ١٦ (، مرفقاً به مشروع القرارين المقدمين من كل من

جمهورية مصر العربية، والمملكة الأردنية الهاشمية.

(٤/٣/٢٠٠٤) - ق: رقم ٦٣٩١ - د.ع) ١٢١ - (ج ٤

-٤٤-

العلاقات العربية - الافريقية:

التحفظات:

-تؤكد مملكة البحرين تحفظها على المساهمة في موازنة الصندوق.

-تؤكد المملكة العربية السعودية على موقفها السابق حول موضوع موازنة الصندوق العربي للمعونة

الفنية للدول

الافريقية، المتمثل في حرصها على كل ما من شأنه تعزيز التعاون العربي الافريقي وتقوية الصلة

مع الدول

الافريقية وتكون دعوتها إلى ضرورة قيام كافة الدول الأعضاء بالوفاء بالتزاماتها تجاه الصندوق،

مع التأكيد على

١٩٩٩ ، بتقديم بيانات تفصيلية بالأنشطة والبرامج وأن/ ٩ /الالتزام بقرار مجلس الجامعة رقم

٥٩٣٤ بتاريخ ١٣

يراعي الصندوق الظروف المالية الراهنة للدول الأعضاء، وأن المملكة ستفي بمساهمتها المالية

تجاه الصندوق إذا

سددت معظم الدول الأعضاء ما عليها من التزامات مالية للصندوق.

-يتحفظ وفد جمهورية العراق على دفع أية التزامات مالية تقع عليه، خارج إطار ميزانية الأمانة

العامة لجامعة

الدول العربية

-تؤكد سلطنة عمان على استمرار موقفها السابق بالتحفظ على موازنة الصندوق العربي للمعونة

الفنية للدول

الافريقية.

-تتحفظ دولة قطر على نسبة مساهمتها في موازنة الصندوق العربي للمعونة الفنية للدول الأفريقية

وتلتزم بدفع

مساهمتها في موازنة الصندوق إذا التزمت الدول العربية الأخرى بذلك.

-يوكد وفد دولة الكويت استمرار تحفظه على المساهمة في موازنة الصندوق العربي للمعونة

الفنية للدول

الافريقية باعتبارها دولة غير عضو بهذا الصندوق.
-تجدد المملكة المغربية استمرار تحفظها على المساهمة في موازنة الصندوق العربي للمعونة الفنية
للدول الافريقية.

- ٤٨-

العلاقات العربية – الأوروبية:

أ-

الحوار العربي الأوروبي

إن مجلس الجامعة على المستوى الوزاري،

-بعد اطلاعه:

على مذكرة الأمانة العامة،

وعلى تقرير نشاط الأمانة العامة فيما بين دورتي المجلس،

وعلى توصية لجنة الشؤون السياسية،

يقرر

١ -الإعراب عن الت تقدير للمواقف الأوروبية التي تضمنتها بيانات قمة الاتحاد الأوروبي
الصادرة خلال شهري أكتوبر / تشرين أول وديسمبر/ كانون أول ٢٠٠٣ ، حول تطوير
العلاقات مع العالم العربي، وبخاصة دعوتها المفوضية الأوروبية والممثل الأعلى
للسياسة الخارجية والأمنية الموحدة للاتحاد، لبلورة خطة عمل تفصيلية لتطوير
العلاقات العربية - الأوروبية.

٢ -الطلب إلى الأمين العام مواصلة جهوده واتصالاته مع رئاسة الاتحاد الأوروبي
والمفوضية الأوروبية من أجل تنشيط العلاقات العربية – الأوروبية الجماعية في
كافة المجالات، وبحث سبل استئناف الحوار العربي الأوروبي.

٣ -الطلب إلى الأمانة العامة الاستمرار في جهودها من أجل فتح قنوات اتصال مع دول
أوروبا الشرقية واسيا الوسطى، بهدف إرساء أسس علاقات حوار وتشاور معها.
٤ -الترحيب بالجهود التي بذلتها الأمانة العامة لتطوير علاقات التعاون بينها وبين مجلس
أوروبا ومنظمة الأمن والتعاون في أوروبا، بما في ذلك مساعي تنظيم برامج لانشطة
مشتركة معهما.

- ٤٩-

٥ -دعوة الدول العربية التي لم تسدد أنصبتها في موازنة المدرسة العربية الأوروبية
للإدارة في غرناطة للإسراع بذلك.

٦ -الطلب إلى الأمين العام متابعة الموضوع وتقديم تقرير بشأنه إلى المجلس في الدورة
القادمة.

(٤/٣/٢٠٠٤) - ق: رقم ٦٣٩٣ / أ - د.ع) ١٢١ - (ج ٤)

-يتحفظ وفد جمهورية العراق على دفع أية التزامات مالية تقع عليه، خارج إطار ميزانية الأمانة العامة لجامعة الدول العربية
-٥٠-

العلاقات العربية - الأوروبية:

-ب-

الشراكة الأوروبية - المتوسطية

إن مجلس الجامعة على المستوى الوزاري،

-بعد اطلاعه:

على مذكرة الأمانة العامة،

وعلى تقرير نشاط الأمانة العامة فيما بين دورتي المجلس،

وعلى توصية لجنة الشؤون السياسية،

يقرر

١ -الإعراب عن التقدير لجهود المنسق العربي لعملية برشلونة (الجمهورية التونسية) ،

والأمانة العامة في الاجتماعات التنسيقية العربية، وكذلك في المؤتمر الوزاري

للشراكة الأوروبية المتوسطية الذي عقد في نابولي (إيطاليا) يومي ٢ و ٣ ديسمبر/

كانون أول ٢٠٠٣

٢ -دعوة المنسق العربي لعملية برشلونة والأمانة العامة مواصلة جهودهما المشتركة من

أجل الإعداد الجيد للمؤتمر الوزاري المقبل الذي سيعقد في دبلن (أيرلندا)

مايو/ أيار ٢٠٠٤

٣ -عقد اجتماع لكبار الموظفين في إطار آلية التنسيق العربي لبحث الموضوعات التي

ستعرض على مؤتمر دبلن ٢٠٠٤ لتنسيق المواقف العربية منها، والنظر في إعداد

ورقة عمل تتضمن تقييماً شاملاً لا لعملية برشلونة ووضع تصورات للسبل والأساليب

التي تمكنها من تحقيق أهدافها

٤ -تأييد طلب الجمهورية الإسلامية الموريتانية للحصول على العضوية الكاملة في

الشراكة الأوروبية المتوسطية.

٥ -مواصلة الجهود من أجل مشاركة الأمانة العامة في آليات برشلونة.

٦ -الطلب إلى الأمين العام متابعة الموضوع وتقديم تقرير بشأنه إلى المجلس في الدورة

القادمة.

(٤/٣/٢٠٠٤) - ق: رقم ٦٣٩٣/ب - د.ع) ١٢١ - (ج ٤

التعاون بين جامعة الدول العربية والأمم المتحدة

إن مجلس الجامعة على المستوى الوزاري ،

-بعد اطلاعه:

على مذكرة الأمانة العامة،

وعلى تقرير نشاط الأمانة العامة فيما بين دورتي المجلس،
٢٠٠٣ (المعنون (: ٥٧ / وعلى قرار الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة رقم ٤٦
"التعاون بين جامعة الدول العربية والأمم المتحدة" ،
وعلى توصية لجنة الشؤون السياسية،

يقرر

- ١-التأكيد على أهمية تطوير التعاون بين جامعة الدول العربية والأمم المتحدة ومنظمتها المتخصصة والطلب إلى الأمانة العامة والمنظمات العربية المتخصصة، دراسة وسائل دعم هذا التعاون وتوسيع المشروعات التي تعود بالفائدة على الدول الأعضاء.
- ٢-دعوة الأمم المتحدة إلى إشراك جامعة الدول العربية ومنظماتها المتخصصة في تنفيذ المشاريع والبرامج التي تقيمها الأمم المتحدة في المنطقة العربية.
- ٣-تكاليف الأمانة العامة والمنظمات العربية المتخصصة، بالعمل على تكثيف جهودها واتخاذ الإجراءات اللازمة للتحضير المبكر للاجتماع القطاعي بين جامعة الدول العربية والأمم المتحدة ومنظمتها المعنية، والمقرر عقده عام ٢٠٠٤ تحت عنوان " تنفيذ وتمويل الأهداف التنموية للألفية والتنمية المستدامة في المنطقة العربية ". وكذلك تكثيف الجهود لانجاح الاجتماع العام للتعاون المقرر عقده خلال عام ٢٠٠٥.

٤-التأكيد مجددًا على مؤسسات التمويل العربية بضرورة المشاركة في اجتماعات التعاون القطاعية والعامة، والمساهمة في تمويل البرامج المشتركة بين الأمم المتحدة وجامعة الدول العربية، لما لهذه المشروعات من مردود إيجابي على التنمية في المنطقة العربية.

-٦٢-

(٤/٣/٢٠٠٤) - ق: رقم ٦٣٩٧ - د.ع) ١٢١ - (ج ٤)
مشروع الذخيرة اللغوية العربية
إن مجلس الجامعة على المستوى الوزاري،
بعد اطلاعه:

على مذكرة الأمانة العامة،

وعلى تقرير نشاط الأمانة العامة فيما بين دورتي المجلس،
وعلى توصية لجنة الشؤون الاجتماعية والثقافية،

يقرر

- ١-شكر الجمهورية الجزائرية على طرحها لهذا المشروع واستعدادها لتقديم التسهيلات الأساسية لقيامه.
- ٢-الطلب من الجمهورية الجزائرية بالتعاون مع الأمانة العامة والمنظمة العربية للتربية والثقافة والعلوم وضع دراسة واقية حول المشروع تعرض على الدورة القادمة لمجلس الجامعة.

(٤/٣/٢٠٠٤) - ق: رقم ٦٣٩٩ - د.ع) ١٢١ - (ج ٤)
-٦٤-

تحديث الميثاق العربي لحقوق الإنسان
إن مجلس الجامعة على المستوى الوزاري،
بعد إطلاعه:

على مذكرة الأمانة العامة،
وعلى توصية اللجنة العربية الدائمة لحقوق الإنسان في اجتماعها
(١٤/١/٢٠٠٤ - الاستثنائي) ٤
وعلى توصية اللجنة الدائمة للشؤون القانونية في اجتماعها
(٢٦/٢/٢٠٠٤ - الاستثنائي) ٢٥
وعلى توصية لجنة الشؤون القانونية،
يقرر

١ - الموافقة بصفة مبدئية على الميثاق العربي لحقوق الإنسان بالصيغة المرفقة.
٢ - رفع الميثاق إلى اجتماع وزراء الخارجية التحضيري، تمهيداً لعرضه على مجلس
الجامعة على مستوى القمة في دورته العادية (١٦) المقرر عقدها في تونس.
(٤/٣/٢٠٠٤) - ق: رقم ٦٤٠٥ - د.ع) (١٢١ - ج) ٤

- تحفظت جمهورية العراق على بعض مواد الميثاق العربي لحقوق الإنسان، وفقاً للمذكرة المرسلة
إلى الأمانة العامة
٢٠٠٤ المقدمة من وفد جمهورية العراق إلى اللجنة العربية الدائمة لحقوق الإنسان / ١ / ٨٥
بتاريخ ١٨ / ٥ / رقم ج / ٣
-٨١-

الأمين العام بإشعار الدول الأعضاء بالتحفظات المبدأة وبطلبات سحبها.
-١٠١-

توصيات

اللجنة العربية الدائمة لحقوق الإنسان
إن مجلس الجامعة على المستوى الوزاري،
بعد إطلاعه:

على مذكرة الأمانة العامة .
وعلى تقرير وتوصيات اللجنة العربية الدائمة لحقوق الإنسان في دورتها الثامنة
(١٨/٢/٢٠٠٤ - عشرة) ١٦
وعلى توصية لجنة الشؤون القانونية .
يقرر

الموافقة على توصيات اللجنة العربية الدائمة لحقوق الإنسان بالصيغة
المرفقة.

(٤/٣/٢٠٠٤) - ق: رقم ٦٤٠٦ - د.ع) (١٢١ - ج) ٤
-١٠٢-

-١٠٧-

الخطوط الاستراتيجية لحقوق الإنسان ومكافحة الإرهاب الصادرة عن المجلس الأوروبي

إن اللجنة العربية الدائمة لحقوق الإنسان،
بعد إطلاعها على:

-مذكرة الأمانة العامة،

-مذكرة الأمين العام للمجلس الأوروبي إلى السيد الأمين العام لجامعة الدول العربية
-الخطوط الاستراتيجية لحقوق الإنسان ومكافحة الإرهاب الصادرة عن المجلس
الأوروبي،

٢٠٠٣ ، بشأن/ ٣ - / قرار مجلس الجامعة رقم ٦٣٠٦ - د. ع (١١٩) بتاريخ ٢٤
الخطوط الاستراتيجية لحقوق الإنسان ومكافحة الإرهاب،
-بعد البحث والمناقشة،

توصي بما يلي

١ -تكليف الأمانة العامة بإحالة الخطوط الاستراتيجية لحقوق الإنسان ومكافحة الإرهاب
الصادرة عن المجلس الأوروبي إلى فريق الخبراء العرب، المكلف بدراسة ومتابعة
٢٠٠١ ، بشأن تدابير مكافحة الإرهاب، لاتخاذ ما / قرار مجلس الأمن رقم ١٣٧٣
يراه مناسباً بشأنها.

٢ -موافاة اللجنة العربية الدائمة لحقوق الإنسان بالنتائج ما يتوصل إليها فريق الخبراء
للنظر فيها في دورة قادمة.
-١٠٨-

انتهاكات النظام العراقي السابق

لحقوق الإنسان

والقانون الدولي طيلة سنوات سابقة

إن اللجنة العربية الدائمة لحقوق الإنسان:

-إذ تسترشد بميثاق الأمم المتحدة والإعلان العالمي لحقوق الإنسان والعهدين الدوليين

للحقوق المدنية والسياسية والحقوق الاقتصادية والاجتماعية والثقافية واعلان

القاهرة لحقوق الإنسان في الإسلام وسائر صكوك حقوق الإنسان ذات الصلة.

-وإذ تشير إلى قرار مجلس الجامعة على المستوى الوزاري المرقم ٦٣٥٤ في

٢٠٠٣ و (المع نون) المقابر الجماعية التي تم اكتشافها في العراق (، وقرار / ٩/٩

٢٠٠٣ حول تطورات الأوضاع في العراق / ٩. / المجلس رقم ٦٣٢٥ بتاريخ ٩

١٩٩١ الذي / ٤ / ١٩٩١ (المؤرخ في ٥ -) وإذ تشير إلى قرار مجلس الأمن رقم ٦٨٨

طالب فيه المجلس النظام العراقي السابق بوقف قمع السكان المدنيين العراقيين وألح

على أن يتعاون مع المنظمات الإنسانية وان يكفل احترام حقوق الإنسان لجميع

المواطنين العراقيين، وقرار مجلس الأمن المرقم ١٤٨٣ في ٢٠٠٣ الذي أكد على

ضرورة المحاسبة على الجرائم والفضائح التي ارتكبتها النظام العراقي السابق.
 -وإذ تشير إلى قرارات لجنة حقوق الإنسان التابعة للأمم المتحدة ١٩/ نيسان ابريل
 ١٧٤ المؤرخ في ١٩/ كانون الأول / ٢٠٠٢ وقرار الجمعية العامة رقم ٥٦
 /ديسمبر / ٢٠٠٢ ، وقرار لجنة حقوق الإنسان التابعة للأمم المتحدة المرقم ٢٠٠٣
 ٨٤. والمؤرخ في ٢٦ / نيسان ابريل / ٢٠٠٣
 -وإذ تستحضر المبادئ الأساسية التي قادت اللجنة العربية الدائمة لحقوق الإنسان في
 صياغة مشروع الميثاق العربي لحقوق الإنسان، كما أوصت به في اجتماعها
 ١٤/٢٠٠٤ / بتاريخ ١٤
 ٢٠٠٣ التي تطلب من - / واذ تشير إلى الفقرة (٦) من قرار مجلس الأمن رقم ١٤٨٣
 السلطة والأطراف ذات الصلة مواصلة بذل الجهود من أجل القيام بما لم يقم به
 النظام العراقي السابق، من تحديد لاماكن جميع الرعايا الكويتيين والرعايا التابعين
 -١٠٩-

لدول ثالثة الذين كانوا موجودين في العراق في ٢ آب/ أغسطس ١٩٩٠ أو بعده،
 والتعرف عليهم واعادتهم إلى أوطانهم، أو تحديد أماكن رفاتهم والتعرف عليها
 واعادتها إلى أوطان أصحابها.
 -وإذ تأخذ بنظر الاعتبار ضرورة احترام وحماية حقوق الإنسان للشعب العراقي
 تحت كل الظروف، خاصة في المرحلة الراهنة التي يعاني فيها من الاحتلال،
 -وإذ تؤكد على أن المقابر الجماعية التي تم اكتشافها في العراق تشكل انتهاكاً لحق
 الإنسان في الحياة وتتعارض مع القيم الدينية والثقافية والحضارية لامتنا العربية
 ومبادئ القانون الدولي،
 -وإذ تشيد ببعثة الأمانة العامة لجامعة الدول العربية برئاسة السيد احمد بن حلي
 والوفد المرافق له للاطلاع على الأوضاع في العراق، والجهود المستمرة للدول
 العربية التي قامت بتقديم العون والمساعدة الإنسانية إلى الشعب العراقي.
 توصي اللجنة:

١ -الإدانة الشديدة للانتهاكات المنهجية والواسعة النطاق والبالغة الخطورة لحقوق الإنسان
 والقانون الدولي الإنساني التي ارتكبتها النظام السابق وعلى مدى سنوات عديدة مما
 أسفر عن عمليات قمع واضطهاد مع تمييز وإرهاب واسع النطاق، وقمع لحرية الفكر
 والتعبير والأعلام والتجمع من خلال بث الخوف من الاعتقال والسجن والإعدام
 والطرده وهدم المنازل وغير ذلك من إجراءات لا إنسانية والتي تمثلت في عمليات
 الإعدام واسعة النطاق والإعدام التعسفي والمقابر الجماعية وعمليات الانفال واستخدام
 الأسلحة الكيماوية في حلبجة والاعتقالات السياسية وما يسمى بتطهير السجون
 والاختفاء القسري وغير الطوعي والاحتجاز التعسفي وممارسة التعذيب بصورة
 منهجية وعلى نطاق واسع والعقوبات القاسية واللاإنسانية، وعدم احترام سيادة
 القانون.

- ٢- كما تدين الانتهاكات الخطيرة لحقوق الإنسان التي تمت أثناء احتلال دولة الكويت، وطمس الحقائق المتعلقة بالأسرى والمفقودين الكويتيين ورعايا دول ثالثة الذين تم العثور على عدد من رفاتهم قتلى في المقابر الجماعية التي اكتشفت مؤخراً.
- ٣- الإعراب عن عميق التعازي لأسر الضحايا الذين جرى التعرف على رفاتهم والقلق لمحنة أولئك الذين لا يزال مكان وجودهم مجهولاً لا والمطالبة ببذل كافة الجهود من أجل كشف مصير جميع الرعايا الكويتيين والرعايا التابعين لدول ثالثة.
- ١١٠-
- ٤- تناشد الدول العربية والمجتمع الدولي مساعدة الشعب العراقي في إقامة مؤسسات حرة وديمقراطية تحترم وتكفل حقوقهم بصرف النظر عن الأصل والعرق والجنس والدين والطائفة.
- ٥- تقديم الدعم المادي للجهات العراقية المعنية بالكشف والحفاظ على المقابر الجماعية والتعرف على وفاة الضحايا فيها.
- ٦- توصي بإحالة مرتكبي الجرائم بحق الشعب العراقي وجرائم ضد الإنسانية من أعضاء النظام السابق لمحاكم عراقية ووفى قا للقانون العراقي وعدم توفير ملاذ آمن للذين يتحملون المسؤولية عن ارتكاب هذه الجرائم، مع إبقاء الباب مفتوحاً لاعطاء المحكمة العراقية بعداً دولياً.

APPENDIX 9

Tunis Declaration of 16th Arab Summit

23-24 May 2004

<http://www.saudiembassy.net/2004News/Statements/StateDetail.asp?cIndex=421>

The representatives of the member states of the League of Arab States, meeting in Tunis, Tunisia on May 22-23, 2004, for the 16th Arab Summit, issued **THE TUNIS DECLARATION** as follows.

We the Leaders of the Arab States, meeting at the Summit Conference of the Arab League Council in its 16th ordinary session held in Tunis, the capital of the Republic of Tunisia, on May 22-23, 2004;

Committed as we are to the principles upon which the League of Arab States was founded and to the objectives enunciated in its Charter, as well as to the noble universal values spelled out in the United Nations Charter and to all the instruments of international legality;

Taking into account the new world changes and the challenges and stakes they generate;

Determined to pursue efforts in order to strengthen the solidarity and cohesion of the Arab Nation, and to consolidate the Arab ranks, in the service of our primordial causes;

(One) Declare the following:

1. The commitment of all international parties to materialize the principles of international legality and the UN resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict, without excluding any of the legal references of the peace process, constitutes the basis for a just, comprehensive and durable settlement to this conflict, in accordance with the Arab peace initiative and in implementation of the 'roadmap'. The international community should join its efforts so as to provide the necessary protection for the Palestinian people against the continuing acts of killing and deportation they are enduring, and also to put an end to the policy of assassination perpetrated by Israel against the Palestinian political leaders, to the siege imposed on the Palestinian people and their leadership, as well as to the aggressions targeting civilians without distinction. Joining these efforts would pave the way for the resumption of peace talks and would enable the brotherly Palestinian people to recover their legitimate rights, in the forefront of which the establishment of their independent state with Al-Quds (East Jerusalem) as its capital, as well as the evacuation of all the Arab occupied territories, including the occupied Syrian Golan and the Lebanese Shaba'a Farms.
2. Achieving these legitimate objectives would provide propitious conditions for building confidence and for establishing a just, durable and comprehensive peace in the region, by convening an international conference aimed at ridding the Middle-East region, including Israel, of the weapons of mass destruction. This will lay the foundations for a new era of entente, based on a mutual commitment to peace as a strategic choice, and will enable the

Arab Nation and all countries in the region to focus their efforts on taking up the challenges confronting them and on pursuing the development action.

3. The Arab community is committed to support the Iraqi territorial integrity and to respect the sovereignty, independence and national unity of sisterly Iraq, and exhorts the Security Council to give a central and active role to the United Nations in Iraq in order to put an end to the occupation and prepare the ground for the transfer of power to the Iraqi people. This will make it possible to establish peace and stability and to launch the process of reconstruction in Iraq, entrusting an Arab troika (the current chairmanship, the previous chairmanship and the next chairmanship of the summit, along with the Arab League Secretary-General) with making the necessary contacts and following up the evolution of the situation in Iraq.
4. Reaffirming the Arab solidarity with sisterly Syria in the face of the American sanctions, and underlining the necessity to favor the logic of dialogue and mutual understanding in settling conflicts among states, so as to spare the region at this critical juncture further tension and instability.
5. Reaffirming the sovereignty of sisterly United Arab Emirates on its three islands and supporting all peaceful steps and initiatives that lead it to recover this sovereignty.
6. Reaffirming the Arab states' solidarity with the sisterly Republic of Sudan, and their determination to preserve its unity and territorial integrity and to reinforce all peace endeavors undertaken by the Sudanese government in conjunction with the international and regional parties.
7. Reaffirming the unity and sovereignty of the sisterly Republic of Somalia, and supporting the efforts aimed at achieving national conciliation, peace and stability in this country.
8. Reaffirming the determination to consecrate the national unity of the sisterly United Republic of Comoros, to preserve its territorial integrity and sovereignty, and to support all peace efforts in this country.

(Two) assert our firm determination:

1. To materialize our common will to develop the system of joint Arab action, through the Tunis Summit resolution to amend the Arab League Charter and to modernize its work methods and its specialized institutions, based on the various Arab initiatives and ideas included in the proposals put forward by the Secretary General as well as on a consensual and coherent vision and on a gradual and balanced approach.
2. To reaffirm our states' commitment to the humanitarian principles and the noble values of human rights in their comprehensive and interdependent dimensions, to the provisions of the various international conventions and charters, and to the Arab Human Rights Charter adopted by the Tunis Summit, as well as to the reinforcement of the freedom of expression, thought and belief and to the guarantee of the independence of the judiciary.
3. To endeavor, based on the Declaration on the process of reform and modernization in the Arab world, to pursue reform and modernization in our countries, and to keep pace with the rapid world changes, by consolidating the democratic practice, by enlarging participation in political and public life, by fostering the role of all components of the civil society, including NGOs, in conceiving of the guidelines of the society of tomorrow, by widening women's participation in the political, economic, social, cultural and

educational fields and reinforcing their rights and status in society, and by pursuing the promotion of the family and the protection of Arab youth.

4. To consolidate the comprehensive development programs and intensify efforts aimed at promoting the educational systems, at disseminating knowledge and encouraging its acquisition, and at fighting illiteracy in order to ensure a better future for the Arab young generations.

5. To achieve economic complementarity among Arab States on the basis of the exchange of benefits and the interdependence of interests, and to endeavor to pursue the upgrading of the Arab economies by entrusting the Economic and Social Council with establishing a joint Arab economic and social action strategy, in such a way as to consolidate the competitiveness of the Arab economy and empower it to establish a solidarity-based partnership with the various economic groupings in the world.

6. To consecrate the values of solidarity and mutual assistance among the Arab states, as part of the Arab anti-poverty strategy adopted by the Tunis Summit, to mobilize all human potentialities in the Arab countries in support of the development efforts, and to endeavor to upgrade the economy of the least developed Arab countries and promote their development programs.

7. To be prepared, as best as possible, to actively participate, at the level of governments, civil society and the private sector, in the World Summit on the Information Society whose second phase will be hosted by Tunisia in November 2005, so that this event will constitute an important opportunity to further promote the position of information and communication technologies in the Arab development plans, and reinforce the capacity of Arab countries to keep up with and contribute to the evolution witnessed in this sector which is one of the basic foundations of development.

8. To take appropriate measures to enable the Arab Organization for Information and Communication Technologies to play its role in consolidating inter-Arab cooperation in this vital sector.

9. To strengthen the bonds of friendship between Arab countries and other countries of the world, and to establish a new approach for solidarity-based cooperation and partnership with them, based on our determination to consecrate dialogue among religions and cultures and to highlight the civilizational and humanist mission of Islam which calls for disseminating the values of tolerance, concord and peaceful coexistence among peoples and nations, and rejects hatred and discrimination.

10. To reaffirm the commitment of Arab States to pursue their contribution to the international efforts exerted to stand against and combat all forms of terrorism, avoid confusing Islam with terrorism and differentiate between legitimate resistance and terrorism.

11. To call for the holding of an international conference, under the auspices of the United Nations, in order to establish an international code of ethics for the fight against terrorism, while working to tackle the root causes of this phenomenon.

(Three) express our deep thanks and high consideration to His Excellency President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, President of the Republic of Tunisia, for his experience, insightfulness, and open-mindedness in managing our Summit proceedings. We are convinced that under his chairmanship of the Summit, the process of joint Arab action will witness further progress, and that the status of the Arab Nation among the nations of the world will be further reinforced. Our thanks and appreciation also go to the Republic

of Tunisia for having hosted the Summit Conference of the Arab League Council in its 16th ordinary session and for its meticulous preparation, in consultation with the Arab countries, in order to ensure optimum conditions for the organization of the Summit. We also commend the efforts exerted by the Arab League Secretary General in this regard.

<http://www.arabsummit.tn/ar/declaration-finale.html>

مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة

الدورة العادية (16) تونس - الجمهورية التونسية

3 و 4 ربيع ثاني 1425 هـ / 22 و 23 مايو / أيار 2004

البيان الختامي

1- بدعوة كريمة من سيادة الرئيس زين العابدين بن علي، رئيس الجمهورية التونسية، انعقد مجلس الجامعة على مستوى القمة في مدينة تونس، عاصمة الجمهورية التونسية، يومي 22 و 23 مايو/ أيار لعام 2004. وإذ يُعرب القادة عن بالغ تقديرهم للجمهورية التونسية رئيساً وحكومةً وشعباً لحسن الاستقبال ولما قدمته من طيب الرعاية وحسن الإعداد لهذا المؤتمر، مما كان له أكبر الأثر في إنجاز مهامه وتحقيق أهدافه، واعتباراً لما تضمنه الخطاب الافتتاحي لسيادة الرئيس زين العابدين بن علي من مضامين ومرئيات قيمة، يُقررون اعتماده كوثيقة رسمية من وثائق المؤتمر .

ويُشيد القادة بالجهود الكبيرة التي بذلها سيادة الرئيس زين العابدين بن علي وحكمته وحنكته في إدارة أعمال القمة مما كان له بالغ الأثر في التوصل إلى هذه النتائج الهامة التي توجت أعمال المجلس. الإعراب عن التقدير للجمهورية التونسية واعتبار خطاب سيادة الرئيس زين العابدين بن علي وثيقة رسمية من وثائق المؤتمر

2- يوجه القادة خالص الشكر والتقدير لحضرة صاحب الجلالة الملك حمد بن عيسى آل خليفة، ملك مملكة البحرين، لجهوده القيمة ومساهماته الكبيرة خلال توليه رئاسة دورة القمة السابقة، ولجنة المتابعة والتحرك مما كان لها أكبر الأثر في تهيئة الظروف لعمل عربي مشترك فعال. الإعراب عن الشكر لحضرة صاحب الجلالة الملك حمد بن عيسى آل خليفة على جهوده خلال توليه رئاسة القمة العربية العادية (15)

3- يُعبر القادة عن تقديرهم للتقرير الشامل للأمين العام الذي قدمه عن العمل العربي المشترك وتطوير منظومته، والجهود المشكور الذي قام به لمتابعة تنفيذ قرارات مجلس الجامعة على مستوى القمة. تقرير الأمين العام

4- يعتبر القادة أن هذه الدورة تمثل انطلاقة جديدة، ومنعطفاً حاسماً، في تاريخ العمل العربي المشترك، استعرضوا خلالها القضايا العربية وقيموا التحديات الماثلة، والظروف المستجدة. تطوير العمل العربي المشترك ومنظومته

5- أقر القادة وثيقة عهد ووافق وتضامن وتم التوقيع عليها بالأحرف الأولى من قِبَل السادة وزراء الخارجية. وثيقة عهد ووافق وتضامن بين قادة الدول العربية

6- الالتزام بمبادرة السلام العربية واعتبارها المشروع العربي لتحقيق السلام العادل والشامل والدائم في المنطقة ورفض المواقف التي تتعارض معها ومع قواعد الشرعية الدولية ومرجعيات عملية

السلام، التي جاءت في الخطابين المتبادلين بين رئيس الوزراء الإسرائيلي والرئيس الأمريكي بما في ذلك تلك التي تستيق نتائج المفاوضات حول مسائل الوضع النهائي .

وفي هذا السياق يؤكد القادة على أن عملية السلام كل لا يتجزأ وقامت على أساس الشرعية الدولية وقرارات الأمم المتحدة ذات الصلة، ولا سيما القرارين 242، 338 ومبدأ الأرض مقابل السلام ومرجعية مؤتمر مدريد، وبناء عليه فإنه لا يحق لأي جهة مهما كانت أن تجرى أي تعديل على أي من المرجعيات التي قامت عليها العملية السلمية لغايات التنصل من التزاماتها أو التراجع عنها، وعمما وقعت عليه من اتفاقيات .

ويكلف القادة لجنة مبادرة السلام العربية على المستوى الوزاري والأمين العام مباشرة العمل فور انتهاء أعمال القمة لتنفيذ خطة تحرك على الساحة الدولية بغية تفعيل هذه المبادرة وحشد التأييد الدولي لها في المنتديات الدولية. تفعيل مبادرة السلام العربية

7- يوجه القادة تحية إجلال وإكبار لمواصلة الشعب الفلسطيني وقيادته الشرعية الوطنية، وعلى رأسها الرئيس ياسر عرفات، في صمودهم وتصديهم الشجاع للعدوان الإسرائيلي المستمر والمتصاعد، وفي نضالهم المشروع من أجل الحصول على حقوقهم الوطنية في تقرير المصير، وإقامة الدولة الفلسطينية المستقلة وعاصمتها القدس، ويؤكدون مجدداً على مواصلة كل أشكال الدعم السياسي والمعنوي والمادي للشعب الفلسطيني في مقاومته المشروعة للاحتلال. تحية إجلال وإكبار لصمود الشعب الفلسطيني

8- يؤكد القادة أن الحصار المفروض على الشعب الفلسطيني ورئيسه الأخ ياسر عرفات، الرئيس المنتخب والشرعي للشعب الفلسطيني، لا يخدم المسيرة السلمية بل يضر بها، في الوقت الذي وافقت فيه القيادة الفلسطينية على التوجه بإيجابية نحو السلام والتزامها بكافة المبادرات التي أقرتها الدول الراعية لعملية السلام وتمسكها بمبادرة السلام العربية وخارطة الطريق المنبثقة عن اللجنة الرباعية .

ويقرر القادة التحرك على كافة المستويات لرفع هذا الحصار في إطار خطة عربية، ويطلبون من اللجنة الرباعية والإدارة الأمريكية والاتحاد الأوروبي الضغط على إسرائيل لاتخاذ خطوات عملية وفعالة، للسماح له بالتنقل بحرية تامة. رفع الحصار عن الشعب الفلسطيني والرئيس ياسر عرفات

9- يؤكد القادة على أن عملية السلام قد قامت على أساس من الشرعية الدولية وقرارات الأمم المتحدة ذات الصلة ومبدأ الأرض مقابل السلام، وعلى ذلك فإنه لا يحق لأي جهة مهما كانت أن تجرى أي تعديل على أي من المرجعيات التي قامت عليها العملية السلمية لغايات التنصل من التزاماتها أو التراجع عما وقعت عليه من اتفاقيات .

وانطلاقاً من المبادئ الإنسانية للحضارة العربية الإسلامية التي تحترم حقوق الكافة دون تمييز وفي أوقات السلم والحرب وتعامل الجميع على أساس من احترام الذات الإنسانية، فإن القادة يدينون جميع العمليات العسكرية الإسرائيلية في الأراضي الفلسطينية والأراضي العربية والعمليات التي تستهدف المدنيين دون تمييز، وكذلك العمليات التي تستهدف القيادات الفلسطينية والتي لا تخلف إلا العنف والعنف المضاد باعتبارها لن تؤدي إلى إقامة السلام الذي تحتاج إليه المنطقة. التمسك بالسلام العادل والشامل في الشرق الأوسط ومبدأ الأرض مقابل السلام

10- يطالب القادة الرئيس الأمريكي بالالتزام بما ورد في رؤيته لقيام دولة فلسطينية قابلة للحياة بجانب إسرائيل، والالتزام بمرجعيات عملية السلام المتمثلة في قرارات الأمم المتحدة ذات الصلة ومبدئي الأرض مقابل السلام وعدم جواز اكتساب الأراضي بالقوة، واعتبار أن كل ما يتصل بالوضع النهائي يتم التفاوض عليه بين الطرفين دون أي شروط أو وعود مسبقة .

كما يُنوهون بما تم من جهود واتصالات عربية، وفي هذا الصدد أخذ القادة علماً بما جاء في الرسائل والتأكيدات الأمريكية المعلنة بشأن إقامة دولة فلسطينية مستقلة وذات سيادة وأن الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية لن تستبق نتائج مفاوضات الوضع النهائي. كما أخذ القادة علماً بالاتصالات الجارية والرسائل المتبادلة التي تمت بين عدد من الملوك والرؤساء والقادة العرب والإدارة الأمريكية وآخرها الرسالة التي تلقاها جلالة الملك عبد الله الثاني ابن الحسين ملك المملكة الأردنية الهاشمية .

ويدعو القادة الإدارة الأمريكية إلى الالتزام بما جاء بهذه الرسائل والتأكيدات. التطورات الأخيرة في القضية الفلسطينية والصراع العربي الإسرائيلي

11- يؤكد القادة على أن أي تعديل أو مساس بمرجعيات عملية السلام يعتبر استباقاً غير مقبول لنتائج المفاوضات وانتهاكاً للحقوق الوطنية المشروعة للشعب الفلسطيني، والتوصل إلى حلٍ عادل يُتفق عليه لمشكلة اللاجئين وفقاً لقرار الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة 194 لعام 1948 بما فيه حق العودة ورفض كل أشكال التوطين في البلدان العربية .

ويؤكد القادة على أن أي انسحاب إسرائيلي من الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة يجب أن يكون شاملاً وناجزاً من جميع هذه الأراضي ومُنهيلاً لاحتلالها، وأن يتم تحت إشراف دولي وبالتنسيق مع السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية .

ويدعو القادة اللجنة الرباعية لاستئناف العمل الجاد من أجل تحقيق السلام العادل والشامل في الشرق الأوسط على أساس مبادرة السلام العربية وخطة خارطة الطريق، وكذلك إلى العمل من أجل تحقيق التزام إسرائيل بوقف ممارساتها العسكرية العدوانية وبما يُحقق وقف إطلاق نار متبادل ومتزامن تحت رقابة دولية ورفع الحصار عن الشعب الفلسطيني ورئيس السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية المنتخب ياسر عرفات .

كما يؤكد القادة على التزام الدول العربية بمواصلة دعم السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية حتى تتمكن من الصمود في تحمل أعباء واستحقاقات المرحلة المقبلة وما يترتب عليها، وتقديم كافة أشكال الدعم السياسي والمادي والمعنوي لتحقيق ذلك، ويطالبوا الدول والمنظمات الدولية المعنية بعدم الاعتراف أو التعامل مع أي ضمانات أو وعود يترتب عليها الانتقاص من الحقوق المشروعة للشعب الفلسطيني ومكافأة الاحتلال الإسرائيلي .

12- كما يؤكد القادة إدانتهم لإرهاب الدولة الذي تمارسه الحكومة الإسرائيلية ومؤسساتها العسكرية والتمثل بسياسة العقاب الجماعي وتدمير البنية التحتية وغيرها في الأراضي الفلسطينية واستمرار القتل العمد واغتيال القيادات والتوسع في الاعتقالات واحتجاز الآلاف من المواطنين الفلسطينيين .

ويُطالب القادة المجتمع الدولي وبشكل خاص مجلس الأمن وأعضاء الدائمين والجمعية العامة العمل الفوري لوقف مثل هذه الجرائم والمجازر التي تُرتكب يومياً بحق المدنيين الفلسطينيين العزل، والعمل على إلزام إسرائيل بوقف فوري ومتبادل لإطلاق النار بإشراف دولي وتأمين الحماية الدولية للشعب الفلسطيني، ويؤكدون ضرورة تنفيذ بنود الإعلان الصادر عن مؤتمر الدول الأطراف السامية المتعاقدة في اتفاقية جنيف لعام 1949 الصادر في 2001/12/5 .

13- يؤكد القادة على عروبة القدس وعدم شرعية الإجراءات الإسرائيلية لضمها وتهويدها وتغيير طبيعتها وتركيبها السكانية والجغرافية، ويدينون إقامة الحائط العنصري المُسمى "غلاف القدس" والذي يستهدف تقطيع أوصال القدس وعزل سكانها الفلسطينيين عن امتدادهم الطبيعي في الضفة الغربية. كما يُدينون استمرار الحفريات الإسرائيلية التي تُهدد الأماكن المقدسة. القدس

14- يؤكد القادة ضرورة حل مشكلة اللاجئين الفلسطينيين حلاً عادلاً يتفق عليه وفقاً لقرارات الشرعية الدولية، وفي مقدمتها قرار الجمعية العامة رقم 194 لعام 1948 بما فيه حق العودة، ويُعبرون عن رفضهم محاولات التوطين بجميع أشكاله والذي يتنافى والوضع الخاص في البلدان العربية المضيفة. اللاجئين

15- يدعو القادة المجتمع الدولي بذل جهوده من أجل وقف النشاط الاستيطاني الإسرائيلي في الأراضي الفلسطينية، وتنفيذ القرارات الدولية ذات الصلة، لاسيما قرار مجلس الأمن رقم 465 لعام 1980، الذي يؤكد عدم شرعية الاستيطان وضرورة تفكيك المستوطنات القائمة. النشاط الاستيطاني الإسرائيلي

16- يُدين القادة العدوان الإسرائيلي المستمر والمتصاعد على الشعب الفلسطيني وسلطته وما يخلفه من ضحايا جسيمة في الأرواح، وخسائر فادحة للاقتصاد الفلسطيني ويؤكدون أهمية الالتزام بسداد مساهمات الدول الأعضاء في دعم موازنة السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية .

وقرر القادة استمرار دعم موازنة السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية لستة أشهر أخرى ابتداءً من 2004/4/1. الدعم المالي لموازنة السلطة الفلسطينية

17- يؤكد القادة مجدداً دعمهم الكامل والحازم لقرار المجتمع الدولي بإعادة كامل الجولان العربي السوري المحتل إلى خط الرابع من يونيو/ حزيران 1967 استناداً إلى أسس عملية السلام وقرارات الشرعية الدولية. ويدعون في هذا الصدد إلى التجاوب مع دعوات سورية المتكررة والتي لاقت ترحيباً دولياً لاستئناف مفاوضات السلام من النقطة التي توقفت عندها، ويجددون رفضهم لكل ما اتخذته سلطات الاحتلال الإسرائيلي من إجراءات تهدف إلى تغيير الوضع القانوني والطبيعي والديمغرافي للجولان المحتل، ويعتبرون هذه الإجراءات غير قانونية ولاغية وباطلة وغير ذي أثر قانوني وجريمة حرب وفقاً لاتفاقية جنيف لعام 1949 وخرقاً لقرار مجلس الأمن رقم 497 لعام 1981، كما يجددون دعمهم لضمود المواطنين العرب في الجولان المحتل والوقوف إلى جانبهم في تصديهم للاحتلال وممارسته الاستيطانية القمعية وإصرارهم على التمسك بأرضهم وهويتهم العربية السورية. الجولان العربي السوري المحتل

18- يؤكد القادة على ضرورة احترام مبادئ وقواعد القانون الدولي لحل الخلافات بين الدول. ويُشدّدون، في هذا الصدد، على تضامنهم التام مع سورية إزاء الضغوط والإجراءات التعسفية التي تستهدفها لاسيما القانون المُسمى "بمساءلة سورية".

ويُعبّر القادة عن ارتياحهم للموقف السوري الداعي إلى تغليب لغة الحوار والدبلوماسية كأسلوب أمثل للتفاهم بين الدول. التضامن مع سورية

19- يؤكد القادة دعمهم للبنان في مواجهة إسرائيل لاستكمال تحرير كامل أرضه بما فيها مزارع شبعا وفقاً لقرار مجلس الأمن رقم 425 وإطلاق المتبقين من أسراه ومعتقليه، وإزالة مئات الألوف من الألغام الإسرائيلية من أرضه، ويُطالبون مجلس الأمن بمنع انتهاكات إسرائيل المتكررة لسيادته وضرورة تقديمها التعويضات عن اعتداءاتها على أرضيه قبل فترة الاحتلال وخلالها وبعدها، مع ضرورة تطبيقها لقرار الجمعية العامة رقم 194 لعام 1948 القاضي بعودة اللاجئين الفلسطينيين إلى وطنهم ورفض كافة أشكال توطيئهم .

كما يؤكدون تضامنهم مع لبنان ضد محاولات استهداف علاقاته الأخوية والتاريخية مع سورية، ورفض التدخل في شؤونه الداخلية من خلال ما يُسمى بقانون "محاسبة سورية" أو أي مشاريع أخرى لاحقة. التضامن مع لبنان ودعمه

20- استعرض القادة تطورات الوضع في العراق، وأكدوا مجدداً حرصهم على وحدة الأراضي العراقية واحترام سيادة العراق واستقلاله ووحدته والالتزام بمبدأ عدم التدخل في شؤونه الداخلية، والتزامهم بمساعدة الشعب العراقي للوقوف في وجه كل المحاولات الرامية إلى زرع بذور الفتنة والفرقة والخلافات وتقديم كافة المساعدات اللازمة له في مختلف الجوانب السياسية والاقتصادية، وإعلان مجلس الحكم بالعراق إقرار قانون إدارة الدولة للمرحلة الانتقالية وبالدور المركزي للأمم المتحدة في تهيئة الظروف الكفيلة لنقل السلطة للشعب العراقي بحلول التاريخ المحدد، ويدعو القادة مجلس الأمن إلى اتخاذ الإجراءات اللازمة لإنهاء الاحتلال وانسحاب قوات الاحتلال من العراق، ومساعدة الشعب العراقي على استعادة كامل سيادته على أرضه، كما يؤكدون على ضرورة اضطلاع الأمم المتحدة بدور مركزي وفعال في العملية السياسية وبناء مؤسسات الدولة، ويكلفون الأمين العام لجامعة الدول العربية بتعزيز التعاون مع الجهات العراقية ومع الأمم المتحدة من أجل تيسير انتقال السلطة والسيادة إلى الشعب العراقي في الموعد المذكور .

ويعبّر القادة عن الإدانة الشديدة للجرائم والممارسات اللاإنسانية واللاأخلاقية التي ارتكبتها جنود قوات الاحتلال ضد المعتقلين العراقيين في السجون والمعتقلات، ويطالبون بإحالة مرتكبي هذه الجرائم والمسؤولين عنها إلى القضاء. كما يحملون سلطة الاحتلال المسؤولية الكاملة لهذه الممارسات. كما يدين القادة الاستخدام المفرط للقوة من قبل قوات الاحتلال، ويؤكدون إدانتهم الشديدة للتفجيرات الإرهابية التي تحدث في العراق وتودي بحياة المئات من الأبرياء من الشعب العراقي .

ويدين القادة الانتهاكات الخطيرة لحقوق الإنسان التي اقترفتها النظام السابق أثناء احتلاله لدولة الكويت وطمس الحقائق المتعلقة بالأسرى والمفقودين الكويتيين ورعايا دول ثالثة اللذين تم العثور على عدد من رفاتهم قتلى في المقابر الجماعية في العراق، ويعربون عن عميق التعازي لأسر

الضحايا اللذين جرى التعرف على رفاتهم والقلق لمحنة أولئك الذين لا يزال مكان وجودهم مجهولاً، والمطالبة بمواصلة الجهود المبذولة للكشف عن مصير أولئك الأسرى والمفقودين، ويؤيدون إحالة مرتكبي هذه الجرائم من أعضاء النظام السابق إلى محكمة عراقية وفقاً للقانون العراقي وعدم توفير ملاذ آمن لهم .

وكلف القادة مملكة البحرين الرئاسة السابقة والجمهورية التونسية الرئاسة الحالية والجمهورية الجزائرية الديمقراطية الشعبية الرئاسة القادمة والأمين العام للجامعة العربية القيام بالتشاور مع الدول العربية المعنية وإجراء الاتصالات اللازمة ومتابعة الوضع في العراق وما يستجد بشأنه من تطورات وتقديم تقارير إلى مجلس الجامعة في هذا الشأن. تطورات الوضع في العراق

21- يُجدد القادة تأكيدهم المطلق على سيادة دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة الكاملة على جزرها الثلاث، طناب الكبرى وطناب الصغرى وأبو موسى، ويؤيدون كافة الإجراءات والوسائل السلمية التي تتخذها دولة الإمارات لاستعادة سيادتها على جزرها المحتلة، ويدعو القادة جمهورية إيران الإسلامية مجدداً إلى إنهاء احتلالها للجزر الإماراتية الثلاث، والكف عن فرض ممارسة سياسة الأمر الواقع بالقوة .

ويُعرب القادة عن أملهم في أن تُعيد جمهورية إيران الإسلامية النظر في موقفها الراض لإيجاد حل سلمي لقضية جزر دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة الثلاث المحتلة، وأن تُترجم ما أعلنته عن رغبتها في تحسين العلاقات مع الدول العربية، إلى خطوات عملية ولموسة، وذلك بالاستجابة إلى الدعوات المخلصة الداعية إلى إيجاد حل للنزاع حول هذه الجزر بالطرق السلمية، وفق الأعراف والمواثيق وقواعد القانون الدولي، من خلال المفاوضات المباشرة الجادة، أو اللجوء إلى محكمة العدل الدولية. ويكلف القادة الأمين العام لجامعة الدول العربية بالاستمرار في متابعة هذا الموضوع. احتلال إيران للجزر العربية الثلاث طناب الكبرى وطناب الصغرى وأبو موسى التابعة لدولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة في الخليج العربي

22- يثمن القادة الرفع الفوري لكافة تدابير الحظر الذي كان مفروضاً على الجماهيرية العظمى، والتي أوفت بجميع التزاماتها وفقاً لقرار مجلس الأمن رقم 1506 بتاريخ 2003/9/12 لما فيه من رفع للمعانة عن الشعب الليبي الشقيق .

وأخذوا علماء بالقرار الذي اتخذته الجماهيرية العظمى بالتخلص من البرامج والمعدات التي قد تؤدي إلى إنتاج أسلحة محظورة دولياً .

ويؤكدون مجدداً دعوتهم لإخلاء منطقة الشرق الأوسط من أسلحة الدمار الشامل. ويطالبون بإلزام إسرائيل بذلك. تطورات قضية لوكربي

23- يؤكد القادة تضامنهم مع السودان والحرص على وحدته والحفاظ على سيادته، ويطالبون الأطراف الإقليمية والدولية بدعم مساعي السلام فيه، ويشيدون بجهود الحكومة السودانية لإحلاله، ويؤكدون الإرادة السياسية للدول العربية في تقديم الدعم للدفع به، ويهيبون بالدول الأعضاء وصناديق التمويل العربية تقديم مساهماتها التنموية لترسيخه، كما يشيدون بجهود الأمين العام في هذا الشأن .

ويعبر القادة عن بالغ قلقهم إزاء تطورات الأوضاع في "دارفور"، ويؤكدون دعمهم للجهود السياسية التي تقوم بها الحكومة التشادية والاتحاد الأفريقي وجامعة الدول العربية والأمم المتحدة لتنفيذ اتفاقية انجamina الموقعة في 2004/4/8 بين الحكومة السودانية وحركتي التمرد بهدف تحقيق الأمن والاستقرار في المنطقة برمتها والحفاظ على وحدة الأراضي السودانية. ويدعمون الخطوات التي اتخذتها الحكومة السودانية لعودة الأوضاع في دارفور لطبيعتها .

ويقررون الإسراع في تقديم العون الإنساني للمتضررين في هذه المنقطة، كما يناشدون المجتمع الدولي تلبية الاحتياجات العاجلة لهؤلاء المتضررين. دعم السلام والتنمية والوحدة في جمهورية السودان

24- يؤكد القادة على وحدة وسيادة جمهورية الصومال، ويشيدون بجهود الحكومة الانتقالية وكافة الفصائل الصومالية التي أدت إلى التوصل إلى اتفاقيتي وقف إطلاق النار واتفاقية 29 يناير/ كانون ثان 2004، ويدعون الفصائل الصومالية الالتزام بتنفيذ تعهداتهم واتفاقاتهم وأن عدم التزامهم سيدفع المجتمع الدولي إلى توقيع عقوبات عليهم من قبل مجلس الأمن،

-التأكيد على الالتزام العربي بقرارات مجلس الأمن المتعلقة بحظر تصدير السلاح إلى الصومال .

-الإسراع في التوصل إلى تسوية سياسية لازمة للحفاظ وحدة البلاد وتمكن من الشروع في إعادة بناء وإعمار الصومال. دعم جمهورية الصومال

25- يؤكد القادة حرصهم على الوحدة الوطنية لجمهورية القمر المتحدة وسلامتها الإقليمية، ويرحبون بالتطورات الايجابية التي شهدتها جمهورية القمر على صعيد المصالحة الوطنية، وإجراء الانتخابات البرلمانية المحلية والاتحادية بما يمكن من بناء مؤسسات الدولة الاتحادية، ويدعون الدول الأعضاء ومؤسسات وصناديق التمويل والاستثمار العربية إلى مواصلة تقديم الدعم لجمهورية القمر المتحدة، ويناشدون المجتمع الدولي وخاصة المؤسسات الاقتصادية والمالية تقديم الدعم لتعزيز التنمية الاقتصادية والاجتماعية في جمهورية القمر المتحدة. دعم جمهورية القمر المتحدة

26- يُعبر القادة عن تعازيهم لأسر ضحايا الزلزال الذي ضرب مدينة الحسيمة بشمال المغرب، ويُجددون تضامنهم الكامل مع الشعب المغربي وقيادته الحكيمة مؤملين تجاوز تدايات هذه الكارثة الطبيعية حتى يعود مجرى الحياة إلى مساره العادي ويتحقق للمتضررين الاطمئنان والسكينة. التضامن مع الشعب المغربي لتجاوز نتائج كارثة زلزال الحسيمة

27- يعتمد القادة الميثاق العربي لحقوق الإنسان ويثمنون عالياً ما يهدف إليه من تعزيز وحماية حقوق الإنسان في الدول العربية وترسيخها ضمن الاهتمامات الوطنية الأساسية. تحديث الميثاق العربي لحقوق الإنسان

28- انطلاقاً من العزم على مواصلة جهود التطوير والتحديث للمجتمعات العربية من أجل بناء مستقبل أفضل لشعوب الوطن العربي، وتأييداً للجهود والمبادرات العربية الايجابية التي تهدف إلى الارتقاء بهذه الجهود، أقر القادة "بيان مسيرة التطوير والتحديث في الوطن العربي"، والذي حدد الرؤية العربية لمبادئ هذه المسيرة وأهدافها، مؤكداً تصميمهم على الاستمرار في بذل الجهود وتكثيفها لمواصلة مسيرة التطوير في المجالات السياسية والاقتصادية والاجتماعية والتربوية تحقيقاً لتقدم المجتمعات العربية النابع من إرادتها الحرة وما يتفق مع قيمها ومفاهيمها الثقافية والدينية

والحضرارية وظروف كل دولة وإمكانياتها، وذلك من خلال تحقيق أسس الديمقراطية والشورى وتوسيع المشاركة في المجال السياسي والشأن العام، واحترام حقوق الإنسان، وبما يدعم دور المجتمع المدني والمنظمات غير الحكومية، ويُعزز من الجهود المبذولة للاهتمام بالطفولة والشباب ومواصلة النهوض بدور المرأة في المجتمع العربي وتدعيم حقوقها ومكانتها في المجتمع، كما أكد القادة على تصميمهم على مواصلة الإصلاحات الاقتصادية للارتقاء بمستوى معيشة الشعوب العربية ورفع معدلات النمو الاقتصادي، وتفعيل دور القطاع الخاص، وتبني الاستراتيجيات والخطط والقوانين اللازمة للإسراع بإنجاز السوق العربية المشتركة وتحقيق التنمية الاقتصادية والاجتماعية الشاملة. مسيرة التطوير والتحديث في الوطن العربي

29- يدعو القادة لاعتماد المبادرة العربية المُقدمة أمام مجلس الأمن في ديسمبر/ كانون أول 2003 والرامية لإخلاء منطقة الشرق الأوسط من أسلحة الدمار الشامل وفي مقدمتها السلاح النووي، ويؤكدون أن تحقيق السلام والأمن في المنطقة يستلزمان انضمام إسرائيل لمعاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية وإخضاع كافة منشآتها النووية لنظام الضمانات الشاملة للوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية، ويعتبرون ذلك شرطاً ضرورياً ولازماً لإرساء أية ترتيبات للأمن الإقليمي في المنطقة مستقبلاً. وفي هذا السياق يدعو القادة إلى عقد مؤتمر للأمم المتحدة لإخلاء منطقة الشرق الأوسط بما فيها إسرائيل من أسلحة الدمار الشامل الأمر الذي سيحقق الأمن والاستقرار في المنطقة. جعل الشرق الأوسط منطقة خالية من أسلحة الدمار الشامل

30- يُجدد القادة إدانتهم الكاملة للإرهاب بكل أشكاله واستعدادهم الكامل للتعاون والمساهمة في كل جهد لمحاربتة تحت مظلة الأمم المتحدة ويطالبون بضرورة عقد مؤتمر دولي في إطار الأمم المتحدة لبحث موضوع الإرهاب ووضع تعريف دقيق له .

ويؤكدون على ضرورة التمييز بوضوح بين الإرهاب الذي يُدينونه وبين الحق المشروع للشعوب في مقاومة الاحتلال الأجنبي رفضاً له ودفاعاً عن النفس وفقاً لمبادئ الشرعية الدولية وقرارات الأمم المتحدة ذات الصلة، ولا سيما قرار الجمعية العامة رقم 51/46 تاريخ 1991/1/19 الخاص بمحاربة الإرهاب. إدانة الإرهاب الدولي

31- يُنوه القادة بالجهود التي قامت بها الأمانة العامة لتطوير علاقات الحوار والتعاون مع الدول والمنظمات الدولية والإقليمية، ويؤكدون الحرص على تعزيز وتطوير آليات التعاون مع الأمم المتحدة ووكالاتها المتخصصة ومع الاتحاد الأوروبي والاتحاد الأفريقي. العلاقات العربية الدولية

32- يؤكد القادة حرصهم على تطوير العلاقات مع دول أمريكا اللاتينية ويُعربون عن تقديرهم لاقتراح البرازيل عقد قمة بين الدول العربية ودول أمريكا الجنوبية بهدف إيجاد إطار عمل للحوار والتعاون بين الجانبين على كافة الأصعدة السياسية والاقتصادية والاجتماعية. عقد قمة عربية مع دول أمريكا الجنوبية

في البرازيل

33- يُعرب القادة عن ارتياحهم لاستمرار تحسن معدلات النمو الاقتصادي في بعض الدول العربية على الرغم من التطورات والأحداث التي شهدتها المنطقة العربية .

ويُعربون عن عدم ارتياحهم حيال نتائج الاجتماع الوزاري الخامس لمنظمة التجارة العالمية الذي عُقد في كانون في سبتمبر 2003 ، وعدم التوصل لاتفاق بشأن موضوعات التفاوض .

ويدعون الدول الأعضاء في منظمة التجارة العالمية إلى عدم فرض شروط متشددة لقبول انضمام الدول العربية إلى المنظمة، ويؤكدون على إدراج طلبات الدول العربية الراغبة في الانضمام للمنظمة على جدول أعمالها .

كما يدعون الدول العربية إلى استمرار تنسيق مواقفها في المنظمة، والاستفادة من الإمكانيات المتاحة في هذا المجال .

ويؤكدون على أن تحقيق معدلات نمو مضطربة وملائمة مرهون بالاستقرار في المنطقة وباستمرار تنفيذ سياسات الإصلاح الاقتصادي التي باشرتها دولهم .

وفي ضوء النمو الكبير في القوى العاملة، يؤكد القادة على ضرورة استمرار الدول العربية في تحسين بيئات الاستثمار وحفز النمو الاقتصادي لزيادة فرص العمل، وتعزيز جهود مواءمة مخرجات التعليم مع احتياجات سوق العمل .

الأوضاع الاقتصادية العربية والإقليمية والدولية

34- يؤكد القادة عزمهم على الارتقاء بمعدلات التجارة العربية البينية، وإزالة كافة المعوقات التي تعترضها، ويتطلعون إلى المشاركة الإيجابية من قبل القطاع الخاص العربي في تفعيل منطقة التجارة الحرة العربية الكبرى والاستفادة من الايجابيات التي تُتيحها في مجالي التجارة والاستثمار. التجارة العربية البينية

35- يؤكد القادة استمرار دعمهم للاقتصاد الفلسطيني لإعادة إعمار بنيته التحتية ودعم صمود الشعب الفلسطيني وتعزيز ارتباط اقتصاده بمحيطه العربي. دعم الاقتصاد الفلسطيني

36- استعرض القادة سبل دعم مشاركة القطاع الخاص لتفعيل دوره وتعزيز مشاركته في التنمية الاقتصادية والاجتماعية العربية، في ظل سياسات وبرامج الإصلاح الاقتصادي في الدول العربية، من خلال تطوير تشريعاتها في مجال التجارة والاستثمار وإزالة المعوقات التي تحد من نشاطه. دور القطاع الخاص في التنمية الاقتصادية والاجتماعية العربية

37- يؤكد القادة على أهمية المنظمات والاتحادات الأهلية وغير الحكومية في تحقيق التنمية المستدامة، وفي دعم العمل العربي المشترك. المنظمات والاتحادات الأهلية وغير الحكومية

38- يؤكد القادة على أهمية بلورة وإقامة مشروعات عربية محددة في مجالات البنية الأساسية للاتصالات والمعلومات والتنمية البشرية والبيئة المعلوماتية والتجارة الالكترونية. رأب الفجوة الرقمية بين الدول العربية وغيرها من الدول

39- يؤكد القادة على أهمية مواصلة التحضير العربي للمرحلة الثانية للقمة المقرر انعقادها في الجمهورية التونسية في 16-18 نوفمبر/ تشرين الثاني 2005، وعلى المشاركة العربية على أعلى المستويات في هذه القمة. القمة العالمية لمجتمع المعلومات

40- يؤكد القادة أهمية الإسراع في استكمال إجراءات المصادقة على النظام الأساسي للمنظمة العربية لتكنولوجيا الاتصال والمعلومات وبدء ممارسة نشاطها قبل المرحلة الثانية للقمة العالمية لمجتمع المعلومات (تونس 2005). المصادقة على النظام الأساسي للمنظمة العربية لتكنولوجيا الاتصال والمعلومات

41- يؤكد القادة على اعتبار السياحة صناعة استراتيجية تمنح كافة التسهيلات الائتمانية والضريبية التي تتمتع بها صناعات التصدير. دعم التنمية السياحية العربية والتكامل السياحي العربي

42- يُعبر القادة عن ارتياحهم للتقدم الملموس في مشروعات الربط الكهربائي ويدعون إلى تهيئة السبل للاستغلال الأمثل للمنظومة الكهربائية العربية. الربط الكهربائي العربي

43- استعرض القادة الجهود المبذولة لتطوير المجلس الاقتصادي والاجتماعي وزيادة فعاليته والارتقاء بأساليب عمله لمواكبة التطورات العربية والإقليمية والدولية، ويتطلعون إلى أن يساهم هذا التطوير في تحقيق تطلعات المواطن العربي من خلال دفع التكامل الاقتصادي والتعاون الاجتماعي العربي، كما وجه القادة بالبدء في تنفيذ هذا التطوير. تطوير المجلس الاقتصادي والاجتماعي

44- يرحب القادة بتوقيع "اتفاقية أغادير" التي جسدت مبادرة صاحب الجلالة الملك محمد السادس ملك المغرب لإقامة منطقة تجارة حرة بين كل من الأردن وتونس ومصر والمغرب، ويثقون أن هذه الاتفاقية سوف تدعم منطقة التجارة الحرة العربية الكبرى وتُسرع من خطى التكامل الاقتصادي في إطار الجهود الحالية لإقامة الاتحاد الجمركي العربي. اتفاقية أغادير لإقامة منطقة تجارة حرة

45- يُنوه القادة بصدور العقد العربي للمعوقين وذوى الاحتياجات الخاصة الذي يضمن حقوق المعاق وإدماجه في المجتمع من خلال التأهيل والتعليم والتدريب وإزالة كل ما يواجهه من عقبات. العقد العربي للمعوقين وذوى الاحتياجات الخاصة

46- يؤكد القادة اهتمامهم بالطفل العربي وحقوقه وضرورة الالتزام بخطة العمل العربية للطفولة التي قررها المؤتمر الثالث رفيع المستوى الذي انعقد في تونس في يناير 2004، واعتبار إعلان تونس جزءاً لا يتجزأ من خطة العمل العربية الثانية للطفولة، وإيلاء اهتمام خاص بالطفل الفلسطيني.

حقوق الطفل العربي

47- يرحب القادة بالاستراتيجية العربية لمكافحة الفقر، ووجهوا بإحالتها إلى المجلس الاقتصادي والاجتماعي لوضع آليات لتتواءم مع الخطة الاقتصادية العربية الشاملة في هذا المجال. الاستراتيجية العربية لمكافحة الفقر

48- يؤكد القادة العرب أهمية المشاركة العربية في معرض فرانكفورت الدولي للكتاب للعام 2004 باعتبارها تظاهرة ثقافية عربية عالمية تُبرز الدور الحضاري والثقافي للعالم العربي. المشاركة العربية في معرض فرانكفورت الدولي للكتاب للعام 2004

49-تدارس القادة الوضع المالي للأمانة العامة للجامعة والصعوبات التي تواجهها في تنفيذ القرارات، وأجمعوا على ضرورة الالتزام في سداد الالتزامات المالية المقررة في موافقتها. الوضع المالي

50-استناداً إلى ما جاء في ملحق ميثاق جامعة الدول العربية الخاص بآلية الانعقاد الدوري المنتظم لمجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة، يُرحب القادة بعقد الدورة العادية (17) لمجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة في الجمهورية الجزائرية الديمقراطية الشعبية خلال شهر مارس/ آذار عام 2005. موعد انعقاد مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة الدورة العادية (17)

APPENDIX 10 The Right War

by Robert Kagan & William Kristol
10/01/2001, Volume 007, Issue 03

<http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/000/078hsbj.asp?pg=2>

President Bush's speech before Congress Thursday night conveyed both the determination and the reassurance the American people needed. But what gave the president's address historic significance was the courageous and visionary mission he set for his administration and for the nation. For Bush pledged not only to find and destroy Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda terrorist network in Afghanistan, and not only to attack and vanquish the brutal Taliban regime that has given bin Laden aid and sanctuary. The president declared that while America's "war on terror" begins with Al Qaeda, "it does not end there." The war, he insisted, will require that "every terrorist group of global reach" be "found, stopped, and defeated," and our enemies, he declared, will include not just those groups but also "every government that supports them."

We trust these words will reverberate far beyond Kabul, in Tehran, Damascus, Khartoum, and above all, in Baghdad, where sits the man whom Secretary of State Colin Powell recently called "one of the leading terrorists on the face of the Earth." Evidence that Iraq may have aided in the horrific attacks of September 11 is beginning to accumulate. American intelligence officials have learned that one of the men who carried out the attacks on the World Trade Center, Mohammed Atta, met with an Iraqi intelligence official in Germany several months ago. Other bits of evidence of Iraqi complicity may emerge in the future. If Attorney General John Ashcroft's investigation does begin to piece together a puzzle that includes Iraq, the American public will demand that the kind of forceful response now being assembled against the Taliban be turned with even greater fury against Saddam and his regime. And they will be right.

But Bush's Thursday speech was significant because the president made clear that taking decisive action against Saddam does not require absolute proof linking Iraq to last week's attack. A few days before, Secretary Powell was even more explicit in saying that the United States should target those "groups out there that mean us no good" and "that have conducted attacks previously against U.S. personnel, U.S. interests, and our allies." That means the war on anti-American terrorism must target Hezbollah, the terrorist group backed by Iran and Syria, as well as the Taliban. And it must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power, by supporting the Iraqi opposition and, if necessary, by using American military force to complete the tragically unfinished task begun in Operation Desert Storm a decade ago.

The president revealed in his speech a deep understanding of an important point: that the "war on terrorism" is not merely a war on terrorists. It is also, and perhaps even more significantly, a war against the kinds of regimes that support and employ terrorism as a deadly weapon in their war against us. Saddam Hussein, because of his strategic position in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, surely represents a more potent challenge to the

United States and its interests and principles than the weak, isolated, and we trust, soon-to-be crushed Taliban. And unlike the Taliban, Saddam Hussein may soon have at his disposal not only terrorist networks, but biological, chemical, and even nuclear weapons. Is it conceivable that the United States would destroy the Taliban but leave the Iraqi regime untouched? Could the war the president so eloquently rallied us to Thursday night be considered won if Saddam were still in power three years from now, aiding our enemies and developing weapons of mass destruction?

As both the New York Times and the Washington Post reported this past week, there has been an argument within the Bush administration over how centrally to target Iraq. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and others in the Pentagon and in Vice President Cheney's office have argued that no war on terrorism can possibly succeed if there is not a change of regime in Iraq—which is what Wolfowitz meant when he said a week ago that it was necessary to "end states that support terrorism." The president made clear in his speech that the war on terrorism must bring about a change of regime in Afghanistan. He surely knows that a change of regime in Iraq may take longer, but is every bit as important.

Indeed, we find it hard to believe that anyone in this administration, whether in the State Department or in the White House or in the CIA, can seriously be arguing that the Iraqi regime should be left alone. In 1998 a group of prominent figures sent a letter to President Clinton urging him to take strong action against Saddam Hussein. They warned that if Saddam were to "acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, as he is almost certain to do if we continue along the present course, the safety of American troops in the region, of our friends and allies like Israel and the moderate Arab states, and a significant portion of the world's supply of oil will all be put at hazard." They pressed President Clinton to make it the aim of American foreign policy to "remove Saddam Hussein and his regime from power."

The signatories of that 1998 letter are today a Who's Who of senior ranking officials in this administration: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of State John Bolton, Under Secretary of State Paula Dobriansky, Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman, and National Security Council senior officials Elliott Abrams and Zalmay Khalilzad. If these Bush administration officials believed it was essential to bring about a change of regime in Iraq three years ago, they must believe it is even more essential today. Last week we lost more than 6,000 Americans to terrorism. How many more could we lose in a world where Saddam Hussein continues to thrive and continues his quest for weapons of mass destruction? Do we really want to find out?

Below we reprint another letter, signed by an equally distinguished group of Americans. The signatories support the president's war on terror. They point out that such a war must include a policy designed to remove Saddam Hussein and his regime from power in Iraq. They call for measures against Hezbollah, and against Iran and Syria if they do not cease their support for that powerful terrorist organization.

These recommendations are consistent with the principles the president laid out Thursday night, and with the vital interests of our nation.

We are at war. It will not be easy. But the sacrifices we will make will be fully justified, and redeemed, if we fight the right war, and fight it to victory.

APPENDIX 11

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz Speech on Iraq Disarmament
Thursday, Jan. 23, 2002 - 1:02 p.m. EST

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2003/iraq-030123-dod01.htm>

(Policy address on Iraqi disarmament at the Council for Foreign Relations in New York City. Also participating were Peter G. Peterson, chairman of the board, Council on Foreign Relations, and Robert C. Orr, vice president and Washington director, Council on Foreign Relations.)

Wolfowitz: (Applause.) Pete, thank you for that kind introduction, and thank you for the kind compliment, not to me, but to the Department of Defense. It really is a bunch of incredibly brave and incredibly skilled and unbelievably smart people doing amazing things in difficult circumstances and it's an honor to be part of them. Every so often I get one of those introductions that's sort of over the top and one is tempted - not in your case - but to recall what the late Vernon Walters cited to me as the first of his three laws of human behavior, which is, "Anyone who says flattery will get you nowhere has obviously never received any." Before I am tempted to be flattered by the size of my audience today I know that it has nothing to do with me personally and everything to do with the importance of the topic. But I appreciate very much the opportunity the council has given me to speak, not only to a large group here in New York, but also simultaneously to a large group in Washington. It's a great tribute to what you've done, Les, with this organization. It's really ... it started at a high level and it's come a lot further. That's a real accomplishment. And it's a pleasure to be back here in New York, which happens to be my birthplace and a city I really do love. The last time I spoke here was a little more than a year ago and the occasion was to commission a ship named the USS Bulkeley, a ship named after a New Yorker, Admiral John Bulkeley, who left a big mark on the Navy during a career that spanned some three decades and a career that included actions in World War II that earned him the Congressional Medal of Honor. It was enormously fitting to commission a great warship named for a man whose life symbolized the resilience and resolve that the world came to associate with this great city since September 11th of 2001-and how appropriate it was that the commissioning took place within walking distance of Ground Zero.

As terrible as the attacks of September 11th were, however, we now know that the terrorists are plotting still more and greater catastrophes. We know they are seeking more terrible weapons-chemical, biological, and even nuclear weapons. In the hands of terrorists, what we often call weapons of mass destruction would more accurately be called weapons of mass terror. The threat posed by the connection between terrorist networks and states that possess these weapons of mass terror presents us with the danger of a catastrophe that could be orders of magnitude worse than September 11th. Iraq's weapons of mass terror and the terror networks to which the Iraqi regime are linked are not two separate themes - not two separate threats. They are part of the same threat. Disarming Iraq and the War on Terror are not merely related. Disarming Iraq of its chemical and biological weapons and dismantling its nuclear weapons program is a

crucial part of winning the War on Terror. Iraq has had 12 years now to disarm, as it agreed to do at the conclusion of the Gulf War. But, so far, it has treated disarmament like a game of hide and seek-or, as Secretary of State Powell has termed it, "rope-a-dope in the desert."

But this is not a game. It is deadly serious. We are dealing with a threat to the security of our nation and the world. At the same time, however, President Bush understands fully the risks and dangers of war and the President wants to do everything humanly possible to eliminate this threat by peaceful means. That is why the President called for the U.N. Security Council to pass what became Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations and, in so doing, to eliminate the danger that Iraq's weapons of mass terror could fall into the hands of terrorists. In making that proposal, President Bush understood perfectly well that compliance with that resolution would require a massive change of attitude and actions on the part of the Iraqi regime. But history proves that such a change is possible. Other nations have rid themselves of weapons of mass destruction cooperatively in ways that were possible to verify. So let's talk for a moment about what real disarmament looks like: There are several significant examples from the recent past-among them South Africa, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. In South Africa, for example, President De Klerk decided in 1989 to end that country's nuclear weapons program and, in 1999 [1990], to dismantle all their existing weapons. South Africa joined the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1991 and later that year accepted full scope safeguards by the U.N.'s atomic energy agency. South Africa allowed U.N. inspectors complete access to both operating and defunct facilities, provided thousands of current and historical documents, and allowed detailed, unfettered discussions with personnel that had been involved in their nuclear program. By 1994, South Africa had provided verifiable evidence that its nuclear inventory was complete and its weapons program was dismantled. In the 1990s, President Kravchuk of Ukraine and President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation and START Treaties, committing their countries to give up the nuclear weapons and strategic delivery systems that they had inherited with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Kazakhstan and Ukraine both went even further in their disclosures and actions than was required by those treaties. Ukraine requested and received US assistance to destroy its Backfire bombers and air-launched cruise missiles. Kazakhstan asked the United States to remove more than 500 kg. of highly enriched uranium. Given the full cooperation of both governments, implementation of the disarmament was smooth. All nuclear warheads were returned to Russia by 1996, and all missile silos and heavy bombers were destroyed before the START deadline. Each of these cases was different but the end result was the same: the countries disarmed while disclosing their programs fully and voluntarily. In each case, high-level political commitment to disarmament was accompanied by the active participation of national institutions to carry out that process. In each case, the responsible countries created a transparent process in which decisions and actions could be verified and audited by the international community.

In Iraq's case, unfortunately, the situation is the opposite. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 gave Saddam Hussein one last chance to choose a path of cooperative disarmament, one that he was obliged to take and agreed to take 12 years ago. We were under no illusions that the Baghdad regime had undergone the fundamental change of

heart that underpinned the successes I just mentioned. Nevertheless, there is still the hope -- if Saddam is faced with a serious enough threat that he would otherwise be disarmed forcibly and removed from power -- there is still the hope that he might decide to adopt a fundamentally different course. But time is running out.

The United States entered this process hopeful that it could eliminate the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass terror without having to resort to force. And we've put more than just our hopes into this process. Last fall, the Security Council requested member states to give, quote, "full support," unquote, to U.N. inspectors.

The United States answered that call and President Bush directed departments and agencies to provide, I quote, "material, operational, personnel, and intelligence support," unquote, for U.N. inspections under Resolution 1441. Such assistance includes a comprehensive package of intelligence support, including names of individuals whom we believe it would be productive to interview and information about sites suspected to be associated with proscribed material or activities. We have provided our analysis of Iraq's nuclear, chemical, biological and missile programs, and we have suggested an inspection strategy and tactics. We have provided counterintelligence support to improve the inspectors' ability to thwart Iraqi attempts to penetrate their organizations.

The United States has also made available a wide array of technology to support the inspectors' efforts, including aerial surveillance support in the form of U-2 and Predator aircraft. So far, Iraq is blocking U-2 flights requested by the U.N., in direct violation of Resolution 1441, which states that inspectors shall have free and unrestricted use of manned and unmanned reconnaissance vehicles.

Let's consider for a moment what inspectors can do and what they can't. As the case of South Africa and the other success stories demonstrate, inspection teams can do a great deal to verify the dismantling of a program if they are working with a cooperative government that wants to prove to the world it has disarmed. It is not the job of inspectors to disarm Iraq; it is Iraq's job to disarm itself. What inspectors can do is confirm that a country has willingly disarmed and provided verifiable evidence that it has done so. If a government is unwilling to disarm itself, it is unreasonable to expect the inspectors to do it for them. They cannot be charged with a "search and destroy" mission to uncover so-called smoking guns, especially not if the host government is intent on hiding them and impeding the inspectors' every move. Inspectors cannot verify the destruction of weapons materials if there are no credible records of their disposition.

Think about it for a moment. When an auditor discovers discrepancies in the books, it is not the auditor's obligation to prove where the embezzler has stashed his money. It is up to the person or institution being audited to explain the discrepancy. It is quite unreasonable to expect a few hundred inspectors to search every potential hiding place in a country the size of France, even if nothing were being moved. And, of course, there is every reason to believe that things are being moved constantly and hidden. The whole purpose, if you think about it, for Iraq constructing mobile units to produce biological weapons could only have been to be able to hide them. We know about that capability

from defectors and other sources, but unless Iraq comes clean about what it has, we cannot expect the inspectors to find them.

Nor is it the inspectors' role to find Saddam's hidden weapons when he lies about them and conceals them. That would make them not inspectors, but detectives, charged with going through that vast country, climbing through tunnels and searching private homes. Sending a few hundred inspectors to search an area the size of the state of California would be to send them on a fool's errand or to play a game. And let me repeat: this is not a game.

David Kay, a former chief UNSCOM inspector, has said that confirming a country's voluntary disarmament is a job that should not take months or years. With cooperation, it would be relatively simple because the real indicators of disarmament are readily apparent. They start with the willingness of the regime to be disarmed, the commitments communicated by its leaders, the disclosure of the full scope of work on weapons of mass destruction, and verifiable records of dismantling and destruction.

Unfortunately, though not surprisingly, we have seen none of these indications of willing disarmament from Iraq.

So let's discuss what disarmament does not look like. Despite our skepticism about the intentions of the Baghdad regime, we entered the disarmament process in good faith. Iraq has done anything but that.

Instead of a high-level commitment to disarmament, Iraq has a high-level commitment to concealing its weapons of mass terror. Instead of charging national institutions with the responsibility to dismantle programs, key Iraqi organizations operate a concealment effort that targets inspectors and thwarts their efforts. Instead of the full cooperation and transparency that is evident in each of those disarmament success stories, Iraq has started the process by openly defying the requirement of Resolution 1441, and I quote, "to provide a currently accurate, full and complete" declaration of all of its programs.

Indeed, with its December 7th declaration, Iraq resumed a familiar process of deception. Secretary Powell has called that 12,200-page document a catalogue of recycled information and brazen omissions that the secretary said, "totally fails to meet the resolution's requirements. Most brazenly of all" -- I'm still quoting Powell -- "the Iraqi declaration denies the existence of any prohibited weapons programs at all," unquote. Among those omissions are large quantities of anthrax and other deadly biological agents and nuclear-related items that the U.N. Special Commission concluded Iraq had not accounted for. There are also gaps in accounting for such deadly items as 1.5 tons of the nerve gas VX, 550 mustard-filled artillery shells, and 400 biological weapons-capable aerial bombs that the U.N. Special Commission concluded in 1999 -- and this is the U.N.'s conclusion -- Iraq had failed to account for.

There is no mention of Iraqi efforts to procure uranium from abroad. Iraq fails to explain why it's producing missile fuel that seems designed for ballistic missiles it claims it does not have. There is no information on 13 recent Iraqi missile tests cited by Dr. Blix that exceeded the 150-kilometer limit. There is no explanation of the connection between

Iraq's extensive unmanned aerial vehicle program and chemical or biological agent dispersal. There is no information about Iraq's mobile biological-weapons production facilities. And, very disturbingly, Iraq has not accounted for some two tons of anthrax growth media.

When U.N. inspectors left Iraq in 1998, they concluded, and I quote: "The history of the Special Commission's work in Iraq has been plagued by coordinated efforts to thwart full discovery of Iraq's programs," unquote. What we know today from the testimony of Iraqis with first-hand knowledge, from U.N. inspectors and from a variety of other sources, about Iraq's current efforts to deceive inspectors suggests that Iraq is fully engaged today in the same old practices of concealment and deception. Iraq seems to be employing virtually all of the old techniques that it used to frustrate U.N. inspections in the past.

At the heart of those techniques, of course, is hiding things, and moving them if they're found. In the past, Iraq made determined efforts to hide its prohibited weapons and to move them if inspectors were about to find them. In 1991, in one of the first, and only, instances where the inspectors found prohibited equipment, they came upon some massive calutrons, devices used for enriching uranium, at an Iraqi military base. Even at that early stage, Iraq had begun to make provisions to move its illegal weapons in case inspectors stumbled across them. As the inspectors appeared at the front gate, the Iraqis moved the calutrons out the back of the base on large tank transporters.

Today, those practices continue, except that over the last 12 years, Iraqi preparations for concealing their illegal programs have become more extensive and sophisticated. Iraq's national policy is not to disarm but rather to hide its weapons of mass terror. That effort, significantly -- the effort of concealment -- is led by none other than Saddam's own son, Qusay, who uses a Special Security Organization under his control for that purpose. Other security organizations contribute to these "anti-inspection" activities, including the National Monitoring Directorate, whose ostensible purpose is to facilitate inspections. Instead, it provides tip-offs of sites that are about to be inspected and uses "minders" to intimidate witnesses. Iraqi security organizations and a number of government agencies provide thousands of personnel to hide documents and materials from inspectors, to sanitize inspection sites and to monitor the inspectors' activities. Indeed, the "anti-inspectors" vastly outnumber the couple of hundred of U.N. personnel on the ground in Iraq.

Already, we have multiple reports and other evidence of intensified efforts to hide documents in places where they are unlikely to be found, such as private homes of low-level officials and universities. We have reports and other evidence of prohibited material and documents being relocated to agricultural areas and private homes or hidden beneath mosques and hospitals. Furthermore, according to these reports, the material is moved constantly, making it difficult to trace or find without absolutely fresh intelligence. It is a shell game played on a grand scale with deadly serious weapons.

Those efforts at concealment are assisted by active surveillance and penetration of the inspectors. In the past, Iraq systematically used its intelligence capabilities to support efforts to conceal its illegal activities. Former inspector David Kay recalled that in 1991, the inspectors came across a document warning the chief security official of the facility

they were about to inspect, that David Kay would lead the U.N. team. That warning had been issued less than 48 hours after the decision had been made for Kay to lead the team, and at that time, fewer than 10 people within the inspection organization were supposed to know the operational plan.

In the 1990s, there were reports that Iraqi intelligence recruited U.N. inspectors as informants. And it was known that Iraqi scientists were fearful about the confidentiality of their interviews. Recent reports that Iraq continues these kinds of efforts are a clear sign that it is not yet serious about disarmament.

Today, we also anticipate that Iraq is likely to target U.N. computer systems through cyber intrusions to steal inspections, methods, criteria, and findings. And we know that Iraq has the capability to do that. According to Khidhir Hamza, a former senior official in the Iraqi nuclear program, Iraq's Babylon Software Company was set up to develop cyber warfare capabilities on behalf of the Iraqi Intelligence Service in the early 1990s. Some people assigned to Babylon were segregated into a highly compartmented unit and tasked with breaking into foreign computers to download sensitive data. Some of the programmers reported that they had accumulated sufficient expertise to break into moderately protected computer systems, such as those that the inspectors depend upon.

Further technique is intimidation and coercion, both of the inspectors and of the people they're inspecting. In the past, Iraq did not hesitate to use pressure tactics to obtain information about the inspectors. Sometimes the pressure was quite crude. During the UNSCOM period, one inspector was reportedly filmed in a compromising situation and blackmailed.

Sometimes the pressure was more subtle. Richard Spertzel, a former inspector in the biological warfare unit, recalled the case of an Iraqi official who coyly asked a member of Spertzel's team, "Just how far is it from Salt Lake City to Minnesota?" Since this woman had just moved from Salt Lake City to Minneapolis a few days prior to her arrival in Iraq, you can imagine that she was unnerved by the comment.

More recently Iraq has again begun referring to the inspectors as spies, clearly hoping to make them uncomfortable at best and afraid at worst, and to intimidate Iraqis from interacting with them.

For Iraqis, there is nothing subtle about the intimidation. As President Bush stated so correctly, and as numerous reports by Human Rights Watch and other organizations confirm, "The dictator of Iraq is a student of Stalin, using murder as a tool of terror and control, within his own cabinet, within his own army, and even within his own family."

Today we know from multiple sources that Saddam has ordered that any scientist who cooperates during interviews will be killed, as well as their families. Furthermore, we know that scientists are being tutored on what to say to the U.N. inspectors and that Iraqi intelligence officers are posing as scientists to be interviewed by the inspectors.

And finally, of course, there's obstruction, and obstruction concealed by lying. In the past, U.N. inspectors faced many instances of delay, with excuses that ranged from, "We can't find the keys," to "You can't come in here because only women are allowed." When all else fails, lying becomes a standard technique.

Richard Butler, the former head of the U.N. Special Commission, reported, and I quote, "Iraqi leaders had no difficulty sitting across from me and spontaneously changing a reported fact or figure." For example, he said, six previously reported warheads could suddenly become 15, or vice versa, with no explanation or apology about a previous lie. Butler reports that actions taken to obstruct inspectors were often explained away with excuses that were as credible as "the dog ate my homework." One example that Butler quotes, literally: "A wandering psychopath cut some wires to the chemical plant monitoring camera. It seems he hadn't received the medicine he needed because of the U.N. sanctions." (Laughter.) And here's another: "The wicked girlfriend of one of our workers tore up the documents in anger."

During the UNSCOM period, Richard Spertzel on one occasion confronted Dr. Rihab Taha, still a principal and sinister figure in Iraq's biological weapons program. He said to her, and I quote, "Dr. Taha, you know that we know that you're lying, so why are you doing it?" Dr. Taha drew herself up and replied, "Dr. Spertzel, it is not a lie when you are ordered to lie." Lying was more than a technique. It was, and it remains, a policy.

Today, Iraqi obstruction continues on large issues as well as small ones. Authorities that Resolution 1441 confers unconditionally on the inspectors are constantly subject to conditions by the Baghdad regime. For example, the resolution requires that the U.N. inspectors shall have, quote, "free and unrestricted use and landing of fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft, including manned and unmanned reconnaissance vehicles," unquote. But Iraq has objected to U-2 flights and shoots at our Predators. Even more serious, Iraq has yet to make a single one of its scientists or technical experts available to be interviewed in confidential circumstances free of intimidation as required by the U.N. resolution.

Long ago Iraq became accustomed to the fact that even when caught, the consequences could be negligible. And hence a new game entered the lexicon: cheat and retreat. This happened on issue after issue. For example, as Butler reports -- I'm quoting again -- "Initially Iraq had denied ever having manufactured, let alone deployed, VX. But this was not true." Confronted with evidence of VX in soil samples, the Iraqis then admitted they had manufactured, but claimed a quantity of no more than 200 liters. Subsequent probing showed they'd made far more. So Iraq's initial complete lie had been replaced by a false statement about the quantity. Iraq then reached for a third lie: they'd never weaponized VX. This, it turned out, was yet a third falsehood.

The same pattern was repeated with Iraq's nuclear and biological weapons. Baghdad revised its nuclear declaration to the IAEA four times within 14 months of the initial submission in April 1991. During the UNSCOM period, Iraq submitted six different biological warfare declarations, each one of which the U.N. inspectors rejected. Following the defection of Saddam's son-in-law, Husayn Kamil, Iraq dramatically

disclosed more than half a million pages of biological weapons-related documents. But, in fact, sparse relevant information was buried within a massive volume of extraneous data, all of which was intended to create the appearance of candor and to overwhelm the U.N. inspectors' analytical resources.

A process that begins with a massive lie and proceeds with concealment, penetration, intimidation and obstruction cannot be a process of cooperative disarmament. The purpose of Resolution 1441, I repeat, was not to play a deadly game of hide-and-seek or cheat-and-retreat for another 12 years. The purpose was to achieve a clear resolution of the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass terror.

If Iraq were to choose to comply with the requirement to dismantle its weapons of mass terror, we would know it. We would know it from their full and complete declaration of everything that we know that they have, as well as by revelations of programs that our intelligence has probably not yet discovered. Recall that after the Gulf War, we were stunned by the magnitude of Iraq's nuclear program, despite all of our intelligence efforts and those of our allies, including Israel, and even though Iraq had been subject to IAEA inspections for many years.

We would know it if we saw an attitude on the part of the Iraqi government that encouraged people to cooperate with inspectors, rather than intimidated them into silence and lies. We would know it when inspectors were able to go about their work without being spied on or penetrated. And we would know it most of all when Iraqi scientists and others familiar with the program were clearly speaking freely.

But in the absence of full cooperation, particularly in the absence of full disclosure of what Iraq has actually done, we cannot expect that the U.N. inspectors have the capacity to disarm an uncooperative Iraq, even with the full support of American intelligence and the intelligence of other nations.

American intelligence capabilities are extraordinary, but they are far from the omniscient, all-seeing eye depicted in some Hollywood movies. For a great body of what we need to know, we are dependent on traditional methods of intelligence -- that is to say, human beings, who either deliberately or inadvertently are communicating to us.

It was only after Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Husayn Kamil, defected in 1995 that U.N. inspectors were led to a large cache of documents, on a chicken farm, that contained important revelations about Iraq's biological weapons. In contemplating the magnitude of the task of finding such hidden sites, one might ask: How many farms are there in Iraq? How many structures are there in which important documents could be stored? How many garages in that big country are large enough to hold the tractor-trailers that make up an Iraqi mobile biological weapons factory?

And we need to be worried. Even when inspectors were in Iraq before, the Baghdad regime was building and retaining weapons of mass terror. It would be folly to think that those efforts stopped when the inspectors left.

Consider that in 1997, U.N. inspectors found Iraq had produced and weaponized at least 10 liters of ricin. In concentrated form, that quantity of ricin is enough to kill more than 1 million people.

Baghdad declared to the U.N. inspectors that it had over 19,000 liters of botulinum toxin, enough to kill tens of millions; and 8,500 liters of anthrax, with the potential to kill hundreds of millions. And consider that the U.N. inspectors believe that much larger quantities of biological agents remained undeclared. Indeed, the inspectors think that Iraq has manufactured two to four times the amount of biological agents it has admitted to and has failed to explain the whereabouts of more than two metric tons of raw material for the growth of biological agents. Despite 11 years of inspections and sanctions, containment and military response, Baghdad retains chemical and biological weapons and is producing more. And Saddam's nuclear scientists are still hard at work.

As the President put it, and I quote, "The history, the logic and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence. To assume the regime's good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. And this is a risk we must not take."

So, we come back to the imperative: Baghdad must disarm, peacefully if at all possible, but by force if necessary. The decision on whether Iraq's weapons of mass terror will be dismantled voluntarily or whether it will have to be done by force is not up to us, it is not up to the inspectors, it is not up to the United Nations. The decision rests entirely with Saddam Hussein. So far, he has not made the fundamental decision to disarm, and unless he does, the threat posed by his weapons programs will remain with us, and, indeed, it will grow.

Yes, there are real dangers in confronting a tyrant who has and uses weapons of mass terror and has links to terrorists. But those dangers will only grow. They are far greater now than they would have been five or 10 years ago, and they will be much greater still five or 10 years from now. President Bush has brought the world to an extraordinary consensus and focus on this problem; it is time to see it resolved, voluntarily or by force, but resolved one way or another. And time is running out.

On a happier note, if one thinks about it, once freed from Saddam's tyranny, it is reasonable to expect that Iraq's educated, industrious population of more than 20 million could build a modern society that would be a source of prosperity, not insecurity, for its neighbors.

Barham Salih, a very brave and distinguished Iraqi Kurdish leader, spoke recently of the dream of the Iraqi people, and I quote. He said, "In my office in Suleymaniyah, I meet almost every day some traveler who has come from Baghdad or other parts of Iraq. Without exception, they tell me of the continuing suffering inflicted by the Iraqi regime,

of the fearful hope secretly nurtured by so many enslaved Iraqis for a free life, for a country where they can think without fear and speak without retribution."

We may someday look back on this moment in history as the time when the West defined itself for the 21st Century, not in terms of geography or race or religion or culture or language, but in terms of values, the values of freedom and democracy.

For people who cherish freedom and seek peace, these are indeed difficult times. But such times can deepen our understanding of the truth. And this truth we know: the single greatest threat to peace and freedom in our time is terrorism. So this truth we must also affirm: the truth does not belong to tyrants and terrorists. The truth belongs to those who dream the oldest and noblest dream of all -- the dream of peace and freedom.

Thank you. (Applause.)

Peterson: Okay. We'll now go to our Washington friends. Bob Orr?

Orr: Thank you, Pete. I think Judge Webster will ask the first question.

Q: Mr. Secretary --

Wolfowitz: Hi, Bill.

Q: (Inaudible.) Can you hear me?

Wolfowitz: I can hear you fine.

Q: Fine. Thank you.

Well, your well-chosen remarks brought back many memories of the same kind of dissemination, cheating and evasion 10, 12 years ago, and now we see some more. I think the American people right now, not to mention some of our erstwhile friends and allies around the world, are looking for what kind of a case can be made for what kind of action. And in that -- to that extent, the role of intelligence does play a role.

I think we have heard far more -- at least I have heard far more of a case from you this morning than I have heard in bits and pieces in the last several months of illustrations. And I'm wondering to what extent a strategy can be developed to provide more factual intelligence in a way that does not prejudice, of course, sources and methods, but makes the case in a way that the American people can understand it and be willing to support it.

Wolfowitz: Of course, you know probably better than anyone the difficulties in revealing things we know, because inevitably you reveal things about how you found them out. At the risk of teasing the press, there are three words in my speech that I was forced to substitute for two rather stunning paragraphs, on the grounds that we would say too much about what we're observing even today.

But what I'd really like to do is to go to the premise of this question. And it's not to say it's the wrong question; I understand why people ask it all the time. But just think about it for the moment.

Saddam Hussein must watch CNN. He certainly gets daily reports on every question that's asked here, sort of like a serial murderer sitting out there, saying, "Well, the district attorney has no grounds for arresting this man, no way to go for him."

We have got to send a message to Saddam Hussein that he has to change. If he thinks that every little possible loophole in the case, every possible way of explaining away, every resort to the old patterns of cheat-and-retreat will get him off the hook, then we are going to continue marching down a road that leads to only one and -- one rather grim conclusion.

Twelve years ago we entered, with real expectations, into a process for Iraq's voluntary disarmament. We really believed it would happen. We were disappointed.

This time we went into it with our eyes open, with an understanding that the only way it could happen was if he were convinced that we were prepared to act.

I understand -- I understand very well, and we spent a lot of time talking, especially to senators and congressmen, about the concerns you refer to. But I think it is very important to make it clear we have a powerful case. It is a case grounded in history. It is a case grounded in current intelligence, current intelligence that comes not only from American intelligence, but many of our allies; intelligence that comes not only from sophisticated overhead satellites and our ability to intercept communications, but from brave people who told us the truth at the risk of their lives. We have that; it is very convincing. At some point we can probably talk about more of it.

But right now, time is running out. It is time for Saddam Hussein to do something that he clearly hasn't done yet, and it is the essential solution to this problem.

Orr: Perhaps, Paul, I could give do a little follow-up. Why do you think it's been so difficult to persuade our leading allies -- France and Russia, and so forth -- of the evidence that presumably you've shared a lot of?

Wolfowitz: I don't know. That would sort of require me to speculate about motives, and you get in trouble when you do that.

I think one of the problems with a lot of people is a well-intentioned belief that the key to preventing war is to persuade us that we mustn't act. And the key, in fact, here to achieving the one alternative to war, which is cooperative disarmament, is to persuade Saddam Hussein that he must act. So I would say whatever the intentions of our allies -- and I believe they agree with us completely that he has these weapons -- I would hope they'd put more effort into persuading Saddam Hussein than into persuading us.

Orr: Thank you.

Now we'll come to New York, please.

Yes, sir?

Q: Michael Gordon, New York Times. Paul, I'd like to just follow up on the first question. The Bush administration has asserted not only that Iraq has had weapons of mass destruction, but that it has resumed production of biological and chemical weapons. And President Bush, in his appearance before the General Assembly, cited Iraq's efforts to acquire aluminum tubes as evidence that Iraq was trying to rejuvenate its nuclear weapons program.

But not all of these claims have been accepted by the U.N. inspectors that you cite. For example, just two weeks ago, the IAEA said that it had looked into the matter of the aluminum tubes and determined, on the evidence so far, that it thought they were for a conventional rocket program. And the IAEA also said that the uranium -- attempts to purchase uranium that you cited in your speech today -- that it had received no information from any governments that would allow it to determine the validity of this assertion as to when Iraq tried to purchase uranium, whether it was recent or long ago, as the Iraqis assert.

Given that we're talking about matters of war and peace, does the administration plan to make a further report and provide intelligence information to address these concerns stated by the IAEA in its public report, and to buttress its claims that Iraq has resumed the production of weapons of mass destruction? And if not, is this because of targeting concerns, sources and methods, or do you simply not have reliable information that would stand up in a public forum on this?

Wolfowitz: I think the short answer, Michael, really is there is a lot of evidence; as the evidence accumulates, our ability to talk about it undoubtedly will grow. But we don't have a lot of time; time is running out, and I repeat: What has clearly not happened is any change of attitude by the Iraqi regime.

Yeah, it's possible that we have been misinformed on some things. The only way to verify that you've been misinformed is with the kind of openness of the South Africans or the Ukrainians or the Kazakhs demonstrated. If you can go into places and talk freely to people and look at all the records, you might be convinced. But in a country that has a history of constructing Potemkin villages, there's absolutely no way to know whether what the inspectors were shown were indeed those aluminum tubes that we're concerned about or whether it was a whole facade constructed to substantiate a certain story.

So, you've got to look at Iraq's behavior toward the inspectors; you've got to look at Iraq's intimidation of its scientists. These efforts to obstruct are very, very clear signs of Iraq's intentions, just as 12 years of foregoing what are estimated to be \$100 billion to \$200 billion of oil revenues in order to not comply with U.N. resolutions are a sign of their policy.

Peterson: Let's take another New York question. Over here, please.

Q: Thank you. I'd like to follow up also on Judge Webster's question. I think, Mr. Wolfowitz, your answer amounts to: "We can't tell you what we have of information, but trust us. It's there." Now, isn't the fundamental principle of a democratic free nation precisely not to trust government? Why should Americans trust their government? We've heard that before in Vietnam, we've heard it many times: "Trust us," and it turned out to be untrustworthy.

I don't see how this administration thinks it can build a policy for war, preventive war, that would be accepted by our allies and by American citizens on the basis of "We've got the info; we can't tell you how we got it or where we got it; we got it, trust us." And isn't that a foolish and ultimately self-destructive way for this administration to proceed?

Wolfowitz: In some cases, we can tell very clearly where we got information from. In some cases, you would put somebody's life at risk if you told how you got it. That's a fact of life; it's not something you can overcome.

I must say I sort of find it astonishing that the issue is whether you can trust the U.S. government. The real issue is, can you trust Saddam Hussein? And it seems to me the record is absolutely clear that you can't. And we're going to have to have some very powerful evidence that he has changed and that we can trust him, because otherwise, we are trusting our security in the hands of a man who makes ricin, who makes anthrax, who makes botulism toxin, who makes aflatoxin, and who has no compunctions whatsoever about consorting with terrorists. Who do you want to trust?

Peterson: (Calls on questioner.)

Q: Kathleen McCarthy, the Graduate Center, City University of New York. Thank you for a very interesting talk, Mr. Secretary.

My question is this: Why is it a much more important immediate short-term goal to disarm Iraq than North Korea, when we know that North Korea also has a very sophisticated arsenal and ties to terrorist groups. Why is supporting and promoting freedom in Iraq more important than promoting freedom in North Korea, when we also know that the administration there is very cruel as well?

Wolfowitz: It's a reasonable question and I hear it a lot. It seems to me, though, very often it sort of comes in the form of let's not do anything because everything ought to wait for something else. When President Bush first talked about Iran and Iraq and North Korea in the same speech, everybody said, "It's terrible, these countries are all different." Well, they are different. We've developed different policies for each. And now that we have different policies, people say, "How come you're treating them differently?" (Laughter.)

We have not one, but 17, U.N. Security Council resolutions to deal with the problem of Iraq. We're at a point of real decision, and if we lose that point, the credibility not only of the United States but of the entire world body is going to go down the tubes. We haven't yet even been able to bring the North Korean issue to the Security Council, much less

have a resolution. When we do -- and I think we will, and I think we should, and I think we're going to -- our credibility and the credibility of the Security Council will be greatly increased if we have managed -- peacefully or, if necessary, by force -- to enforce the will of the U.N. expressed in 1441.

These are different cases, different countries. The North Korean people suffer as much, maybe worse, if it's possible. They're the only candidates in the world for suffering worse than the Iraqi people.

But again, it is a different case. We have different partners, different countries to work with. We have got to have a strategy that doesn't just do one problem at a time, take the most important one and wait for everything else. We're trying, in a reasonable way, to focus now where we have the world's entire attention focused, to clean up something that's 12 years old.

The North Korean problem is there, and we're also dealing with that. But it's a good question. Thank you.

I think this has to be my last one. Pete, I'm sorry.

Peterson: All right. Well, then we'll go to Washington, please. Bob Orr?

Orr: Karen DeYoung?

Q: Thank you. My question is also on intelligence. You said that it's not the job of inspectors to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and disarm Iraq, but it's for Iraq to voluntarily supply that information. If that's the case, why, then, are we interested in giving the inspectors some of our most sensitive intelligence information, as we've said we've done, to help them find those weapons?

And secondarily, we now say that we have been supplying some of that information, primarily site information, presumably so that the inspectors have a chance of finding some of it. Yet it doesn't seem to have produced any results yet. Is that because, in your view, that the intelligence was mistaken, or the inspectors have not been able to follow up on all of it yet? And if the latter is the case, then what's the case against giving them more time to use that intelligence?

Wolfowitz: There are many good reasons for giving the inspectors intelligence, starting with the fact that we've been asked by the Security Council in 1441 to do exactly that. And we believe in complying with the resolution, though the Iraqis are not. And as I said in my talk, at some length, there is a clear, important role for inspectors to play in verifying if you have genuine compliance. And if you saw the signs of genuine compliance, you would also want the most sophisticated intelligence, to make sure that those signs that you saw were not somehow deceptions.

But when you see signs, absolutely clear signs, that that fundamental decision to disarm hasn't been made; when you start with 12,200 pages of what has been called, correctly, a long, long lie, the inspectors are disabled. The inspectors are there, I repeat, to enable us to have confidence, if Iraq decides to disarm cooperatively, that it has in fact done so.

If Iraq decides to continue hiding and cheating and stealing, the inspectors cannot disarm Iraq, and they may or may not find particular things in particular places. Biological weapons labs, as I mentioned, are a prime example.

But if you're looking for evidence, you can start with the fact that they have a declaration that is known to be false even by the standards of the old U.N. report.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

APPENDIX 12

REMARKS OF VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY TO VETERANS OF KOREAN WAR

<http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2002/August/20020829174710ross@pd.state.gov0.4231378.html>

(begin transcript)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Vice President

August 29, 2002

Marriott River Front Hotel San Antonio, Texas

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Thank you, and thank you, Colonel. It's a very special privilege to be here this afternoon, and I appreciate that warm welcome. Just last month, I had the opportunity in Washington to be part of the presentation ceremony for veterans and family members receiving the Republic of Korea Service Medal. And I appreciate this opportunity once again to join with so many distinguished veterans of the Korean War. And I bring good wishes to all of you from the seat of power -- Crawford, Texas. (Laughter and applause.)

I know you all feel especially welcome here in President Bush's home state, and in this great city of San Antonio -- as the Colonel pointed out, the site of the Alamo. The armed forces have a tremendous presence in this community, at Brooks, Lackland, and Randolph Air Forces bases -- and of course at Fort Sam Houston, the place where military aviation was born, and where Dwight Eisenhower was first posted as a second lieutenant. San Antonio is a proud military town, and I know the residents of this community are honored by your presence.

I, too, am honored to be with you. Colonel Gray was very thoughtful to send me an invitation some months ago, and I couldn't have been more pleased to accept. And in this room I see more than a few friends, and many personal heroes. You share the experience of serving in America in an hour of need -- of showing incredible strength, endurance, and character in the worst imaginable conditions. And you gained that experience in what has been called "the war that America forgot to remember."

I was struck by an item that appeared in the corrections column of a major newspaper several months ago. It seems that the obituary of Colonel William Barber -- a Medal of Honor recipient known to all of you -- the paper described Chosin Reservoir as "one of the worst defeats in Marine Corps history." Well, they may not have checked with many Marines before they printed that. But something tells me they heard from Marines after they printed it. In any event, the editors had to run a correction to point out that the

American action was a "series of tactical victories in the course of a fighting withdrawal."

The paper did right by correcting that record. But it does tell us something when, even fifty years after the fact, there's still a lot of misinformation out there. At the first reunion of the Chosin Few, I'm told, one member of your group said that he asked his children what they teach in the schools about the Korean War. The kids replied, "What war?"

Fortunately, that was a long time ago, and Americans already familiar, now, with the tremendous accomplishments of America's armed forces not only in World War Two and Vietnam have been reminded once again of the tremendous contribution that all of you made in Korea. Visitors to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington now see the names of more than 58,000 Americans lost in that conflict, over a period of more than a decade. Nearby, of course, at the Korean War Veterans Memorial, a lot of people are surprised to learn that in Korea we lost almost that many in just three years' time, the length of the Korean conflict. A good number of you, I'm sure, have seen that memorial -- with the figures of 19 troops, fitted for battle, moving toward the American flag. One visitor asked a Korean veteran if he liked the statues. He did. But, he said, "If you want to know what Korea was like," come back and "look at them when it's 10 degrees below zero, snowing and sleeting."

The Korean War Memorial, together with the 50th anniversary observances, has done a great deal to reacquaint the nation with the history of that conflict. When the conflict began, our military was greatly weakened by years of demobilization, and was scarcely prepared for what lay ahead. It was, said one soldier, "a war of fists and rifle butts" -- where weapons rusted in the monsoons of summer, and froze solid during the coldest Korean winter in a hundred years; where many who fell into enemy hands were treated with almost unimaginable brutality. Yet in Korea were written some of the most notable chapters in military history -- among them General MacArthur's brilliantly conceived landing at Inchon, the intense struggle for Pork Chop Hill, the Eighth Army's phenomenal defense of the Pusan Perimeter, and, of course, the successful fighting withdrawal from the death trap of the Chosin Reservoir.

Military historians have properly termed Chosin Reservoir "the most violent small unit fighting in the history of warfare" and "one of those military masterpieces that occur when skill and bravery fuse to defy rational expectation." This is not the audience for a recitation of those facts; you all know firsthand what happened there. I will say that I hope and pray that greater and greater numbers of Americans will, over time, learn and understand what the Chosin Few did for our nation.

Americans must know names like Lieutenant Colonel, later General, Ray Davis, who led the First Battalion against a numerically superior and ferocious enemy force, pressing on through deep snow into the face of withering fire, carrying all his wounded with him, taking and holding vital terrain and saving a rifle company from annihilation. We all should know, of course, about how Colonel Barber, felled by gunfire, maintained personal control of Company F, commanding his troops from a stretcher.

We need to know about men who fought for weeks on end, having as their only shelter the holes they scooped in the snow. About how General Smith, exhausted and overburdened, gained new strength simply by hearing the sound coming from a warming tent: It was a group of enlisted men singing the Marine Corps Hymn.

We need to remember, as well, that in addition to those who died, more than ninety thousand others came home wounded from that war. And even at this hour several thousand remain missing: brave men last seen doing their duty, honored and remembered by their country, which will persist in our effort to account for every last one of them.

The cause America stood for in Korea -- joined by forces from many countries -- was noble and just. It was the cause of human freedom. It was a struggle to determine, as General Ridgway put it, "Whether the rule of men who shoot their prisoners, enslave their citizens, and deride the dignity of man shall displace the rule of those to whom the individual and individual rights are sacred."

Because so many sacrificed in that cause, South Korea is today a land that enjoys progress and prosperity, its people free from repression, scarcity, and starvation -- the daily conditions of life in North Korea. President Bush has observed that satellite photos of the Korean Peninsula at night show the North in almost complete darkness. South Korea, on the other hand, is bathed in light -- a vibrant, enterprising society; a prosperous democracy sharing ties of commerce and cooperation with many nations all over the globe; a peaceful and talented people who have built the third-largest economy in Asia.

We look to the day when the light of freedom and progress covers all of Korea, and stability on the Peninsula rests on a foundation of peaceful reconciliation. Until then, stability will be maintained by our great military alliance. Thirty-seven thousand American troops proudly serve in Korea today. We will maintain our presence there. America's commitment to peace in the region, and to security for our friends, is unshakable.

Our people stationed in South Korea today follow in the finest of traditions, going back to all of you -- and to the millions of others who have honored this country by their military service. In these last ten months, the people of the United States have been inspired once again by the bravery and selflessness of our armed forces. And I can say, as a former Secretary of Defense, I have never been more proud of the America's military.

Our military will carry out many critical missions as we fight the global war against terror. As Secretary Rumsfeld recently put it, we are still closer to the beginning of this war than we are to the end of it. We have entered a struggle of years -- a new kind of war against a new kind of enemy. The terrorists who struck America are ruthless, they are resourceful, and they hide in many countries. They came into our country to murder thousands of innocent men, women, and children. And there is no doubt but that they wish to strike again, and that they are working to acquire the very deadliest weapons.

Against such enemies, America and the civilized world have only one option: wherever terrorists operate, we must stop them, stop them in their planning, and one by one bring them to justice.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban regime and al Qaeda terrorists have met the fate that they chose for themselves. And they saw, up close and personal, the new methods and capabilities of America's armed forces.

For whatever lies ahead, our men and women in uniform deserve the very best weapons, the very best equipment, the best support, and the best training we can possibly provide them. And under President Bush they will have them all. The President has asked Congress for a one-year increase of more than \$48 billion for national defense, the largest increase since Ronald Reagan lived in the White House. And for the good of the nation's military families, he has also asked Congress to provide every man and woman in uniform with a pay raise. We think they've earned it.

In this war, we have assembled a broad coalition of civilized nations that recognize the danger and that are working with us on all fronts. The President has made very clear that there is no neutral ground in the fight against terror. Those who harbor terrorists share guilt for the acts they commit. And under the Bush Doctrine, a regime that harbors or supports terrorists will be regarded as an enemy of the United States.

The Taliban has already learned that lesson, but Afghanistan was only the beginning of a lengthy campaign. Were we to stop now, any sense of security we have would be only temporary. There is a terrorist underworld out there around the globe, spread to more than 60 countries. The job we have will require every tool of diplomacy, finance, intelligence, law enforcement, and military power. But we will, over time, find and defeat the enemies of the United States. In the case of Osama bin Laden -- as President Bush said recently - - "If he's alive, we'll get him. If he's not alive, we already got him." (Laughter.) A Texas saying, I think. (Laughter and applause.)

But the challenges to our country involve more than just tracking down a single person or one small group. 9/11 and its aftermath awakened this nation to danger, to the true ambitions of the global terror network, and to the reality that weapons of mass destruction are being sought by determined enemies who would not hesitate to use them against us.

It is a certainty that the al Qaeda network is pursuing such weapons, and has succeeded in acquiring at least a crude capability to use them. We found evidence of their efforts in the caves and tunnels of al Qaeda hideouts in Afghanistan. And we've seen in recent days additional confirmation in tapes played on CNN -- pictures of al Qaeda members training to commit acts of terror, and testing chemical weapons on dogs. Those terrorists who remain at large are determined to use these capabilities against the United States and against our friends and allies around the world.

As we face this prospect, old doctrines of security do not apply. In the days of the Cold War, we were able to manage the threat with strategies of deterrence and containment. But it's a lot tougher to deter enemies who have no country to defend. And containment is not possible when dictators obtain weapons of mass destruction and are prepared to share them with terrorists who intend to inflict catastrophic losses on the United States.

In the case of Saddam Hussein, we have a dictator who was defeated in the Persian Gulf War, and who agreed at the time to the destruction of all of his weapons of mass destruction. In the past decade, however, Saddam has systematically broken all of these agreements. His regime is busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological agents, and they continue to pursue an aggressive nuclear weapons program. These are not weapons designed for the purpose of defending Iraq; these are offensive weapons for the purpose of inflicting death on a massive scale, developed so that Saddam Hussein can hold the threat over the head of anyone he chooses, in his own region or beyond.

On the nuclear question, many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire such weapons fairly soon. Just how soon, we cannot really judge. Intelligence is at best an uncertain business, even under the best circumstances. This is especially the case when you are dealing with a totalitarian government that has made a science out of deceiving the international community. One must keep in mind the history of U.N. inspection teams in Iraq. Even as they were conducting the most intrusive system of arms control in history, the inspectors often missed a great deal. Before being barred from the country, the inspectors found and destroyed thousands of chemical weapons, and hundreds of tons of mustard gas and other nerve agents.

Yet Saddam Hussein had sought to frustrate and deceive them at every turn, and was often successful in doing so. At one point in 1995, the inspectors were actually on the verge of declaring that Saddam's programs to develop chemical weapons and ballistic missiles had been fully accounted for and shut down. In time, aided by information from defectors and other sources, they discovered that Saddam Hussein had kept them largely in the dark about the extent of his program to mass-produce VX, one of the deadliest chemicals known to man. And far from having shut down Iraq's prohibited missile programs, the inspectors found that Saddam had continued to test such missiles, almost literally under the noses of U.N. inspectors.

Many have suggested that the problem can be dealt with simply by returning inspectors to Iraq. But we must remember that inspections are not an end in themselves. The objective has to be disarmament; to compel Iraqi compliance with the U.N. Security Council Resolutions that call for the complete destruction of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction and an end to all efforts to develop or produce more chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.

With Saddam's record of thwarting inspections, one has to be concerned that he would continue to plot, using the available time to husband his resources, to invest in his ongoing chemical and biological weapons programs, and to gain the possession of nuclear weapons.

Should all his ambitions be realized, the implications would be enormous for the Middle East, for the United States, and for the peace of the world. The whole range of weapons of mass destruction then would rest in the hands of a dictator who has already shown his willingness to use such weapons, and has done so, both in his war with Iran and against his own people. Armed with an arsenal of these weapons of terror, and sitting atop ten percent of the world's oil reserves, Saddam Hussein could then be expected to seek domination of the entire Middle East, to take control of a great portion of the world's energy supplies, and to directly threaten America's friends throughout the region, and subject the United States or any other nation to nuclear blackmail.

Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us. And there is no doubt that his aggressive regional ambitions will lead him into future confrontations with his neighbors -- confrontations that will involve both the weapons he has today, and the ones he will continue to develop with his oil wealth.

We are, after all, dealing with the same dictator who shoots at American and British pilots in the no-fly zone on a regular basis; the same dictator who dispatched a team of assassins to murder former President Bush as he traveled abroad; the same dictator who invaded Iran and Kuwait, and has fired ballistic missiles at Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel; the same dictator who has been on the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism for nearly two decades.

In the face of such a threat, we must proceed with care, deliberation, and in consultation with our allies. I know our President very well. I've worked alongside him as he directed our response to the events of last September 11th. I know that he will proceed cautiously and deliberately to consider all possible options to deal with the threat that Iraq, ruled by Saddam Hussein, represents. And I am confident that he will, as he has said he would, consult widely with our Congress, with our friends and allies around the world, before deciding upon a course of action. He welcomes the debate that has been joined here at home, and he has made it clear to his national security team that he wants us to participate fully in the hearings that will be held in Congress next month on this vitally important issue.

The elected leaders of the country have a responsibility to consider all available options, and we are doing so. What we must not do in the face of a mortal threat is give in to wishful thinking or to willful blindness. We must not simply look away, hope for the best, and leave the matter for some future administration to resolve. As President Bush has said, time is not on our side. Deliverable weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terror network, or a murderous dictator, or the two working together, constitutes as grave

a threat as can be imagined. The risks of inaction are far greater than the risk of action.

Now and in the future, the United States will work closely with the global coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction. We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect America and our allies from sudden attack. And the entire world must know that we will take whatever action is necessary to defend our freedom and our security.

As former Secretary of State Kissinger recently stated: "The imminence of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the huge dangers it involves, the rejection of a viable inspection system, and the demonstrated hostility of Saddam Hussein combine to produce an imperative for preemptive action." If the United States could have preempted 9/11, we would have, no question. Should we be able to prevent another, much more devastating attack, we will, no question. This nation will not live at the mercy of terrorists or terror regimes.

Some have argued that to oppose Saddam Hussein would cause even greater troubles in that part of the world, and interfere with the larger war against terror. I believe the opposite is true. Regime change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits to the entire region. When the gravest of threats are eliminated, the freedom-loving peoples of the region will have a chance to promote the values that can bring lasting peace. As for the reaction of the Arab "street," the Middle East expert, Professor Fouad Ajami, predicts that after liberation, in Basra and Baghdad the streets are "sure to erupt in joy in the same way the throngs in Kabul greeted the Americans." Extremists in the region would have to rethink their strategy of jihad. Moderates throughout the region would take heart. And our ability to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process would be enhanced, just as it was following the liberation of Kuwait in 1991.

The reality is that these times bring not only dangers but also opportunities. In the Middle East, where so many have known only poverty and oppression, terror and tyranny, we look to the day when people can live in freedom and dignity, and the young can grow up free of the conditions that breed despair, hatred, and violence.

In other times the world saw how the United States defeated fierce enemies, then helped rebuild their countries, forming strong bonds between our peoples and our governments. Today in Afghanistan, the world is seeing that America acts not to conquer but to liberate, and remains in friendship to help the people build a future of stability, self-determination, and peace.

We would act in that same spirit after a regime change in Iraq. With our help, a liberated Iraq can be a great nation once again. Iraq is rich in natural resources and human talent, and has unlimited potential for a peaceful and a prosperous future. Our goal would be an Iraq that has territorial integrity, a government that is democratic and pluralistic, a nation where the human rights of every ethnic and religious group are recognized and respected. In that troubled land, all who seek justice and dignity and the chance to live their own lives can know they have a friend and ally in the United States of America.

Great decisions and challenges lie ahead of us. Yet we can and will build a safer and better world beyond the war on terror. I have shared these thoughts with you today because war veterans with your experience often have a superior perspective on matters involving the nation's security. From experience you understand the overriding importance of clear thinking, careful preparation, and above all honesty, when we think about any future course of action. You understand as well the purposes of this nation -- peace, freedom, self-determination -- because you defended those very purposes in the defining hours of your lives.

Once again, I am grateful for this chance to join you today. And on behalf of the President and the nation, I thank you for your service to the United States. Those who seek the true meaning of duty, honor, service, and sacrifice, will find it in the Chosin Few.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

(end transcript)

APPENDIX 13

Prepared Testimony of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld before the House Armed Services Committee regarding Iraq

<http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2002/September/20020918151541mkellerh@pd.state.gov0.751034.html>

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C., September 18, 2002

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today.

Last week, we commemorated the one-year anniversary of the most devastating attack our nation has ever experienced -- more than 3,000 innocent people killed in a single day.

Today, I want to discuss the task of preventing even more devastating attacks -- attacks that could kill not thousands, but potentially tens of thousands of our fellow citizens.

As we meet, state sponsors of terror across the world are working to develop and acquire weapons of mass destruction. As we speak, chemists, biologists, and nuclear scientists are toiling in weapons labs and underground bunkers, working to give the world's most dangerous dictators weapons of unprecedented power and lethality.

The threat posed by those regimes is real. It is dangerous. And it is growing with each passing day. We cannot wish it away.

We have entered a new security environment, one that is dramatically different than the one we grew accustomed to over the past half-century. We have entered a world in which terrorist movements and terrorists states are developing the capacity to cause unprecedented destruction.

Today, our margin of error is notably different. In the 20th century, we were dealing, for the most part, with conventional weapons -- weapons that could kill hundreds or thousands of people, generally combatants. In the 21st century, we are dealing with weapons of mass destruction that can kill potentially tens of thousands of people -- innocent men, women and children.

Further, because of the nature of these new threats, we are in an age of little or no warning, when threats can emerge suddenly -- at any place or time -- to surprise us. Terrorist states have enormous appetite for these powerful weapons -- and active programs to develop them. They are finding ways to gain access to these capabilities. This is not a possibility -- it is a certainty. In word and deed, they have demonstrated a willingness to use those capabilities. Moreover, after September 11th, they have discovered a new means of delivering these weapons -- terrorist networks. To the extent that they might transfer WMD to terrorist groups, they could conceal their responsibility for attacks. And if they

believe they can conceal their responsibility for an attack, then they would likely not be deterred.

We are on notice. Let there be no doubt: an attack will be attempted. The only question is when and by what technique. It could be months, a year, or several years. But it will happen. It is in our future. Each of us needs to pause, and think about that for a moment -- about what it would mean for our country, for our families -- and indeed for the world.

If the worst were to happen, not one of us here today will be able to honestly say it was a surprise. Because it will not be a surprise. We have connected the dots as much as it is humanly possible -- before the fact. Only by waiting until after the event could we have proof positive. The dots are there for all to see. The dots are there for all to connect. If they aren't good enough, rest assured they will only be good enough after another disaster -- a disaster of still greater proportions. And by then it will be too late.

The question facing us is this: what is the responsible course of action for our country? Do you believe it is our responsibility to wait for a nuclear, chemical or biological 9/11? Or is it the responsibility of free people to do something now -- to take steps to deal with the threat before we are attacked?

The President has made his position clear: the one thing that is not an option is doing nothing.

There are a number of terrorist states pursuing weapons of mass destruction -- Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, to name but a few. But no terrorist state poses a greater and more immediate threat to the security of our people, and the stability of the world, than the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

No living dictator has shown the murderous combination of intent and capability -- of aggression against his neighbors; oppression of his own people; genocide; support of terrorism; pursuit of weapons of mass destruction; the use of weapons of mass destruction; and the most threatening hostility to its neighbors and to the United States, [other] than Saddam Hussein and his regime.

Mr. Chairman, these facts about Saddam Hussein's regime should be part of this record and of our country's considerations:

-- Saddam Hussein has openly praised the attacks of September 11th.

-- Last week, on the anniversary of 9-11, his state-run press called the attacks "God's punishment."

-- He has repeatedly threatened the U.S. and its allies with terror -- once declaring that "every Iraqi [can] become a missile."

-- He has ordered the use of chemical weapons -- Sarin, Tabun, VX, and mustard agents -- against his own people, in one case killing 5,000 innocent civilians in a single day.

- His regime has invaded two of its neighbors, and threatened others.
- In 1980, they invaded Iran, and used chemical weapons against Iranian forces.
- In 1990, they invaded Kuwait and are responsible for thousands of documented cases of torture, rape and murder of Kuwaiti civilians during their occupation.
- In 1991, they were poised to march on and occupy other nations -- and would have done so, had they not been stopped by the U.S.-led coalition forces.
- His regime has launched ballistic missiles at four of their neighbors -- Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.
- His regime plays host to terrorist networks, and has directly ordered acts of terror on foreign soil.
- His regime assassinates its opponents, both in Iraq and abroad, and has attempted to assassinate the former Israeli Ambassador to Great Britain, and a former U.S. President.
- He has executed members of their cabinet, including the Minister of Health, whom he personally shot and killed.
- His regime has committed genocide and ethnic cleansing in Northern Iraq, ordering the extermination of between 50,000 and 100,000 people and the destruction of over 4,000 villages.
- His attacks on the Kurds drove 2 million refugees into Turkey, Syria and Iran.
- His regime has brought the Marsh Arabs in Southern Iraq to the point of extinction, drying up the Iraqi marshlands in order to move against their villages -- one of the worst environmental crimes ever committed.
- His regime is responsible for catastrophic environmental damage, setting fire to over 1,100 Kuwaiti oil wells.
- His regime beat and tortured American POWs during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and used them as "human shields."
- His regime has still failed to account for hundreds of POWs, including Kuwaiti, Saudi, Indian, Syrian, Lebanese, Iranian, Egyptian, Bahraini and Omani nationals -- and an American pilot shot down over Iraq during the Gulf War.

-- His regime on almost a daily basis continues to fire missiles and artillery at U.S. and coalition aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones in Northern and Southern Iraq, and has made clear its objective of shooting down coalition pilots enforcing U.N. resolutions -- it is the only place in the world where U.S. forces are shot at with impunity.

-- His regime has subjected tens of thousands of political prisoners and ordinary Iraqis to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, summary execution, torture, beatings, burnings, electric shocks, starvation and mutilation.

-- He has ordered doctors to surgically remove the ears of military deserters, and the gang rape of Iraqi women, including political prisoners, the wives and daughters of their opposition and members of the regime suspected of disloyalty.

-- His regime is actively pursuing weapons of mass destruction, and willing to pay a high price to get them -- giving up tens of billions in oil revenue under economic sanctions by refusing inspections to preserve his WMD programs.

-- His regime has amassed large, clandestine stockpiles of biological weapons -- including anthrax and botulism toxin, and possibly smallpox.

-- His regime has amassed large, clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons -- including VX, sarin, cyclosarin and mustard gas.

-- His regime has an active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons.

-- They have the knowledge of how to produce nuclear weapons, and designs for at least two different nuclear devices.

-- They have a team of scientists, technicians and engineers in place, as well as the infrastructure needed to build a weapon.

-- Very likely all they need to complete a weapon is fissile material -- and they are, at this moment, seeking that material -- both from foreign sources and the capability to produce it indigenously.

-- His regime has dozens of ballistic missiles, and is working to extend their range in violation of U.N. restrictions.

-- His regime is pursuing pilotless aircraft as a means of delivering chemical and biological weapons.

-- His regime agreed after the Gulf War to give up weapons of mass destruction and submit to international inspections -- then lied, cheated and hid their WMD programs for more than a decade.

-- His regime has in place an elaborate, organized system of denial and deception to frustrate both inspectors and outside intelligence efforts.

-- His regime has violated U.N. economic sanctions, using illicit oil revenues to fuel their WMD aspirations.

-- His regime has diverted funds from the U.N.'s "oil for food" program -- funds intended to help feed starving Iraqi civilians -- to fund WMD programs.

-- His regime violated 16 U.N. resolutions, repeatedly defying the will of the international community without cost or consequence.

-- And his regime is determined to acquire the means to strike the U.S., its friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction, acquire the territory of their neighbors, and impose their control over the Persian Gulf region.

As the President warned the United Nations last week, "Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger." It is a danger to its neighbors, to the United States, to the Middle East, and to international peace and stability. It is a danger we do not have the option to ignore.

The world has acquiesced in Saddam Hussein's aggression, abuses and defiance for more than a decade.

In his U.N. address, the President explained why we should not allow the Iraqi regime to acquire weapons of mass destruction -- and issued a challenge to the international community: to enforce the numerous resolutions the U.N. has passed and Saddam Hussein has defied; to show that Security Council's decisions will not be cast aside without cost or consequence; to show that the U.N. is up to the challenge of dealing with a dictator like Saddam Hussein; to show that the U.N. is determined not to become irrelevant.

President Bush has made clear that the United States wants to work with the U.N. Security Council to deal with the threat posed by the Iraqi regime. But he made clear the consequences of Iraq's continued defiance: "The purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced ... or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power." The President has asked the Members of the House and the Senate to support the actions that may be necessary to deliver on that pledge. He urged that the Congress act before the congressional recess. He asked that you send a clear signal -- to the world community and the Iraqi regime -- that our country is united in purpose and ready to act. Only certainty of U.S. and U.N. purposefulness can have even the prospect of affecting the Iraqi regime.

It is important that Congress send that message as soon as possible -- before the U.N. Security Council votes. The Security Council must act soon, and it is important that the U.S. Congress signal the world where the U.S. stands before the U.N. vote takes place. Delaying a vote in the Congress would send a message that the U.S. may be unprepared to take a stand, just as we are asking the international community to take a stand, and as Iraq will be considering its options.

Delay would signal the Iraqi regime that they can continue their violations of the U.N. resolutions. It serves no U.S. or U.N. purpose to give Saddam Hussein excuses for further delay. His regime should recognize that the U.S. and the U.N. are purposeful.

It was Congress that changed the objective of U.S. policy from containment to regime change, by the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998. The President is now asking Congress to support that policy.

A decision to use military force is never easy. No one with any sense considers war a first choice -- it is the last thing that any rational person wants to do. And it is important that the issues surrounding this decision be discussed and debated.

In recent weeks, a number of questions have been surfaced by Senators, Members of Congress and former government officials. Some of the arguments raised are important. Just as there are risks in acting, so too there are risks in not acting.

Those risks need to be balanced, and to do so it is critical to address a number of the issues that have been raised:

Some have asked whether an attack on Iraq would disrupt and distract the U.S. from the Global War on Terror.

The answer to that is: Iraq is a part of the Global War on Terror -- stopping terrorist regimes from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a key objective of that war. We can fight all elements of this war simultaneously.

Our principal goal in the war on terror is to stop another 9/11 -- or a WMD attack that could make 9/11 seem modest by comparison -- before it happens. Whether that threat comes from a terrorist regime or a terrorist network is beside the point. Our objective is to stop them, regardless of the source.

In his State of the Union address last January, President Bush made our objectives clear. He said: "by seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases the price of indifference would be catastrophic." Ultimately, history will judge us all by what we do now to deal with this danger.

Another question that has been asked is this: The Administration argues Saddam Hussein poses a grave and growing danger. Where is the "smoking gun?"

Mr. Chairman, the last thing we want is a smoking gun. A gun smokes after it has been fired. The goal must be to stop Saddam Hussein before he fires a weapon of mass destruction against our people. As the President told the United Nations last week, "The first time we may be completely certain he has nuclear weapons is when, God forbid, he uses one. We owe it to ... our citizens to do everything in our power to prevent that day from coming." If the Congress or the world wait for a so-called "smoking gun," it is certain that we will have waited too long.

But the question raises an issue that it is useful to discuss -- about the kind of evidence we consider to be appropriate to act in the 21st century.

In our country, it has been customary to seek evidence that would prove guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt" in a court of law. That approach is appropriate when the objective is to protect the rights of the accused. But in the age of WMD, the objective is not to protect the "rights" of dictators like Saddam Hussein -- it is to protect the lives of our citizens. And when there is that risk, and we are trying to defend against the closed societies and shadowy networks that threaten us in the 21st century, expecting to find that standard of evidence, from thousands of miles away, and to do so before such a weapon has been used, is not realistic. And, after such weapons have been used it is too late.

I suggest that any who insist on perfect evidence are back in the 20th century and still thinking in pre-9/11 terms. On September 11th, we were awakened to the fact that America is now vulnerable to unprecedented destruction. That awareness ought to be sufficient to change the way we think about our security, how we defend our country -- and the type of certainty and evidence we consider appropriate.

In the 20th century, when we were dealing largely with conventional weapons, we could wait for perfect evidence. If we miscalculated, we could absorb an attack, recover, take a breath, mobilize, and go out and defeat our attackers. In the 21st century, that is no longer the case, unless we are willing and comfortable accepting the loss not of thousands of lives, but potentially tens of thousands of lives -- a high price indeed.

We have not, will not, and cannot know everything that is going on in the world. Over the years, even our best efforts, intelligence has repeatedly underestimated the weapons capabilities of a variety of countries of major concern to us. We have had numerous gaps of two, four, six or eight years between the time a country of concern first developed a WMD capability and the time we finally learned about it.

We do know that the Iraqi regime has chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction and is pursuing nuclear weapons; that they have a proven willingness to use the weapons at their disposal; that they have proven aspirations to seize the territory of, and threaten, their neighbors; proven support for and cooperation with terrorist networks;

and proven record of declared hostility and venomous rhetoric against the United States. Those threats should be clear to all.

In his U.N. address, the President said "we know that Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even when inspectors were in his country. Are we to assume that he stopped when they left?" To the contrary, knowing what we know about Iraq's history, no conclusion is possible except that they have and are accelerating their WMD programs.

Now, do we have perfect evidence that can tell us precisely the date Iraq will have a deliverable nuclear device, or when and where he might try to use it? That is not knowable. But it is strange that some seem to want to put the burden of proof on us -- the burden of proof ought to be on him -- to prove he has disarmed; to prove he no longer poses a threat to peace and security. And that he cannot do.

Committees of Congress currently are asking hundreds of questions about what happened on September 11th -- pouring over thousands of pages of documents, and asking who knew what, when and why they didn't prevent that tragedy. I suspect, that in retrospect, most of those investigating 9/11 would have supported preventive action to pre-empt that threat, if it had been possible to see it coming.

Well, if one were to compare the scraps of information the government had before September 11th to the volumes of information the government has today about Iraq's pursuit of WMD, his use of those weapons, his record of aggression and his consistent hostility toward the United States -- and then factor in our country's demonstrated vulnerability after September 11th -- the case the President made should be clear.

As the President said, time is not on our side. If more time passes, and the attacks we are concerned about come to pass, I would not want to have ignored all the warning signs and then be required to explain why our country failed to protect our fellow citizens.

We cannot go back in time to stop the September 11th attack. But we can take actions now to prevent some future threats.

Some have argued that the nuclear threat from Iraq is not imminent -- that Saddam is at least 5-7 years away from having nuclear weapons.

I would not be so certain. Before Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the best intelligence estimates were that Iraq was at least 5-7 years away from having nuclear weapons. The experts were flat wrong. When the U.S. got on the ground, it found the Iraqi's were probably six months to a year away from having a nuclear weapon -- not 5 to 7 years.

We do not know today precisely how close he is to having a deliverable nuclear weapon. What we do know is that he has a sizable appetite for them, that he has been actively and persistently pursuing them for more than 20 years, and that we allow him to get them at our peril. Moreover, let's say he is 5-7 years from a deliverable nuclear weapon. That raises the question: 5-7 years from when? From today? From 1998, when he kicked out the inspectors? Or from earlier, when inspectors were still in country? There is no way of

knowing except from the ground, unless one believes what Saddam Hussein says.

But those who raise questions about the nuclear threat need to focus on the immediate threat from biological weapons. From 1991 to 1995, Iraq repeatedly insisted it did not have biological weapons. Then, in 1995, Saddam's son-in-law defected and told the inspectors some of the details of Iraq's biological weapons program. Only then did Iraq admit it had produced tens of thousands of liters of anthrax and other biological weapons. But even then, they did not come clean. U.N. inspectors believe Iraq had in fact produced two to four-times the amount of biological agents it had declared. Those biological agents were never found. Iraq also refused to account for some three tons of materials that could be used to produce biological weapons.

Iraq has these weapons. They are much simpler to deliver than nuclear weapons, and even more readily transferred to terrorist networks, who could allow Iraq to deliver them without fingerprints.

If you want an idea of the devastation Iraq could wreak on our country with a biological attack, consider the recent "Dark Winter" exercise conducted by Johns Hopkins University. It simulated a biological WMD attack in which terrorists released smallpox in three separate locations in the U.S. Within 22 days, it is estimated it would have spread to 26 states, with an estimated 6,000 new infections occurring daily. Within two months, the worst-case estimate indicated one million people could be dead and another 2 million infected. Not a nice picture.

The point is this: we know Iraq possesses biological weapons, and chemical weapons, and is expanding and improving their capabilities to produce them. That should be of every bit as much concern as Iraq's potential nuclear capability.

Some have argued that even if Iraq has these weapons, Saddam Hussein does not intend to use WMD against the U.S. because he is a survivor, not a suicide bomber -- that he would be unlikely to take actions that could lead to his own destruction.

Then why is Iraq pursuing WMD so aggressively? Why are they willing to pay such a high price for them -- to suffer a decade of economic sanctions that have cost them tens of billions in oil revenues -- sanctions they could get lifted simply by an agreement to disarm?

One answer is that, as some critics have conceded, "he seeks weapons of mass destruction ... to deter us from intervening to block his aggressive designs." This is no doubt a motivation. But consider the consequences if they were allowed to succeed.

Imagine for a moment that Iraq demonstrated the capacity to attack U.S. or European populations centers with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Then imagine you are the President of the United States, trying to put together an international coalition to stop their aggression, after Iraq had demonstrated that capability. It would be a daunting task. His regime believes that simply by possessing the capacity to deliver WMD to Western

capitals, he will be able to prevent -- terrorize -- the free world from projecting force to stop his aggression -- driving the West into a policy of forced isolationism.

That said, it is far from clear that he would not necessarily restrain from taking actions that could result in his destruction. For example, that logic did not stop the Taliban from supporting and harboring al-Qaeda as they planned and executed repeated attacks on the U.S. And their miscalculation resulted in the destruction of their regime. Regimes without checks and balances are prone to grave miscalculations. Saddam Hussein has no checks whatsoever on his decision-making authority. Who among us really believes it would be wise or prudent for us to base our security on the hope that Saddam Hussein, or his sons who might succeed him, could not make the same fatal miscalculations as Mullah Omar and the Taliban?

It is my view that we would be ill-advised to stake our people's lives on Saddam Hussein's supposed "survival instinct."

Some have argued Iraq is unlikely to use WMD against us because, unlike terrorist networks, Saddam has a "return address."

Mr. Chairman, there is no reason for confidence that if Iraq launched a WMD attack on the U.S. it would necessarily have an obvious "return address." There are ways Iraq could easily conceal responsibility for a WMD attack. They could deploy "sleeper cells" armed with biological weapons to attack us from within -- and then deny any knowledge or connection to the attacks. Or they could put a WMD-tipped missile on a "commercial" shipping vessel, sail it within range of our coast, fire it, and then melt back into the commercial shipping traffic before we knew what hit us. Finding that ship would be like searching for a needle in a haystack -- a bit like locating a single terrorist. Or they could recruit and utilize a terrorist network with similar views and objectives, and pass on weapons of mass destruction to them. It is this nexus between a terrorist state like Iraq with WMD and terrorist networks that has so significantly changed the U.S. security environment.

We still do not know with certainty who was behind the 1996 bombing [of] the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia -- an attack that killed 19 American service members. We still do not know who is responsible for last year's anthrax attacks. The nature of terrorist attacks is that it is often very difficult to identify who is ultimately responsible. Indeed, our consistent failure over the past two decades to trace terrorist attacks to their ultimate source gives terrorist states the lesson that using terrorist networks as proxies is an effective way of attacking the U.S. with impunity.

Some have opined there is scant evidence of Iraq's ties to terrorists, and he has little incentive to make common cause with them.

That is not correct. Iraq's ties to terrorist networks are long-standing. It is no coincidence that Abu Nidal was in Baghdad, when he died under mysterious circumstances. Iraq has also reportedly provided safe haven to Abdul Rahman Yasin, one of the FBI's most wanted terrorists, who was a key participant in the first World Trade Center bombing. We

know that al-Qaeda is operating in Iraq today, and that little happens in Iraq without the knowledge of the Saddam Hussein regime. We also know that there have been a number of contacts between Iraq and al-Qaeda over the years. We know Saddam has ordered acts of terror himself, including the attempted assassination of a former U.S. President.

He has incentives to make common cause with terrorists. He shares many common objectives with groups like al-Qaeda, including an antipathy for the Saudi royal family and a desire to drive the U.S. out of the Persian Gulf region. Moreover, if he decided it was in his interest to conceal his responsibility for an attack on the U.S., providing WMD to terrorists would be an effective way of doing so.

Some have said that they would support action to remove Saddam if the U.S. could prove a connection to the attacks of September 11th -- but there is no such proof.

The question implies that the U.S. should have to prove that Iraq has already attacked us in order to deal with that threat. The objective is to stop him before he attacks us and kills thousands of our citizens.

The case against Iraq does not depend on an Iraqi link to 9/11. The issue for the U.S. is not vengeance, retribution or retaliation -- it is whether the Iraqi regime poses a growing danger to the safety and security of our people, and of the world. There is no question but that it does.

Some argue that North Korea and Iran are more immediate threats than Iraq. North Korea almost certainly has nuclear weapons, and is developing missiles that will be able to reach most of the continental United States. Iran has stockpiles of chemical weapons, is developing ballistic missiles of increasing range, and is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons. The question is asked: why not deal with them first?

Iran and North Korea are indeed threats -- problems we take seriously. That is why President Bush named them specifically, when he spoke about an "Axis of Evil." And we have policies to address both.

But Iraq is unique. No other living dictator matches Saddam Hussein's record of waging aggressive war against his neighbors; pursuing weapons of mass destruction; using WMD against his own people and other nations; launching ballistic missiles at his neighbors; brutalizing and torturing his own citizens; harboring terrorist networks; engaging in terrorist acts, including the attempted assassination of foreign officials; violating his international commitments; lying, cheating and hiding his WMD programs; deceiving and defying the express will of the United Nations over and over again.

As the President told the U.N., "in one place -- in one regime -- we find all these dangers in their most lethal and aggressive forms."

Some respond by saying, OK, Iraq poses a threat we will eventually have to deal with -- but now is not the time to do so.

To that, I would ask: when? Will it be a better time when his regime is stronger? When its WMD programs are still further advanced? After he further builds his forces, which are stronger and deadlier with each passing day? Yes, there are risks in acting. The President understands those risks. But there are also risks in further delay. As the President has said: "I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons."

Others say that overthrowing the regime should be the last step, not the first.

I would respond that for more than a decade now, the international community has tried every other step. They have tried diplomacy; they have tried sanctions and embargoes; they have tried positive inducements, such as the "oil for food" program; they have tried inspections; they have tried limited military strikes. Together, all these approaches have failed to accomplish the U.N. goals.

If the President were to decide to take military action to overthrow the regime, it would be not the first step, it would be the last step, after a decade of failed diplomatic and economic steps to stop his drive for WMD.

Some have asked: why not just contain him? The West lived for 40 years with the Soviet threat, and never felt the need to take pre-emptive action. If containment worked on the Soviet Union, why not Iraq?

First, it's clear from the Iraqi regimes 11 years of defiance that containment has not led to their compliance. To the contrary, containment is breaking down -- the regime continues to receive funds from illegal oil sales and procure military hardware necessary to develop weapons of mass murder. So not only has containment failed to reduce the threat, it has allowed the threat to grow.

Second, with the Soviet Union we faced an adversary that already possessed nuclear weapons -- thousands of them. Our goal with Iraq is to prevent them from getting nuclear weapons. We are not interested in establishing a balance of terror with the likes of Iraq, like the one that existed with the Soviet Union. We are interested in stopping a balance of terror from forming.

Third, with the Soviet Union, we believed that time was on our side -- and we were correct. With Iraq, the opposite is true -- time is not our side. Every month that goes by, his WMD programs are progressing and he moves closer to his goal of possessing the capability to strike our population, and our allies, and hold them hostage to blackmail.

Finally, while containment worked in the long run, the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal prevented the West from responding when they invaded their neighbor, Afghanistan. Does anyone really want Saddam to have that same deterrent, so he can invade his neighbors with impunity?

Some ask: Why does he have to be overthrown? Can't we just take out the capabilities he has that threaten us?

While the President has not made that decision, the problem with doing it piecemeal is this: First, we do not know where all of Iraq's WMD facilities are. We do know where a fraction of them are. Second, of the facilities we do know, not all are vulnerable to attack from the air. Some are underground. Some are mobile. Others are purposely located near population centers -- schools, mosques, hospitals, etc. -- where an air strike could kill large numbers of innocent people. The Iraq problem cannot be solved with air strikes alone.

Some have argued that, if we do have to go to war, the U.S. should first lay out details of a truly comprehensive inspections regime, which, if Iraq failed to comply, would provide a *casus belli*.

I would respond this way: if failure to comply with WMD inspections is a *casus belli*, the U.N. already has it -- Iraq's non-compliance with U.N. inspection regimes has been going on for more than a decade. What else can one ask for?

The U.S. is not closed to inspections as an element of an effective response. But the goal is not inspections -- it is disarmament. Any inspections would have to be notably different from the past. Given the history of this regime, the world community has every right to be skeptical that it would be. And that is why, in 1998, the U.S. began to speak of regime change. Our goal is disarmament. The only purpose of any inspections would be to prove that Iraq has disarmed, which would require Iraq to reverse its decades-long policy of pursuing these weapons: something they are unlikely to do.

There are serious concerns about whether an inspections regime could be effective. Even the most intrusive inspection regime would have difficulty getting at all his weapons of mass destruction. Many of his WMD capabilities are mobile and can be hidden to evade inspectors. He has vast underground networks and facilities to hide WMD, and sophisticated denial and deception techniques. It is simply impossible to "spot check" a country the size of Iraq. Unless we have people inside the Iraqi program who are willing to tell us what they have and where they have it -- as we did in 1995 with the defection of Saddam's son in law, Hussein Kamel -- it is easy for the Iraqi regime to hide its capabilities from us.

Indeed, Hans Blix, the chief U.N. Weapons inspector, said as much in an interview with the New York Times last week. According to the Times, (quote) " [Mr. Blix] acknowledged that there were some limitations to what his team could accomplish even if it was allowed to return. Mr. Blix said his inspectors might not be able to detect mobile laboratories for producing biological weapons materials, or underground storehouses for weapons substances, if the inspectors did not have information about such sites from the last time they were in Iraq or have not seen traces of them in satellite surveillance photography." (Unquote).

When UNSCOM inspectors were on the ground, they did an admirable job of uncovering many of Iraq's violations -- which is undoubtedly why Iraq had them expelled. But despite the U.N.'s best efforts, from 1991-1995 Saddam was able to conceal some of his nuclear program and his biological weapons program. Some aspects were uncovered after his son-in-law defected and provided information that allowed inspectors to find them. And even then, Iraq was able to hide many of those activities from inspectors -- capabilities he most likely still has today, in addition to what he has developed in recent years.

There is a place in this world for inspections. They tend to be effective if the target nation is cooperating -- if they are actually willing to disarm and want to prove to the world that they are doing so. They tend not be as effective in uncovering deceptions and violations when the target is determined not to disarm. Iraq's record of the past decade shows the regime is not interested in disarming or cooperating. Their behavior demonstrates they want weapons of mass destruction and are determined to continue developing them.

Some ask: now that Iraq has agreed to "unconditional inspections," why does Congress need to act?

Iraq has demonstrated great skill at playing the international community. When it's the right moment to lean forward, they lean forward. When it's a time to lean back, they lean back. It's a dance. They can go on for months or years jerking the U.N. around. When they find that things are not going their way, they throw out a proposal like this. And hopeful people say: "There's our opportunity. They are finally being reasonable. Seize the moment. Let's give them another chance." And then we repeatedly find, at the last moment, that Iraq withdraws that carrot and goes back into their mode of rejecting the international community. And the dance starts all over again.

The issue is not inspections. The issue is disarmament. The issue is compliance. As the President made clear in his U.N. address, we require Iraq's compliance with all 16 U.N. resolutions that they have defied over the past decade. And, as the President said, the U.N. Security Council -- not the Iraqi regime -- needs to decide how to enforce its own resolutions. Congress's support for the President is what is needed to further generate international support.

Some have asked whether military intervention in Iraq means the U.S. would have to go to war with every terrorist state that is pursuing WMD?

The answer is: no. Taking military action in Iraq does not mean that it would be necessary or appropriate to take military action against other states that possess or are pursuing WMD. For one thing, preventive action in one situation may very well produce a deterrent effect on other states. After driving the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, we have already seen a change in behavior in certain regimes.

Moreover, dealing with some states may not require military action. In some cases, such as Iran, change could conceivably come from within. The young people and the women in Iran are increasingly fed up with the tight clique of Mullahs -- they want change, and may well rise up to change their leadership at some point.

Some say that there is no international consensus behind ousting Saddam -- and most of our key allies are opposed.

First, the fact is that there are a number of countries that want Saddam Hussein gone. Some are reluctant to say publicly just yet. But, if the U.S. waited for a consensus before acting, we would never do anything. Obviously, one's first choice in life is to have everyone agree with you at the outset. In reality, that is seldom the case. It takes time, leadership and persuasion. Leadership is about deciding what is right, and then going out and persuading others.

The coalition we have fashioned in the global war on terror today includes some 90 nations -- literally half the world. It is the greatest coalition ever assembled in the annals of human history. It was not there on September 11th. It was built, one country at a time, over a long period of time. If we had waited for consensus, the Taliban would still be in power in Afghanistan today. The worldwide coalition was formed by leadership.

During the Persian Gulf War, the coalition eventually included 36 nations. But they were not there on August 2, 1990, when Saddam invaded Kuwait. They were not there on August 5th, when the President George H. W. Bush announced to the world that Saddam's aggression "will not stand." That coalition was built over a period of many months.

With his U.N. speech, President George W. Bush began the process of building international support for dealing with Iraq. The reaction has been positive. We will continue to state our case, as the President is doing, and I suspect that as he does so, you will find that other countries in increasing numbers will cooperate and participate. Will it be unanimous? No. Does anyone expect it to be unanimous? No. Does it matter that it will not be unanimous? No. But does the U.S. want all the support possible -- you bet. Just as we have in the coalition supporting the Global War on Terrorism.

The point is: if our nation's leaders do the right thing, others will follow and support the just cause -- just they have in the global war against terror.

Some say that our European allies may reluctantly go along in the end, but that U.S. intervention in Iraq would spark concern in the Arab world -- that not one country in that regions supports us, and many are vocally opposed.

That is not so. Saddam's neighbors are deathly afraid of him -- and understandably so. He has invaded his neighbors, used weapons of mass destruction against them, and launched ballistic missiles at them. He aspires to dominate the region. The nations of the region would be greatly relieved to have him gone, and that if Saddam Hussein is removed from

power, the reaction in the region will be not outrage, but great relief. And the reaction of the Iraqi people will most certainly be jubilation.

Some ask, but will they help us? Will they give us access to bases and territory and airspace we need to conduct a military operation?

The answer is that the President has not decided to take military action, but, if he does, we will have all the support we need to get the job done. You can be certain of it.

Another argument is that military action in Iraq will be expensive, and will have high costs for the global economy.

That may be true. But there are also dollar costs to not acting -- and those costs could well be far greater. Consider: the New York City Comptroller estimates that the economic costs of the Sept. 11 attacks to New York alone were between \$83 and \$95 billion. He further estimated that New York lost 83,000 existing jobs and some 63,000 jobs the city estimates would have been created had the attacks not happened. One institute puts the cost to the national economy at \$191 billion -- including 1.64 million jobs lost as a direct result of the 9/11 attacks. Other estimates are higher -- as much as \$250 billion in lost productivity, sales, jobs, advertising, airline revenue and the like. And that is not to mention the cost in human lives, and the suffering of those who lost fathers and mothers, sons and daughters, sisters and brothers that day.

And we must not forget that the costs of a nuclear, chemical or biological weapons attack would be far worse. The price in lives would be not thousands, but tens of thousands. And the economic costs could make September 11th pale by comparison. Those are the costs that also must be weighed carefully. And this is not mention the cost to one's conscience of being wrong.

Some have suggested that if the U.S. were to act it might provoke Saddam Hussein's use of WMD. Last time, the argument goes, he didn't use chemical weapons on U.S. troops and allies because he saw our goal was not to oust him, but to push back his aggression. This time, the argument goes, the opposite would be true, and he would have nothing to lose by using WMD.

That is an important point. And the President made clear on March 13, 2002, the consequences of such an attack. He said: "we've got all options on the table because we want to make it very clear to nations that you will not threaten the United States or use weapons of mass destruction against us, our allies, or our friends."

There are ways to mitigate the risk of a chem-bio attack, but it cannot be entirely eliminated -- it is true that could be a risk of military action. But consider the consequences if the world were to allow that risk to deter us from acting. We would then have sent a message to the world about the value of weapons of mass destruction that we would deeply regret having sent. A country thinking about acquiring WMD would conclude that the U.S. had been deterred by Iraq's chemical and biological weapons capabilities, and they could then resolve to pursue those weapons to assure their impunity. The message the world should want to send is the exact opposite. The message should be

that Iraq's pursuit of WMD has not only not made it more secure, it has made it less secure -- that by pursuing those weapons, they have attracted undesired attention to themselves.

But if he is that dangerous, then that only makes the case for action stronger -- because the longer we wait, the more deadly his regime becomes. If the world community were to be deterred from acting today by the threat that Iraq might use chemical or biological weapons, how will the U.N. feel when one day, when Iraq demonstrates it has a deliverable nuclear weapon? The risks will only grow worse. If we are deterred today, we could be deterred forever -- and Iraq will have achieved its objective. Or will the world community be deterred until Iraq uses a weapon of mass destruction, and only then decide it is time to act.

But I would suggest that even if Saddam Hussein were to issue an order for the use chemical or biological weapons, that does not mean his orders would necessarily be carried out. Saddam Hussein might not have anything to lose, but those beneath him in the chain of command most certainly would have a great deal to lose -- let there be no doubt. He has maintained power by instilling fear in his subordinates. If he is on the verge of losing power, he may also lose his ability to impose that fear -- and, thus, the blind obedience of those around him. Wise Iraqis will not obey orders to use WMD.

If President Bush were to decide to take military action, the U.S. will execute his order and finish the job professionally -- Saddam Hussein and his regime would be removed from power. Therefore, with that certain knowledge, those in the Iraqi military will need to think hard about whether it would be in their interest to follow his instructions to commit war crimes by using WMD -- and then pay a severe price for that action. The United States will make clear at the outset that those who are not guilty of atrocities can play a role in the new Iraq. But if WMD is used all bets are off.

I believe many in the Iraqi Armed Forces despise Saddam Hussein, and want to see him go as much as the rest of the world does. Those who may not despise him, but decide they would prefer to survive, may desert and try to blend into the civilian population or escape the country. This is what happened in Panama, when it became clear that Noriega was certain to be on his way out.

Some say that Saddam might succeed in provoking an Israeli response this time -- possibly a nuclear response -- and that this would set the Middle East aflame.

We are concerned about the Iraqi regime attacking a number of its neighbors, and with good reason: Saddam Hussein has a history of doing so. Iraq has attacked Bahrain, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Iraq is a threat to its neighbors. We will consult with all of our allies and friends in the region on how to deal with this threat.

But the fact that they have blackmailed their neighbors makes the case for action stronger. If we do nothing, that blackmail will eventually become blackmail with weapons of mass destruction -- with significantly new consequences for the world.

Some have said the U.S. could get bogged down in a long-term military occupation, and want to know what the plan is for a post-Saddam Iraq?

That is a fair question. It is likely that international forces would have to be in Iraq for a period of time, to help a new transitional Iraqi government get on its feet and create conditions where the Iraqi people would be able to choose a new government and achieve self-determination. But that burden is a small one, when balanced against the risks of not acting.

In Afghanistan, our approach was that Afghanistan belongs to the Afghans -- we did not and do not aspire to own it or run it. The same would be true of Iraq.

In Afghanistan, the U.S. and coalition countries helped create conditions so that the Afghan people could exercise their right of self-government. Throughout the Bonn process and the Loya Jirga process, a new president was chosen, a new cabinet sworn-in, and a transitional government, representative of the Afghan people, was established to lead the nation.

If the President were to make the decision to liberate Iraq, with coalition partners, it would help the Iraqi people establish a government that would be a single country, that did not threaten its neighbors, the United States, or the world with aggression and weapons of mass destruction, and that would respect the rights of its diverse population.

Iraq has an educated population that has been brutally and viciously repressed by Saddam Hussein's regime. He has kept power not by building loyalty, but by instilling fear -- in his people, his military and the government bureaucracy. I suspect that there would be substantial defections once it became clear that Saddam Hussein was finished. Moreover, there are numerous free Iraqi leaders -- both inside Iraq and abroad -- who would play a role in establishing that new free Iraqi government. So there is no shortage of talent available to lead and rehabilitate a free Iraq.

In terms of economic rehabilitation, Iraq has an advantage over Afghanistan. A free Iraq would be less dependent on international assistance, and could conceivably get back on its feet faster, because Iraq has a marketable commodity -- oil.

Some have raised concerns that other countries elsewhere in the world might take advantage of the fact that the U.S. is tied up in Iraq, and use that as an opportunity to invade neighbors or cause other mischief.

There is certainly a risk that some countries might underestimate our capability to handle Iraq and stop their aggression at the same time. But let there be no doubt: we have that capability.

Last year, we fashioned a new defense strategy, which established that we will and do have the capability to near simultaneously:

- Defend the U.S. homeland;
- Undertake a major regional conflict and win decisively -- including occupying a country and changing their regime;
- If necessary, swiftly defeat another aggressor in another theater; and
- Simultaneously conduct a number of lesser contingencies -- such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan.

The United States can do the above, if called upon to do so.

Another argument is that acting without provocation by Iraq would violate international law.

That is untrue. The right to self-defense is a part of the U.N. Charter. Customary international law has long provided for the right of anticipatory self-defense -- to stop an attack before it happens. In addition, he is in violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions. Those concerned about the integrity of international law should focus on their attention his brazen defiance of the U.N.

Some ask: What has changed to warrant action now?

What has changed is our experience on September 11th. What has changed is our appreciation of our vulnerability -- and the risks the U.S. faces from terrorist networks and terrorist states armed with weapons of mass destruction.

What has not changed is Saddam Hussein's drive to acquire these weapons. Every approach the U.N. has taken to stop Iraq's drive for WMD has failed. In 1998, after Iraq had again kicked out U.N. inspectors, President Clinton came to the Pentagon and said (quote):

"If [Saddam] fails to comply, and we fail to act, or we take some ambiguous third route which gives him yet more opportunities to develop his weapons of mass destruction ... and continue to ignore the solemn commitment he made ... he will conclude that the international community has lost its will. He will conclude that he can go right on and do more to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction ... The stakes could not be higher. Some day, some way, I guarantee you, he'll use that arsenal." (unquote)

At the time, the U.S. massed forces in the Persian Gulf, ready to strike. At the last minute, Iraq relented and allowed U.N. inspectors to return. But predictably, they kicked them out again 10 months later. They have not been allowed to return since. He has not only [not]

paid a price for that defiance, he has been rewarded for his defiance of the U.N. by increased trade from a large group of U.N. member nations.

If, in 1998, Saddam Hussein posed the grave threat that President Clinton correctly described, then he most certainly poses a vastly greater danger today, after four years without inspectors on the ground to challenge his WMD procurement and development efforts. To those who still ask -- that is what has changed!

Some have asked what are the incentives for Iraq to comply -- is there is anything the Iraqi regime could do to forestall military action? Or is he finished either way?

Our objective is gaining Iraq's compliance. Our objective is an Iraq that does not menace its neighbors, does not pursue WMD, does not oppress its people or threaten the United States. The President set forth in his speech what an Iraqi regime that wanted peace would do. Everything we know about the character and record of the current Iraqi regime indicates that it is highly unlikely to do the things the President has said it must do. So long as Saddam Hussein is leading that country, to expect otherwise is, as the President put it, to "hope against the evidence." If Saddam Hussein is in a corner, it is because he has put himself there. One choice he has is to take his family and key leaders and seek asylum elsewhere. Surely one of the 180- plus countries would take his regime -- possibly Belarus.

Some ask: Does the U.S. needs U.N. support?

The President has asked the U.N. Security Council to act because it is the U.N. Security Council that is being defied, disobeyed and made less relevant by the Iraqi regime's defiance. There have already been 16 U.N. resolutions, every one of which Saddam Hussein has ignored. There is no shortage of U.N. resolutions. What there is, is a shortage of consequences for Saddam's ongoing defiance of those 16 U.N. resolutions. The President has made the case that it is dangerous for the United Nations to be made irrelevant by the Iraqi regime.

As the President put it in his address last week, "All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?"

But the President has also been clear that all options are on the table. The only option President Bush has ruled out is to do nothing.

Mr. Chairman, as the President has made clear, this is a critical moment -- for our country and for the world. Our resolve is being put to the test. It is a test that, unfortunately, the world's free nations have failed before in recent history -- with terrible consequences.

Long before the Second World War, Hitler wrote in Mein Kampf indicating what he intended to do. But the hope was that maybe he would not do what he said. Between 35 and 60 million people died because of a series of fatal miscalculations. He might have been stopped early -- at a minimal cost of lives -- had the vast majority of the world's

leaders not decided at the time that the risks of acting were greater than the risks of not acting.

Today, we must decide whether the risks of acting are greater than the risks of not acting. Saddam Hussein has made his intentions clear. He has used weapons of mass destruction against his own people and his neighbors. He has demonstrated an intention to take the territory of his neighbors. He has launched ballistic missiles against U.S. allies and others in the region. He plays host to terrorist networks. He pays rewards to the families of suicide bombers in Israel -- like those who killed five Americans at the Hebrew University earlier this year. He is hostile to the United States, because we have denied him the ability he has sought to impose his will on his neighbors. He has said, in no uncertain terms, that he would use weapons of mass destruction against the United States. He has, at this moment, stockpiles chemical and biological weapons, and is pursuing nuclear weapons. If he demonstrates the capability to deliver them to our shores, the world would be changed. Our people would be at great risk. Our willingness to be engaged in the world, our willingness to project power to stop aggression, our ability to forge coalitions for multilateral action, could all be under question. And many lives could be lost.

We need to decide as a people how we feel about that. Do the risks of taking action to stop that threat outweigh these risks of living in the world we see? Or is the risk of doing nothing greater than the risk of acting? That is the question President Bush has posed to the Congress, to the American people and to the world community.

The question comes down to this: how will the history of this era be recorded? When we look back on previous periods of our history, we see there have been many books written about threats and attacks that were not anticipated:

-- "At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor"

-- "December 7, 1941: The Day the Admirals Slept Late"

-- "Pearl Harbor: Final Judgment"

-- "From Munich to Pearl Harbor"

-- "While England Slept"

-- "The Cost of Failure"

The list of such books is endless. And, unfortunately, in the past year, historians have added to that body of literature -- there are already books out on the September 11th attacks and why they were not prevented. As we meet today, Congressional committees are trying to determine why that tragic event was not prevented.

Each is an attempt by the authors to "connect the dots" -- to determine what happened, and why it was not possible to figure out that it was going to happen

Our job today -- the President's, the Congress' and the U.N.'s is to connect the dots before the fact -- to anticipate vastly more lethal attacks before they happens -- and to make the right decision as to whether we should take preventive action -- before it is too late.

We are on notice -- each of us. Each has a solemn responsibility to do everything in our power to ensure that, when the history of this period is written, the books won't ask why we slept -- to ensure that history will instead record that on September 11th the American people were awakened to the impending dangers -- and that those entrusted with the safety of the American people made the right decisions and saved our nation, and the world, from 21st century threats.

President Bush is determined to do just that.

(end text)

APPENDIX 14

Dr. Condoleezza Rice Discusses President's National Security Strategy

Waldorf Astoria Hotel
New York, New York

1 Oct 2002

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021001-6.html>

I am honored to deliver this year's Wriston Lecture. And happy to be in New York. It is important for government officials to venture beyond Washington, to get out, talk to -- and listen to -- Americans from every corner of our vast, great country. The President said it best when talking about the National Security Strategy that he sent to Congress ten days ago. He was very clear that he wanted the document written in plain English, not academic jargon. He said, "This is the ... Security Strategy of the [entire] United States. The boys in Lubbock ought to be able to read it." Manhattan is not Lubbock, but it is that same spirit that brings me here tonight to speak plainly about some of the great issues facing our country.

Wriston Lecturers are an eclectic group, but this is the first time you've ever had a National Security Advisor, and it may seem like an odd fit. The Manhattan Institute's expertise is not foreign policy, but domestic policy, with a special emphasis on America's great cities. Yet there is a crucial intersection between what you do and what I do.

Foreign policy is ultimately about security -- about defending our people, our society, and our values, such as freedom, tolerance, openness, and diversity. No place evokes these values better than our cities. Here in New York, about a third of the population was born abroad. Across the street from here is St. Bartholomew's, a Protestant church. Go three blocks to the east from here and there's the Sutton Place Synagogue. Go a couple of blocks to the west, and you'll come to St. Patrick's Cathedral. Over the bridge in Queens, you'll find a Hindu temple. Go uptown a few blocks from where we are and you will come to the Manhattan Won Buddhist Temple on East 57th. Keep going north and you will run into the Islamic Cultural Center on East 96th.

Go further up and into the Bronx and you will come to a neighborhood that used to be called "Banana Kelly" because it was a mix of immigrants from the Caribbean and Ireland. And there, a Jamaican-American family raised the boy who became the man who is now our Secretary of State.

These facts stand as living rebukes to the extremism of our enemies, and the mindset that prevails in too many parts of the world that difference is a reason to hate and a license to kill. America is proof that pluralism and tolerance are the foundations of true national greatness. And today -- 385 days after September 11, 2001 -- it is clear that our commitment to our ideals is stronger than ever.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the World Trade Center were the bookends of a long transition period. During that period those of us who think about foreign policy for a living searched for an overarching, explanatory theory or framework that would describe the new threats and the proper response to them. Some said that nations and their militaries were no longer relevant, only global markets knitted together by new technologies. Others foresaw a future dominated by ethnic conflict. And some even thought that in the future the primary energies of America's Armed Forces would be devoted to managing civil conflict and humanitarian assistance.

It will take years to understand the long-term effects of September 11th. But there are certain verities that the tragedy brought home to us in the most vivid way.

Perhaps most fundamentally, 9/11 crystallized our vulnerability. It also threw into sharp relief the nature of the threats we face today. Today's threats come less from massing armies than from small, shadowy bands of terrorists -- less from strong states than from weak or failed states. And after 9/11, there is no longer any doubt that today America faces an existential threat to our security -- a threat as great as any we faced during the Civil War, the so-called "Good War", or the Cold War.

President Bush's new National Security Strategy offers a bold vision for protecting our Nation that captures today's new realities and new opportunities.

It calls on America to use our position of unparalleled strength and influence to create a balance of power that favors freedom. As the President says in the cover letter: we seek to create the "conditions in which all nations and all societies can chose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty."

This strategy has three pillars:

- We will **defend the peace** by opposing and preventing violence by terrorists and outlaw regimes.
- We will **preserve the peace** by fostering an era of good relations among the world's great powers.
- And we will **extend the peace** by seeking to extend the benefits of freedom and prosperity across the globe.

Defending our Nation from its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government. And as the world's most powerful nation, the United States has a special responsibility to help make the world more secure.

In fighting global terror, we will work with coalition partners on every continent, using every tool in our arsenal -- from diplomacy and better defenses to law enforcement, intelligence, cutting off terrorist financing, and, if needed, military power.

We will break up terror networks, hold to account nations that harbor terrorists, and confront aggressive tyrants holding or seeking nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons that might be passed to terrorist allies. These are different faces of the same evil. Terrorists need a place to plot, train, and organize. Tyrants allied with terrorists can greatly extend the reach of their deadly mischief. Terrorists allied with tyrants can acquire technologies allowing them to murder on an ever more massive scale. Each threat magnifies the danger of the other. And the only path to safety is to effectively confront both terrorists and tyrants.

For these reasons, President Bush is committed to confronting the Iraqi regime, which has defied the just demands of the world for over a decade. We are on notice. The danger from Saddam Hussein's arsenal is far more clear than anything we could have foreseen prior to September 11th. And history will judge harshly any leader or nation that saw this dark cloud and sat by in complacency or indecision.

The Iraqi regime's violation of every condition set forth by the UN Security Council for the 1991 cease-fire fully justifies -- legally and morally -- the enforcement of those conditions.

It is also true that since 9/11, our Nation is properly focused as never before on preventing attacks against us before they happen.

The National Security Strategy does not overturn five decades of doctrine and jettison either containment or deterrence. These strategic concepts can and will continue to be employed where appropriate. But some threats are so potentially catastrophic -- and can arrive with so little warning, by means that are untraceable -- that they cannot be contained. Extremists who seem to view suicide as a sacrament are unlikely to ever be deterred. And new technology requires new thinking about when a threat actually becomes "imminent." So as a matter of common sense, the United States must be prepared to take action, when necessary, before threats have fully materialized.

Preemption is not a new concept. There has never been a moral or legal requirement that a country wait to be attacked before it can address existential threats. As George Shultz recently wrote, "If there is a rattlesnake in the yard, you don't wait for it to strike before you take action in self-defense." The United States has long affirmed the right to anticipatory self-defense -- from the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 to the crisis on the Korean Peninsula in 1994.

But this approach must be treated with great caution. The number of cases in which it might be justified will always be small. It does not give a green light -- to the United States or any other nation -- to act first without exhausting other means, including diplomacy. Preemptive action does not come at the beginning of a long chain of effort. The threat must be very grave. And the risks of waiting must far outweigh the risks of action.

To support all these means of defending the peace, the United States will build and maintain 21st century military forces that are beyond challenge.

We will seek to dissuade any potential adversary from pursuing a military build-up in the hope of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States and our allies.

Some have criticized this frankness as impolitic. But surely clarity is a virtue here. Dissuading military competition can prevent potential conflict and costly global arms races. And the United States invites -- indeed, we exhort -- our freedom loving allies, such as those in Europe, to increase their military capabilities.

The burden of maintaining a balance of power that favors freedom should be shouldered by all nations that favor freedom. What none of us should want is the emergence of a militarily powerful adversary who does not share our common values.

Thankfully, this possibility seems more remote today than at any point in our lifetimes. We have an historic opportunity to break the destructive pattern of great power rivalry that has bedeviled the world since rise of the nation state in the 17th century. Today, the world's great centers of power are united by common interests, common dangers, and -- increasingly -- common values. The United States will make this a key strategy for preserving the peace for many decades to come.

There is an old argument between the so-called "realistic" school of foreign affairs and the "idealistic" school. To oversimplify, realists downplay the importance of values and the internal structures of states, emphasizing instead the balance of power as the key to stability and peace. Idealists emphasize the primacy of values, such as freedom and democracy and human rights in ensuring that just political order is obtained. As a professor, I recognize that this debate has won tenure for and sustained the careers of many generations of scholars. As a policymaker, I can tell you that these categories obscure reality.

In real life, power and values are married completely. Power matters in the conduct of world affairs. Great powers matter a great deal -- they have the ability to influence the lives of millions and change history. And the values of great powers matter as well. If the Soviet Union had won the Cold War, the world would look very different today -- Germany today might look like the old German Democratic Republic, or Latin America like Cuba.

Today, there is an increasing awareness -- on every continent -- of a paradigm of progress, founded on political and economic liberty. The United States, our NATO allies, our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere, Japan, and our other friends and allies in Asia and Africa all share a broad commitment to democracy, the rule of law, a market-based economy, and open trade.

In addition, since September 11th all the world's great powers see themselves as falling on the same side of a profound divide between the forces of chaos and order, and they are acting accordingly.

America and Europe have long shared a commitment to liberty. We also now understand that being the target of trained killers is a powerful tonic that makes disputes over other important issues look like the policy differences they are, instead of fundamental clashes of values.

The United States is also cooperating with India across a range of issues -- even as we work closely with Pakistan.

Russia is an important partner in the war on terror and is reaching towards a future of greater democracy and economic freedom. As it does so, our relationship will continue to broaden and deepen. The passing of the ABM Treaty and the signing of the Moscow Treaty reducing strategic arms by two-thirds make clear that the days of Russian military confrontation with the West are over.

China and the United States are cooperating on issues ranging from the fight against terror to maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula. And China's transition continues. Admittedly, in some areas, its leaders still follow practices that are abhorrent. Yet China's leaders have said that their main goal is to raise living standards for the Chinese people. They will find that reaching that goal in today's world will depend more on developing China's human capital than it will on China's natural resources or territorial possessions.

And as China's populace become more educated, more free to think, and more entrepreneurial, we believe this will inevitably lead to greater political freedom. You cannot expect people to think on the job, but not at home.

This confluence of common interests and increasingly common values creates a moment of enormous opportunities. Instead of repeating the historic pattern where great power rivalry exacerbates local conflicts, we can use great power cooperation to solve conflicts, from the Middle East to Kashmir, Congo, and beyond. Great power cooperation also creates an opportunity for multilateral institutions -- such as the UN, NATO, and the WTO -- to prove their worth. That's the challenge set forth by the President three weeks ago to the UN concerning Iraq. And great power cooperation can be the basis for moving forward on problems that require multilateral solutions -- from terror to the environment.

To build a balance of power that favors freedom, we must also extend the peace by extending the benefits of liberty and prosperity as broadly as possible. As the President has said, we have a responsibility to build a world that is not only safer, but better.

The United States will fight poverty, disease, and oppression because it is the right thing to do -- and the smart thing to do. We have seen how poor states can become weak or even failed states, vulnerable to hijacking by terrorist networks -- with potentially

catastrophic consequences. And in societies where legal avenues for political dissent are stifled, the temptation to speak through violence grows.

We will lead efforts to build a global trading system that is growing and more free. Here in our own hemisphere, for example, we are committed to completing a Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005. We are also starting negotiations on a free trade agreement with the Southern African Customs Union. Expanding trade is essential to the development efforts of poor nations and to the economic health of all nations.

We will continue to lead the world in efforts to combat HIV/AIDS -- a pandemic which challenges our humanity and threatens whole societies.

We will seek to bring every nation into an expanding circle of development. Earlier this year the President proposed a 50 percent increase in U.S. development assistance. But he also made clear that new money means new terms. The new resources will only be available to countries that work to govern justly, invest in the health and education of their people, and encourage economic liberty.

We know from experience that corruption, bad policies, and bad practices can make aid money worse than useless. In such environments, aid props up bad policy, chasing out investment and perpetuating misery. Good policy, on the other hand, attracts private capital and expands trade. In a sound policy environment, development aid is a catalyst, not a crutch.

At the core of America's foreign policy is our resolve to stand on the side of men and women in every nation who stand for what the President has called the "non-negotiable demands of human dignity" -- free speech, equal justice, respect for women, religious tolerance, and limits on the power of the state.

These principles are universal -- and President Bush has made them part of the debate in regions where many thought that merely to raise them was imprudent or impossible.

From Cairo and Ramallah to Tehran and Tashkent, the President has made clear that values must be a vital part of our relationships with other countries. In our development aid, our diplomacy, our international broadcasting, and in our educational assistance, the United States will promote moderation, tolerance, and human rights. And we look forward to one day standing for these aspirations in a free and unified Iraq.

We reject the condescending view that freedom will not grow in the soil of the Middle East -- or that Muslims somehow do not share in the desire to be free. The celebrations we saw on the streets of Kabul last year proved otherwise. And in a recent UN report, a panel of 30 Arab intellectuals recognized that for their nations to fully join in the progress of our times will require greater political and economic freedom, the empowerment of women, and better, more modern education.

We do not seek to impose democracy on others, we seek only to help create conditions in which people can claim a freer future for themselves. We recognize as well that there is no "one size fits all" answer. Our vision of the future is not one where every person eats Big Macs and drinks Coke -- or where every nation has a bicameral legislature with 535 members and a judiciary that follows the principles of Marbury vs. Madison.

Germany, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey show that freedom manifests itself differently around the globe -- and that new liberties can find an honored place amidst ancient traditions. In countries such as Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Qatar, reform is underway, taking shape according to different local circumstances. And in Afghanistan this year, a traditional Loya Jirga assembly was the vehicle for creating the most broadly representative government in Afghan history.

Because of our own history, the United States knows we must be patient -- and humble. Change -- even if it is for the better -- is often difficult. And progress is sometimes slow. America has not always lived up to our own high standards. When the Founding Fathers said, "We, the people," they didn't mean me. Democracy is hard work. And 226 years later, we are still practicing each day to get it right.

We have the ability to forge a 21st century that lives up to our hopes and not down to our fears. But only if we go about our work with purpose and clarity. Only if we are unwavering in our refusal to live in a world governed by terror and chaos. Only if we are unwilling to ignore growing dangers from aggressive tyrants and deadly technologies. And only if we are persistent and patient in exercising our influence in the service of our ideals, and not just ourselves.

Thank you very much.

APPENDIX 15

**Remarks to the United Nations Security Council
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell**

New York, New York
February 14, 2003

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2003/iraq-030214-17763pf.htm>

SECRETARY POWELL: Thank you very much, Mr. President. Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, Distinguished Members of the Council, it's a great pleasure to be here with you again to consider this very important matter. And I'm very pleased to be here as the Secretary of State of a relatively new country on the face of the earth, but I think I can take some credit sitting here as being a representative of the oldest democracy that is assembled here around this table.

I'm proud of that. A democracy that believes in peace, a nation that has tried in the course of its history to show how people can live in peace with one another, but a democracy that has not been afraid to meet its responsibilities on the world stage when it has been challenged; more importantly, when others in the world have been challenged or when the international order has been challenged or when the international institutions of which we are a part have been challenged.

That's why we have joined and been active members of institutions such as the United Nations and a number of other institutions that have come together for the purpose of peace and for the purpose of mutual security and for the purpose of letting other nations which pursue a path of destruction, which pursue paths of developing weapons of mass destruction which threaten their neighbors, to let them know that we will stand tall, we will stand together, to meet these kinds of challenges.

I want to express my appreciation to Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei for their presentation this morning. They took up a difficult challenge when they went back into Iraq last fall in pursuit of disarmament, as required by Resolution 1441. And I listened very attentively to all they said this morning and I am pleased that there have been improvements with respect to process. I'm pleased that there have been improvements with respect to not having five minders with each inspector, down to something less than five minders with each inspector. But I think they still are being minded, they are still being watched, they are still being bugged. They still do not have the freedom of access around Iraq that they need to do their job well.

I am pleased that a few people have come forward for interviews, but not all the people who should be coming forward for interviews, and with the freedom to interview them in a manner that their safety can be protected and the safety of their families can be protected, as required by UN Resolution 1441.

I am glad that access has been relatively good. But that is all process; it is not substance. I am pleased to hear that decrees have now been issued that should have been issued years and years ago. But does anybody really think a decree from Saddam Hussein, directed to whom, is going to fundamentally change the situation? And it comes out on a morning when we are moving forward down the path laid out by Resolution 1441.

These are all process issues. These are all tricks that are being played on us. And to say that new commissions are being formed that will go find materials that they claim are not there in the first place, can anybody honestly believe that either one of these two new commissions will actively seek out information that they have been actively trying to deny to the world community, to the inspectors, for the last eleven plus years?

I commend the inspectors. I thank them for what they are doing. But at the same time, I have to keep coming back to the point that the inspectors have repeatedly made, and they've made it again here this morning. They've been making it for the last eleven plus years: What we need is not more inspections, what we need is not more immediate access; what we need is immediate, active, unconditional, full cooperation on the part of Iraq.

What we need is for Iraq to disarm. Resolution 1441 was not about inspections. Let me say that again. Resolution 1441 was not about inspections. Resolution 1441 was about the disarmament of Iraq. We worked on that resolution for seven weeks, from the time of President Bush's powerful speech here at the United Nations General Assembly on the 12th of September until the resolution was passed on the 8th of November.

We had intense discussions. All of you are familiar with it. You participated in these discussions and it was about disarmament. And the resolution began with the clear statement that Iraq was in material breach of its obligations for the past eleven years and remains to that day, the day the resolution was passed, in material breach.

And the resolution said Iraq must now come into compliance. It must disarm. The resolution went on to say that we want to see a declaration from Iraq within 30 days of all of its activities. Put it all on the table. Let's see what you have been doing. Give us a declaration that we can believe in that is full, complete and accurate. That's what we said to Iraq on the 8th of November. And some 29 days later we got 12,000 pages. Nobody in this Council can say that that was a full, complete or accurate declaration.

And now it is several months after that declaration was submitted, and I have heard nothing to suggest that they have filled in the gaps that were in that declaration or they have added new evidence that should give us any comfort that we have a full, complete and accurate declaration.

You will recall, we put that declaration requirement into the resolution as an early test of Iraq's seriousness. Are they serious? Are they going to disarm? Are they going to comply? Are they going to cooperate? And the answer with that declaration was, "No. We're going to see what we can get away with. We can see how much we can slip under your nose,"

and everybody will clap and say, "Isn't that wonderful? They provided a declaration that was of not any particular use."

We then had some level of acceptance of the fact inspectors would be going back in. Recall that Iraq tried to use this gambit right after the President's speech in September to try to keep Resolution 1441 from ever coming down the pipe.

Suddenly, on the following Monday after the President's speech, "Oh, we'll let inspectors back in." Why? Because when the President spoke and when Iraq saw that that the international community was now coming together with seriousness and with determination, it knew it better do something. It didn't do it out of the goodness of its heart or it suddenly discovered that it's been in violation for all those years. They did it because of pressure. They did it because this Council stood firm. They did it because the international community said, "Enough." We will not tolerate Iraq continuing to have weapons of mass destruction to be used against its own people, to be used against its neighbors."

Or worse, if we find a post-9/11 nexus between Iraq and terrorist organizations that are looking for just such weapons -- and I would submit and will provide more evidence that such connections are now emerging and we can establish that they exist -- we cannot wait for one of these terrible weapons to show up in one of our cities and wonder where it came from after it's been detonated by al-Qaida or somebody else. This is the time to go after this source of this kind of weaponry. And that's what 1441 was all about.

And to this day, we have not seen the level of cooperation that was expected, anticipated, hoped for -- I hoped for. No one worked harder than the United States, and I submit to you no one worked harder, if I might humbly say, I did to try to put forward a resolution that would show the determination of the international community to the leadership in Iraq so that they would now meet their obligations and come clean and comply. And they did not.

Notwithstanding all of the discussion we've heard so far this morning about giving inspections more time, let's have more airplanes flying over, let's have more inspectors added to the inspection process, Dr. Blix noted earlier this week that it's not more inspectors that are needed; what's needed is what both Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei have said what's been needed since 1991: immediate, active, unconditional compliance and cooperation.

I'm pleased that Iraq is now discussing this matter with South Africa, but it isn't brain surgery. South Africa knows how to do it. Anybody knows how to do it.

If we were getting the kind of cooperation that we expected when 1441 was passed and we hoped for when 1441 was passed, these documents would be flooding out of homes, flooding out of factories. There would be no question about access. There would be no question about interviews. If Iraq was serious in this matter, interviewees would be standing up outside of UNMOVIC and IAEA offices in Baghdad and elsewhere, waiting

to be interviewed, because they are determined to prove to the world, to give the world all the evidence needed that these weapons of mass destruction are gone.

But the questions, notwithstanding all of the lovely rhetoric, the questions remain, and some of my colleagues have talked about it. We haven't accounted for the anthrax. We haven't accounted for the botulinum, the VX, bulk biological agents, growth media, 30,000 chemical and biological munitions. These are not trivial matters one can just ignore and walk away from and say, well, maybe the inspectors will find them, maybe they won't. We have not had a complete, accurate declaration.

We have seen the reconstitution of casting chambers for missiles. Why? Because they are still trying to develop these weapons.

We have not seen the kind of cooperation that was anticipated, expected and demanded of this body. And we must continue to demand it. We must continue to put pressure on Iraq, put force upon Iraq, to make sure that the threat of force is not removed, because 1441 was all about compliance, not inspections. The inspections were put in as a way, of course, to assist Iraq in coming forward and complying, in order to verify, in order to monitor, as the Chief Inspector noted. But we've still got an incomplete answer from Iraq. We are facing a difficult situation.

More inspectors? Sorry, not the answer. What we need is immediate cooperation.

Time? How much time does it take to say, "I understand the will of the international community and I and my regime are laying it all out for you"? And not playing guess, not forming commissions, not issuing decrees, not getting laws that should have been passed years ago, suddenly passed on the day when we are meeting.

These are not responsible actions on the part of Iraq. These are continued efforts to deceive, to deny, to divert, to throw us off the trail, to throw us off the path.

The resolution anticipated this kind of response from Iraq, and that's why in all of our discussions about that resolution we said they're in material breach; if they come into new material breach with a false declaration or not a willingness to cooperate and comply, as OP 4 says, then the matter has to be referred to the Council for serious consequences.

I submit to you that notwithstanding the improvements in process that we have noted, and I welcome and I thank the inspectors for their hard work, these improvements in process do not move us away from the central problem that we continue to have; and more inspections and a longer inspection period will not move us away from the central issue, the central problem we are facing; and that central problem is that Iraq has failed to comply with 1441. The threat of force must remain.

Force should always be a last resort. I have preached this for most of my professional life, as a soldier and as a diplomat, but it must be a resort. We cannot allow this process to be endlessly strung out as Iraq is trying to do right now-- string it out long enough and the

world will start looking in other directions, the Security Council will move on, we'll get away with it again.

My friends, they cannot be allowed to get away with it again. We now are in a situation where Iraq's continued noncompliance and failure to cooperate, it seems to me, in the clearest terms, requires this Council to begin to think through the consequences of walking away from this problem with a reality that we have to face this problem; and that, in the very near future, we will have to consider whether or not we've reached that point where this Council, as distasteful as it may be, as reluctant as we may be, as many as -- there are so many of you who would rather not have to face this issue, but it's an issue that must be faced. And that is whether or not it is time to consider serious consequences of the kind intended by 1441.

The reason we must not look away from it is because these are terrible weapons. We are talking about weapons that will kill not a few people, not a hundred people, not a thousand people, but that could kill tens of thousands of people if these weapons got into the wrong hands.

And the security of the region, the hopes for the people of Iraq, themselves, and our security rest upon us meeting our responsibilities. And, if it comes to it, invoking the serious consequences called for 1441 -- in 1441. 1441 is about disarmament and compliance and not merely a process of inspections that goes on forever without ever resolving the basic problem.

Thank you.

APPENDIX 16

Richard Perle article "*Coalitions of the Willing Are Our Best Hope*"

http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.16666,filter.all/pub_detail.asp

Friday, March 21, 2003

Saddam Hussein's reign of terror is about to end. He will go quickly, but not alone: In a parting irony he will take the United Nations down with him.

Well, not the whole United Nations. The "good works" part will survive, the low-risk peacekeeping bureaucracies will remain, the looming chatterbox on the Hudson will continue to bleat. What will die in Iraq is the fantasy of the United Nations as the foundation of a new world order.

As we sift the debris of the war to liberate Iraq, it will be important to preserve, the better to understand, the intellectual wreckage of the liberal conceit of safety through international law administered by international institutions.

As free Iraqis document the quarter-century nightmare of Saddam's rule, as we hear from the survivors able to speak from their own soil for the first time, let us not forget who was for this war and who was not, who held that the moral authority of the international community was enshrined in a plea for more time for inspectors, and who marched against "regime change." In the spirit of postwar reconciliation that diplomats are always eager to engender, we must not reconcile the timid, blighted notion that world order requires us to recoil before rogue states that terrorize their own citizens and menace ours.

Many have argued against a coalition of the willing using force to liberate Iraq. Decent, thoughtful and high-minded, they must surely have been moved into opposition by an argument so convincing that it overpowered the obvious moral case for removing Saddam's regime.

No, instead the thumb on the scale of judgment about this war is the idea that only the UN Security Council can legitimize the use of force. It matters not if troops are used only to enforce the UN's own demands. A willing coalition of liberal democracies isn't good enough. If any institution or coalition other than the UN Security Council uses force, even as a last resort, "anarchy," rather than international law, would prevail, destroying any hope for world order.

This is a dangerously wrong idea, an idea that leads inexorably to handing great moral--and even existential politico-military decisions--to the likes of Syria, Cameroon, Angola, Russia, China and France.

When challenged with the argument that if a policy is right with the approbation of the Security Council, how can it be wrong just because communist China or Russia or France or a gaggle of minor dictatorships withhold their assent, they fall back on the primacy of "order" versus "anarchy."

But is this right? Is the United Nations Security Council the institution most capable of ensuring order and saving us from anarchy? History would suggest not. The United Nations arose from the ashes of a war that the League of Nations was unable to avert. The League was simply not up to confronting Italy in Abyssinia, much less--had it survived that debacle--to taking on Nazi Germany.

In the heady aftermath of the Allied victory in the Second World War, the hope that security could be made collective was reposed in the United Nations Security Council--with abject results. During the Cold War, the Security Council was hopelessly paralyzed. The Soviet empire was wrestled to the ground, and Eastern Europe liberated, not by the United Nations but by the mother of all coalitions, NATO. Apart from minor skirmishes and sporadic peacekeeping missions, the only case of the Security Council acting in a serious matter affecting world order during the Cold War was its use of force to halt the North's invasion of South Korea--and that was only possible because the Soviets had boycotted the Security Council and were not in the chamber to cast their veto. It was a mistake they did not make again. With war looming, the UN withdrew from the Middle East, leaving Israel to defend itself in 1967 and again in 1973.

Facing Milosevic's multiple aggressions, the UN could not stop the Balkan wars or even protect its victims. Remember Sarajevo? Remember Srebrenica? It took a coalition of the willing to save Bosnia from extinction. And when the war was over, peace was made in Dayton, Ohio, not in the United Nations. The rescue of Muslims in Kosovo was not a UN action: Their cause never gained Security Council approval. The United Kingdom, not the United Nations, saved the Falklands.

This new century now challenges the hopes for a new world order in new ways. We will not defeat or even contain fanatical terror unless we can carry the war to the territories from which it is launched. This will sometimes require that we use force against states that harbour terrorists, as we did in destroying the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

The most dangerous of these states are those that also possess weapons of mass destruction, the chemical, biological and nuclear weapons that can kill not hundreds or thousands but hundreds of thousands. Iraq is one such state, but there are others. Whatever hope there is that they can be persuaded to withdraw support or sanctuary from terrorists rests on the certainty and effectiveness with which they are confronted. The chronic failure of the Security Council to enforce its own resolutions--17 of them with respect to Iraq, the most recent, 1441, a resolution of last resort--is unmistakable: It is simply not up to the task.

We are left with coalitions of the willing. Far from disparaging them as a threat to a new world order, we should recognize that they are, by default, the best hope for that order, and the true alternative to the anarchy of the abject failure of the United Nations.

APPENDIX 17

President Bush Outlines Steps to Help Iraq Achieve Democracy and Freedom

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/20040524-10.html>

Remarks by the President on Iraq and the War on Terror
 United States Army War College
 Carlisle, Pennsylvania

8:00 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you all. Thank you and good evening. I'm honored to visit the Army War College. Generations of officers have come here to study the strategies and history of warfare. I've come here tonight to report to all Americans, and to the Iraqi people, on the strategy our nation is pursuing in Iraq, and the specific steps we're taking to achieve our goals.

The actions of our enemies over the last few weeks have been brutal, calculating, and instructive. We've seen a car bombing take the life of a 61-year-old Iraqi named Izzedin Saleem, who was serving as President of the Governing Council. This crime shows our enemy's intention to prevent Iraqi self-government, even if that means killing a lifelong Iraqi patriot and a faithful Muslim. Mr. Saleem was assassinated by terrorists seeking the return of tyranny and the death of democracy.

We've also seen images of a young American facing decapitation. This vile display shows a contempt for all the rules of warfare, and all the bounds of civilized behavior. It reveals a fanaticism that was not caused by any action of ours, and would not be appeased by any concession. We suspect that the man with the knife was an al Qaeda associate named Zarqawi. He and other terrorists know that Iraq is now the central front in the war on terror. And we must understand that, as well. The return of tyranny to Iraq would be an unprecedented terrorist victory, and a cause for killers to rejoice. It would also embolden the terrorists, leading to more bombings, more beheadings, and more murders of the innocent around the world.

The rise of a free and self-governing Iraq will deny terrorists a base of operation, discredit their narrow ideology, and give momentum to reformers across the region. This will be a decisive blow to terrorism at the heart of its power, and a victory for the security of America and the civilized world.

Our work in Iraq has been hard. Our coalition has faced changing conditions of war, and that has required perseverance, sacrifice, and an ability to adapt. The swift removal of Saddam Hussein's regime last spring had an unintended effect: Instead of being killed or captured on the battlefield, some of Saddam's elite guards shed their uniforms and melted into the civilian population. These elements of Saddam's repressive regime and secret police have reorganized, rearmed, and adopted sophisticated terrorist tactics. They've linked up with foreign fighters and terrorists. In a few cities, extremists have tried to sow

chaos and seize regional power for themselves. These groups and individuals have conflicting ambitions, but they share a goal: They hope to wear out the patience of Americans, our coalition, and Iraqis before the arrival of effective self-government, and before Iraqis have the capability to defend their freedom.

Iraq now faces a critical moment. As the Iraqi people move closer to governing themselves, the terrorists are likely to become more active and more brutal. There are difficult days ahead, and the way forward may sometimes appear chaotic. Yet our coalition is strong, our efforts are focused and unrelenting, and no power of the enemy will stop Iraq's progress. (Applause.)

Helping construct a stable democracy after decades of dictatorship is a massive undertaking. Yet we have a great advantage. Whenever people are given a choice in the matter, they prefer lives of freedom to lives of fear. Our enemies in Iraq are good at filling hospitals, but they do not build any. They can incite men to murder and suicide, but they cannot inspire men to live, and hope, and add to the progress of their country. The terrorists' only influence is violence, and their only agenda is death.

Our agenda, in contrast, is freedom and independence, security and prosperity for the Iraqi people. And by removing a source of terrorist violence and instability in the Middle East, we also make our own country more secure.

Our coalition has a clear goal, understood by all -- to see the Iraqi people in charge of Iraq for the first time in generations. America's task in Iraq is not only to defeat an enemy, it is to give strength to a friend - a free, representative government that serves its people and fights on their behalf. And the sooner this goal is achieved, the sooner our job will be done.

There are five steps in our plan to help Iraq achieve democracy and freedom. We will hand over authority to a sovereign Iraqi government, help establish security, continue rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure, encourage more international support, and move toward a national election that will bring forward new leaders empowered by the Iraqi people.

The first of these steps will occur next month, when our coalition will transfer full sovereignty to a government of Iraqi citizens who will prepare the way for national elections. On June 30th, the Coalition Provisional Authority will cease to exist, and will not be replaced. The occupation will end, and Iraqis will govern their own affairs. America's ambassador to Iraq, John Negroponte, will present his credentials to the new president of Iraq. Our embassy in Baghdad will have the same purpose as any other American embassy, to assure good relations with a sovereign nation. America and other countries will continue to provide technical experts to help Iraq's ministries of government, but these ministries will report to Iraq's new prime minister.

The United Nations Special Envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, is now consulting with a broad spectrum of Iraqis to determine the composition of this interim government. The special envoy intends to put forward the names of interim government officials this week. In addition to a president, two vice presidents, and a prime minister, 26 Iraqi ministers will oversee government departments, from health to justice to defense. This new government

will be advised by a national council, which will be chosen in July by Iraqis representing their country's diversity. This interim government will exercise full sovereignty until national elections are held. America fully supports Mr. Brahimi's efforts, and I have instructed the Coalition Provisional Authority to assist him in every way possible.

In preparation for sovereignty, many functions of government have already been transferred. Twelve government ministries are currently under the direct control of Iraqis. The Ministry of Education, for example, is out of the propaganda business, and is now concerned with educating Iraqi children. Under the direction of Dr. Ala'din al-Alwan, the Ministry has trained more than 30,000 teachers and supervisors for the schools of a new Iraq.

All along, some have questioned whether the Iraqi people are ready for self-government, or even want it. And all along, the Iraqi people have given their answer. In settings where Iraqis have met to discuss their country's future, they have endorsed representative government. And they are practicing representative government. Many of Iraq's cities and towns now have elected town councils or city governments - and beyond the violence, a civil society is emerging.

The June 30th transfer of sovereignty is an essential commitment of our strategy. Iraqis are proud people who resent foreign control of their affairs, just as we would. After decades under the tyrant, they are also reluctant to trust authority. By keeping our promise on June 30th, the coalition will demonstrate that we have no interest in occupation. And full sovereignty will give Iraqis a direct interest in the success of their own government. Iraqis will know that when they build a school or repair a bridge, they're not working for the Coalition Provisional Authority, they are working for themselves. And when they patrol the streets of Baghdad, or engage radical militias, they will be fighting for their own country.

The second step in the plan for Iraqi democracy is to help establish the stability and security that democracy requires. Coalition forces and the Iraqi people have the same enemies -- the terrorists, illegal militia, and Saddam loyalists who stand between the Iraqi people and their future as a free nation. Working as allies, we will defend Iraq and defeat these enemies.

America will provide forces and support necessary for achieving these goals. Our commanders had estimated that a troop level below 115,000 would be sufficient at this point in the conflict. Given the recent increase in violence, we'll maintain our troop level at the current 138,000 as long as necessary. This has required extended duty for the 1st Armored Division and the 2nd Light Cavalry Regiment -- 20,000 men and women who were scheduled to leave Iraq in April. Our nation appreciates their hard work and sacrifice, and they can know that they will be heading home soon. General Abizaid and other commanders in Iraq are constantly assessing the level of troops they need to fulfill the mission. If they need more troops, I will send them. The mission of our forces in Iraq is demanding and dangerous. Our troops are showing exceptional skill and courage. I thank them for their sacrifices and their duty. (Applause.)

In the city of Fallujah, there's been considerable violence by Saddam loyalists and foreign fighters, including the murder of four American contractors. American soldiers and Marines could have used overwhelming force. Our commanders, however, consulted with Iraq's Governing Council and local officials, and determined that massive strikes against the enemy would alienate the local population, and increase support for the insurgency. So we have pursued a different approach. We're making security a shared responsibility in Fallujah. Coalition commanders have worked with local leaders to create an all-Iraqi security force, which is now patrolling the city. Our soldiers and Marines will continue to disrupt enemy attacks on our supply routes, conduct joint patrols with Iraqis to destroy bomb factories and safe houses, and kill or capture any enemy.

We want Iraqi forces to gain experience and confidence in dealing with their country's enemies. We want the Iraqi people to know that we trust their growing capabilities, even as we help build them. At the same time, Fallujah must cease to be a sanctuary for the enemy, and those responsible for terrorism will be held to account.

In the cities of Najaf and Karbala and Kufa, most of the violence has been incited by a young, radical cleric who commands an illegal militia. These enemies have been hiding behind an innocent civilian population, storing arms and ammunition in mosques, and launching attacks from holy shrines. Our soldiers have treated religious sites with respect, while systematically dismantling the illegal militia. We're also seeing Iraqis, themselves, take more responsibility for restoring order. In recent weeks, Iraqi forces have ejected elements of this militia from the governor's office in Najaf. Yesterday, an elite Iraqi unit cleared out a weapons cache from a large mosque in Kufa. Respected Shia leaders have called on the militia to withdraw from these towns. Ordinary Iraqis have marched in protest against the militants.

As challenges arise in Fallujah, Najaf, and elsewhere, the tactics of our military will be flexible. Commanders on the ground will pay close attention to local conditions. And we will do all that is necessary -- by measured force or overwhelming force -- to achieve a stable Iraq.

Iraq's military, police, and border forces have begun to take on broader responsibilities. Eventually, they must be the primary defenders of Iraqi security, as American and coalition forces are withdrawn. And we're helping them to prepare for this role. In some cases, the early performance of Iraqi forces fell short. Some refused orders to engage the enemy. We've learned from these failures, and we've taken steps to correct them. Successful fighting units need a sense of cohesion, so we've lengthened and intensified their training. Successful units need to know they are fighting for the future of their own country, not for any occupying power, so we are ensuring that Iraqi forces serve under an Iraqi chain of command. Successful fighting units need the best possible leadership, so we improved the vetting and training of Iraqi officers and senior enlisted men.

At my direction, and with the support of Iraqi authorities, we are accelerating our program to help train Iraqis to defend their country. A new team of senior military officers is now assessing every unit in Iraq's security forces. I've asked this team to oversee the training of a force of 260,000 Iraqi soldiers, police, and other security personnel. Five Iraqi army battalions are in the field now, with another eight battalions to join them by July the 1st.

The eventual goal is an Iraqi army of 35,000 soldiers in 27 battalions, fully prepared to defend their country.

After June 30th, American and other forces will still have important duties. American military forces in Iraq will operate under American command as a part of a multinational force authorized by the United Nations. Iraq's new sovereign government will still face enormous security challenges, and our forces will be there to help.

The third step in the plan for Iraqi democracy is to continue rebuilding that nation's infrastructure, so that a free Iraq can quickly gain economic independence and a better quality of life. Our coalition has already helped Iraqis to rebuild schools and refurbish hospitals and health clinics, repair bridges, upgrade the electrical grid, and modernize the communications system. And now a growing private economy is taking shape. A new currency has been introduced. Iraq's Governing Council approved a new law that opens the country to foreign investment for the first time in decades. Iraq has liberalized its trade policy, and today an Iraqi observer attends meetings of the World Trade Organization. Iraqi oil production has reached more than two million barrels per day, bringing revenues of nearly \$6 billion so far this year, which is being used to help the people of Iraq. And thanks in part to our efforts -- to the efforts of former Secretary of State James Baker, many of Iraq's largest creditors have pledged to forgive or substantially reduce Iraqi debt incurred by the former regime.

We're making progress. Yet there still is much work to do. Over the decades of Saddam's rule, Iraq's infrastructure was allowed to crumble, while money was diverted to palaces, and to wars, and to weapons programs. We're urging other nations to contribute to Iraqi reconstruction -- and 37 countries and the IMF and the World Bank have so far pledged \$13.5 billion in aid. America has dedicated more than \$20 billion to reconstruction and development projects in Iraq. To ensure our money is spent wisely and effectively, our new embassy in Iraq will have regional offices in several key cities. These offices will work closely with Iraqis at all levels of government to help make sure projects are completed on time and on budget.

A new Iraq will also need a humane, well-supervised prison system. Under the dictator, prisons like Abu Ghraib were symbols of death and torture. That same prison became a symbol of disgraceful conduct by a few American troops who dishonored our country and disregarded our values. America will fund the construction of a modern, maximum security prison. When that prison is completed, detainees at Abu Ghraib will be relocated. Then, with the approval of the Iraqi government, we will demolish the Abu Ghraib prison, as a fitting symbol of Iraq's new beginning. (Applause.)

The fourth step in our plan is to enlist additional international support for Iraq's transition. At every stage, the United States has gone to the United Nations -- to confront Saddam Hussein, to promise serious consequences for his actions, and to begin Iraqi reconstruction. Today, the United States and Great Britain presented a new resolution in the Security Council to help move Iraq toward self-government. I've directed Secretary Powell to work with fellow members of the Council to endorse the timetable the Iraqis have adopted, to express international support for Iraq's interim government, to reaffirm

the world's security commitment to the Iraqi people, and to encourage other U.N. members to join in the effort. Despite past disagreements, most nations have indicated strong support for the success of a free Iraq. And I'm confident they will share in the responsibility of assuring that success.

Next month, at the NATO summit in Istanbul, I will thank our 15 NATO allies who together have more than 17,000 troops on the ground in Iraq. Great Britain and Poland are each leading a multinational division that is securing important parts of the country. And NATO, itself, is giving helpful intelligence, communications, and logistical support to the Polish-led division. At the summit, we will discuss NATO's role in helping Iraq build and secure its democracy.

The fifth and most important step is free, national elections, to be held no later than next January. A United Nations team, headed by Carina Perelli, is now in Iraq, helping form an independent election commission that will oversee an orderly, accurate national election. In that election, the Iraqi people will choose a transitional national assembly, the first freely-elected, truly representative national governing body in Iraq's history. This assembly will serve as Iraq's legislature, and it will choose a transitional government with executive powers. The transitional national assembly will also draft a new constitution, which will be presented to the Iraqi people in a referendum scheduled for the fall of 2005. Under this new constitution, Iraq will elect a permanent government by the end of next year.

In this time of war and liberation and rebuilding, American soldiers and civilians on the ground have come to know and respect the citizens of Iraq. They're a proud people who hold strong and diverse opinions. Yet Iraqis are united in a broad and deep conviction: They're determined never again to live at the mercy of a dictator. And they believe that a national election will put that dark time behind them. A representative government that protects basic rights, elected by Iraqis, is the best defense against the return of tyranny -- and that election is coming. (Applause.)

Completing the five steps to Iraqi elected self-government will not be easy. There's likely to be more violence before the transfer of sovereignty, and after the transfer of sovereignty. The terrorists and Saddam loyalists would rather see many Iraqis die than have any live in freedom. But terrorists will not determine the future of Iraq. (Applause.)

That nation is moving every week toward free elections and a permanent place among free nations. Like every nation that has made the journey to democracy, Iraqis will raise up a government that reflects their own culture and values. I sent American troops to Iraq to defend our security, not to stay as an occupying power. I sent American troops to Iraq to make its people free, not to make them American. Iraqis will write their own history, and find their own way. As they do, Iraqis can be certain, a free Iraq will always have a friend in the United States of America. (Applause.)

In the last 32 months, history has placed great demands on our country, and events have come quickly. Americans have seen the flames of September the 11th, followed battles in the mountains of Afghanistan, and learned new terms like "orange alert" and "ricin" and "dirty bomb." We've seen killers at work on trains in Madrid, in a bank in Istanbul,

at a synagogue in Tunis, and at a nightclub in Bali. And now the families of our soldiers and civilian workers pray for their sons and daughters in Mosul and Karbala and Baghdad.

We did not seek this war on terror, but this is the world as we find it. We must keep our focus. We must do our duty. History is moving, and it will tend toward hope, or tend toward tragedy. Our terrorist enemies have a vision that guides and explains all their varied acts of murder. They seek to impose Taliban-like rule, country by country, across the greater Middle East. They seek the total control of every person, and mind, and soul, a harsh society in which women are voiceless and brutalized. They seek bases of operation to train more killers and export more violence. They commit dramatic acts of murder to shock, frighten and demoralize civilized nations, hoping we will retreat from the world and give them free rein. They seek weapons of mass destruction, to impose their will through blackmail and catastrophic attacks. None of this is the expression of a religion. It is a totalitarian political ideology, pursued with consuming zeal, and without conscience.

Our actions, too, are guided by a vision. We believe that freedom can advance and change lives in the greater Middle East, as it has advanced and changed lives in Asia, and Latin America, and Eastern Europe, and Africa. We believe it is a tragedy of history that in the Middle East -- which gave the world great gifts of law and science and faith -- so many have been held back by lawless tyranny and fanaticism. We believe that when all Middle Eastern peoples are finally allowed to live and think and work and worship as free men and women, they will reclaim the greatness of their own heritage. And when that day comes, the bitterness and burning hatreds that feed terrorism will fade and die away. America and all the world will be safer when hope has returned to the Middle East.

These two visions -- one of tyranny and murder, the other of liberty and life -- clashed in Afghanistan. And thanks to brave U.S. and coalition forces and to Afghan patriots, the nightmare of the Taliban is over, and that nation is coming to life again. These two visions have now met in Iraq, and are contending for the future of that country. The failure of freedom would only mark the beginning of peril and violence. But, my fellow Americans, we will not fail. We will persevere, and defeat this enemy, and hold this hard-won ground for the realm of liberty.

May God bless our country. (Applause.)

تأطير الصراع والسياسة الخارجية: حالة العراق 2000-2004

إعداد
بن روبرت جونسون

المشرف
الدكتور زيد عيادات

ملخص

Arabic Summary

أضيفت هذه الرسالة إلى أدب نظرية النقد (critical theory) و"تأطير الصراع" وقد ارتبط "تأطير الصراع" بتشكيل السياسة الخارجية خصوصاً حالة العراق من عام 2001-2004. بالتركيز على سياسة الحوار من قبل إدارة بوش والجامعة العربية، بينت هذه الرسالة إطار صراع المجموعتين في القضية العراقية. فقد ألفت هذه الدراسة الضوء على وجهة نظرهم وجمعت النصوص المختلفة التي تم نشرها من قبل المجموعتين و استخدمت الدراسة منهج "تحليل النص" باستخدام الأداتين جدول الأفكار وجدول تقدير وجهات النظر. استطاعت هذه الجداول أن تقيم وتلخص الأفكار الرئيسية حول إطار الصراعات من خلال شرحها في النصوص.

أوضحت نتائج "تحليل النص" أن إطار صراع الجامعة العربية كان ضد الحرب في العراق بشكل كامل والأفكار الرئيسية فيها تتحدث عن المعاناة في العراق بسبب الحروب السابقة، والاحترام لسيادة كل دولة في الشرق الأوسط، والحاجة لتجديد عملية السلام في فلسطين. وقد أوضحت النتائج من إدارة بوش أن إطار الصراع لديهم كان تأييد غزو العراق فكانوا يعتبرون أن صدام حسين يملك أسلحة دمار شامل ويتعاون مع الإرهاب ولذلك اعتبروه وحكومته من أخطر أعداء المصالح الأمريكية. وبعد ما ناقشت الرسالة النواحي المختلفة عن إطار صراع المجموعتين، قدمت الرسالة صورة جديدة لشرح العلاقة بين إطار الصراعات والسياسة الخارجية وهذه الصورة هي النواة حيث أن إطارات الصراع تحاصر تشكيل السياسة الخارجية كأنها تحيط بها وتؤثر عليها.